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I. ARREST, SEARCH, AND SEIZURE
A. Scope of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment's scope is principally defined by the per-
sonal nature of fourth amendment rights.' By manipulating the stand-
ing requirements of the fourth amendment, the Supreme Court is
attempting to narrow the amendment's scope. In two decisions during
the 1980 term, the Court further limited who may invoke the exclusion-
ary rule, and curtailed the suppression of evidence under the federal
courts' supervisory powers.
1. Standing to invoke the exclusionary rule
In United States v. Salvucci,3 the Court overturned the "automatic
standing" rule of Jones v. United States,4 holding that defendants
charged with possessory crimes must establish that their own fourth
amendment rights have been violated in order to invoke the exclusion-
ary rule.' The Court reasoned that since a defendant's testimony at a
pretrial "standing" hearing is now barred from the prosecution's case-
in-chief, the automatic standing rule is no longer necessary. However,
as Justice Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion, the extreme likeli-
hood that such testimony would be admissible for impeachment under-
mines this rationale.' The Court also noted that it "has not decided
whether Simmons v. United States precludes the use of a defendant's
testimony at a suppression hearing to impeach his testimony at trial."7
1. The fourth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that: "[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
2. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230 (1973); Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165, 171-74 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968).
3. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
4. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
5. 448 U.S. at 85.
6. Id. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 94.
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However, the Court's recent fifth amendment decisions strongly suggest
that it is eager to permit this use of prior testimony.8
The Court attempted to dismiss criticism of its holding by observ-
ing that Simmons "not only extend[ed] protection against th[e] risk of
self-incrimination in all of the cases covered by Jones, but also
grant[ed] a form of 'use immunity' to those defendants charged with
nonpossessory crimes. In this respect, the protection of Simmons is
therefore broader than that of Jones."9 However, under Jones, a de-
fendant did not need to present any information regarding his posses-
sion of the illegally seized evidence; since possession was an essential
element of the offense, automatic standing was conferred.' 0 Under
Simmons, cases involving nonpossessory crimes may require a defend-
ant to admit ownership or possession, but such testimony is barred
from trial only on the issue of guilt." As Justice Brennan stated in his
dissent in Harris v. New York,' 2 "'[a]n incriminating statement is as
incriminating when used to impeach credibility as it is when used as
direct proof of guilt and no constitutional distinction can legitimately
be drawn.' ""'
A third case further demonstrates the trend in the Courts recent
decisions to narrow the fourth amendment's scope by restricting stand-
ing. In Rawlings v. Kentucky,'4 the Court decided that the petitioner
lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in a companion's purse, de-
spite his declared ownership of the illegal drugs inside.'" Six police
officers arrived at a residence where the petitioner and his companion
were visiting.' 6 The officers sought to arrest another party pursuant to
an arrest warrant, but were unable to locate him.'7 While searching for
him, the officers smelled marijuana smoke, and observed several seeds
in plain view. The occupants were then detained while two of the of-
8. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (prearrest silence admissible to
impeach defendant's credibility); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (inculpatory state-
ments obtained after defendant asserted his Miranda rights admissible to impeach his credi-
bility); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (inculpatory statements made after arrest
but prior to Miranda warnings admissible to impeach defendant's credibility).
9. 448 U.S. at 90.
10. 362 U.S. at 264-65.
11. 390 U.S. at 394.
12. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
13. Id at 231 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 324, 221
N.E.2d 541, 543 (1966) (Keating, J., dissenting)).
14. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
15. Id. at 104-05.
16. Id. at 100.
17. Id.
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ficers obtained a search warrant."8 After returning with the warrant,
the officers ordered the petitioner's companion to empty her purse onto
the coffee table. While doing so, she asked the petitioner to "take what
was his." He immediately claimed ownership of the several vials of
drugs. Although it was unclear how the drugs arrived in the purse,
apparently the petitioner had put them there that morning.
The Court held that although the petitioner had claimed owner-
ship of the drugs, five factors prevented him from having a legitimate
expectation of privacy in his companion's purse: 19 (1) he had known
his companion for only a few days; (2) he "had never sought or re-
ceived access to her purse prior to that sudden bailment"; (3) he had no
right to exclude other persons from access to the purse; (4) "the precipi-
tous nature of the transaction hardly support[ed] a reasonable inference
that petitioner took normal precautions to maintain his privacy"; and
(5) he "had no subjective expectation that . . .[the] purse would re-
main free from governmental intrusion. 2 °
2. Suppression of evidence under supervisory powers
During the 1980 term, the Court further narrowed the scope of the
fourth amendment by subjecting the federal courts' supervisory powers
to the fourth amendment's standing limitations. In United States v.
Payner,2' the Court decided that federal courts do not have authority
under their supervisory powers to exclude evidence obtained in deliber-
ate violation of a third party's fourth amendment rights.22 The IRS
was investigating the financial activities of American citizens in the Ba-
hamas. In their zeal to gain information, IRS agents deliberately par-
ticipated in the unlawful seizure of a briefcase belonging to a Mr.
Wolstencroft, vice-president of a Bahamian bank, and arranged the
theft of a rolodex from the bank's office.23 Contrary to Payner's claims,
the records obtained from the search of the briefcase showed that he
maintained a foreign bank account.
At a consolidated suppression hearing and court trial, Payner was
convicted of falsifying his federal income tax return. Afterwards, the
court determined that most of the Government's evidence had been
obtained through a "flagrantly illegal" search.24 An extensive review of
18. Id.
19. Id. at 105.
20. Id.
21. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
22. Id. at 735.
23. Id. at 740-41.
24. Id. at 729.
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Supreme Court decisions indicated to the court that it was obligated,
under its supervisory powers, to exclude evidence obtained by govern-
ment conduct that was "purposefully illegal or motivated by an inten-
tional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right."2 Finding that both
criteria were met by the "outrageous"2 6 circumstances of the search,
and that the need for deterrence was especially compelling,27 the court
suppressed the evidence derived from the search of the briefcase.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial and appellate courts, hold-
ing that federal courts do not have authority under their supervisory
powers to exclude evidence "seized unlawfully from a third party not
before the court."'28 The Court reasoned that the same considerations
underlying the application of the exclusionary rule were present in de-
termining whether to suppress evidence under the judicial supervisory
powers.29 Only when other social interests outweighed the need to in-
troduce relevant evidence at trial would the Court consider it appropri-
ate to suppress tainted evidence under the judicial supervisory
powers.30 Absent a violation of the defendant's fourth amendment
rights, the interest in deterring egregiously illegal searches was consid-
ered to be insufficient to outweigh the need for relevant evidence.3'
In a dissent joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, Justice
Marshall criticized the Court for "engraft[ing]. . . standing limitations
of the Fourth Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory powers."32
Marshall explained that the policies underlying the supervisory powers
25. United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 134-35 (N.D. Ohio 1977), rev'd, 447 U.S.
727 (1980).
26. Id. at 130. As part of the effort to search Wolstencroft's briefcase, the IRS arranged
a "date" for him when he visited Miami. While the two were at a restaurant, IRS agents
entered the date's apartment and stole the briefcase. In a parking lot five blocks away, a
"trusted" locksmith made a key to the briefcase. Eight blocks from there, in an IRS agent's
home, the contents were photographed by the IRS supervising agent and by a photography
expert using a high-speed microfilmer. After the lookout in the restaurant notified the
agents that the couple had finished dinner, the briefcase was locked and returned to the
date's apartment.
Needing further information, the IRS sent the date to visit Wolstencroft in the Baha-
mas. There she stole his rolodex. For her role in the "briefcase caper," and for stealing the
rolodex, she received $1,000.
The district court concluded that the IRS's actions constituted a prima facie violation of
three Florida criminal statutes: larceny, acting as a first degree principal in a crime, and
unauthorized appropriation of trade secrets. Id. at 130 n.66.
27. Id. at 134 n.75.
28. 447 U.S. at 735.
29. Id. at 734-37.
30. Id. at 734-35.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 748 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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and the exclusionary rule are different. Exercise of the supervisory
powers is intended to protect the court's integrity, rather than to vindi-
cate the defendant's constitutional rights. By subjecting the supervisory
powers to the fourth amendment's standing requirement, federal courts
would be prevented from withholding their imprimatur upon egre-
giously illegal searches, unless the defendant could establish a violation
of his fourth amendment rights. Marshall criticized this rule as frus-
trating the distinct policy underlying the supervisory powers.
33
Marshall also observed that such a rule renders the supervisory
powers superfluous.34 If the defendant must establish a violation of his
fourth amendment rights before a court may suppress evidence under
its supervisory powers, then an independent constitutional basis for
suppression would already exist.
Marshall's second point of criticism addressed various characteri-
zations of the district court's exercise of its supervisory powers. The
majority first characterized this as a case in which the district court was
not supervising the administration of justice "'among the parties
before the bar,' -3 presumably referring to the absence of the third
party whose rights the search violated. Marshall refuted this character-
ization by explaining that the Government was before the bar, making
this an appropriate instance for using the supervisory powers.36 Mar-
shall further noted that the central role of the illegal search distin-
guished this exercise of supervisory power from Chief Justice Burger's
characterization of it as an exercise of" 'general supervisory authority
over operations of the Executive Branch.' ",31
To prove that this was not a case of "indiscriminate" or "unbend-
ing" application of the exclusionary rule, Marshall quoted the district
court's qualification that suppression under its supervisory powers was
"'done only as a last resort.' ",38 He also explained that the district
court considered suppression proper under its supervisory powers only
when the Government's conduct was "'purposefully illegal,'" or was
"'motivated by an intentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional
right.' ",39 Only after finding that both requirements were met, and that
there was no other deterrent to the Government's policy of violating
33. Id. at 748-49.
34. Id. at 748.
35. Id. at 749 (quoting 447 U.S. at 735 n.7).
36. 447 U.S. at 749.
37. Id. at 750 (quoting 447 U.S. at 737 (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
38. 447 U.S. at 750 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 134 n.74 (1977)).
39. 447 U.S. at 750 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 134-35).
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constitutional rights, did the district court suppress the evidence.4°
From this analysis, Marshall concluded that suppression under the su-
pervisory power was patently appropriate.4'
The most disturbing aspect of the Supreme Court's decision is that
it subordinates the interests protected by the fourth amendment to the
gathering of criminal evidence. The Court quite clearly stated that, by
itself, the interest in deterring illegal searches is outweighed by the need
for relevant evidence.42 While it acknowledged that the corrective
measures adopted by the IRS were disappointingly weak, 43 the Court
nevertheless found that "[t]o require in addition [to these corrective
measures] the suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial
against a third party would penalize society unnecessarily." 44 Consid-
ering the egregiously illegal circumstances of the search, society was
probably penalized more by the Government's deliberate violation of
constitutionally protected rights than by the suppression of evidence.
Despite the Court's disclaimer that "[n]o court should condone the
unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior" 45 of the IRS, the un-
mistakable effect of this decision is to encourage the Government's pol-
icy of instructing its agents "'to purposefully conduct an
unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual. . . to obtain ev-
idence against third parties.' "46
B. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
The "poisonous fruit" doctrine extends the application of the ex-
clusionary rule to evidence obtained as a result of a fourth amendment
violation. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to deter future un-
lawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures."'47
When this purpose is not served, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that the application of the exclusionary rule is inappropriate.48 Three
exceptions to the exclusionary rule recognize instances when the pur-
pose underlying the rule will not be served by its application: (1) in-
40. 447 U.S. at 750.
41. Id. at 751.
42. Id. at 734-35.
43. Id. at 733 n.5.
44. Id. at 734 n.5.
45. Id. at 733.
46. Id. at 730 (quoting United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. at 132-33).
47. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974).
48. Id. at 348.
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dependent source, 49 (2) inevitable discovery,5 ° and (3) attenuation.5 1
In United States v. Crews,52 the Supreme Court decided that a rob-
bery victim's in-court identification of the defendant did not constitute
a "fruit" of the defendant's illegal arrest. The police had observed a
black youth loitering in the area of the robbery who matched the de-
scriptions given by three separate robbery victims. After a bystander
tentatively identified the youth as having been present on the day of
one of the robberies, the police detained him for an hour at the Wash-
ington, D.C. Park Police headquarters on the pretext of being a sus-
pected truant. 3 The police's true purpose for keeping the defendant
was to photograph him for identification by the victims. The following
day, the police showed one of the victims an array of eight photo-
graphs, among which was one of the defendant. Although the victim
had made no identification from more than one hundred photographs
54
in previous displays, this time she immediately identified the defend-
ant's photograph. Another victim made a similar identification three
days later. Eleven days later both victims identified the defendant at a
court-ordered lineup.5
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court suppressed the
photographic and lineup identifications as "fruits" of the illegal deten-
tion. However, the court allowed the introduction of the victims' in-
court identification of the defendant on the ground that it was based on
independent recollection untainted by the intervening identifications.56
The defendant was thereafter convicted of the armed robbery of the
first victim.
57
On appeal, the Supreme Court decided that the victim's in-court
identification did not constitute a "fruit" of the defendant's illegal ar-
rest. The Court's analysis addressed whether the three necessary ele-
49. No deterrence is achieved by suppressing evidence "gained from an independent
source." Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (by
implication).
50. No deterrence is achieved by suppressing "evidence. . . that. . . would have been
discovered" regardless of a fourth amendment violation. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
406 n.12 (1977) (by implication).
51. No deterrence is achieved by suppressing evidence that "has 'become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint'" of a fourth amendment violation. Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (by implication) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939)).
52. 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
53. Id. at 467.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ia. at 468.
57. Id.
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ments comprising an in-court identification resulted from a fourth
amendment violation: (1) whether the robbery victim's presence in
court was the product of police misconduct, (2) whether the victim's
ability to give accurate identification testimony was affected by that
misconduct, and (3) whether the defendant's presence in court consti-
tuted an illegal "fruit" of the arrest."8
The Court decided that the victim's presence in court was not a
product of police misconduct, as this was "not a case in which the wit-
ness' identity was discovered or her cooperation secured only as a result
of an unlawful search or arrest."59 The victim had notified the police
immediately after the attack and had voluntarily continued to assist
them. The Court acknowledged that under some circumstances the in-
tervening photographic and lineup identifications could affect the relia-
bility of an in-court identification. However, the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's specific determination that the reliability of the
in-court identification had remained unaffected by the previous inter-
vening identifications.6 0 The Court also stated that the defendant's
own presence at trial as a result of the illegal arrest did not immunize
him from prosecution because "[a]n illegal arrest, without more, has
never been viewed as a bar to subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense
to a valid conviction." 61
However, a plurality of the Court expressly declined to decide the
question raised by the defendant's argument: "whether respondent's
person should be considered evidence, and therefore [suppressable as] a
possible 'fruit' of police misconduct."62 Such a decision was unneces-
sary, the plurality reasoned, because "respondent's unlawful arrest
served merely to link together two extant [untainted] ingredients in his
identification,"63 the victim's presence in court and her ability to iden-
tify the robber.
By characterizing the function of the arrest as a link between two
untainted elements, the plurality creates the impression that the arrest
played a neutral role in the identification, and that this neutral role
somehow prevented the illegality of the arrest from tainting the identifi-
cation process. The implication is that since the defendant's presence
in court functioned only as a link between two untainted elements in
58. Id. at 471.
59. Id. at 471-72.
60. Id. at 472-73.
61. Id. at 474.
62. Id. at 475.
63. Id.
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the identification, his "person" never functioned as evidence in the
identification process. Since the defendant's person did not function as
evidence in the identification, the plurality reasoned that it was unnec-
essary to decide whether it should be considered evidence, i.e., a sup-
pressible "fruit" of the illegal arrest.
At the beginning of the analysis, however, the plurality identified
the defendant's presence in terms indicating that his presence did func-
tion as physical evidence in the identification. 64 Yet at this later point
in the analysis, the Court's terminology so characterized the role of the
arrest as to obscure the evidentiary function of the defendant's presence
in the identification process. By so characterizing the role of the arrest,
the plurality precluded from ever arising, and therefore, made unneces-
sary a decision on, the issue of whether the defendant's presence should
be considered evidence for identification purposes.
This characterization of the role of the arrest does not indicate
whether the arrest's legality is relevant to the admissibility of the identi-
fication. Since the plurality's preceeding analysis never considered the
evidentiary function of the defendant's presence to arise as an issue,
one would expect the legality of the arrest to be irrelevant to the admis-
sibility of the identification. However, the plurality's analysis indicates
that the admissibility of the identification is affected by whether there
were some untainted, reasonable grounds to suspect Crews of the of-
fense prior to his arrest.6 5 Because the analysis seeks some independ-
ent, reasonable grounds to justify his presence in court, this suggests
that the legality of the arrest has some relevance to the admissibility of
the identification.
Contrary to the intimations in Justice White's concurring opinion,
the plurality was not suggesting that reasonable suspicion replace prob-
able cause to arrest.66 The confusion in the plurality's analysis derived
from unconsciously mixing two "poisonous tree" doctrines: independ-
ent source and inevitable discovery.
The analysis first consciously argued that the victim's descriptions
of Crews constituted independent grounds for reasonable suspicion
64. "A victim's in-court identification of the accused has three distinct elements ....
Third, the defendant is also physically present in the courtroom, so that the victim can ob-
serve him and compare his appearance to that of the offender." Id. at 471.
65. "[P]rior to his illegal arrest, the police both knew respondent's identity and had some
basis to suspect his involvement in the very crimes with which he was charged.. .. Here,
in contrast [to Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)], the robbery investigation had al-
ready focused on respondent, and the police had independent reasonable grounds to suspect
his culpability." 445 U.S. at 475-76.
66. Id. at 478.
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prior to his illegal arrest. Then, unconsciously, the analysis incorpo-
rated the inevitable discovery doctrine at the conclusion of distinguish-
ing this case from Davis v. Mississppi.67 The resulting, and probably
unintentional, implication is that since the investigation had focused on
Crews prior to his illegal arrest, through the independent evidence of
the victims' descriptions, the reasonable suspicion then existing would
have inevitably led to the discovery of more evidence, constituting
probable cause to arrest. Then Crews' presence in court for identifica-
tion purposes would have been justified, making it unnecessary to de-
cide whether his presence was illegally obtained evidence.
The obvious problem with this line of reasoning is that the hypo-
thetical, untainted discovery of additional evidence constituting proba-
ble cause may never have occurred. There is, in fact, no evidence.
suggesting that it would have inevitably occurred. In Justice White's
words: "the presence of Crews in the courtroom would not have oc-
curred but for his arrest without probable cause. .. .
Despite the illegal arrest, a majority of the Court69 would have
admitted the in-court identification by extending the rationale of Ker v.
Illinois,"° reaffirmed in Frisbie v. Collins.7 That rationale provides that
"the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the
fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction" illegally.72
Applying this rule to Crews extends the use of the defendant's
presence in court beyond the legally recognized purpose of enabling
"the Government. . . to prove his guilt through the introduction of
evidence wholly untainted by the police misconduct."7 3 By admitting
the identification when made in court, the majority permits the prose-
cution to prove his guilt through evidence which would otherwise have
been tainted by the illegal detention. For example, if Crews had been
identified by the victims when originally detained, as in a "walk-up,"
this evidence would have been inadmissible as tainted by the illegality
of the detention, just as were the subsequent photographic and lineup
67. See supra note 65.
68. 445 U.S. at 478.
69. The majority was comprised of Justices Powell, Blackmun, White, Burger and
Rehnquist.
70. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
71. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
72. Id. at 522 (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886)).
73. 445 U.S. at 474. Neither Ker nor Frisbie involved the use of the defendant's pres-
ence for the purpose of an in-court identification. Ker permitted the trial of a criminal
defendant who had been virtually kidnapped from Peru to stand trial for larceny. Frisbie
similarly permitted the trial of a defendant who had been blackjacked and kidnapped to
stand trial for murder.
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identifications. By admitting the identification simply because it is
made in court, the majority permits the defendant's lawful presence in
court for trial to be used for the unlawful purpose of discovering evi-
dence otherwise gathered in violation of the fourth amendment.
Admitting the identification circumvents the exclusionary rule's
enforcement of the fourth amendment. A rule excluding in-court iden-
tification testimony when the defendant's presence has been procured
illegally would comport with the deterrence rationale underlying the
exclusionary rule, and would restore the fourth amendment's
protection.
C Warrants
1. Search-sufficiency of affidavit
In United States v. Lefrowitz,74 the court upheld the sufficiency of
an affidavit supporting a warrant to search the defendant's corporate
offices and his residence.75 In an appeal from a conviction of several
tax fraud offenses,76 the defendant argued that the failure of the affida-
vit to disclose his estranged wife's identity as one of the informants
prevented the magistrate from making an informed and independent
determination of probable cause because her information may have
been tainted by "vengeance, and perhaps a desire to obtain advanta-
geous property settlement information.""
The court applied the Franks v. Delaware7" test for challenging an
affidavit otherwise valid on its face. Under this test, the defendant
must prove that: (1) the affidavit contains intentionally or recklessly
false statements, and (2) the affidavit purged of its falsities would be
insufficient to establish probable cause.79 The court found that the de-
fendant asserted no proof of the first requirement. The second require-
ment was not met because even if the wife's identity had been
disclosed, the affidavit would still have shown probable cause from in-
formation obtained from IRS files and investigations showing the com-
74. 618 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 1315.
76. 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001 (1948): conspiracy to defraud the United States, and fraudu-
lent misrepresentation to the United States government; 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203, 7206(1)
(1954): tax evasion, failure to pay tax, and fraudulent statements made under penalty of
perjury.
77. 618 F.2d at 1317.
78. 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 171-72 (1978) (defendant's substantial preliminary showing of
intentional or reckless false statement in affidavit triggers his right to request a hearing to
determine affidavit's sufficiency when purged of the false statement).
79. Id. at 155-56.
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mission of tax fraud. 0
In United States v. Federbush,81 appellants Federbush and Quilici
unsuccessfully challenged the sufficiency of affidavits supporting search
warrants instrumental to their convictions for mail and wire fraud. 2
During their investigation, FBI agents concluded that the appellants
were operating a sham bank consisting of nothing more than a charter
with the names of Federbush and Quilici.83 The appellants had per-
suaded a travel agency to deposit its funds in a bonafide bank account
in the name of the sham bank. They then transferred the travel
agency's assets abroad, and paid the agency's obligations with worth-
less checks.8 4 The appellants told the payees that the checks were good
and would be honored. FBI agents arrested Federbush and Quilici af-
ter a payee of one of the dishonored checks reported that they were
arriving for a meeting to resolve the non-payment problem. Federbush
was arrested at the payee's office and Quilici in his San Francisco hotel
room. The agents seized briefcases from each, and subsequently ob-
tained warrants to search the .briefcases and the appellants' hotel
rooms.
8 5
The court summarily rejected the appellants' challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the search warrant affidavits, holding that the affidavits'
description adequately supported the magistrate's conclusion that 18
U.S.C. Section 231486 had been violated. "The affidavits described the
fraudulent scheme-checks drawn on what appeared to be a nonexis-
tent bank and payees unable to collect-and described the travel of [the
appellants] from Boston to San Francisco in connection with the
scheme."8" Utilizing the reasonableness standard articulated in United
States v. Hendershot,"' the court summarily decided that the affidavit
sufficiently indicated that evidence would reasonably be located in the
briefcases in the appellants' possession when arrested. 9
80. 618 F.2d at 1317 n.4.
81. 625 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1980).
82, Id. at 252.
83. Id. at 250.
84. Id. at 248.
85. Id. at 251.
86. The statute proscribes interstate transportation of forged securities or of a person in
furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.
87. 625 F.2d at 252.
88. 614 F.2d 648, 65 4 (9th Cir. 1980). In upholding the sufficiency of an affidavit sup-
porting a warrant to search an automobile used in connection with a bank robbery, the court
stated that an affidavit's facts need only show that "it would be reasonable to seek the evi-
dence in the place indicated."
89. 625 F.2d at 252 (citing United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d at 654).
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2. Home arrest
As is the quintessential seizure,90 arrest of the person is governed
by the fourth amendment requirement of reasonableness. 91 Prior to
United States v. Watson,92 the Supreme Court had not been presented
with the issue of whether a warrant was required to make a felony ar-
rest in public when the police had sufficient opportunity to obtain
one.93 The "course of [the Supreme Court's] modem decisions constru-
ing the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment" 94 indicated that,
absent exigent circumstances, such an arrest should be made only upon
a warrant.95 Contrary to this expectation, the Court decided in United
States v. Watson,96 that a warrant was not required to make a felony
arrest in public.97 Justices Powell and Stewart, however, emphasized
that in Watson the Court did not decide "whether or under what cir-
cumstances an officer lawfully may make a warrantless arrest in a pri-
vate home or other place where the person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy." 98
This question was decided in Payton v. New York.99 There, the
Court held that "the Fourth Amendment. . .prohibits the police from
making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in
order to make a routine felony arrest. ''"" ° In Payton, after two days of
intensive investigation, the police broke into and entered the defend-
ant's apartment without a warrant to arrest him for a murder commit-
ted two days earlier.101 They seized a 30-caliber shell casing, in plain
view, which was admitted into evidence at his trial. In the companion
case, Riddick v. New York, police went to the defendant's apartment
without a warrant to arrest him for two armed robberies committed
three years earlier. They knocked and entered after the defendant's
young son opened the door. The defendant was found sitting in bed
covered by a sheet. Before allowing him to dress, the police searched
90. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring).
91. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97
(1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
92. 423 U.S. 411 (1975).
93. 423 U.S. at 426-27 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 436-38 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
94. 423 U.S. at 433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
95. See id. at 443-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. 423 U.S. 411 (1975).
97. Id. at 414, 424.
98. Id. at 432-33 (Powell, J., concurring).
99. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
100. Id. at 576.
101. Id.
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for weapons in a chest of drawers two feet from the bed, and found
narcotics and related paraphernalia. The defendant was subsequently
indicted and convicted on narcotics charges.'0 2
The Court's rationale for holding the entries illegal began with a
reiteration of principles evolved through fourth amendment litigation,
which focused on the preservation of "'the sanctity of the home' "103
from warrantless invasions, absent exigent circumstances. 1°4 The
Court rejected New York's argument that the reasons supporting the
Watson decision were applicable to Payton. Those reasons, absent in
Payton, were: (1) a "well-settled common-law rule"'0 5 permitting fel-
ony arrest in a public place upon probable cause, (2) a "clear consensus
among the States adhering to that. . rule,"10 6 and (3) "the expression
of the judgment of Congress that such an arrest is 'reasonable.' "107
The Court's discussion showed that not only was there "no direct
authority supporting forcible entries into a home to make a routine ar-
rest,"' 1 8 but the authorities "strongly suggest that the prevailing prac-
tice was not to make such arrests except in hot pursuit or when
authorized by a warrant."' 0 9 The Court's conclusion derived from:
(1) its own analysis of a seminal passage of "equivocal dictum"'110 from
Semayne's Case;' (2) the sharply divided analysis of this passage by
common law commentators;" 2 (3) common law decisions, especially
those inspired by Lord Coke, which "clearly viewed a warrantless entry
for the purpose of arrest to be illegal"; 1 3 and (4) common law and
colonial "zealous and frequent repetition of the adage that a 'man's
house is his castle.' ,114
102. Id. at 578.
103. Id. at 589 (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 423 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 913 (1978)).
104. 445 U.S. at 590-601.
105. Id. at 590.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 598.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 592.
111. 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603). Semayne ! Case is one of the earliest common
law expressions regarding warrantless arrests in residences. Its dictum on this question is
extensively quoted by scholars who are sharply divided over whether it condones warrant-
less entries, or circumscribes the extent of authority in executing the King's writ. The
Supreme Court adopted the latter interpretation. The actual issue in Semayne's Case did
not involve entry to arrest, but to effect service of civil process.
112. 445 U.S. at 592-98.
113. Id. at 594.
114. Id. at 596.
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The Court acknowledged that a majority of states permit warrant-
less home arrest absent exigent circumstances, but explained that the
kind of unanimity present in Watson was lacking. Its decision that a
"clear consensus" was absent was based on the strength of a declining
trend to permit such arrests indicated by several state courts resting
their decisions upon a violation of their state constitutions." 5 Lastly,
congressional expression that warrantless home arrests are reasonable
was also considered lacking. 6
Two years ago, the Ninth Circuit anticipated the Payton decision
by announcing a similar, but more exacting and expansive rule in
United States v. Prescott."7 Although the Ninth Circuit stated in
United States v. Blake," 8 that the Supreme Court reiterated the Pres-
cott rule in Payton v. New York, this is incorrect. The Prescott rule
differs from the Payton rule in two respects. Under Prescott, an arrest
warrant "must describe 'the place to be searched,'. . . and 'the persons
or things to be seized.' "11 9 Under Payton, an arrest warrant need only
describe the arrestee,12 as required in the usual arrest warrant. In ad-
dition, the holding in Prescott requires an arrest warrant when a sus-
pect is arrested in a third person's residence: "absent exigent
circumstances, police . . . must obtain a warrant before entering a
dwelling to carry out the arrest."' 12' This requirement was reiterated in
United States v. Jabara,12 2 when the court stated that an arrest warrant
was required to arrest both defendants within one defendant's resi-
dence: "the agents did not have arrest warrants for Jabara or McClain
at the time of their arrests. Because the arrests took place at Jabara's
residence, the Government must establish exigent circumstances in or-
der for the arrest to be justified under the Fourth Amendment."' 23 In
Payton, however, the Supreme Court specifically reserved decision on
this question: "[n]or do these cases raise any question concerning the
authority of the police, without either a search or arrest warrant, to
115. Id. at 598-600.
116. Id. at 601.
117. 581 F.2d 1343, 1350 (9th Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court in Payton did not have
occasion to specify what a warrant for a home arrest must contain. In Prescott, the Ninth
Circuit held that such a warrant "must describe 'the place to be searched' . and 'the
persons. . . to be seized.'" 581 F.2d at 1350.
118. 632 F.2d 731, 733 (9th Cir. 1980).
119. 581 F.2d at 1350.
120. 445 U.S. at 575-76 (by implication).
121. 581 F.2d at 1350.




enter a third party's home to arrest a suspect."1 24
Between the Court's decisions in Prescott and Payton, only two
Ninth Circuit cases were decided on the question of warrantless home
arrest. Both represent exigent circumstance exceptions to the warrant
requirement,'25 leaving Prescott's rule unchanged when Payton was de-
cided. Because the Payton decision did not reach either of the above
questions distinguishing its holding from the holding in Prescott, the
Payton decision leaves intact the Ninth Circuit's more exacting and
expansive Prescott rule.
In United States v. Blake, 26 the court decided that its Prescott rule
should be applied retroactively, holding that the defendant's warrant-
less home arrest was illegal. The FBI established Blake's identity by
comparing a photograph taken of him with a surveillance camera in the
bank that he robbed to a driver's license photograph of a man stopped
a week earlier on suspicion of casing a bank. The day after the rob-
bery, the FBI learned from Blake's estranged wife where he was liv-
ing.'27 A local police officer then went to Blake's house and waited
there for about an hour until Blake drove up and entered the house
with his female companion. After learning of his arrival, and without
obtaining an arrest warrant, the FBI went to the house and positioned
local police around it.'28 An agent knocked on the door and an-
nounced his identity. After receiving no response, he began kicking the
door. A woman then opened the door. The agent pulled her out onto
the step and entered the house with another agent. They found Blake
emerging from a bedroom and immediately arrested him.' 29 The
124. 445 U.S. at 583.
125. United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 446 U.S. 987
(1980). In Jabara, an eleven month investigation by drug enforcement agents led to the
arrest of one of the defendants, when she sold heroin to an undercover agent. The agents
initially contacted a magistrate to obtain arrest warrants for her confederates. When they
learned that, instead of cooperating in the arrest of the others, she had made several at-
tempts to warn them of her arrest, the agents obtained permission from the supervising
assistant district attorney to make warrantless arrests. Accordingly, the others were arrested
in their apartment at about 9:35 p.m. The defendants argued that exigent circumstances
were absent, thereby precluding their warrantless arrests. The court upheld the arrests on
the ground that the "probability of destruction of evidence and flight do constitute exigent
circumstances." Id. at 1324. In United States v. Stubblefield, 621 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir.
1980), the court upheld the warrantless entry into a house to search for an unapprehended
bank robbery suspect on grounds that hot pursuit and the possibility that the suspect was
inside constituted exigent circumstances.
126. 632 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980).
127. Id. at 732.
128. d. at 733.
129. Id.
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agents searched him, finding a bait bill in his pocket that had been
taken from the bank.' 30 After advising him of his Miranda rights at the
local police station, the agents began questioning him. At first he de-
nied having knowledge of the robbery, but he later confessed when he
was confronted with the surveillance photograph and the bait bill. He
then consented to a search of the house, which produced three more
bait bills.131
Blake argued that his warrantless arrest violated the Payton-Pres-
cot rule, and that evidence obtained as a result should have been sup-
pressed at trial. 132 The Government contended that the warrantless
arrest was justified by exigent circumstances, and, alternatively, that
the Payton-Prescott rule should not be applied retroactively.
33
The Ninth Circuit first decided that the trial court's determination
that exigent circumstances were present was "clearly erroneous."' 
34
The trial court had reached its decision by applying the criteria of a
District of Columbia case, Dorman v. United States. 35 The Dorman
court looked to: (1) the gravity of the crime involved, (2) the reasona-
bleness of the belief that the suspect is armed, (3) the degree of proba-
ble cause for the arrest, (4) the likelihood that the suspect is on the
premises, (5) the risk of escape, and (6) the manner of entrance by the
police.' 36 While acknowledging that a "district court's finding of exi-
gent circumstances should not be lightly rejected,"'137 the appellate
court was "'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
[had] been committed.' ,13
The court's conclusion derived from its own application of the
Dorman criteria to the facts presented, using the definition of exigent
circumstances developed in United States v. Flickinger. 39 The court
noted that while the crime was serious, it had not caused any bodily





134. Id. at 734.
135. 435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
136. Id.
137. 632 F.2d at 734.
138. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
139. 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978). The Flickinger
court stated that "[tlhe term 'exigent circumstances,' in conjunction with an arrest in a resi-
dence, refers to a situation where the inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must
give way to an urgent need for immediate action."
140. The discovery of a pellet gun under the seat of the car that Blake was driving when
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the officers had a high degree of probable cause to arrest, there was no
apparent substantial reason to believe that the appellant would think
that his apprehension was imminent and flee.14 In fact, the "measured
and deliberate manner"'e4 in which the police pursued their investiga-
tion indicated that they thought that "arrest was not. . . required im-
mediately upon the ripening of probable cause."' 143 In addition, the
officers' entry was by force.
The court contrasted the facts of Dorman to those in the instant
case. In Dorman, the police had tried to obtain a warrant, but a magis-
trate was unavailable, and to find a judge authorized to issue the war-
rant at 9:00 p.m. on a Friday would have been quite time consuming.
Defendant Dorman had used'a gun in his robbery and had fired a shot
in the course of it. There was a strong possibility that he would flee
from his home because he would be likely to realize that he had left at
the robbery documents identifying his name and address. His arrest
only four hours after the robbery indicated that there was "no delay of
the police's 'own making.' ,44 Also, the officers entered peacefully af-
ter announcing their purpose.
A factor that the court considered even more decisive than the in-
congruity between the present facts and those in Dorman was that ob-
taining a warrant here would have entailed neither "great difficulty nor
• . . the loss of any substantial amount of time."'1 4 The court stated
that "adequate time to obtain a warrant. . . requires a stronger show-
ing with respect to the Dorman criteria than otherwise is necessary."'
146
Here the arresting officer testified that he knew that a warrant could
have been obtained by telephone, but decided to make the arrest with-
out one. Also, the arrest was made at 3:00 p.m. on a weekday and was
preceded by about an hour of surveillance. 147 Because of the ease with
which a warrant could have been obtained, and because of the factual
disparity between the present case and Dorman, the Ninth Circuit
found the trial court determination that exigent circumstances were
present to be clearly erroneous.'
48





144. Id. (quoting Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
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In deciding the retroactivity issue, the court acknowledged that
certain Supreme Court decisions could have provided a basis for decid-
ing that prospective application was mandatory. 49 The court stated
that the decision of Stovall v. Denno 15 0 may have required only pro-
spective application if the purpose of the new constitutional principle
of Payton-Prescott did not "enhance the truth-finding function of the
trial."'' However, the court considered that, in this respect, the Pay-
ton-Prescott rule did "'not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospec-
tivity.' ,"52 Therefore, prospective application of the Payton-Prescott
rule was permissible, not mandatory. Whether to apply this rule pro-
spectively was to be determined, apparently, by the criteria established
in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.153 Under those criteria, prospective appli-
cation is appropriate "[w]here the decision establishes a new principle
of law 'either by overruling clear past precedent. . . or by deciding an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshad-
owed.' ""54 In a footnote, the court noted that there was no clear past




150. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
151. 632 F.2d at 735.
152. I1d. (quoting Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249-52 (1969)).
153. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
154. 632 F.2d at 734-35 (quoting Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971)).
155. 632 F.2d at 735 n.l. The decisions from 1959 to 1972 never addressed the question
of the necessity of a warrant for home arrest. Instead the cases "focused on whether the
officers had probable cause to make an arrest and whether the officers entered the residence
only after announcing their identity and purpose and being denied admittance." Id. In
Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781, 790-94 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 951
(1960), the court upheld the warrantless home arrest of defendants for federal narcotics vio-
lations on the grounds that: (1) there was probable cause to arrest, and (2) the arrests were
validly executed by a state police officer, pursuant to California Penal Code § 844, when
"[a]fter receiving no response to their knocking, the officers simply opened an unlocked door
and entered without objection." Id. at 793. In Munoz v. United States, 325 F.2d 23, 26-27
(9th Cir. 1963), the court invalidated the warrantless arrest of defendant in his hotel room
for federal narcotics violations on the grounds that the arresting officer: (1) gave defendant
notice of his authority and purpose "practically instantaneous[ly]" with entry by passkey,
and (2) was not refused admittance, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1948). 325 F.2d at
26. The court in Ng Pui Yu v. United States, 352 F.2d 626, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1965), upheld
the warrantless arrest of defendant for federal narcotics violations when defendant opened
his hotel room door just as federal agents were assembling before the door to make the
arrest, on the grounds that: (1) there was probable cause to arrest, and (2) "entry made
through the open door was not made in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109." 352 F.2d at 631-32.
In Jack v. United States, 387 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 394 (1968),
the court upheld a theoretically warrantless arrest of defendant in his apartment for federal
narcotics violations on the grounds that: (1) there was probable cause to arrest, and (2) the
officers' entry with a passkey obtained from landlord after knocking, announcing their iden-
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The court's primary emphasis was on showing that the Prescott
decision was "clearly foreshadowed." '156 It referred to two cases de-
cided prior to Prescott'57 in which the Ninth Circuit "indicated that a
tity and purpose, and being denied admittance, complied with 18 U.S.C. § 3109. In United
States v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1971), the court upheld the warrantless
residential arrest of defendant for federal narcotics violations on the grounds that: (1) there
was probable cause to arrest, and (2) announcement of identity and purpose before making
a forceful entry was excused by the exigent circumstances of the possibility of the defend-
ant's flight and destruction of evidence.
In 1973, the court indicated in Williams v. Gould, 486 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), that the permissibility of a warrantless residential arrest remained an undecided
question. In reversing a directed verdict against a police officer in a civil rights suit for
damages in making a warrantless arrest of a felon believed to be in the plaintiffs apartment,
the court stated that "[w]hether a warrant is required in such a situation is an open constitu-
tional issue. It divides the Supreme Court. . . . Either view as to its ultimate resolution
might be entertained reasonably and in good faith." Id. at 548.
Subsequent cases through 1978 avoided the issue by deciding that the admission of
evidence resulting from an illegal arrest was harmless error, or more commonly, that the
warrantless arrest was justified by exigent circumstances. United States v. Masterson, 529
F.2d 30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 908 (1976). In Masterson, the court explicitly de-
cined to address the defendant's contention that a warrant was required to arrest him in his
home for bank robbery, absent exigent circumstances: "[wie need not consider that conten-
tion, however, since even if the entry was improper, the trial court's failure to exclude the
evidence was harmless error." Id. at 31. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8-
9 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974), specifically avoided the issue of first
impression, and upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant in his garage for narcotics
violations when the possibility of detecting the agents at the stake-out created the exigency
that the defendant might escape or destroy evidence. In United States v. McLaughlin, 525
F.2d 517, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976), the Ninth Circuit explic-
itly stated that they, as had the United States Supreme Court, would "avoid the issue." The
court upheld the warrantless arrest of the defendant in McLaughlin's residence for narcotics
violations, on the grounds that: (1) the arrest of a confederate in front of the house created
the exigency that the other defendants might have discovered that they were under surveil-
lance leading to the destruction of evidence, and (2) the state of siege that would persist
while waiting for a warrant to be issued would endanger neighbors. Id. Finally in United
States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354-57 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978), the
court explicitly acknowledged that the issue had not been decided by either the United
States Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit. There, the court upheld the warrantless arrest
for narcotics violations of several defendants in Flickinger's home, on the ground that an
exigency was present, in that two previously arrested confederates may have telephoned a
warning to them. Id. at 1357.
156. United States v. Blake, 632 F.2d at 735.
157. United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974). The court invalidated the
warrantless ruse entry of federal narcotics agents into a locked commercial building to arrest
the defendant in his office, on the ground that "the agents did not have probable cause to
believe that Phillips was in the office building at the time of the raid." Id. at 1136. Regard-
ing the legitimacy of a warrantless arrest on premises deemed a house for the purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 3109, the court stated:
An officer without an arrest warrant certainly has no more license than an
officer with a warrant in seeking entry to effect an arrest. The constitutional safe-
guard that assures citizens the privacy and security of their homes unless a judicial
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warrant very likely was required to legitimate an arrest within a resi-
dence based on probable cause in the absence of exigent circum-
stances."'' 5 8 Considering these cases, and the Ninth Circuit's persistent
avoidance of the issue, the court felt that "reasonable observers"'
5 9
should have been put on notice that the issue eventually might be de-
cided against their interests, by requiring a warrant for residential ar-
rests absent exigent circumstances.
The court also stated that to decide that the Prescott rule should be
applied only prospectively would require a determination that the Pres-
cott holding did not merely reiterate the preexisting circuit case law.
This, the court said, would contradict the rationale of the Prescott
court, and its finding that the "fundamental source" of its holding was
"the sanctity of the home in England immediately before the revolu-
tion." 6 For this reason, and because the Prescott decision was clearly
foreshadowed, the court held that the Prescott rule would be applied
retroactively. The court clarified, however, that since its decision relied
only upon Ninth Circuit law, it was unnecessary to decide or comment
upon the possible retroactivity of Pay/on.16 '
In United States v. Johnson,162 the Ninth Circuit overturned the
defendant's conviction for aiding and abetting obstruction of corre-
spondence because his warrantless home arrest was illegal. Johnson
was one of three men who had been contacted to help fraudulently cash
a mistakenly mailed United States Treasury check. After studying the
check, Johnson phoned another person for assistance in cashing the
check.'
63
A warrant was issued for the arrest of Dodd, one of the other men
who had given Johnson's telephone number as the place where he
could be reached. Investigation revealed that Johnson had been in-
officer determines that it must be overridden, is applicable not only in case of entry
to search for property, but also in cases of entry to arrest a suspect.
Id. at 1135. In United States v. Calhoun, 542 F.2d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1064 (1977), the court reviewed the night-time warrantless arrest of one of the
defendants in his house and stated that "(bloth sides apparently agree that absent exigent
circumstances, the entry would be illegal." Id. Because exigent circumstances were not sub-
stantiated by the Government, "entry into the [defendant's] apartment was not justified
without a warrant." Id. at 1102.
158. 632 F.2d at 735. The court clarified that in neither Phillpos nor Calhoun was there a
specific holding to this effect. However, "in Calhoun the government apparently agreed that
under such circumstances a warrant was required." Id.
159. Id. at 735-36.
160. Id. at 736.
161. Id.
162. 626 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1980).
163. Id. at 754-55.
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volved in Dodd's past criminal activity. Although the Secret Service
agents expected to arrest Dodd at Johnson's residence, no warrant was
obtained for Johnson's arrest.114
After a short stake out of Johnson's residence, the Secret Service
agents watched Johnson's car pull into the driveway and the two pas-
sengers enter the house. The agents approached the doorway, drew
their guns, and pointing them downwards, knocked at the door and
identified themselves by fictitious names. When Johnson answered the
door, the agents identified themselves as special agents. Johnson in-
vited them inside in response to their request to talk to him. One of the
agents remained with Johnson in the living room while the other briefly
searched the other rooms for persons who might present a danger. A
woman was discovered and was asked to wait in the living room. After
finding no one else, the agents returned their guns to their holsters.65
The agents asked Johnson to step into the bedroom to talk and he
agreed. Before entering, one of the agents informed Johnson of his
constitutional rights. He responded that he wished to cooperate. He
then told them of his involvement in the scheme and was informed that
he was under arrest. After arriving at the police station, Johnson was
again given his Miranda warnings. Thereafter, he signed under oath a
written statement similar to the admission given at his home.
Johnson appealed his conviction on the ground that his incrimi-
nating statements were the fruits of an illegal arrest. In analyzing the
legality of the arrest, the court first addressed the question of when the
arrest occurred, using the objective criteria of whether a person inno-
cent of a crime would have thought that the defendant was "free to
choose between terminating or continuing the encounter with the [po-
lice, '"166 considering all of the circumstances. The court determined
that the arrest occurred when Johnson opened his door to confront
agents with drawn weapons.1 67 The ensuing search of his house while
the agents' guns were still drawn, and while he was held in his living
room by another agent, constituted additional circumstances warrant-
ing a reasonable person's conclusion that he was under arrest.
168
Under all of these circumstances, the court considered it extremely
doubtful that Johnson would have thought that he was free to leave at
any time, or to request the officers to leave "after the initial
164. Id. at 755.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 755-56.
168. Id. at 755.
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encounter." 169
The court explained that where, as here, a suspect is arrested while
standing inside his home, with the arresting officers standing outside
with drawn weapons, "it is the location of the arrested person, and not
the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a
home."' 170 This rule is designed to prevent the officers from avoiding
an illegal entry into a home but controlling the suspect's movements
from outside through the threat of using weapons "that greatly extend
the 'reach' of the arresting officers."''
The court then addressed the question of whether the warrantless
arrest of Johnson in his doorway violated the fourth amendment. It
noted the Supreme Court's decision in Payton v. New YorkI72 for its
"strong language .. .emphasizing the special protection [that] the
Constitution affords to individuals within their homes,"' 73 and for the
close parallel between the involuntariness of Johnson's opening of his
door and the opening of Riddick's door by his three year old son. In
neither case did the defendant voluntarily expose himself to a warrant-
less arrest as in a public place.'
74
After noting the validity of warrantless, felony arrests in public,
175
the court distinguished this case from two others where warrantless fel-
ony arrests made within the defendant's doorway were upheld. The
court explained that the warrantless arrest of the defendant in United
States v. Santana176 was upheld because she had first voluntarily ex-
posed herself to public view in her doorway; "her. . .retreating into
her house [afterwards] could not thwart an otherwise proper arrest by
officers who pursued her inside."'177 In United States v. Botero,'T7 the
warrantless arrest in the defendant's doorway was upheld because the
defendant voluntarily opened his door after the police had properly
identified themselves, thereby voluntarily exposing himself to public
view. Exigent circumstances were also present.
179
In the present case, the warrantless arrest was invalid because the
169. Id. at 756.
170. Id. at 757.
171. Id.
172. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
173. 626 F.2d at 757.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 756.
176. 427 U.S. 38 (1976).
177. 626 F.2d at 756.
178. 589 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
179. Id. at 432.
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agents had misrepresented their identities;' "thus, Johnson's initial
exposure to the view and the physical control of the agents was not
consensual. ... "8I His subsequent invitation to enter was also con-
sidered involuntary because of the "coercive effect of the weapons
brandished by the agents."' 2 For these reasons, Johnson's arrest in his
doorway was held to be unconstitutional.8 3
D. Warrantless Searches
1. Vehicle searches
The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment's pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches to mean that warrantless
searches "'areper se unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifi-
cally established and well-delineated exceptions.'"" 8 4 These exceptions
are "jealously and carefully drawn."'8 5 Those seeking exemption must
show that "the exigencies of the situation made that course impera-
tive."' 86 The burden of proof is upon "those seeking the exemp-
tion."' 87  Searches under exigent circumstances, 8 8 and in certain
situations, vehicle searches and administrative searches may be exe-
cuted without a warrant.
The Supreme Court has historically recognized a distinction be-
tween searches of fixed structures and searches of "movable ves-
sel[s]."' 9 It has upheld warrantless automobile searches under the
theory that, when potentially mobile, an automobile's mobility presents
an inherent exigency: "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
180. 626 F.2d at 757.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. The court decided that both the admission in Johnson's house, and the one given
at the police station constituted fruits of the unlawful arrest. Id. at 757-58.
184. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1970) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
185. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1957).
186. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
187. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
188. Recognized exigencies are: (1) to protect police or third persons, Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978); United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1979); United States v. McLaughlin, 525 F.2d 517, 521 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 904 (1976); (2) to prevent escape, United States v. Flickinger,
573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1979); United States v. Valen-
tin, 569 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1978); and (3) to preserve evidence, United States v.
Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 (1976); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
189. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151, 154 (1925). For an historical review of
this recognized distinction, see id. at 143-53.
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the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction." 190
In United States v. Emens,191 the court upheld the defendants'
challenge to warrantless searches of their automobiles and boats on ap-
peal from their convictions for smuggling marijuana. Customs officers
had followed a boat that was suspected of being used for smuggling
marijuana as it was trailered to a warehouse. A consent search of the
boat revealed 1,910 pounds of marijuana. While the defendants were
being questioned, other officers had entered the warehouse and found
90 additional pounds of marijuana in another boat.' 92 The remaining
defendants were subsequently arrested, or taken into custody. After-
wards, two more of their boats, one parked behind a residence, the
other at sea, and two of their trucks, were searched without warrants.
These searches yielded approximately 16,000 additional pounds of
marijuana. 1
93
The court held that the Government failed to meet its burden 194 to
overcome the presumption that the warrantless searches were unrea-
sonable.' 95 The court explained that exigent circumstances were ab-
sent, and that, because the defendants "were handcuffed, and the boat
was immobilized in a private warehouse," the vehicle exception was
inapplicable. 96 The court's summary of the facts lacks sufficient detail
to determine the extent of the immobility of the vehicles that were
searched away from the warehouse premises. However, the "custody"
of some suspects at their residence, and the "arrest" of others at another
residence does imply a similar immobility rendering the vehicle excep-
tion also inapplicable to the searches conducted there. 197 However, it is
unclear why the vehicle exception was not applied to the search of the
boat at sea, since its mobility would seem unrestricted.
In United States v. Williams, 98 the court refused to uphold the
warrantless search of a mobile home and car, suspected of being used
for the manufacture of P.C.P., on the grounds of the vehicle exception,
but the court did uphold the search under the exigent circumstances
190. Id. at 153.
191. 649 F.2d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 1980).
192. Id. at 655.
193. Id. at 655-56.
194. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
195. 649 F.2d at 658.
196. Id. at 657 (footnote omitted); see also United States v. McCormick, 502 F.2d 281,
287 (9th Cir. 1974) (vehicle exception inapplicable where suspect was immediately hand-
cuffed in his home, thus preventing use of automobile in driveway).
197. 649 F.2d at 655-56.
198. 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 197 (1980).
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exception. 199 A border patrolman obtained consent to search the trunk
of a car that he suspected of being used to smuggle illegal aliens. The
driver said that his uncle, who had been riding in a mobile home in
tandem with this and another car, had the key.2" When the patrolman
located the mobile home, the uncle first confirmed, and then denied
having a nephew in the area, and further asserted that no one inside the
mobile home had a key to anything."'
The patrolman returned to the car and forced open the trunk. In-
side he found several cardboard boxes containing beakers, plastic bags
filled with white powder, and wet paper towels reeking of a strong
chemical odor.20 2 Five hours later, a warrantless search of the mobile
home produced various laboratory apparatus and chemicals. At the
same time, a warrantless search of the third car in the tandem revealed
large quantities of chemicals.2 3 The defendants appealed their convic-
tions for conspiracy and attempt to manufacture P.C.P., alleging the
warrantless searches to be illegal. The Government justified its
searches under the vehicle and exigent circumstances exceptions.
204
The court found that the search of the mobile home was not justi-
fied under the vehicle exception because it would not have been re-
moved before a search warrant could have been obtained, since its
occupants had been arrested and were in custody.20 5 Also, the greater
expectations of privacy implicit in travelling in a mobile home pre-
cluded treating it as an ordinary automobile, subject to the vehicle ex-
ception .2  The court, nevertheless, upheld the warrantless searches of
the mobile home and the third automobile as justified by exigent cir-
cumstances.20 7 One of the officers testified at the suppression hearing
that "they entered the motor home because of the volatility of half-
manufactured PCP. ' 2 8 This statement was sufficient, the court said,
for the trial court to find that "manufacture of this particular controlled
substance under these conditions created special dangers.' '2°9 Simi-
larly, the chemical odor emanating from the third automobile justified
199. Id. at 1326-27.
200. Id. at 1324.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1323.
204. Id. at 1326-27.
205. Id. at 1326.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1326-27.
208. Id. at 1327.
209. Id.
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its warrantless search.210
In United States v. Kimak,211 the court upheld the warrantless
search of an automobile at a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) garage
that had been seized pursuant to the federal forfeiture statute2 12 for
transporting M.D.A., a controlled substance. After the driver had ad-
mitted that five pounds of marijuana and a small amount of M.D.A.
were in the car, it was towed to a DEA garage where a warrantless
search produced the described contraband.2 13 The defendant chal-
lenged both the seizure and the search.
The court reasoned that because
at the time of the seizure, the automobile was on the street
and not only had been [used], but was still being used to facil-
itate the completion of the sale of MDA. . . . [T]he seizure
of the defendant's automobile at that time was [therefore]
valid under the "automobile exception" announced in Carroll
v. United States.
2 14
Because the forfeiture seizure was legal, the court held the subsequent
search to be legal.2 .15
In United States v. Brannon,"6 the court upheld the warrantless
search of an automobile suspected of transporting armed kidnap-
pers. 7 Investigators from the District Attorney's office observed two
men and a woman enter a car that was reported to have been used in
an armed kidnapping.218 The men fit the descriptions of the armed
kidnappers. One carried a cardboard box, the other held a jacket over
his arm from which a weapon appeared to protrude.21 9 They placed
these items in the trunk, and then drove off. When stopped by the in-
vestigators, the woman refused to leave the car. She was pulled out
and was found to be wearing a holstered pistol in her waistband. With-
out a search warrant, the investigators opened the trunk and found a
210. Id.
211. 624 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1980).
212. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1976) provides, in pertinent part: "It]he following shall be subject
to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them. . . [a]ll convey-
ances, including. . . vehicles.. . which are used, or are intended for use, to transport...
[illegal controlled substances]."
213. 624 F.2d at 905.
214. Id. (citations omitted).
215. Id.
216. 616 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1980).
217. Id. at 416.
218. Id. at 415.
219. Id.
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loaded sawed-off shotgun, ammunition and a pair of "patch pants. 22 °
These items, including the pistol, resembled those photographed by
surveillance cameras during a bank robbery the previous day.22' Sub-
sequently, the defendants were found guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon.222 On appeal they challenged the validity of the warrantless
search of the car. The Government contended that it was justified
under the vehicle exception, and was necessitated by exigent
circumstances. 2 3
Citing Carroll v. United States2 4 and Chambers v. Maroney,225 the
Brannon court upheld the search under the vehicle exception.226 Prob-
able cause was established when the investigators saw what appeared to
be a concealed weapon placed in the trunk of a car suspected of being
used in a reported armed kidnapping.227 The court's decision is consis-
tent with the Carroll-Chambers principle that a vehicle, especially one
stopped on the roadside, presents an inherent exigency by its sheer po-
tential mobility. If the propriety of the decision is at all questionable, it
is because the vehicle exception is itself suspect, at least in those cases
where probable cause to search the vehicle is also sufficient to consti-
tute probable cause to arrest. In this circumstance, and absent other
exigencies, the exigency presented by the vehicle's mobility is removed
by the legal ability of the police to obtain custody of the occupants.
The Ninth Circuit has already implicitly accepted the principle
that the Carroll exception is inapplicable when a vehicle's occupants
have been arrested and taken into custody, and the car is not otherwise
potentially subject to removal.228 In United States v. Emens, z9 United
States v. Williams,230 and United States v. McCormick231 the court has
recognized this principle. If Brannon were treated consistently with
these cases, the police should have been required to obtain a warrant
before searching the trunk. 3u
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 416.
223. Id.
224. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
225. 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
226. 616 F.2d at 416.
227. Id. at 415.
228. See 649 F.2d at 657 n.5.
229. Id. at 658.
230. 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1980).
231. 502 F.2d 281, 286-87 (9th Cir. 1974); accord, United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d
930, 935 (9th Cir. 1973).
232. 616 F.2d at 415.
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The facts suggest that the officers had probable cause to arrest the
defendants for armed kidnapping. Two men fitting the description of
armed kidnappers were seen placing into the trunk of a car, which was
reportedly used in the kidnapping, objects appearing to be concealed
weapons. If these facts were sufficient to "make an immediate...
search of the trunk for instrumentalities of a crime," 233 presumably
armed kidnapping, they should have been sufficient to establish proba-
ble cause to arrest the defendants for that crime.
The probable cause to arrest legally enabled the police to take cus-
tody of the defendants. The legal ability to arrest the defendants estab-
lished the officers' control over the car. This removed the exigency of
the car's potential mobility that justified dispensing with the warrant
requirement. In the absence of the exigency, the police should have
been required to obtain a warrant before searching the car's trunk.234
For this reason, although the court's decision is factually consistent
with the Carroll-Chambers concept that a vehicle stopped at the road-
side presents an inherent exigency by its sheer potential mobility, the
decision is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's recognition that the po-
tential mobility is removed when the occupants are arrested.
In United States v. Mackey,2 35 the Ninth Circuit upheld the war-
rantless search of the car of two bank robbers, and of a paper bag
found inside.236 The two defendants were arrested in their getaway car
while fleeing from the scene of a bank robbery. After the arrest, the
police immediately searched the car without a warrant.237 A further
warrantless search of a paper bag found beneath the passenger's front
seat revealed a hand gun and the stolen money. After the search, the
car was impounded to search it further. At the police station, it was
searched before and after interrogation.238
Mackey, the defendant who drove the car, appealed his conviction
of aiding and abetting an armed bank robbery on two grounds: (1) that
233. Id. at 416.
234. A warrant should have been required, unless the court means to distinguish between
a search conducted when custody is legaly possible, and one conducted after custody has
actually occurred. It is unlikely that the court attaches legal significance to such a distinction
in this context because it is theoretically indefensible. It is indefensible because the legality
of the respective searches would turn on whether the police overtly arrested and took cus-
tody of the vehicle's occupants before initiating the search. Endorsing such a distinction
would leave up to the police's discretion whether they should be required to obtain a
warrant.
235. 626 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1980).
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the warrantless search of the car at the scene of his arrest was not justi-
fied under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, and
(2) that the warrantless search of the paper bag violated his fourth
amendment rights.239
On the first issue, the defendant contended that there was no dan-
ger that the car might be removed because the police had seized exclu-
sive control of the car upon arrest, and therefore, no exigency
existed.24 He attempted to distinguish his case from Chambers v. Ma-
roney24' on the ground that, in his case, the police had decided to im-
pound the car at the time of arrest, thereby establishing "complete and
exclusive possession of the car" at that time.242 In Chambers, the de-
fendant argued, the police "merely moved [the car] to the street outside
the police station to conduct the search," 243 indicating that "the police
there did not intend to seize exclusive control of the car,"2' and that
"the possibility that some person might rightfully demand the use of
the car was still present."
245
In finding the automobile search valid, the court questioned the
validity of the defendant's analysis of Chambers on the ground that
subsequent Supreme Court decisions clarify that "Chambers was for-
mulated as a practical rule that does not draw fine distinctions among
searches conducted after a car is stopped on a street or highway. 246
The court stated that it did not need to decide whether it was the inten-
239. Id. at 684.
240. Id. at 685.
241. 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (upheld the legality of a warrantless search of the defendants'
automobile conducted at the police station after the arrest).




246. Id. at 686 n.2 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 n.10, 765-66 n.14 (1979)
(requiring a warrant, in absence of exigent circumstances, to search luggage located in trunk
of taxi which police had legally stopped at roadside); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
12, 13 n.7 (1977) (requiring a warrant, in absence of exigent circumstances, to search double-
locked footlocker that had just been lifted into trunk of car, when it remained under contin-
uous exclusive control of agents, and when storage facilities were readily available); Texas v.
White, 423 U.S. 6, 68 (1975) (upholding warrantless search of defendant's car on ground that
probable cause to search for forged checks that defendant was seen stuffing between seats
when police car stopped at bank drive-in window persisted at police station, where search
was made); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (a plurality opinion, upholding a war-
rantless automobile search at an impoundment lot the day after arrest); Cady v. Dombrow-
ski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-43 (1973) (upholding warrantless search of car trunk while car was
stored at unguarded garage car-lot, on ground that search for defendant policeman's service
revolver was standard practice); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-64, & n.20
(1971) (requiring warrant to search car on ground that the vehicle exception did not apply
because neither defendant nor his wife could have gained access to car).
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tion of the police to impound an automobile contemporaneously with
arrest would subject the automobile to the police's exclusive control.
The Ninth Circuit declined to reach this question because the trial
judge had found that the car was impounded after the arrest and
search. In addition, the defendant had offered no evidence either to
refute that finding or to "suggest that the police intended all along to
impound the car."247
In challenging the search of the paper bag, the defendant argued
that the critical factor in the Court's decision inArkansas v. Sanders,24 8
prohibiting the warrantless search of a suitcase found in the trunk of a
car, was the fact that luggage "'is a common repository for one's per-
sonal effects, and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation
of privacy.' "249 The defendant argued that a paper bag is similarly a
common repository of personal effects.250
While noting that the rationale of Sanders extends to containers
other than luggage, the court stated that extending the Sanders ration-
ale to this case would depend on whether the defendant possessed "a
sufficient privacy interest in the paper bag to justify imposing the war-
rant requirement."'25 ' The court concluded that the defendant could
not reasonably entertain sufficient expectations of privacy in a paper
bag. The rationale was based primarily upon the bag's physical
properties: "[i]t is easily torn, it cannot be latched, and. . . its contents
can frequently be discerned merely by holding or feeling [it]."' 252 Be-
cause "[a] paper bag is among the least private of containers, ' 253 the
court considered it indistinguishable, in privacy terms, from "any other
part of the automobile." '254 Since the search of the car was considered
legal,255 so was the search of the bag.256
Judge Tang argued in his dissent that the majority wrongly as-
sumed that the defendant bore the burden of proving that he possessed
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bag. He noted that warrant-
less searches are unreasonableperse, and that "[t]he burden is on those
seeking the exemption to show the need for it."'257 He explained that
247. 626 F.2d at 686.
248. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
249. 626 F.2d at 686 (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 762).
250. Id.





256. Id. at 686-87.
257. Id. at 688 (Tang, J., dissenting).
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the Government had failed to carry that burden because it merely ar-
gued that Arkansas v. Sanders applies only to luggage.
Judge Tang cited a footnote in Sanders to refute the proposition
that "the search of the bag was part of the search of the car and so was
within the automobile exception." '258 In addition to contending that the
search was not within the automobile exception, Judge Tang argued
that the search could not be justified under any other recognized excep-
tion. The most pertinent ones that were inapplicable here were exigent
circumstances and plain view: "there was no danger of evidence being
lost. . . [n]or were the contents of the bag in plain view. The container
was not of a type whose outward appearance reveals its contents." 25 9
The majority's decision to uphold the warrantless search of the car
is inconsistent with its recognition in Emens,260 Williams,26' and Mc-
Cormick,262 that the vehicle exception is inapplicable when the arrest
of its occupants removes the vehicle's potential mobility.
2 63
The majority's rationale upholding the search of the paper bag is
weak for two reasons. First, the properties of the paper bag upon
which its rationale relies do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
"[a] paper bag is among the least private of containers." 264 The court
asserts that a paper bag is inherently only minimally private. However,
there is nothing inherently less private about a container that "is easily
torn, . . . cannot be latched. . . [and the contents of which] can fre-
quently be discerned merely by holding or feeling"'2 6 than there is
about any shopping bag into which one's purchases are placed by a
store clerk. Few people, however, would consider the materials and
construction of the bag relevant to their expectation that it be free from
unwanted inspection. By making privacy depend upon the construc-
tion of a container, the court's decisions become inherently susceptible
to arbitrary distinctions. Protecting some containers, but not others,
also amounts to protecting places, rather than people, and by arbitrary
standards.
The second weakness in the court's rationale lies in failing to con-
258. Id. (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.13 for the proposition that "appli-
cability of warrant requirement to searches of containers does not depend on whether they
are seized from automobiles").
259. 626 F.2d at 688.
260. 649 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1980).
261. 630 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 197 (1980).
262. 502 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1974).
263. See United States v. Emens, 649 F.2d at 657 n.5.
264. 626 F.2d at 687.
265. Id.
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sider the true basis from which people's expectations of privacy arise.
Most people simply do not derive an expectation of privacy from such
facts as the construction or materials of a container. Such expectations
arise from the social context in which an inspection occurs. For exam-
ple, most international travellers expect, at a border, to open upon re-
quest even locked trunks of the kind protected in United States v.
Chadwick266 from warrantless inspection. On a picnic, or at the beach,
these same persons would expect even their paper bags to remain free
from unwanted police inspection. These expectations are patently rea-
sonable, but their reasonableness has nothing to do with the construc-
tion of the containers.
If the court is serious about protecting privacy interests, its criteria
for determining the reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy
should derive from what people actually expect in a given situation,
rather than from an esoteric, legal sense of what expectations are com-
patible with the police's interest in discovering evidence expediently.
Using a legal standard of reasonableness that accounts for the social
context in which a search occurs would protect those expectations that
people actually rely upon daily.
Such a rule would more meaningfully preserve privacy as a char-
acteristic condition of American life in a way contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Katz v. United States. 67 To do this would, however,
lead the court to acknowledge that in most contexts, Americans expect
a fairly high degree of privacy to attend themselves and their posses-
sions. As a result, warrantless searches of almost any container would
become truly the exception.
2. Search of the person incident to arrest
In United States v. Ziller,268 the Ninth Circuit rejected the conten-
tion that United States v. Chadwick269 required suppression of evidence
seized from an arrestee's wallet, without a warrant, after it had been
reduced to the exclusive control of the authorities.
Federal agents had lawfully arrested Ziller at San Francisco Air-
port and transported him directly to the San Francisco Federal Build-
266. 433 U.S. 1 (1976) (search of footlocker in federal building after arrest of defendants).
267. 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.. .. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected.").
268. 623 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cer. denied, 101 S. Ct. 221 (1980).
269. 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (search of footlocker in exclusive control of federal agents
while suspects in custody not incident to arrest and required warrant).
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ing. Once there, agents searched the defendant, confiscated his wallet,
and removed from it a piece of paper which was instrumental to his
subsequent conviction.270 On appeal, defendant challenged the admis-
sibility at trial of the slip of paper on the ground that it had been ile-
gally seized without a warrant.27 1 Defendant argued that the searching
officers had exclusive control over his wallet after his arrest and there-
fore, under Chadwick, any further search of it required a warrant.27 2
However, because the Chadwick Court expressly excluded seized per-
sonal property "immediately associated with the person of the arrestee"
from the warrant requirement, 73 the court rejected defendant's chal-
lenge. 74 It correctly pointed out that the instant factual situation was
more properly placed in the mold of United States v. Robinson,275 in
which the Court held that, given a lawful custodial arrest, "a full search
of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment, but is also a 'reasonable search' under that
Amendment." 76 On this reasoning, the Robinson Court found that the
arresting officer was fully justified in seizing and opening without a
warrant a crumpled cigarette package on the person of the arrestee
which was found to contain heroin-filled gelatin capsules.2 77
3. Border searches
The authority to conduct border searches derives from customs
laws278 that exempt customs agents from the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement.2 79 "As reflected in the legislation conferring sweep-
ing authority upon customs officials to conduct border searches,
Congress has determined that at least some measure of the individual
270. 623 F.2d at 562.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 563.
273. 433 U.S. at 15.
274. 623 F.2d at 563.
275. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
276. Id. at 235.
277. Id. at 236. While it is certainly arguable that the concern of the Chadwick Court
(arrestee access to weapon or opportunity to destroy evidence) is no longer an issue once
personal effects are removed from the control of the arrestee, and that, therefore, the "not
immediately associated with the arrestee" qualification should not be mechanically applied,
it is clear that Robinson is directly applicable to the facts in Ziller.
278. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1581(a), 1582 (1976).
279. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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right to privacy must yield to this superior national right."2 '
This broad reach of the customs legislation imposes duties upon
the courts to prevent undue extensions of this border search exception
beyond the actual borders of the nation. As the Supreme Court in
Carroll v. United States2"' noted:
Travellers may be . . stopped in crossing an international
boundary because of national self protection reasonably re-
quiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled
to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be law-
fully brought in. But those lawfully within the country, enti-
tled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage
without interruption or search unless there is known to a com-
petent official .authorized to search, probable cause for believ-
ing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise. 2
Although initially a source of controversy, it is now settled that the
concept of a border extends some distance beyond the actual boundary
line.283 The concept of the "elastic" '284 or "extended" border is neces-
sary because of the problems that a rigid definition of the border posed
for law enforcement agents.2"' The actual limits of this extended bor-
der area, however, have not been settled.
The concept of the extended or elastic border was adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Alexander v. United States. 6 InAlexander, the court
stated that the legality of a search for contraband by customs officers,
not made at or in the immediate vicinity of the border,
must be tested by a determination whether the totality of the
surrounding circumstances, including the time and distance
elapsed as well as the manner and extent of surveillance, are
such as to convince the fact finder with reasonable certainty
280. Note, From Bags to Body Cavities: The Law of Border Search, 74 COLUM. L. REV.
53, 53-54 (1974) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited as Border Search].
281. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
282. Id. at 154.
283. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973).
284. Border Search, supra note 280, at 57.
285. "No customs search can be made precisely at the border. All must be made some-
where north of the border between Mexico and the United States." Id. at 57 n.22 (quoting
Murgia v. United States, 285 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 977 (1961));
see also United States v. Rodriguez, 195 F. Supp. 513, 516 (S.D. Tex. 1960) ("[N]or do I
conceive it to be the law that, where the suspect may momentarily escape detection and pass
safely through the first Custom's check, he is immune from further interrogation or exami-
nation by Customs officers . ), aft'd, 292 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1961).
286. 362 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 977 (1966).
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that any contraband which might be found in or on the vehi-
cle at the time of search was aboard the vehicle at the time of
entry into the jurisdiction of the United States.287
This test was refined in Castillo-Garcia v. United States,288 in
which the Ninth Circuit held that a vehicle search 105 miles from the
border constituted an extended border search. The continuous surveil-
lance of the defendants after crossing the border was considered a more
important factor in the court's rationale than the distance from the
border.
The distance from the border, whether it be 105 miles or 500
miles, is important only as it relates to the surveillance and any
other circumstances which aids the fact finder in determining
with reasonable certainty that any contraband which might be
found in the vehicle at the time of the search was aboard the
vehicle at the time of entry into the jurisdiction of the United
States.289
Because some nexus to the border is required in order to allow
warrantless searches near the border where probable cause would
otherwise be required, the concept of continuous surveillance after a
border crossing developed. Thus, if
surveillance subsequent to the creation of the border nexus
signals the probability of unchanged conditions [since the
crossing], a search may be justified, although distant in both
time and space from the border. Surveillance serves to pre-
serve the necessary nexus, and to expand the permissible area
in which a border search may take place.29 °
The Ninth Circuit has clearly followed this expansive reasoning.291
287. Id. at 382.
288. 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1970).
289. Id. at 485 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971).
290. Border Search, supra note 280, at 68; see United States v. Martinez, 481 F.2d 214,
218-19 (5th Cir. 1973) (150 miles and 142 hours from border), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931
(1974); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256,258 (9th Cir. 1967) (20 miles and
15 hours from border).
291. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. Only a Sixth Circuit district court has
taken a step to limit the necessary conclusion that constant surveillance places any search
within the elastic border. In United States v. Cusanelli, 357 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D. Ohio
1972), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1204 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953 (1973), customs
agents pursued a suspicious airplane from Miami to Ohio where a search disclosed mari-
juana. The court rejected the prosecution's argument that this was a valid border search,
despite the constant vigil kept on the airplane. Observing that Ohio was not in the "geo-
graphical area within reasonable extension of the immediate entry point," the court declined
19811
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It has been suggested that as "applied, constant surveillance estab-
lishes a 'nexus' with the border that appears indefinitely elastic."292
This suggestion is borne out in the 1980 case of United States v.
Moore.293 The defendants were apprehended at a small airport in Cal-
ifornia after flying into the United States from Mexico. The only sur-
veillance of the defendants' airplane was by government agents on a
radar screen. The court characterized the ensuing search as an ex-
tended border search and upheld its validity based on Castillo-Garcia.
If the court's analysis was correct, Moore expands the extended
border search doctrine to allow mechanical surveillance without any
visual verification of the border crossing at all. The analysis in Moore
demonstrates the court's willingness to overlook the limits espoused in
Cusanelli294 and to expand the doctrine as necessary. More impor-
tantly, the Ninth Circuit appears willing to disregard the right to pri-
vacy of travellers once inside the boundaries of the United States.29s
The problems of indefinite elasticity and reasonable suspicion
could have been avoided if the Ninth Circuit had analyzed Moore as a
search at the functional equivalent of the border, rather than as an ex-
tended border search.2 96 In 41meida-Sanchez v. United Slates,2 97 the
Supreme Court discussed the concept of the border, stating that
"searches. . . may in certain circumstances take place not only at the
border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well. '298
The Ninth Circuit applied this concept in United States v. Pot-
ter, 299 a case strikingly similar to Moore. The Potter court upheld a
search of the defendants' aircraft shortly after it landed in Las Vegas.
The court relied on the functional equivalent doctrine, without discuss-
to stretch the concept of elasticity to an absurd result. Id at 680; see also Border Search,
supra note 280, at 69.
292. Border Search, supra note 280, at 69. Surveillance is not the sole factor in determin-
ing the validity of the search, however, as Alexander and Well illustrate. Although it is not
certain to what extent, both Alexander and Well require a reasonable certainty that contra-
band has been smuggled across the border. Hence, "[t]hat the vehicle or pedestrian searched
has crossed an international boundary is not, therefore, the sine qua non of a valid border
search . . . ." Id. at 63 (citing United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1970), cer.
denied, 401 U.S. 947 (1971)).
293. 638 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1980).
294. See supra note 291.
295. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
296. See generally Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (search
of auto on road lying at least twenty miles north of Mexican border held not at functional
equivalent of a border).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ing the extended border concept, and concluded that the "search of an
aircraft arriving at an inland city airport after a non-stop flight from
Mexico would clearly be the functional equivalent of a border
search." 3"
In setting forth the standards for concluding that a search occurred
at the functional equivalent of a border, the court "required . .. that
'the totality of the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowl-
edge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information be
sufficient in the light of their experience to warrant afirm belief that a
border crossing has occurred.' "" In Moore, as in Potter, it was rea-
sonably clear that customs agents had a firm belief that the defendants'
airplane had crossed the border since they had tracked it on radar. As
the court correctly concluded, the "reliable technology used by the
agents in this case was more than acceptable."3"2
Thus, by employing the proper analysis, the Ninth Circuit could
have avoided (1) a further expansion of the extended border search
doctrine and potential conffict with Carroll, and (2) the inference that
the reasonable suspicion requirement of previous Ninth Circuit ex-
tended border search cases was no longer required. The functional
equivalent analysis in Potter avoids both of these problems, and the
facts of Moore fit nicely into the Potter analysis.
Only one week after Moore, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v.
Smith 3°1 again considered the limits of the extended border search.
This time the court's decision was analytically sound, representing a
proper application of the doctrine. It is clear from Smith that distance
from the border is no longer a factor relevant to the court's analysis.
Customs agents, in searching a commercial airplane bound from Lima,
Peru to San Francisco during an intermediate stop in Los Angeles, dis-
covered about three and one-half pounds of cocaine hidden in the ceil-
ing panels of the right rear lavatory of the plane. The plane was
searched while the passengers were processed through customs. The
agents replaced the cocaine and kept the right rear lavatory under sur-
300. Id. at 907 (citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. at 273).
301. 552 F.2d at 907 (citing United States v. Tilton, 534 F.2d 1363, 1366-67 (9th Cir.
1976)) (emphasis in original).
302. United States v. Moore, 638 F.2d at 1173.
303. 629 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1980).
304. Previously the time under surveillance and distance from the border when searched
were factors considered by both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits. See United States v. Fogel-
man, 586 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Weil, 432 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1970)
(surveillance made it "reasonably certain" suspect had crossed border), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
947 (1971).
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
veillance for the remainder of the trip. Shortly after leaving Los Ange-
les, the defendant entered the center lavatory carrying a shoulder bag.
Sixteen minutes later, defendant emerged and upon an immediate
search of the right rear lavatory, the cocaine was discovered missing.
When the plane landed in San Francisco, defendant was detained for a
continuing customs examination and the cocaine was found 0.3°
Defendant, on appeal, attempted to argue that this second search,
by virtue of its occurring in San Francisco, was "too remote from the
border to constitute a valid customs search."3 °6 The court rejected de-
fendant's claim and held that the "distance is not a factor here, how-
ever, because the appellant had not mingled in the normal stream of
commerce so as to lessen the certainty that the contraband had come
directly across the border. ' 3 7 Thus, clearly from this case the distance
consideration is no longer an essential part of the reasonable suspicion
analysis.3 °8
In upholding this second search as valid, the court further rejected
defendant's claim that once the customs agents had made their original
search of his person and bag in Los Angeles, they could make no fur-
ther search without a warrant. 30 9 The court relied upon Well for the
proposition that if an initial border search disclosed nothing, a second
search was permitted "when [the] agents had cause to believe that the
vehicle and its occupant had picked up [smuggled] contraband.
'310
The court analogized the instant case to Well and reasoned:
There, as here, the first search was unavailing because the
smuggler was physically separated from the contraband at the
time the search occurred. The second search which took place
in Well, as in this case, when the smuggler had gained posses-
sion of the contraband on this side of the border, was upheld.
The same result should follow here.31
Finally, the court rejected defendant's claim that this case was factu-
ally distinct from the extended border search cases. Defendant argued
that in this case the contraband had already been discovered prior to
305. 629 F.2d at 1302-03.
306. Id. at 1303.
307. Id. at 1304 (citing United States v. Sayer, 579 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1978) (agent rea-
sonably certain contraband had just come across border); United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d
821, 833 (5th Cir. 1971) (agents had reasonable cause to suspect vehicles contained imported
contraband), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971)).
308. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.





the challenged search while in the earlier cases it had not. The court
stated that the "essential holding of Alexander is that the agents could
defer seizure of contraband until, by means of surveillance, they had
identified those responsible for its unlawful importation, ' 3 2 and found
that was all that Smith involved.313
In Smith and Moore, the Ninth Circuit has again assumed a lead-
ing role in expanding the increasingly indefinite border area. Should
this expansion continue, the fourth amendment protection against war-
rantless searches once inside the nation's boundaries will collide with
this extended second border search doctrine. Because the need to en-
force the integrity of the boundaries seems to be paramount to the
court, border search extensions will probably continue despite the colli-
sion course.
4. Administrative searches
Administrative searches are also governed by the fourth amend-
ment. In Camara v. Municipal CoUrt,3 14 the Supreme Court upheld the
fourth amendment right of an apartment tenant to refuse a warrantless
inspection of his residence for a possible violation of the building's oc-
cupancy permit. The Court held that routine administrative inspec-
tions of residences require a warrant, which should normally be sought
only after entry is refused.315 This rule was expanded in See v. City of
Seattle316 to non-residential, commercial structures, where the Court
upheld the fourth amendment right of a warehouse owner to refuse a
warrantless inspection for a possible violation of the municipal fire
code.317
Exceptions to this rule have been made for pervasively regulated
businesses in which the federal government has an important interest.
The leading Supreme Court case is United States v. Biswell.318 There
the Court upheld a warrantless regulatory inspection of a locked gun
storeroom pursuant to the Gun Control Act of 1968, on the grounds
that: (1) there was an important federal interest in preventing violent
312. Id. at 1304.
313. Id. As cited in Smith, it appears that the Fifth Circuit had also expanded the ex-
tended border search cases. See, e.g., Government of Canal Zone v. Eulberg, 581 F.2d 1216
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
829 (1971).
314. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
315. Id. at 539-40.
316. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
317. Id. at 545-46.
318. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
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crime, (2) inspection was crucial to the regulatory scheme, and
(3) knowledge of the federal licensee that his pervasively regulated
business was subject to inspection minimized his justifiable expecta-
tions of privacy.
319
Exceptions to the See rule have also been made for historically
closely regulated industries. The leading case in this area is Colonnade
Catering Corp. v. United States.320 This case involved the warrantless
breaking and entering of a caterer's locked liquor storeroom by federal
inspectors. Although the Court stated that "[t]he general rule. . . in
See v. City of Seattle. . . is. . . not applicable" to historically regu-
lated industries, it invalidated the forcible search on the ground that
the exclusive congressional sanction for refusing entry was a fine,
which precluded the use of force to effect an entry.321
In United States v. Raub,322 the court upheld an agent's warrant-
less inspection aboard a fishing boat.323 An agent of the Marine Fish-
eries Service was told by two fishermen, who were authorized to fish in
the area, that they did not recognize a particular boat that was fishing
with a gill net.324 At that time of year, only Point Elliot Treaty Indians
were permitted to fish in this area for sockeye or pink salmon using gill
nets. The agent obtained permission to board the reported boat. When
he confronted the defendant with the discrepancy between the placard
displayed on the boat representing him as a Point Elliot Treaty Indian
and his own Indian identity card, the defendant admitted that the plac-
ard was not his. Later, the agent reboarded the boat, and after issuing
the defendant a citation, seized one of his sockeye salmon and a swatch
of his gill net. On appeal from his conviction for violating 16 U.S.C.
section 776,325 defendant argued that salmon fishing was exempt from
the Biswell-Colonnade warrant exception because federal regulation of
it was a recent development, and because the statute permits inspecting
officers unlimited investigatory discretion.
The court provided a detailed history which showed that com-
mercial fishing has long been closely regulated by the federal govern-
319. Id. at 315-16.
320. 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
321. Id. at 76-77.
322. 637 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1980).
323. Id. at 1210-11.
324. A gill net is a flat net suspended vertically in the water that catches a fish's gill covers
in its meshes when it tries to withdraw.
325. Sockeye Salmon and Pink Salmon Fishing Act of 1947, 16 U.S.C. § 776 (1976). This
Act prohibits fishing with a net in convention waters during certain specified dates. See 50
C.F.R. §§ 371.3(g), 371.9 app. A, 1 2 (1979).
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ment.3 26 Because the statute and detailed regulations promoted salmon
conservation, an important federal interest was also present.327 The
court explained that the statute's provisions carefully limited the au-
thority and scope of warrantless searches to those necessary to protect
the federal interest in salmon conservation. 328 For these reasons, and
for the reason that the defendant's awareness of the federal regulations
precluded his possessing a reasonable expectation of privacy,329 the
court decided that the case came within the B/swell-Colonnade excep-
tion, upholding the warrantless inspection.
. Warrantless Arrests
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in pertinent part, that "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . particularly
describing the . . . person . . . to be seized. ' 33° Historically, the
Supreme Court has recognized the validity of warrantless arrests, even
in situations where it would not be impractical to obtain an arrest war-
rant.33 ' The Court has, however, strictly adhered to the probable cause
standard, requiring "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowl-
edge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reason-
able caution, in believing in the circumstances shown, that the suspect
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.
332
In United States v. Bernard,333 the Ninth Circuit applied a varia-
tion of this test, holding that where officers working in close concert334
collectively have knowledge sufficient to constitute probable cause,335
the fourth amendment requirement of probable cause to arrest is satis-
fied although the arresting officers were unaware of the other officers'
information.336
326. 637 F.2d at 1209.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1210.
329. Id.
330. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
331. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113 (1975) (while arrest warrants preferred
when feasible, lack of warrant alone has not been basis of invalidation). But cf. Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (warrantless entry without consent into a suspect's
home to make routine felony arrest prohibited by the fourth amendment).
332. Michigan v. DefiUippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
333. 623 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1979).
334. Id. at 561.
335. Id. at 560.
336. Id. at 561.
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In Bernard, Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
agents had been informed by a suspect in custody for illegal manufac-
ture of methamphetamine that he and Bernard had made the drug dur-
ing the previous year.337 The informant also claimed that Bernard and
others were manufacturing it in Oregon and that the necessary chemi-
cals had been obtained by Bernard under the cover of a legitimate busi-
ness.338 Subsequent DEA investigation verified that Bernard had
purchased chemicals necessary for amphetamine manufacture. On one
occasion, agents observed defendants Bard and Childress pick up
chemicals ordered by Bernard and take them to Childress' residence in
Hermiston, Oregon.339 While surveilling the suspects, investigating
agents noted what appeared to be counter-surveillance activities by
Bard and Childress after they had picked up the chemicals. 340 During
this time, the DEA received independent tips from other informants
that methamphetamine would soon be manufactured in the Clarks-
town, Oregon area and made available in the Hermiston-Pendleton
area.3
41
On the day of defendants' arrests, DEA agents followed defendant
Bard to a mobile home located in a trailer park where a number of
vehicles, which had previously been seen at the residences under sur-
veillance, were parked.342 These vehicles and the mobile home were
then followed to a state park where defendants conducted a counter-
surveillance sweep of the surrounding area before carrying boxes from
their vehicles to the mobile home.3 43
In the ensuing hours, agent Nielsen observed that all the vents and
the door of the mobile home had been left open while the curtains re-
mained drawn. He also heard voices, which he guessed to be Bard's
and Childress', informing their companions that the park was under
surveillance by DEA agents. At about this same time Nielsen observed
defendant Brock rush out of the mobile home, gasping and shaking his
head in an apparent effort to draw some fresh air.344 The agent also
thought he smelled something "cooking" but could not identify the
odor. Nielsen then conferred with agent Lackey, who was also surveil-
ling the area, and the two concluded that the mobile home was being





342. Id. at 553-54.
343. Id. at 554.
344. Id.
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used by the suspects as a laboratory.345
At this point, agent Fredericks arrived and conferred with agent
Lackey. Lackey related his conclusion to Fredericks but failed to in-
form him of the choking incident or of the suspects' conversation indi-
cating their knowledge of the on-going surveillance.346 On the basis of
the information he had gathered prior to the stakeout, the incomplete
information related to him by Lackey, and Lackey's own conclusions,
Fredericks ordered the defendants' warrantless arrests.347 The ensuing
search of the mobile home revealed evidence of methamphetamine
production. Prior to their trial, defendants successfully moved for sup-
pression of all evidence as the fruit of an arrest unsupported by proba-
ble cause.348
The court of appeals reversed. 49 Following a citation of the fa-
miliar tests for probable cause3 50 and warrantless arrests,35' the court
reviewed all of the facts known to agent Fredericks at the time he or-





349. Id. at 562.
350. The test if [sic] probable cause is whether at the moment of arrest the facts and
circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers "and of which they
had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man
in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense."
Id. at 559 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
351. "If the officers have probable cause to make the arrest it is not necessary to prove
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest." 623 F.2d at 559 (citing United States
v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976)).
352. The facts which emerged from the prearrest investigation were summarized as fol-
lows: (1) an informant's tip that Bernard was operating an illegal methamphetamine manu-
facturing business and might be ready to produce the drug sometime around March, 1978;
(2) corroborating surveillance information that Bernard was purchasing the necessary chem-
icals and that some of the chemicals were located in the Meachem, Oregon area and proba-
bly in the Hermiston, Oregon area; (3) knowledge that Bernard and his associates acted
suspiciously while purchasing the chemicals and indications that they were conducting
counter-surveillance activities; (4) knowledge that Bernard had instructed the chemical sup-
plier to give the chemicals to Childress, and that Childress and Bard had picked up the
chemicals the same day; (5) knowledge that vehicles which had been seen at the residences
in Meacham and Hermiston, where some of the chemicals had been taken, were seen to-
gether at the scene of the arrest; and (6) knowledge that Bernard associated with suspected
drug traffickers. 623 F.2d at 559.
Agent Fredericks testified that his arrest decision was based upon the above informa-
tion combined with (1) an inference that the location of the mobile home in an isolated area
would be suitable for the maintenance of a clandestine laboratory, (2) knowledge that some
of the persons in the park had assisted Bernard in purchasing chemicals, (3) an inference
that the boxes transferred to the mobile home contained the chemicals associated with am-
phetamine production, (4) an inference that the windows and vents of the mobile home were
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mation known to agent Fredericks was insufficient to warrant a
prudent man in believing that the defendants were committing an of-
fense." '353 It also noted that no agent was aware of Bernard's presence
at the park until after the arrests and that Fredericks was not apprised
of the choking incident or the fact that agent Nielsen might have
smelled something cooking.354
The court then turned its attention to the Government's argument
that a probable cause assessment need not be confined to the personal
knowledge of agent Fredericks, but might properly take into considera-
tion the collective knowledge of all agents involved in the operation. It
found that the collective knowledge of agents Fredericks, Lackey, and
Nielsen "was sufficient to constitute probable cause."3 5 The court then
focused upon the question of whether Fredericks "could rely upon in-
formation known to agents Lackey and Nielsen which had not been
communicated to Fredericks" at the time he ordered the arrests.
356
Passing over the question of how one might rely upon information not
within one's own knowledge, the court drew upon case authority from
other circuits which held in various factual contexts that probable cause
may be present on the basis of all " 'objective facts available for consid-
eration by the agencies or officers participating in the arrest.' -7
We recognize that in some[351 of the cases holding that the
collective knowledge of the arresting officers could be consid-
ered in determining probable cause, the substance of informa-
tion obtained by other officers had been communicated to the
arresting officers. . . We do not find, however, that this is
left open to provide ventilation for the lab while the curtains remained drawn to conceal the
operation, and (5) an inference that the defendants were involved in counter-surveillance
activities when they were driving around the area of the park.. Id. at 559-60.
353. Id. at 560.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. (emphasis added).
357. Id. at 560-61 (quoting United States v. Stratton, 453 F.2d 36, 37 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972)). For the same proposition, the court cited the following cases:
United States v. Caraballo, 571 F.2d 975, 977 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Rose, 541
F.2d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v. Heisman,
503 F.2d 1284, 1290 n.5 (8th Cir. 1974); Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
358. Of the four cases cited by the court, three show that the arresting officer was in
possession of secondhand knowledge constituting probable cause which had been communi-
cated to him by fellow officers prior to the arrest. The three cases are: United States v. Rose,
541 F.2d 750, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v.
Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284, 1286-87 (8th Cir. 1974); Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d
901, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
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required, particularly where, as here, the agents were working
in close concert.359
In an attempt to bolster its collective knowledge theory, the court
drew an analogy between the instant factual situation and a case in
which a law enforcement officer made an arrest on the strength of a
police radio bulletin.36 ° In the latter instance the arresting officer is
entitled to rely upon a radio bulletin which is based upon probable
cause.361 The court compared agent Fredericks' position with that of
the arresting officer in United States v. Gaither.36 z In Gaither, the
Fourth Circuit held that an arrest made on the basis of a radio bulletin
was based on probable cause because the bulletin was grounded on the
personal observation of the FBI.363  The Bernard court felt that
"[s]imilarly, agent Fredericks was entitled to rely on the observations
and knowledge of agents Lackey and Nielsen, even though some of the
critical information had not been communicated to him.' 6
The outcome of Bernard is unsatisfactory. The court accepts,
359. United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d at 561 (citation omitted). A reading of the cited
collective knowledge cases gives no indication whether their outcomes would have been
different had the information constituting probable cause not been communicated to the
arresting officer. Likewise, there is no indication of the possible outcome had the person
ordering the arrest not been in possession of sufficient facts to make a finding of probable
cause on his own at the time that he gave the order. These courts had no occasion to con-
sider the type of situation presented in Bernard.
360. 627 F.2d at 561 (citing Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); United States v.
Gaither, 527 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976)).
361. In Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971), the Supreme Court found that a warrant
which was the basis of a bulletin for defendant's arrest was invalid due to the failure of the
underlying affidavit to show probable cause. Id. at 568. Consequently, the Court held that
the arrest made on the strength of the resulting radio bulletin was unconstitutional. Id. at
569. The Court did acknowledge, however, that the arresting officers were entitled in the
first instance to assume that a warrant underlying the radio bulletin had been issued after a
proper judicial assessment of probable cause and to act on the basis of the bulletin. Id.
362. 527 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
363. Id. at 458.
364. 623 F.2d at 561. If it was the court's intention to bolster its view of the collective
theory with the radio bulletin analogy it certainly chose a very weak crutch. In the Gaither
case the arresting officer was acting merely as an instrument of other officers whose burden it
was to make a correct assessment of probable cause to arrest. The Gaither court had no
occasion to address the problem which would have arisen had the decision-making officers
made an incorrect assessment of probable cause and then ordered the officer to arrest. In
Bernard, agent Fredericks would be more correctly placed in the role of the officer who
broadcasts the arrest order. In the final analysis, it was his decision to arrest and that deci-
sion may be properly reached only on the basis of facts at hand which would support a
personal finding of probable cause in each case. To say that such a decision may be properly
made by an individual in possession of less than sufficient facts to cross the threshold of
probable cause is clearly contrary to prevailing views of the individual's right to be safe-
guarded from unjustified intrusion upon personal liberty.
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without clear explanation, the doctrine of collective knowledge. The
collective knowledge approach to the assessment of probable cause, ac-
cepting as it does all knowledge possessed at the time of an arrest by
any member of a law enforcement agency, seems to proceed from the
premise that arrest decisions are made by agencies in some sort of cor-
porate capacity. It would appear, however, that ultimate arrest deci-
sions, and ultimate determinations of probable cause, are made by
individuals in authority or on the scene. The concept of some sort of a
corporate brain or central information repository which may be drawn
upon by an officer making the arrest decision, without his knowledge, is
a convenient fiction.
In Bernard, the facts are susceptible to a reading which would in-
dicate that agent Fredericks, as agent in charge, made an unfortunate
error in assessing probable cause to arrest. Yet, instead of suffering the
consequences of his error (i.e. suppression of the evidence seized as an
incident of an illegal arrest), the Government is courteously given a
second bite at the apple by being judicially allowed to refer back to the
"corporate information repository" and to take after the fact informa-
tional supplements to support Fredericks' earlier uninformed arrest de-
cision. It is no justification for this departure from constitutional
principles to summarily conclude, as the Bernard court did, that agent
Fredericks was entitled to "rely upon information. . . which had not
been communicated to [him].
'365
365. Id. at 560. Nowhere does the court undertake to explain why this conclusion is
justified. The practical effect of embracing the collective knowledge theory is to subject the
officer making the arrest decision to a less strict standard than that applied to the magistrate
who issues arrest warrants. It is, to say the least, anomalous to allow an officer in the posi-
tion of Fredericks to patch up gaping holes in his required knowledge after the crucial arrest
decision has been made. Quite properly, the magistrate is not allowed such a luxury. When
that official warrants an arrest without sufficient facts before him to make a correct probable
cause determination, the warrant is irretrievably invalid. If there is some justification for
this anomaly, it is not to be found in the Bernard opinion. Just as the magistrate must be
apprised of the collective knowledge of the officers, the arresting officer should be apprised
of the "corporate" knowledge which constitutes probable cause. See United States v. Del
Porte, 357 F. Supp. 969, 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the district court observed that:
While hearsay from fellow officers is a valid basis for probable cause, (citation
omitted) and while the Second Circuit seems to have approved cases in other cir-
cuits which hold that the collective knowledge of a large police organization can be
imputed to an individual arresting officer, see United States v. Canieso, 470 F.2d
1224 n.7 (1972), that concept would not appear to be applicable when the hearsay
is communicated to no one until after the arrests have been made. ...
Taken to its extreme, the Bernard rule tacitly encourages law enforcement officers to arrest
with less than probable cause known to them with the hope that there might be sufficient




In Dunaway v. New York,366 the United States Supreme Court
held that where investigating officers detain an individual and take him
to a police station for interrogation, such a detention is a "seizure"
within the fourth amendment and requires a showing of probable
cause.
3 67
Although the detectives in Dunaway lacked sufficient information
for an arrest warrant, they were ordered to "pick up" defendant Duna-
way, who was located at a neighbor's residence. The defendant was not
told that he was under arrest, but was taken into custody and brought
to the police station where he was interrogated. The officers conceded
at trial that had Dunaway attempted to leave, he would have been
physically restrained.368
The Court concluded that "detention for custodial interrogation-
regardless of its label-intrudes so severely on interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment as necessarily to trigger the traditional safe-
guards against illegal arrest."369 Because statements made by Duna-
way at the station house should have been suppressed at trial, the Court
reversed his conviction.
In United States v. Mendenhall,370 a divided Court37 declined to
apply the Dunaway rule in an analogous situation involving the interro-
gation of an airline passenger who *as suspected of carrying narcot-
ics. 372 In Mendenhall, DEA agents assigned to Detroit's Metropolitan
Airport observed the defendant deplaning and concluded that her be-
havior was typical of a person transporting narcotics.373 The agents
366. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by
Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Rehnquist wrote a dis-
sent, in which Chief Justice Burger joined.
367. 442 U.S. at 216.
368. Id. at 203.
369. 442 U.S. at 216.
370. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
371. Justice Stewart announced the judgment and issued an opinion joined in full by
Justice Rehnquist. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Blackmun joined in part.
Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
372. The Court apparently found Dunaway distinguishable because Dunaway's detention
was involuntary. See id at 554-55.
373. Mendenlalrs behavior apparently coincided with the suspect conduct characteristics
of the DEA's drug courier profile. Specifically, the agents noted that (1) defendant was
arriving from Los Angeles, a city considered the source of much of Detroit's heroin, (2) de-
fendant was the last to disembark from the plane, she appeared nervous, and she looked
over the area where the agents stood, (3) defendant walked past the baggage area without
claiming any luggage, and (4) defendant switched airlines for her flight out of Detroit to
Pittsburgh. Id. at 547 n.l.
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approached Mendenhall, identified themselves as government agents,
and requested to see her identification and airline ticket. She produced
a driver's license bearing her name and a ticket bearing a different
name. When asked about the discrepancy, Mendenhall replied that she
-just felt like using" the false name. The agents then specifically iden-
tified themselves as narcotics agents, whereupon Mendenhall became
visibly distraught.
The agents returned the identification and asked the defendant if
she would accompany them to the airport DEA office to answer some
additional questions. She silently complied with this request. At the
office, Mendenhall was asked if she would consent to a search of her
handbag and person, but was also cautioned that she need not assent.
She replied, "Go ahead." The handbag search revealed a receipt for a
plane ticket issued three days earlier in the name of "F. Bush." Men-
denhall admitted that she had used that ticket for her trip to Los
Angeles.
At this point, a female police officer arrived to conduct the search
of Mendenhall's person. After being assured by the agents that Men-
denhall had consented to the search, the officer escorted Mendenhall to
a private room. There the officer received Mendenhall's express con-
sent to the search. Upon being instructed to disrobe, the defendant
stated that she had a plane to catch. She was assured that if she pos-
sessed no narcotics there would be no problem. As Mendenhall shed
her clothes, she removed two packets from her underclothing, one of
which appeared to contain heroin. She was then arrested on possession
charges.
374
The district court denied Mendenhall's motion to suppress the
packets on the ground that the agents' detention of defendant was justi-
fied under the standards for investigatory stops enunciated in Terry v.
Ohio37 5 and United States v. BrIgnoni-Ponce.376 The court further
ruled that no arrest or detention had taken place after the initial stop
because the defendant had accompanied the agents "voluntarily in a
spirit of apparent cooperation. ' 377
The Sixth Circuit concluded that the factual predicates for the in-
374. The facts of Mendenhall parallel those of Dunaway: a police-citizen confrontation
was followed by a police request that the citizen accompany the officers from the scene for
questioning, and the request was subsequently complied with by the citizen.
375. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
376. 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
377. 446 U.S. at 549 (citing to unreported trial court opinion). Notable here is that the
trial court in the first instance found involuntary accompaniment, whereas the Dunaway trial
court found otherwise. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 207 & n.6.
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vestigtory stop and subsequent events were indistinguishable from
those in United States v. MCaleb,378 thus compelling the reversal of
Mendenhall's conviction.
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and affirmed
Mendenhall's conviction. Justice Stewart, writing for himself and Jus-
tice Rehnquist,379 held the view that Mendenhall had never been seized
and that she had both accompanied the agents and submitted to the
strip search freely and voluntarily.380 Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,381 expressed the opinion that,
while it could be assumed that a seizure had occurred, it had been
based upon reasonable suspicion and was therefore not violative of the
fourth amendment.382  The concurring justices agreed with Justice
Stewart that Mendenhall had voluntarily accompanied the agents and
submitted to the strip search.383 Justice White, writing for the four dis-
senters, would have held that a seizure unjustified by reasonable suspi-
cion had occurred,384 that Mendenhall had been under detention
amounting to an arrest not based on probable cause or consent when
she accompanied the agents, 385 and that her subsequent consent to the
strip search was fatally tainted by the agents' earlier unconstitutional
conduct.386
378. 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). In McCaleb, defendants were stopped by DEA agents
at Detroit Airport after they arrived from Los Angeles. The stop was based upon defend-
ants' behavioral conformity with the drug courier profile. See supra note 373. After asking
the suspects for identification and tickets, the agents noticed that one suspect's identification
did not coincide with his luggage tag, and that the other two had flown under false identities.
The three were escorted to the DEA airport office where the agents searched defendant
McCaleb's bag and discovered a quantity of heroin. Id. at 719.
The Sixth Circuit held that while observation of a combination of drug courier charac-
teristics could provide the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop, the
observations in McCaleb did not do so. The court alternatively held that even if the initial
stop was valid, it became an arrest and exceeded the scope of investigation permitted by
Terry when the defendants were "taken" to the DEA office. Id. at 720. The McCaleb court
did not address the issue of the voluntariness of the defendants' accompaniment of the
agents. Presumably, the Government never raised the issue.
379. Although Justice Stewart was a member of the Dunaway majority, in Mendenhall he
adopted the reasoning of the Dunaway dissent.
380. 446 U.S. at 554-55.
381. Justice Blackmun was a member of the Dunaway majority and Justice Powell did
not participate in the case.
382. 446 U.S. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring).
383. Id.
384. Id. at 574 (White, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 574-75.
386. Id. at 577.
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The Stewart-Rehnquist opinion
Prior to oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Govern-
ment's sole contention was that the agents' actions amounted to a law-
ful investigatory stop followed by a consent to search. 38 7  The
Government raised its "no seizure" contention for the first time in its
brief on the merits and again at oral argument. Justice Stewart justified
this departure from the Court's policy of refusing to consider matters
neither raised nor decided by the courts below on the ground of ex-
traordinary circumstances.
388
Preliminarily, Justice Stewart observed that "'[o]bviously not all
personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves 'seizures'
of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a 'seizure' has occurred.' "389 Citing Terry and Sibron v.
New York 390 as examples, Justice Stewart concluded that the Court
had never before expressly defined those factors which indicate a
seizure has been made.
391
Noting that the fourth amendment's protections are not intended
to preclude all contact between law enforcement officers and the public,
the Stewart opinion enunciated an objective totality of the circum-
stances test (first advocated by Justice Rehnquist in Dunaway),392 by
which police-citizen interaction should be evaluated in determining the
existence of a seizure.393 The question to be raised was whether a rea-
sonable person under the circumstances would believe that she was not
387. Id. at 551 n.5.
388. Id. "We consider the Government's contention that there was no seizure of the re-
spondent... because the contrary assumption, embraced by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, rests on a serious misapprehension of federal constitutional law." Id.
389. Id. at 552 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
390. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
391. 446 U.S. at 552-53.
392. Justice Rehnquist asserted that the voluntariness of the detention is determined by
"whether the police conduct, objectively viewed, restrained petitioner's liberty by show of
force or authority .... The question turns on whether the officer's conduct is objectively
coercive or physically threatening ... ." 442 U.S. at 224 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
393. We conclude that a person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt
to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use
of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request
might be compelled.
446 U.S. at 554.
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free to leave.394 Justice Stewart concluded that "nothing in the rec-
ord"395 suggested that Mendenhall had any objective reason to believe
that she was not free to terminate the conversation with the agents and
proceed on her way.3 96
Following this determination, Justice Stewart ruled that Menden-
hall had been neither seized nor constructively arrested when she was
escorted to the DEA office. This conclusion was based on an accept-
ance of the district court's finding of voluntariness, which Justice Stew-
art found amply supported by the record. That a contrary finding was
made by the court of appeals was deemed irrelevant in that that court
had been "mistaken in substituting for [the district court's] finding its
view of the evidence.
397
The concurring and dissenting opinions
Justice Powell in his concurring opinion agreed in all respects with
the findings of Justice Stewart, except that he declined to address the
Government's "no seizure" argument because "neither of the courts be-
low considered the question." '398 Instead, he undertook a Terry analy-
sis, which led to the conclusion that the agents' initial seizure of
Mendenhall was valid, and deferred to the trial court's finding that
Mendenhall's subsequent compliance with the agents' requests was
voluntary.399
394. The dissent criticized Justice Stewart for ignoring the likelihood that the record was
devoid of such evidence because the precise issue had never been raised or addressed below.
Id. at 569 & n.2, 570-71 (White, J., dissenting). This is a valid criticism. Because of prior
decisions, the parties had no reason to make a record of the objective factors stressed by
Justice Stewart.
395. Id. at 555. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stewart found it decisive that (1) the
agents neither wore uniforms nor displayed weapons, (2) they did not summon Mendenhall
to them but approached her instead, and (3) the agents requested but did not demand to see
Mendenhall's identification and ticket.
396. Id. The plurality opinion did not address the question of why the record was suffi-
cient on the voluntariness issue and what distinguished it from the deficient record in Duna-
way. Compare the dissenters' evaluation of the record in the instant case. See id. at 570 &
n.3 (White, J., dissenting).
397. Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
398. Id. at 560 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell did not, however, reject Justice
Stewart's objective test. "I do not necessarily disagree with the views expressed in Part II-A.
For me, the question whether the respondent in this case reasonably could have thought she
was free to 'walk away' when asked by two Government agents for her driver's license and
ticket is extremely close." Id. at 560 n.l.
399. Id. at 565. Justice Powell concluded that the combination of the agents' experience
and their observations of Mendenhall's behavior furnished a reasonable suspicion of crimi-
nal activity which outweighed the relatively modest intrusion upon the individual's personal
liberty interests. He considered the intrusion "quite modest" in view of the fact that Men-
denhall would not have been initially isolated from public aid had she felt threatened, that
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As to the plurality's finding that Mendenhall had accompanied the
agents voluntarily, the dissenters argued that the record was devoid of
evidence which would support such a finding either in the first instance
by the trial court or by the Supreme Court on review.40 The dissent
also argued that "[t]he evidence of consent here is even flimsier than
that we rejected in Dunaway where it was claimed that the suspect
made an affirmative response when asked if he would accompany the
officers to the police station." 0' The dissenters found it "unbelievable"
that the present chain of events demonstrated no infringement of con-
stitutionally protected privacy interests and stated that "[tihe rule of
law requires a different conclusion."4"2
Satisfactory reconciliation of Dunaway and Mendenhall is not pos-
sible if one is attempting to discern a uniform progression in the
Court's approach to the permissible extent of the Terry stop, or even to
when a Terry stop occurs. It does seem possible, however, to draw
some conclusions as to the prevailing sentiments among a majority of
the Court. First, the crux of the Dunaway decision, that police may not
under ordinary circumstances detain a suspect for custodial question-
ing in the absence of probable cause or consent, appears unquestioned.
Second, a majority of the Court appears disinclined to accept the prop-
osition that involuntariness may be presumed where the subject of a
Terry stop, or one upon whom criminal suspicion has focused, acts in
conformity with a police request without being first informed that he is
not obligated to so act. Third, a majority of this Court has probably
accepted the position that the existence of a seizure is properly evalu-
ated only in light of all the objective circumstances surrounding a po-
the agents identified themselves and made only reasonable requests and inquiries, that there
was no physical touching or display of weapons, and that the questioning was brief. Id. at
562-63. Balancing the "compelling [public] interest in detecting those who would traffic in
deadly drugs for personal profit," id. at 561, against "the nature and scope of the intrusion,
and. . . the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his
knowledge and expertise," id., Powell concluded that the stop was justified. Id. at 565 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
400. Id. at 576 (White, J., dissenting).
The heart of the dissent lies in the contention that, whether or not the initial stop of the
defendant was violative of Terry and fourth amendment principles, "she undoubtedly was
'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, when the agents escorted her from
the public area of the terminal to the DEA office for questioning and a strip search of her
person." Id. at 574. Justice White noted that from the moment Mendenhall left the termi-
nal in the company of the DEA agents, the factual setting of the case became indistinguish-
able from that in Dunaway, and that Dunaway therefore demanded that the case be treated
as one of constructive arrest made without probable cause. Id. at 574-75.
401. Id. at 576 (citation omitted).
402. Id. at 577 (footnote omitted).
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lice-citizen interaction, and that the intentions of the investigating
officers are irrelevant insofar as they remain uncommunicated to the
subject of an alleged seizure.
Mendenhall is consistent with recent Ninth Circuit prearrest deten-
tion decisions. For example, in United States v. Post,4 °3 a DEA agent
stopped the defendant and his companion in an airport terminal. The
stop was based on reasonable suspicion °.4  Post and his companion
agreed to accompany the agent to an interrogation room. Post was
questioned and searched; the search produced packets of heroin.
Post was convicted in the district court after his motion to suppress
the heroin was denied. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the
close factual similarity of Dunaway, but correctly distinguished that
case. In Dunaway, the trial court resolved the issue of the voluntary
character of the accompaniment adversely to the Government and the
Supreme Court chose to accept that finding.4 °5 Since the district court
in Post had made no specific finding of involuntariness, and because
there was an evidentiary conflict on the issue, the court of appeals felt
constrained to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state
as the prevailing party below.40 6 Relying on United States v. Chat-
man,4 7 the court held that no fourth amendment interest of the de-
fendant had been violated. 8
United States v. Perez-Esparza419 similarly represents an instance
of correct Ninth Circuit treatment of a Dunaway-type case. Perez-Es-
parza involved an interior border stop of a suspected drug smuggler.
Because they had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was smug-
gling drugs,410 DEA agents directed United States Customs agents to
stop defendant's car if it should pass their checkpoint. The Customs
agents acted in conformity with this request when defendant drove
403. 607 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1979).
404. The observations which the court found sufficient to justify reasonable suspicion
were: (1) one suspect paced the length of the airport while tightly clutching a brief case,
(2) this suspect met with defendant Post and both purchased round trip tickets to Los Ange-
les, (3) defendant's first initial and last name were identical to those of a known narcotics
trafficker, and (4) the behavior of the two suspects coincided with a judicially approved
profile of typical narcotics courier characteristics. Id. at 849-50 & n.3.
405. 442 U.S. at 207 & n.6.
406. 607 F.2d at 851.
407. 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977). In Chatman, the Ninth Circuit held that where reason-
able suspicion to make a stop exists, the stop does not become a detention just because the
officer, without coercion, directs that the questioning occur in a less public place. Id. at 567.
408. The Post court properly ignored the suggestion in Dunaway that all requests made of
subjects of Terry stops are inherently coercive. See supra note 373.
409. 609 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
410. Id. at 1285.
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through the checkpoint some hours later. Defendant was held at the
Customs office for two and one-half hours while the agents awaited the
arrival of the DEA agents.41' When those agents finally arrived, they
issued Miranda warnings and informed Perez-Esparza that he was be-
ing held on suspicion of drug smuggling and that a search warrant for
his car was presently being sought. The defendant then invited the
agents to conduct a search, and the agents discovered a quantity of
cocaine concealed in a headlight. The agents issued Miranda warnings
again after the cocaine was discovered.
In reversing Perez-Esparza's conviction for possession with intent
to distribute, the court of appeals properly held that the prolonged de-
tention of the defendant was so similar to a traditional arrest that Duna-
way mandated suppression because there was no probable cause to
support the "arrest. '41 2 However, Perez-Esparza also serves to high-
light a difficulty which was not addressed in Dunaway and which the
Ninth Circuit declined to resolve in this case. The difficulty arises
when a valid Terry stop is made and, for some extraordinary reason,
the officer who makes the stop is unable to determine quickly whether
there exists probable cause to arrest.413 This situation was squarely
presented in 1980 in United States v. Erwin.4 1  That case was decided
after both Dunaway and Mendenhall, but was analyzed as a border
search since the suspect had flown in from another country.
In Erwin, the defendant was properly detained by DEA agents at
San Francisco International Airport following her arrival from Bang-
kok, Thailand. A baggage search was conducted which revealed items
that, combined with Erwin's apparent difficulty in walking and sitting,
led the agents to believe that she had concealed drugs in a body cavity.
When Erwin refused to submit to a strip search, the agents applied for
a court order requiring her to consent to the search and to an x-ray,
411. Id. at 1291.
412. Id. at 1286-87. There was no question in Perez-Esparza that the defendant had not
consented to the prolonged detention. Therefore, there could be no question as to the appli-
cability of Dunaway. Under the objective Mendenhall test for seizure, it is clear that a rea-
sonable person detained as was Perez-Esparza would have concluded that he was not free to
walk away once customs agents had separated him from his car.
413. Id. at 1287 n.2. The Perez-Esparza court recognized that situations arise in which a
suspect is detained pending the arrival of specialized agents and the detaining officer is inca-
pable of resolving the matter himself. The Ninth Circuit has previously held that such ex-
tended detentions are valid in view of such circumstances. United States v. O'Looney, 544
F.2d 385, 389-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1023 (1976). The Perez-Esparza court was
not forced to resolve the question of the constitutionality of such prolonged stops after Duna-
way because the DEA agents in this case were not essential to the questioning of the defend-
ant and therefore the case was not within the O'Looney exception.
414. 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 14
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
and, if the x-ray revealed objects concealed in a body cavity, to a body
cavity search as well. The order was eventually obtained and an x-ray
examination revealed a foreign object concealed in Erwin's vagina. Er-
win then removed a heroin-filled plastic container from her vagina and
was arrested. The detention, from inception to arrest, lasted seven
hours.415
On review of the trial court's refusal to suppress the heroin as the
product of an illegal arrest, the court of appeals rejected Erwin's argu-
ment that the seven hour detention constituted an arrest made in the
absence of probable cause and that the heroin seized incident to the
illegal arrest should have been suppressed. 416 The court distinguished
the cases upon which Erwin based her argument, Perez-Esparza, Duna-
way and United States v. Beck,4 17 by pointing out that the instant de-
tention was made in the context of a border search.4 8 Noting that
"government intrusions on citizens' mobility at the international bor-
ders are reviewed by the courts under different standards than other
police investigatory techniques, ' 419 the court stated that the standard
measure of the propriety of a border detention is whether the scope of
the detention exceeded "what was necessary for the agents to conduct a
legal border search."42
The Erwin court held that defendant's detention pending issuance
of the search warrant was reasonable.421 In view of the fact that no
warrant is usually required for a border search, but "[g]iven the strong
preference for search warrants in body cavity searches expressed by this
court in United States v. Cameron, it would be inconsistent for the court
now to hold that, in trying to follow the preference for a warrant, the
agents detained a traveler for an excessive period."
4 22
The Erwin reasoning is irreproachable. Certainly drug smugglers
cannot be allowed to conceal contraband in such a way that enforce-
415. Id. at 840.
416. Id. at 841.
417. 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979). In Beck, the Ninth Circuit held that where four cus-
toms cars were used to surround defendant's taxi and several agents escorted defendant from
the vehicle, the display of excessive force would have led one to reasonably believe that he
was under arrest. Id. at 500.
418. 625 F.2d at 841.
419. Id. (citing United States v. Shorter, 469 F.2d 61, 63 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 918 (1973)).
420. 625 F.2d at 841.
421. Id.
422. Id. (citing United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1976)). The Erwin court
also noted that Cameron itself "indicates that a reasonable detention while a warrant is
being obtained is not invalid." 625 F.2d at 841 (citing 538 F.2d at 258 n.7).
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ment officers are faced with the Hobson's choice of either letting them
go or detaining them pending issuance of a warrant with the knowledge
that a subsequent warrant-authorized search would be invalidated due
to the prior illegal "arrest." However, the concern expressed by the
Erwin court-that law enforcement efforts should not be penalized
where agents have at all times acted with regard for constitutional safe-
guards-would appear to be equally applicable outside the limited con-
text of border searches. As recognized by the Perez-Esparza court,
situations will arise where some delay after a valid initial stop is not
only unavoidable but also required by valid law enforcement concerns
and reasonable under all of the surrounding circumstances. In such
cases, the Dunaway limitation on the permissible scope of the Terry
stop should not be applied so inflexibly as to operate as a universal bar
to otherwise justifiably prolonged detentions.423
G. Outrageous Government Conduct
The outrageous government conduct or involvement defense was
first recognized by the Ninth Circuit in the 1971 decision of Greene v.
United States.424 The court of appeals reversed appellants' convictions
for possession of unregistered distilling apparatus, illegal sale of dis-
tilled spirits, and conspiracy 425 on the ground that government agents
had too directly and continuously involved themselves over a lengthy
period of time in the creation and maintenance of the criminal
operation.426
In Greene, a government agent posed as an underworld syndicate
figure and established a relationship with appellants which led to their
sale of illegal spirits to government agents, and consequently, to their
conviction for distilling violations.427 While this case was pending, the
agent, still acting in his undercover capacity, reinitiated contact with
appellants. 428 Approximately a year after their conviction, they were
released from jail and were contacted again by the agent.429 For about
two and one-half years, the agent continued his undercover role en-
423. Perhaps the key to rationalizing an extraordinary circumstances exception to the
Dunaway rule lies in the construction of a test which would take into account the motiva-
tions of the authorities responsible for the prolonged detention. This approach is suggested
by the language of the Perez-Esparza decision. See 609 F.2d at 1287 n.2.
424. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
425. Id. at 783-84.
426. Id. at 786-87.
427. Id. at 784. Appellants were sentenced to six months in jail.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 784-85.
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couraging the defendants in their illegal manufacturing,43 ° the product
of which he would buy as the sole customer.43 ' The agent offered to
supply some equipment for this operation and actually provided two
thousand pounds of sugar at wholesale.432 Eventually, over several
months, the defendants made three shipments of illegal spirits for
which they were arrested and convicted.433
The Ninth Circuit found that the agent's conduct after the first
conviction rose to a level of" 'creative activity'. . . substantially more
intense and aggressive than the level of such activity charged against
the Government in. . . entrapment cases." 434 However, the court held
that the defendants could not take advantage of the entrapment de-
fense 435 because they were deemed "predisposed" to commit the
crime.4 36 Even so, the court reasoned that "although this is not an en-
trapment case, when the Government permits itself to become en-
meshed in criminal activity, from beginning to end, to the extent which
appears here, the same underlying objections which render entrapment
repugnant to American criminal justice are operative. '4 37 Thus, look-
430. During the two and one-half year interval between appellants' reassociation with the
government agent and their second arrest, the agent encouraged their efforts at every oppor-
tunity. Of a total of thirty-two contacts between the parties during this time, the agent,
Courtney, initiated twenty-two. Id. at 785.
431. Id. at 787.
432. Id. at 785-86. The agent extended his participation by securing for appellants a
distillery site and offering to supply them a still and a still operator.
433. Id. at 785.
434. Id. at 787.
435. Generally a claim of entrapment arises if a defendant can show that the criminal
design originated with the government which then induced the defendant to commit the
crime. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW § 48, at 371 (1972).
436. In the federal system, the predisposition of the defendant to commit the charged
crime negates the effectiveness of the entrapment defense. Thus, the defendant must be an
innocent person who would not have committed the crime but for the government induce-
ment. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423, 433 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); Sorrell v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1932). The majority of the state courts also follow this ap-
proach. See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pidgeons & Agent Provo-
cateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1105-06 (1951). But see People v. Barraza, 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591
P.2d 147, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1979) (minority test adopted; governmental acts looked at
objectively without reference to the subjective intent or predisposition of the defendant).
437. 454 F.2d at 787. The court of appeals cited the following six factors, the aggregation
of which compelled the dismissal of the indictment: (1) agent Courtney had reestablished
contact with appellants following their initial arrest when he ordinarily would have had no
reason to do so, (2) the length of the government involvement in the criminal operation
(approximately two and one-half years), (3) the government's substantial participation in the
scheme, including the offers of supplies and the actual furnishing of supplies, (4) the "veiled
threat" to appellants to produce bootleg which was couched in his statement that his supe-
rior was becoming impatient with the delay in delivery, (5) government activity which re-
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ing at the government's involvement in the criminal activity, the court
concluded that the only fair remedy would be to vacate the defendants'
convictions and dismiss their indictments.43 The Greene decision thus
opened a new defense for predisposed defendants unable to invoke the
entrapment defense.
While the Ninth Circuit in Greene endorsed the outrageous con-
duct defense, to date the United States Supreme Court has neither to-
tally rejected nor clearly accepted the use of the defense as a bar to
criminal prosecution. In United States v. Russell,43 9 a decision subse-
quent to Greene, five members of the Court conceded that they might
"some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would
absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to ob-
tain a conviction." 440 The Russell Court declined, however, to hold
that the Government's supplying of a critical, but otherwise legal and
obtainable chemical, to a criminal drug manufacturing operation con-
stituted such objectionable conduct." The Court also held that the
entrapment defense was inapplicable because the defendants were
predisposed to commit the crime.44z Following Russell, the Court in
Hampton v. United States" 3 divided on the question of whether gov-
ernment misconduct or over-involvement in a criminal scheme could
stand as an absolute bar to prosecution in light of a defendant's predis-
position. The plurality opinion indicated that the only remedy avail-
able to "predisposed" individuals would be the entrapment defense.4 "
The concurring justices felt that the due process clause would still bar
some prosecutions in spite of the predisposition of the individual."4
established what had been a defunct criminal operation, and (6) the fact that the government
was at all times appellants' sole customer. Id. at 786-87.
438. Id. at 787.
439. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
440. Id. at 43 1-32.
441. Id. at 432.
442. Id.; see supra note 436 and accompanying text.
443. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
444. Writing for himself and two other members of the Court, Justice Rehnquist stated
that "[t]he remedy of the criminal defendant with respect to the acts of Government agents,
which, far from being resisted, are encouraged by him, lies solely in the defense of entrap-
ment." Id. at 490.
445. Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, agreed that the
particular fact that the government agents in Hampton supplied the contraband which de-
fendant was prosecuted for selling did not constitute a violation of due process ideals. Ad-
hering to the Russell principles, however, the justices rejected the position that "the concept
of fundamental fairness inherent in the guarantee of due process would never prevent the
conviction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the outrageousness of police behavior in
light of the surrounding circumstances." Id. at 492 (Powell, J., concurring).
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Thus, the Court, while endorsing the entrapment defense, has not
stated clearly whether due process principles may ever be invoked to
vacate a conviction because of outrageous governmental conduct.
This lack of resolution by the high Court has caused some confu-
sion in the latest Ninth Circuit decisions, which have rejected claims of
outrageous governmental conduct. Although Greene has not been
overturned, the viability of the defense has been questioned and the
rationale employed by the circuit in rejecting these claims has not been
clear.
For example, in United States v. McQuin, 46 the Ninth Circuit re-
jected appellants' claim of outrageous government conduct involving
an FBI agent's encouragement and participation in a bank robbery." 7
The FBI became involved when it acted on a tip from a paid inform-
ant, Canale, that defendant McQuin was looking for an armed accom-
plice to assist in a planned bank robbery.448 The FBI arranged for
Canale to introduce agent Taulbee as an underworld figure and willing
accomplice.449 The agent was accepted readily by McQuin and briefed
on the details of the latter's plan. They agreed to commit the robbery
eight days after this initial meeting.45° When agent Taulbee and in-
formant Canale arrived at McQuin's residence on the appointed day,
they were met at the door by a woman who falsely informed them that
defendant was in jail. At trial, McQuin claimed that Canale had told
him later that day that Taulbee was going to have him killed for not
going through with the robbery.45 l On the following day, Canale and
Taulbee again went to McQuin's residence and met with their "part-
ner." There, according to McQuin's testimony, Taulbee had entered
McQuin's room with gun drawn and had intimidated him into partici-
pating in the robbery on that day.4 52 McQuin and an accomplice were
arrested by waiting FBI agents as they approached the targeted bank
wearing ski masks and carrying weapons. McQuin was later convicted
446. 612 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
447. Id. at 1196.
448. Id. at 1194.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 1194-95.
451. Id. at 1195. Canale, however, testified that Taulbee merely had "felt like" having
defendant killed. Id. Although the jury apparently believed Taulbee's and Canale's testi-
mony, the court assumed "for purposes of argument" that McQuin's version was the accu-
rate one. Id. at 1196.
452. Id. at 1195. The testimony on this point was contradictory. Id. at 1195, 1196. The
court did not assume the accuracy of McQuin's testimony here and in fact avoided consider-
ation of the outrageous conduct issue by finding that the jury had not believed him. Id. at
1196.
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in the district court of conspiracy and attempted bank robbery. On
appeal, the defendant claimed that the outrageousness of the govern-
ment's conduct in the course of its undercover investigation should
have barred his prosecution and compelled reversal of his
conviction.453
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court's Hamp-
ton decision had "'left open the possibility that the conviction of a
predisposed defendant may be reversed where the government involve-
ment in the criminal scheme reaches such an outrageous level as to
violate due process,' -454 but found that, even if Canale had told the
defendant that Taulbee was going to have him killed for his lapse, the
government had not engaged in outrageous conduct.455  While not
commending the informant's actions, the court characterized the state-
ments as "vulgarity and 'puffing' engaged in by all participants in the
transaction. ' 456 Turning next to McQuin's allegations that Taulbee
had threatened him with a drawn gun, the court declined to state
whether such conduct, if proved, would have amounted to outrageous
conduct.457 In light of the contradictory testimony given by the agent
and the defendant himself, the court observed that the defendant "suf-
fers .. from an inability even to establish that the conduct he claims
was outrageous even occurred. 458
The Ninth Circuit also rejected an outrageous government con-
duct/involvement defense in United States v. Wylie,459 where the de-
fendant alleged that federal agents were the motivating force in the
LSD sales for which defendant was prosecuted.460 In Wylie, defendant
Bachrach had approached a friend, Bloch, and discussed with him the
possibility of obtaining a chemical, ergotamine tartrate (ET), necessary
for manufacturing LSD, and of selling the LSD itself.46' After
Bachrach financed an unsuccessful trip to Poland by Bloch to obtain
ET, Bloch contacted federal agents and informed them of Bachrach's
scheme.462 The agents instructed Bloch to tell Bachrach that he had
453. Id. at 1194.
454. Id. at 1196 (quoting United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.
1977)).
455. Id.
456. Id. (quoting United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978)).
457. 612 F.2d at 1196.
458. Id.
459. 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 863 (1981).
460. Id. at 1377-78.




contacted a source for the ET.463 Bachrach later met with undercover
DEA agents and explained to them that he required a quantity of ET to
supply a clandestine laboratory operating in Berkeley. The agents
agreed to supply the ET in return for a portion of the LSD manufac-
tured. Three days later, Bachrach gave to the agents 400 units of LSD
and a price list of the different types of LSD which were available.464
A number of ET-LSD exchanges followed, culminating with the de-
fendants' arrests. The defendants were subsequently convicted of vari-
ous counts of conspiracy, manufacture, and distribution.465 On appeal,
the defendants claimed that the government involvement in the crimi-
nal operation was so improper that it constituted a violation of due
process because the federal agents had suggested that the defendants
supply LSD in return for the ET.466
The court of appeals found little difficulty in disposing of defend-
ants' "outrageous government involvement" defense.467 Although the
court noted authority supporting the existence of the due process de-
fense,468 it could characterize the government involvement in Wylie
only as "good, solid undercover investigative work. ' 4 69 Undercover in-
filtration of a criminal enterprise, based on the information of an in-
formant, the court noted, was a long accepted tactic for the detection of
crime. Moreover, the court refused to place any special emphasis on
the creativity of the undercover investigation, on which the defense had
focused. The court felt that the decisions which establish the outra-
geous government conduct or involvement defense "focus on the outra-
geousness of the governmental agents' involvement in the criminal
activity. Any consideration of the creativity exercised by the govern-
ment agents is secondary to the consideration of the outrageousness of
their involvement."470 The defendants emphasized that the agents had
suggested that LSD should be exchanged for ET. However, the court
463. Id.
464. Id. This price list was made in the handwriting of defendant Wylie.
465. Id. at 1375.
466. Id. at 1377. Bachrach claimed he had intended only to purchase ET.
467. Id.
468. Id. (citing Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973); United States v. McQuin, 612
F.2d 1193, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 955 (1980); United States v. Prairie, 572
F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir.
1976); United States v. Gonzales-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 923 (1976)).
469. 625 F.2d at 1378.
470. Id. at 1377 n.7.
1981]
LOYOLAI OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
rejected the outrageous conduct claim471 because the defendants' pre-
disposition toward the sale of LSD was clearly established on the rec-
ord.472 Finally, the court rejected the claim that the agents'
maintenance of a series of transactions, all of which were separately
charged in the indictment, provided support for the defense.473 The
court believed the agents had acted justifiably because they were inves-
tigating a large scale distribution ring and were anxious to uncover as
many participants as possible.474
The court's reasoning on two points is somewhat faulty. First, its
rejection of the creativity argument is questionable in light of the
Greene court's emphasis of this point.475 However, Greene can be dis-
tinguished factually from Wylie.4 76 Second, the court improperly cited
the defendants' predisposition as a reason for not invoking the outra-
geous conduct defense. Predisposition, an issue in entrapment cases,
4 77
has no applicability in Greene-type cases.478
In sum, while the Ninth Circuit in both McQuin and Wylie at least
tacitly endorsed the outrageous conduct defense, the court rejected its
application to the facts in those cases. In the process of rejecting the
defendants' claims, the Ninth Circuit's language reflects questions the
circuit may have as to the continued viability of the defense, especially
in light of the post-Greene Supreme Court decisions.




475. 454 F.2d at 787.
476. The Wylie court noted the "unique" circumstances of Greene in which the govern-
ment "'directly and continuously involved itself in the creation and maintenance of the
criminal operations,'" a state of affairs the Wylie court thought not to be present in its facts.
625 F.2d at 1379 n.l 1 (quoting United States v. Granger, 475 F.2d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 929 (1973)). Although unclear in the opinion, it appears that the clandes-
tine laboratory had been operatingprior to the time that the government became involved in
the enterprise. Thus, the governmental acts were not "creative" of a criminal enterprise.
477. See supra note 436 and accompanying text.
478. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring);
Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971). The proper focus should be on the
question of whether the government created the opportunity for criminal activity and partic-
ipated in the activity to such an extent that it would be fundamentally unfair to allow the
government to prosecute its co-participants. Although the Wylie defendants may have been
predisposed toward the sale of LSD, they were prosecuted for the sales to the government
agents. A correct inquiry would be limited to the question of whether the government cre-
ated the opportunity for the criminal sales to occur by supplying the ET and then partici-
pated to an unacceptable extent by demanding the ET-LSD exchanges.
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H. Promise by Agent
In United States v. Hudson,479 the Ninth Circuit addressed the
question of whether the United States Attorney must honor promises
made by federal agents to criminal defendants. 480 The court held that
where the promise is clearly beyond the agent's authority, and where
the defendant has not detrimentally relied upon it, "fundamental fair-
ness does not require that the United States Attorney abide by the
agent's promise."48'
In Hudson, defendants Russo and Hudson were arrested by San
Francisco police on suspicion of possessing and passing counterfeit
money.482 Hudson was released from custody the same day and was
requested to meet with counterfeiting expert, Secret Service Agent Mc-
Mann, the following week.483 After this meeting, a complaint was filed
against Hudson, to which she pleaded not guilty.
484
Prior to her trial, Hudson moved for dismissal on the ground that
agent McMann had promised codefendant Russo that all charges
against the two would be dropped, provided that Russo cooperated in
apprehending the supplier of the counterfeit obligations.485 The district
court denied Hudson's request for an evidentiary hearing on the mo-
tion, as well as the motion itself. 486 Hudson was convicted of passing
and possessing counterfeit obligations.487
On appeal, Hudson contended that the denial of her motion to
dismiss was error.488 The court of appeals acknowledged that "it is a
question of first impression in this circuit whether the United States
Attorney is bound by the acts and promises of other federal agents" not
within the United States Attorney's office.
4 8 9
At the outset, the court recognized that the federal courts were
bound to ensure that prosecutors scrupulously honored their promises
to criminal defendants. 490 However, the court failed to discover any
authority for the proposition that federal prosecutors should or could
479. 609 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
480. Id. at 1328.
481. Id. at 1329.
482. Id. at 1327-28.





488. Id. at 1327.
489. Id. at 1328.
490. Id. at 1328 n.3 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); United States v.
Carter, 454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972)).
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be bound by promises made to defendants without the prosecutor's
knowledge or consent. In Hudson, the defendant never contended that
agent McMann's alleged promise was made with the United States At-
torney's knowledge or consent.
Curiously, the court cited United States v. Lombardozzi491 as hold-
ing that even "where an FBI agent convinced the defendant that he was
speaking for the Assistant United States Attorney, the prosecution
would not be bound by the agent's alleged promise of concurrent fed-
eral and state sentences."4 92 In fact, the Lombardozzi court stated no
such holding. Rather, the Fourth Circuit merely found that no promise
had actually been made by the agent, and that it was insignificant that
the defendant might have subjectively believed that the agent was
speaking for the United States Attorney.493 The court did not discuss
the result that might have been reached had the agent misrepresented
his prosecutorial authority.494 Citing the absence of two critical factors,
the court of appeals refused to find that Hudson was entitled to benefit
from any promise which agent McMarm might have made to her co-
defendant. 495 These factors were: (1) it was not alleged that the United
States Attorney knew about or had sanctioned the agent's alleged ac-
tion, and (2) the lack of any detrimental reliance by Hudson on the
alleged promise which might indicate that its nonenforcement would
be fundamentally unfair.496 The court concluded by stating:
491. 467 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973). Defendant
Lombardozzi was charged with agreeing to transport a stolen check across state lines. At the
time, he was awaiting sentencing on a state perjury charge. Lombardozzi's claim on appeal
was that his plea of guilty to the federal charge was made on the basis of a promise made to
him by a federal agent that any federal sentence resulting from his plea would run concur-
rently with, and no longer than, any sentence he received on the state perjury charge. Id. at
161.
492. United States v. Hudson, 609 F.2d at 1328-29 (citing United States v. Lombardozzi,
467 F.2d 160, 163 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973)).
493. United States v. Lombardozzi, 467 F.2d at 162.
494. Even though it cited and relied to some degree on the "authority" of Lombardozzi,
the Hudson court apparently recognized that the former case was factually dissimilar in a
number of critical respects. The Hudson court noted that, in Lombardozzi, the defendant
"knew the agent could not bind the Department of Justice and the agent never guaranteed
the defendant anything." United States v. Hudson, 609 F.2d at 1329. The Hudson court
also acknowledged that defendant Lombardozzi, prior to his sentencing, assured the trial
court that there had been no inducements of which the court had not been informed. Id.
There were no similar facts or knowledge on the part of defendant in Hudson.
495. The court noted, but expressed no opinion on, the issue of whether Hudson, under
other circumstances, would be entitled to assert third party beneficiary status to an agree-
ment such as that which defendant Hudson maintained was made. Id. at 1329 n.5. (citation
omitted).
496. Id. at 1329.
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While we do not suggest that federal agents as a matter of law
may never bind the prosecution to promises made to criminal
defendants,. . . we do hold that under the facts of this case,
where a federal agent is alleged to have made a promise
clearly outside his authority and the defendant has incurred
no detriment in reliance upon the promise, fundamental fair-
ness does not require that the United States Attorney abide by
the agent's promise.4 97
II. PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
A. The Right Against Se/f-Incrimination
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
in part, that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."498 It prohibits the government from compel-
ling self-incriminating answers in any proceeding, judicial or extrajudi-
cial, criminal or civil, if they possibly could subject the individual to
criminal responsibility.
499
During the 1980 term, the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered whether the fifth amendment privilege extends to false immunized
testimony 5°° and prearrest silence.50' In addition, the Supreme Court
more specifically defined "interrogation 50 2 within the meaning of Mi-
randa v. Arizona, °3
At the same time, the Ninth Circuit examined the scope of the fifth
amendment privilege as it applies to income tax returns.
5 4
1. Use of immunized testimony
In United States v. Apfelbaum, 0 5 the Supreme Court held that
neither the federal immunity statute50 6 nor the fifth amendment barred
497. Id.
498. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
499. McCarthy v. Amdstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
500. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 130 (1980).
501. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232 (1980).
502. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
503. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
504. United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Carlson, 617
F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1980).
505. 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
506. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976) provides that when a witness is compelled to testify over his
claim of a fifth amendment privilege, no testimony or other information compelled under
the order to testify may be used against the witness in any criminal case, "except fin] a
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the
order." (emphasis added).
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the use of respondent's immunized grand jury testimony at a subse-
quent prosecution for making false statements during that testimony.50 7
In 4pfelbaum, the Government compelled respondent, who had as-
serted his constitutional right to remain silent, to testify before a federal
grand jury after granting him immunity pursuant to section 6002 of
title 18 of the United States Code.5"8 Respondent was later indicted
and convicted under section 1623(a) of title 18509 for false swearing
during his grand jury testimony. At trial, respondent had objected to
the use of his immunized testimony except the portions charged in the
indictment as false, but the trial court admitted other portions of the
testimony as being relevant to prove that he had knowingly made the
charged false statements.510
The Third Circuit reversed the trial court, holding that because
such immunized testimony did not constitute the "corpus delicti" or
"core" of the false statements offense, it could not be admitted.5 ' The
Supreme Court granted certiorari because its own conflicting authority
had led to differences among the circuits on this issue.51 2
507. 445 U.S. at 117.
508. Id.; see supra note 506.
509. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (1976) provides in pertinent part that "[w]hoever under oath in
any proceeding before ... a grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false
material declaration... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both."
510. 445 U.S. at 119.
511. 584 F.2d 1 264, 1265 (3d Cir. 1978), rey'd, 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
512. 445 U.S. at 119. In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), the Supreme
Court stated that an immunity statute "[clannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and that it
cannot replace or supply one, at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent in scope
and effect." Id at 585. This principle was recently cited with approval in New Jersey v.
Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 456-57 (1979). Thus, prior toApfelbaum, the Supreme Court appar-
ently maintained that a valid immunity statute must have the same effect as the fifth amend-
ment, i.e., the involuntary witness must be left in the same position as if he had never
testified.
The Apfelbaum Court explained that this requirement was a misconception because
properly drawn immunity statutes had long been recognized as valid, 445 U.S. at 125, and
because prosecution for making false statements during immunized testimony was constitu-
tionally permitted. Id. at 126 (citing United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174 (1977); United
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976)). The Court reasoned that the Constitution does
not, therefore, require an immunity statute to have the same effect as the fifth amendment
because the mere grant of immunity and consequent compulsion to testify places a witness
asserting his fifth amendment privilege in the dilemma of having to decide whether to an-
swer the questions truthfully or falsely, a position he never would have been in had he
simply been permitted to remain silent upon the invocation of his privilege. 445 U.S. at 120-
21 n.6.
TheApfelbaum Court also cited language in recent decisions as a source of difficulty for
the courts of appeals. This language, "if taken literally, would preclude the introduction of
immunized testimony even for the purpose of establishing the 'corpus delicti' or core of the
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In a well reasoned opinion, the Court eliminated this confusion,
holding that "neither the immunity statute nor the Fifth Amendment
precludes the use of [a] respondent's grand jury testimony at a subse-
quent prosecution for making false statements, so long as that testi-
mony otherwise conforms to applicable rules of evidence. '5 3 After
concluding that section 6002 creates a blanket exemption from the bar
against the use of such testimony where the witness is subsequently
prosecuted for making false statements, the Court addressed the consti-
tutional question.514 The Court stated that it was "analytically incor-
rect to equate the effect of remaining silent as a result of the invocation
of the Fifth Amendment privilege with the protections conferred by the
privilege."5 5 It concluded that "[flor a grant of immunity to provide
protection 'coextensive' with that of the Fifth Amendment, it need not
perjury offense." Id (citations omitted); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972),
where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an immunity statute, but stated
that the statute "prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony
in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of
criminal penalties on the witness." Id at 453 (emphasis in original); see also New Jersey v.
Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979), where the Supreme Court stated that "[t]estimony given in
response to a grant of legislative immunity is the essence of coerced testimony [and involves]
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in its most pristine form." The Court
also stated that "a defendant's compelled statements may not be put to any testimonial use
whatsoever against him in a criminal trial" because to do so would be a denial of due pro-
cess of law. Id
As a result of this confusing language, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Patrick,
542 F.2d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977), and the Third Circuit in
United States v. Apfelbaum, 584 F.2d 1264, 1265 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 115 (1980),
had held that the Government may introduce into evidence only so much of the witness'
testimony as is essential to establish the "corpus delecti" of the offense of perjury. The
Second and Tenth Circuits, on the other hand, had held that false, but not truthful, immu-
nized testimony is admissible in a subsequent prosecution for perjury. See United States v.
Berardelli, 565 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155, 165 (2d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978); United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 822 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977); United States v. Dunn, 577 F.2d 119, 125-26 (10th
Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 100 (1979). Finally, the Sixth and Eighth Cir-
cuits had held that any portion of immunized testimony may be used for any purpose in
such a prosecution. Daniels v. United States, 196 F. 459, 462-63 (6th Cir. 1912); Edelstein v.
United States, 149 F. 636, 642-44 (8th Cir. 1906).
513. 445 U.S. at 131.
514. Id at 121. The Court concluded that the language of § 6002 makes no distinction
between truthful and untruthful statements made during the course of giving immunized
testimony. Id It also noted that the immunity statute's legislative history made it evident
that "Congress intended to permit the use of both truthful and false statements made during
the course of immunized testimony in a subsequent prosecution for perjury if such use was
not prohibited by the fifth amendment." Id at 123. To reach its conclusion, the Court
relied on both Senate and House of Representative Reports concerning the proposed § 6002
immunity legislation. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 145 (1969); H.R. REP. No. 1549,
91st Cong., 2d Sess., 42 (1970).
515. 445 U.S. at 127. See generally cases cited and discussion supra note 514.
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leave the witness as if he had remained silent. '51 6
The Court reasoned that the "Fifth Amendment did not prevent
the use of respondent's immunized testimony at his trial because, at
the time he was granted immunity, the privilege did not protect him
against false testimony that he might later decide to give. ' 5 17 In other
words, a future intention to commit perjury does not create a substan-
tial and real hazard of incrimination."1 '
The result of the Court's decision as it applies to the specific facts
inApfelbaum is sound. The Court's holding, however, that neither "the
[immunity] statute nor the Fifth Amendment requires that the admissi-
bility of immunized testimony be governed by any different rules than
other testimony at a trial for making false statements," 5 9 sweeps more
broadly than the facts in Apfelbaum required. In Apfelbaum petitioner
was prosecuted for making false statements while giving immunized
testimony.5 20 As Justice Blackmun noted, the Court's
statement of its holding. . . makes no distinction between a
prosecution for false testimony given under a grant of immu-
nity and a prosecution for false testimony in other contexts
... . There is no occasion to determine whether the immu-
nized testimony could have been used to prove perjury or
false statements occurring at some other time. 2'
Nonetheless, the Court has at least eliminated the considerable confu-
sion surrounding the issue whether immunized testimony, false or not,
is admissible in a prosecution for perjury during that testimony.
2. Use of prearrest silence
In a recent decision, Jenkins v. Anderson,5 2 the Supreme Court
held that prearrest silence prior to an affirmative assertion of the right
516. Id
517. Id at 130.
518. Id at 128. The Court stated that "[tihe central standard for the privilege's applica-
tion has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely
trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination." Id (quoting Marchetti v. United States, 390
U.S. 39, 53 (1968)).
The Marchetti Court stated that the law must look not to whether the act is a past or a
prospective occurrence, but instead solely to the substantiality of the risks of incrimination.
390 U.S. at 54. Thus, the Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination was not
entirely inapplicable to prospective acts, although it did indicate that, ordinarily, prospective
acts will involve only speculative and insubstantial risks of incrimination. Id at 54.
519. 445 U.S. at 117.
520. Id at 118.
521. Id at 133 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
522. 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
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to remain silent may be used to impeach a defendant's credibility with-
out violating the fifth amendment or the fundamental fairness guaran-
teed by the fourteenth amendment." 3 The Court rejected petitioner's
contention that use of his prearrest silence for impeachment constituted
a denial of due process under Doyle v. Ohio.524
At his trial in a Michigan state court for first degree murder, peti-
tioner testified that he had acted in self-defense.525 On cross-examina-
tion, the prosecutor questioned him concerning his silence about his
involvement in the crime until two weeks after the killing when he sur-
rendered to government authorities. The prosecutor referred again to
petitioner's prearrest silence in closing argument, suggesting that he
would have spoken sooner had he really killed in self-defense.526 Peti-
tioner was convicted and the Sixth Circuit affirmed.527
The Supreme Court affirmed, relying on Raffel v. United States,528
and Brown v. United States.5" 9 In Raffel, the Supreme Court held that
the fifth amendment is not violated when a defendant who testifies at
his second trial is impeached by his prior silence during his first trial.53°
In Brown, the Court held that a defendant who takes the stand on his
own behalf waives the right to invoke on cross-examination the privi-
lege against self-incrimination regarding matters made relevant by his
direct examination.
531
Using the Brown rationale to extend the Raffel holding, the
Supreme Court in Jenkins held that the fifth amendment is not violated
by the use of prearrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credi-
bility.532 The Court distinguished this rule from the fifth amendment
523. Id at 238.
524. 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (prosecution's cross-examination revealing defendant's si-
lence after arrest and after Miranda warnings violates due process).
525. 447 U.S. at 232.
526. Id at 233-34.
527. Id at 234.
528. 271 U.S. 494 (1926).
529. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
530. 271 U.S. at 495-97. The Raffel Court explicitly rejected the contention that the pos-
sibility of impeachment by prior silence is an impermissible burden upon the exercise of fifth
amendment rights. The Court stated: "We are unable to see that the rule that [an accused
who] testifies. . . must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable em-
barrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify or
not." Id at 499.
531. 356 U.S. at 157. The Court in Brown stated that it was the choice of the defendant
whether to take the witness stand and risk cross-examination. Therefore, once a defendant
decides to testify, "the interests of the other party and regard for the function of the courts of
justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations
determining the scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination." Id at 156.
532. 447 U.S. at 238.
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
prohibition against the prosecution commenting on the silence of a de-
fendant who asserts the right to remain silent during his criminal
trial.533 In Jenkins, petitioner was silent before arrest but later chose to
testify. The Court stated that such impeachment was proper in that it
followed the petitioner's own decision to testify, and became important
in advancing the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.534
In finding that the use of petitioner's prearrest silence in Jenkins
comported with due process, the Court noted that the defendant in
Doyle v. Ohio535 was silent after he had been informed by the police of
his right to remain silent.536 Use of his silence violated due process
because of the implicit assurance given in the warning that it would not
be used.537 Because petitioner's silence in Jenkins was prior to any gov-
ernment warning, its use was permissible. 38
3. Interrogation within the meaning of Miranda
The Supreme Court recently considered the admissibility of state-
ments of an in custody suspect following Miranda warnings. In Rhode
Island v. Innis,539 the Court defined interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda v. Arizona.540 In Innis, a taxicab driver, who had been robbed
533. Id at 235 (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965)).
534. 447 U.S. at 238.
535. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
536. 447 U.S. at 239-40.
537. Id at 240 (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976)).
538. Id The Court's analysis is defensible. The Doyle Court predicated its holding upon
the defendants' having been advised of their right to remain silent by government authori-
ties prior to their exercising it. 426 U.S. at 617. Nevertheless, Jenkins results in the anomaly
that while the right to remain silent does not arise from the Miranda warnings, evidence of
its exercise is constitutionally protected only if it follows Miranda warnings given by the
government.
While the Court's reliance on Raffel regarding the fifth amendment issue is suspect, see
447 U.S. at 245-46 n.10 (Stevens, J., concurring); id at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting), it, too,
is technically defensible. Raffel was never expressly overruled. The critical defect in Jenkins
is its effect. As Justice Marshall observed, "[t]o penalize [petitioner] for failing to relinquish
his privilege against self-incrimination by permitting the jury to draw an adverse inference
from his silence. . . replaces the privilege against self-incrimination with a duty to incrimi-
nate oneself." 447 U.S. at 250 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). It forces one,
before being accused, to incriminate oneself voluntarily or to face the prospect of an attack
on one's subsequent testimony based on the failure to volunteer a statement to the police.
This tension between the right against self-incrimination and the right to testify in one's own
defense is "an intolerable burden on the exercise of those rights." Id at 254 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
539. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
540. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda standards include as constitutional safeguards the
requirements that the defendant be informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that
anything he does say can be used against him in a court of law. Id at 479. In addition, he
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by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun, identified a picture of respon-
dent as that of his assailant. Shortly thereafter, a patrolman arrested
respondent on the street, and advised him of his Miranda rights. When
other police officers arrived at the arrest scene, respondent, who was
unarmed, was advised twice again of his Miranda rights. Respondent
stated that he understood his rights and wanted to speak with an
attorney.-
4 1
Respondent was then placed in a police car to be driven to the
central station in the company of three police officers, who had been
instructed not to question him or intimidate him in any way. 42 While
en route to the station, two of the officers discussed the missing shot-
gun. One stated that there were "a lot of handicapped children running
around in this area" because a school for handicapped children was
located nearby, and "God forbid one of them might find a weapon with
shells and they might hurt themselves."5 43 Respondent then inter-
rupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car
around so that he could show them where the gun was located.5
44
Upon returning to the arrest scene where a search for the gun was
in progress, respondent was again advised of his Miranda rights. He
replied that he understood those rights but that he wanted to get the
gun out of the way because of the children located in the area. He then
led the police to the shotgun.
545
Respondent was convicted of kidnapping, robbery, and the mur-
der of another taxicab driver.5 46 The trial court, denying respondent's
motion to suppress the shotgun and the statements he had made to the
police regarding its discovery, ruled that he had waived his Miranda
rights.
547
The Rhode Island Supreme Court set aside the conviction and
held that respondent was entitled to a new trial.54 8 The court con-
cluded that Innis had invoked his Miranda right to counsel, and that,
contrary to Miranda's mandate that in the absence of counsel all custo-
must be informed that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot
afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id
541. 446 U.S. at 294.
542. Id
543. Id at 294-95.
544. Id at 295.
545. Id
546. Id at 295-96.
547. Id at 296.
548. Id at 296-97.
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dial interrogation must cease, the officers in the vehicle had "interro-
gated" respondent without a valid waiver of his right to counsel.
5 49
The United States Supreme Court had decided previously in
Brewer v. Williams550 that the sixth amendment right to counsel pro-
hibited law enforcement officers from deliberately eliciting incriminat-
ing information from a defendant in the absence of counsel after a
formal charge against the defendant had been filed. 55 ' Because respon-
dent in Brewer had already been arraigned when his statements were
elicited, the Court was able to base its holding on the sixth amendment
right to counsel rather than on the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. With Innis, the Court was confronted with a similar
fact situation without the sixth amendment application because the
statements had been elicited prior to any "critical stage" proceedings.
The Court consequently had to formulate a working definition of "in-
terrogation" to determine whether or not respondent's statements
should have been suppressed.
5 5 2
While the Innis Court held that interrogation may be conducted
indirectly, it concluded that Innis' statements were not a reasonably
foreseeable response to the officers' conversation and, thus, were not
the product of an unlawful interrogation. 53 It concluded that the Mi-
randa safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is sub-
jected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.5 54 In
other words, "interrogation" includes any words or actions on the part
of the police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.555 The Court stated that this
functional-equivalent analysis focuses primarily upon the perception of
549. Id at 296.
550. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). In Brewer, the defendant responded to what has been labeled
"the Christian Burial Speech" while he was being driven to Des Moine, Iowa, after he had
been arrested, arraigned, and briefly jailed for abducting a ten year old girl. The speech was
made by a police officer who was aware that the defendant was a former mental patient and
also deeply religious. In the speech, the officer urged the defendant to locate the girl's body
because her parents were entitled to a Christian burial for the child, who had been abducted
on Christmas Eve. The defendant eventually made several incriminating statements and
finally directed the police to the girl's body. Id at 392-93.
551. 430 U.S. at 401.
552. See generally Grano, Rhode Island v. Inni." A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional
Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 1, 8-9 (1979); Kamisar,
Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda" What is "interrogation'? When Does it Matter?,
67 GEo. LJ. 1 (1978).
553. 446 U.S. at 302-03.
554. Id at 300-01.
555. Id at 301.
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the suspect, rather than upon the intent of the police.556
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to adopt a strict "hands-off' rule
concerning police conduct once the suspect has chosen to exercise his
right to remain silent under Miranda. Instead, it opted for a more flex-
ible standard whereby the courts will decide on a case by case basis
whether police should have known that their words or conduct were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
In his dissent, Justice Marshall 557 stated that while he was in sub-
stantial agreement with the majority's definition of interrogation, he
believed the majority had failed to apply faithfully its own test to
the facts of the case.558 He argued that the police officers' conduct
amounted to a patent psychological appeal to the conscience of the pe-
titioner, and that this factor should not be overlooked simply because
the officers were supposedly talking among themselves instead of di-
rectly to the petitioner.
59
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissenting opinion,5 60 remarked that
under the majority's holding, a suspect is afforded considerably less
protection than that granted by Miranda.56' If a suspect does not ap-
pear to be susceptible to a particular type of psychological pressure, the
police are apparently free to exert that pressure on him despite his re-
quest for counsel, as long as they are careful not to punctuate their
statements with question marks. If, contrary to reasonable expectation,
the suspect makes an incriminating statement, that statement can be
used against him at trial. In its desire to protect the admissibility of a
suspect's statements to law enforcement officials, the Innis Court en-
courages police to devise indirect means of eliciting statements.
4. Assertion of the privilege in federal tax returns
In two recent decisions the Ninth Circuit examined the effect of
556. Id
557. Id at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
558. Id He also noted that the case was an "aberration." Id
559. Id at 306. Marshall's argument seems to be a valid criticism of the majority opinion
in that it appeared from the facts in Inns that the police officers' conversation might elicit a
self-incriminating response from the petitioner. Under the majority's definition, this would
appear to constitute a form of interrogation.
560. Id at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
561. Id at 311-12. Justice Stevens argued that in order to give full protection to a sus-
pect's right to be free of any form of interrogation once his Miranda rights have been exer-
cised, "the definition of 'interrogation' must include any police statement or conduct that has
the same purpose or effect as a direct question." Id at 311. He went on to argue that any
statement that appears to call for a response from the suspect, as well as those that are
designed to do so, should be considered interrogation. Id
1981]
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the fifth amendment on self-incriminating assertions made in tax
returns.
In United States v. Neff,562 the Ninth Circuit rejected appellant's
assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination in response to each
federal income tax return question requesting financial information. 63
Neff had submitted individual tax return forms in 1974 and 1975 with
the words "Object: Self-Incrimination" printed in response to each
question requesting financial and tax status information. After the IRS
notified Neff that the returns were unacceptable, he refused to complete
the tax returns, claiming that to do so would waive his right to fifth
amendment protections.5 64 He was subsequently convicted, under In-
ternal Revenue Code section 7203,565 of two counts of willful failure to
file income tax returns. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit was asked to con-
sider Neffs claim that he was denied his privilege against self-incrimi-
nation when forced to complete his income tax returns.
The Supreme Court was confronted with a related issue in United
States v. Sullivan . 66  The Supreme Court held that the privilege
against self-incrimination does not justify an outright refusal to file any
income tax return.567 An objection may be raised properly only in re-
sponse to specific questions asked in the return. 6 If the privilege
against self-incrimination is validly exercised in response to specific
questions asked in the return, it constitutes an absolute defense to a
prosecution for willful failure to file an income tax return. 569
Other circuits, when faced with wholesale assertions of the privi-
lege against self-incrimination similar to those in Neff, have held that
such assertions constitute an outright refusal to file a return, and that
consequently the fifth amendment defense to a section 7203 prosecu-
562. 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1980).
563. Id at 1237.
564. Id
565. I.R.C. § 7203 (1976) provides in pertinent part that "any person required. . . to pay
tax, or required.., to make a return. . . who willfully fails to pay such.. . tax [or]
make such return.. . shall. . . be guilty of a misdemeanor .
566. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
567. Id at 263.
568. Id; see Garner v. United States, 501 F.2d 228, 239 n.18 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc),
aft'd, 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
569. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1976) (questions on income tax re-
turns are "neutral on their face and directed at the public at large"); Albertson v. SACB, 382
U.S. 70, 79 (1965). "Therefore, in order for [a defendant] to escape prosecution under
§ 7203, there must be something peculiarly incriminating about his circumstances that justi-




tion is invalid under Sullivan.57°
The Neff court criticized this approach as simply an avoidance of
the fifth amendment issue571 and held that each invocation of the fifth
amendment must be independently analyzed. 2 In affirming appel-
lant's conviction, the court held that the response to each unanswered
question must present a "real and appreciable danger" of incrimination
before reliance on the fifth amendment is justified.573 The court stated
that in determining whether a real and appreciable danger of incrimi-
nation exists, the trial court must examine the implications of the ques-
tions and the setting in which they are asked.57 4 In addition, the trial
court "must be governed as much by [its] personal perception of the
peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence. ' 575 Apply-
ing these criteria to the facts of Neff, the court concluded that appellant
had no valid fifth amendment defense to the section 7203 prosecution.
Appellant's refusal to complete the forms was motivated, if by any-
thing, by a desire to protest taxes, rather than by a fear of self-incrimi-
nation, and "at no point during the trial . . . was the district judge
presented with any indicia of potential incrimination.
576
Whereas Neff concerned the validity of a fifth amendment asser-
tion made in a tax return to avoid self-incrimination for non-tax law
violations, United States v. Carlson577 raised the question whether the
privilege against self-incrimination may be validly asserted in a tax re-
turn to avoid self-incrimination for a past violation of income tax
laws.578 The Carlson decision is especially noteworthy in that it
presented a question of first impression not only to the Ninth Circuit,
but also to the United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit
courts.
5 79 In Garner v. United States,58 the Supreme Court had held
that the privilege against self-incrimination, if validly exercised, is an
570. See United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S.
1012 (1978); United States v. Silkman, 543 F.2d 1218, 1219-20 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977); United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28, 30 (8th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1064 (1973).
571. 615 F.2d at 1238-39.
572. Id at 1239.
573. Id (citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968)).
574. Id at 1239-40.
575. Id at 1240 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951)).
576. Id at 1240-41. Appellant had appended 100 pages of protest material to his incom-
plete forms. Id at 1237. At trial, he presented no evidence to the trial judge to substantiate
his fifth amendment claims. Id at 1241.
577. 617 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1980).
578. Id at 520.
579. Id
580. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
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absolute defense to a section 7203 prosecution for failure to file an in-
come tax return.5 81 The Garner Court, however, expressly limited its
holding to only those claims of privilege justified by a fear of self-in-
crimination for crimes other than those under the tax laws.5 8 2
In Carlson, appellant, a tax protester, utilized a tax evasion scheme
whereby he first claimed ninety-nine invalid withholding exemptions
on a withholding tax form, and later refused on fifth amendment
grounds to provide any information from which his tax liability could
be calculated on his year-end federal income tax return. 3 Appellant
was convicted of failure to file a tax return over his defense that he had
validly asserted his fifth amendment privilege. 84 He argued that the
fifth amendment constituted a valid defense to his refusal to file a re-
turn on the ground that a truthfully completed return would have con-
stituted evidence tending to incriminate him as to the filing of the
previous false withholding form.5 85 Although conceding that a truth-
fully completed return would have provided incriminating evidence to
appellant,58 6 the Ninth Circuit refused to uphold the validity of his fifth
amendment claim. The court stated that an individual who seeks to
frustrate the tax laws by claiming too many withholding exemptions,
with an eye to covering that crime and evading the tax return require-
ment by assertion of the fifth amendment, is not entitled to that amend-
ment's protection.587 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
adopted the balancing approach advocated by the Supreme Court in
Calfornia v. Byers,588 whereby the public need for the disclosure re-
quirement is balanced against the individual's claim to constitutional
protections. 58 9 The Ninth Circuit held that the importance of the pub-
581. Id at 662-63.
582. Id at 650 n.3.
583. 617 F.2d at 519.
584. Id
585. Id
586. Id at 523.
587. Id
588. 402 U.S. 424 (1971).
589. The Byers Court stated:
Tension between the State's demand for disclosures and the protection of the right
against self-incrimination is likely to give rise to serious questions. Inevitably these
must be resolved in terms of balancing the public need on the one hand, and the
individual claim to constitutional protections on the other, neither interest can be
treated lightly.
Id at 427.
The decision concerned § 20002(a)(1) of the CAL. VEH. CODE (West 1971), which re-
quires anyone involved in an automobile accident resulting in damage to property to stop
and furnish his name and address at the scene of the accident. The plurality opinion never
reached the balancing stage because it held that the statute compelled non-testimonial be-
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lic revenue interests far outweighed the importance of protecting Carl-
son's patently calculated scheme to avoid the payment of taxes. 9 °
The result in Carlson may seem reasonable given appellant's
premediated scheme to violate the law and subsequently immunize
himself from prosecution via his privilege against self-incrimination.
However, in less clear-cut circumstances, for example where no obvi-
ous tax evasion scheme is present, balancing the defendant's constitu-
tional protections against the public's need for revenue could seriously
undermine fifth amendment protection.5 91 The apparent willingness of
the Ninth Circuit to balance constitutional guarantees against what the
court might deem to constitute the public need is simplistic. The stat-
ute in Byers required a driver of a vehicle involved in an accident with
property damage to give the owner of that property his name and ad-
dress. The statute promoted satisfaction of civil liability arising from
automobile accidents. 92 Absence of such a statute would preclude, as
a practical matter, most successful prosecutions of driving violations
resulting in accidents.5 93 No better alternative exists to serve this stat-
ute's purpose. In problems incident to the federal statute requiring the
filing of tax returns and to prosecutions for failure to file such returns,
however, an equally effective alternative exists. A restriction limiting
the use of compulsory information on tax returns to the collection of
taxes would preserve the fifth amendment privilege while accommodat-
ing the government's interest in securing revenue from the public.5 94
havior, rendering moot appellant's assertion of the fifth amendment claim on that ground.
Id at 431-34.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion disagreed with the majority and instead found
that the statute compelled testimony. Id at 434 (Harlan, J., concurring). He then applied
the balancing test to the statute in question and concluded that the fifth amendment defense
was outweighed by the statute's demand for disclosure. Id at 448-49 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
590. 617 F.2d at 523.
591. The Ninth Circuit noted that it is possible that the crime of claiming too many with-
holding allowances, even when not undertaken as part of a scheme such as appellant's, may
never be protected by the assertion of the fifth amendment privilege on a tax return because
of the "character and urgency of the tax laws." 617 F.2d at 523 n.6.
592. 402 U.S. at 430.
593. Id at 443.
594. Prosecution of willful failure to fie a tax return is normally based on evidence from
collateral sources. The government does not ordinarily depend upon self-provided informa-
tion to develop its case as it does in the hit and ran context considered in Byers. The balanc-
ing proposed in Byers, if adopted at all, should be restricted to situations in which the
evidentiary problem is similarly acute.
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B. The Right to Counsel
1. Attachment of the right
The right to the assistance of counsel flows from two sources: the
fifth amendment59 right against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment5 96 right to counsel.5 97 While the fifth amendment deriva-
tion arises when a suspect is held for "custodial interrogation,5 -9 8 the
sixth amendment derivation attaches only with the institution of adver-
sary judicial proceedings.
5 99
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit decided two cases dealing with this is-
sue. In United States v. Zazzara,6" the defendant claimed that his
right to effective assistance of counsel 60' had been violated by the fail-
ure of his attorney, Kirk, to render adequate assistance at an FBI inter-
view. In order to question Kirk, Zazzara's friend and business partner,
an FBI agent had gone to Kirk's office. By coincidence, Zazzara,
whom the agent also had wanted to interview, was at the office when
the agent arrived. Deciding to interview Zazzara instead, the agent
read him his Miranda warnings. Kirk acted as Zazzara's attorney, but
did not object to any of the questions asked by the agent. At the time
of the interview, the FBI investigation into Zazzara's activities had just
begun; he had been neither arrested nor indicted. °2
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention of ineffec-
tive assistance, finding that the defendant had no constitutional right to
counsel at the time of the interview. 60 3 In reaching this conclusion, the
court examined both the fifth and sixth amendment sources of the
right.6°  First, the court held that the fifth amendment right to counsel
had not attached because the interview was not "custodial. 605 Second,
595. U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in part: "No person. . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
596. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the ight... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
597. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1972); United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1980); Jett v.
Castaneda, 578 F.2d 842, 844 (9th Cir. 1978).
598. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1968).
599. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-
90 (1972); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
600. 626 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980).
601. See infra text accompanying notes 652-91.
602. 626 F.2d at 138.
603. Id
604. d at 137-38.
605. Id The court noted that the test used by the Ninth Circuit to determine when an
interrogation is "custodial" is "whether a reasonable person would have believed himself to
be in custody." Id at 137. The court found that a reasonable person would not have
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the court held that the defendant did not have a sixth amendment right
to counsel because at the time of the interview he had not been "ar-
rested or indicted. 60 6
In the other 1980 case, United States v. Erwin,607 the defendant
argued that her rights of notice and an opportunity to be heard under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment were violated because
the Government had prevented her attorney from attending a hearing
for an order compelling her to submit to strip and body cavity
searches. 6 8 The defendant had been detained by customs officials who
had suspected that she had something hidden in a body cavity. The
defendant's attorney learned of the officials' plan to seek the court or-
der and requested from the assistant United States Attorney the name
of the magistrate who would hear the order application. The request
was refused, and the defendant's attorney was not present at the
hearing.60 9
Viewing the order application as the "functional equivalent" of a
request for a search warrant, "traditionally an ex parte proceeding,
61 0
the Ninth Circuit ruled that since the defendant would not have had a
right to the presence of counsel at a search warrant application pro-
ceeding, she did not have the right to have counsel present in this
proceeding.61'
thought himself to be in custody at the interview in this case because the encounter was
coincidental and the record showed that the FBI agent exerted no pressure on the defendant
to stay and answer questions. For an example of a case where the Ninth Circuit has held
that the defendant reasonably could have believed that he was in custody, see United States
v. Kennedy, 573 F.2d 657, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1978) (four agents stopped defendant's car, put
him in their vehicle, and questioned him for 45 minutes about his past criminal acts; defend-
ant's belief that he was in custody held reasonable).
606. 626 F.2d at 138; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972); United States v. King, 472 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 864 (1973); United States v. Halley, 431 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. de-
nied, 401 U.S. 916 (1971).
607. 625 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1980).
608. The defendant raised no right to counsel claim under either the fifth amendment
self-incrimination clause or the sixth amendment. The self-incrimination clause would not
apply because she was not in custody and subject to interrogation at the time of the order
application. The sixth amendment would also be inapplicable because she had not been
indicted or formally charged at that time.
609. 625 F.2d at 840.
610. Id
611. Id The court cited no authority for its position other than the ex parte tradition of
search warrant application hearings. The result is also supported by a consideration of the
desirability of having the Government obtain a court order prior to conducting a body cav-
ity search. The Ninth Circuit has noted the benefits of such a procedure, but has held that
the Government is not required to obtain a court order before conducting a body cavity
examination in a border search context. See United States v. Cameron, 538 F.2d 254, 258-
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The Ninth Circuit distinguished the District of Columbia Circuit's
decision in United States v. Crowder,612 which involved a "search" via a
"surgical exploration of the accused's body."6 3 The Crowder court
had approved the lower court's imposition of a full adversary hearing
at which the defendant was represented by counsel before issuing a
search warrant authorizing the surgery.6 14 However, the special health
risk present in Crowder was the missing factor in Erwin.61-5 By dist-
inguishing Crowder, the Erwin court implicitly recognized, however,
that in special circumstances, such as where a dangerous procedure is
to be used, a suspect may have a due process right to the presence of
counsel at an application hearing.
2. The right to appointed counsel
The sixth and fourteenth amendments require states to afford an
indigent defendant the right to appointed counsel in criminal proceed-
ings.616 This requirement applies to'both felonies and misdemean-
ors. 617 However, the Supreme Court has held that this right is limited.
In Scott v. Illinois,618 the Court ruled that imposition of imprisonment
triggered an indigent's right to appointed counsel. The Court held that
defendant Scott had no right to appointed counsel in a misdemeanor
prosecution where, although the misdemeanor charge carried a possible
prison sentence, he was only fined.619 Thus, under Scott, a misde-
meanor conviction which results in a prison sentence is constitutionally
59 (9th Cir. 1976) (search warrant obtained before a body cavity examination can help allay
the apprehensions of suspects and assure that the search is conducted in a reasonable man-
ner). A rule requiring the presence of suspects' counsel at hearings for orders compelling
submission to body cavity searches might discourage the Government from using this discre-
tionary procedure and, thus, its benefits would be lost. Cf. United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d
15, 22 (2d Cir.) (a holding that the right to counsel is triggered by the use of an arrest
warrant predicated on a complaint, but not triggered by the use of an arrest warrant predi-
cated on an affidavit, would tend to discourage the former's use, whereas the policy should
be to encourage it), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
612. 543 F.2d 312, 316 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
613. 625 F.2d at 840.
614. 543 F.2d at 316. The Erwin court misconstrues Crowder by stating that Crowder had
"required the presence of counsel" at the search warrant application hearing. 625 F.2d at
840. Crowder merely approved the district court's holding of a full adversary hearing; this
procedure contributed to making the search reasonable. See 543 F.2d at 316.
615. 625 F.2d at 840.1
616. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (indigent defendant must be
afforded right to appointed counsel in federal criminal proceedings).
617. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
618. 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
619. Id at 373-74.
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valid only if the defendant was afforded "the right to assistance of ap-
pointed counsel in his defense."62
In the latter part of its 1979 term, the Supreme Court inBaldasar v.
Illinois"' considered the issue of whether a Scott-like conviction could
be used under a repeat offender statute to convert a defendant's subse-
quent, counseled misdemeanor conviction into a felony with an in-
creased prison term. Defendant Baldasar was first convicted for
shoplifting, a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year in
prison and a fine not to exceed $1,000. Although Baldasar, an indigent,
had not been represented by counsel at this proceeding, the conviction
was valid under Scott because the penalty imposed was a fine, not in-
carceration. A few months later, the defendant was again charged
under the same statute, which provided that a second conviction could
be treated as a felony with a prison term of one to three years.
622
Baldasar was represented by counsel at the second trial. Over defense
objections that the prior conviction was too unreliable to support en-
hancement because Baldasar had been unrepresented, the prosecution
introduced evidence of the first conviction and asked that the defen-
dant be punished as a felon. The jury found Baldasar guilty on the
felony charge, and he was sentenced to jail for one to three years.623
Had the defense objections to the use of the first conviction been sus-
tained, Baldasar could have been sentenced to prison for only one year.
In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment and held that Baldasar's prior uncounseled conviction could not
be used for the purpose of increasing the prison term of his subsequent
conviction. 624 However, a five member majority could not agree on a
common reason for the result. Separate rationales were given in three
concurring opinions written by Justices Stewart,625 Marshall,626 and
Blackmun.627
All five justices in the majority agreed that Baldasar had been sen-
tenced to a prison term solely because of his prior uncounseled convic-
tion.628 Only four-Stewart, Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens-agreed
620. Id
621. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
622. Id at 223.
623. Id
624. Id at 224.
625. Id (Stewart, J., concurring).
626. Id at 224 (Marshall, J., concurring).
627. Id at 229 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
628. See id at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id (Marshall, J., concurring); id at 229
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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that this use of the uncounseled conviction was improper because it was
a violation of Scott.629 These four justices reasoned that Baldasar's un-
counseled conviction was invalid under Scott for the purpose of impos-
ing any term of imprisonment, whether it be for that conviction itself or
to add to the penalty imposed for a subsequent conviction under a re-
peat offender statute.630
Justice Blackmun concurred. He argued that an indigent defend-
ant must be afforded the right to assistance of appointed counsel when-
ever he is prosecuted for an offense punishable by more than six
months imprisonment, exactly the punishment Baldasar faced in his
first trial.631 Since Baldasar's first conviction was invalid under Justice
Blackmun's approach, it should not have been used to enhance the sec-
ond conviction's term of imprisonment.632 Citing his dissent in
Scott,633 Justice Blackmun emphasized that his approach would pro-
vide a "measure of clarity for all concerned. 634
In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the four dissenting justices
attacked the majority on two grounds.635 First, the dissenters con-
tended that Baldasar's prior uncounseled conviction was constitution-
ally valid under Scott because no term of imprisonment had been given
and therefore it could be used to enhance a prison sentence imposed for
a subsequent offense.636 Justice Powell found support for this position
in Scott, which he characterized as holding that "an uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction is constitutionally valid if the offender is not
jailed. 637
The dissent's interpretation of Scott completely misconstrues that
decision. In Scott, the Supreme Court expressly held that "no indigent
criminal defendant [may] be sentenced to a term of imprisonment un-
less the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed
counsel in his defense." 638 The Court then affirmed the penalty im-
posed on the uncounseled defendant, a fine, because it did not involve
incarceration.639 Scott therefore teaches that an uncounseled convic-
629. See id at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Bren-
nan and Stevens joined in both the concurring opinions of Justices Stewart and Marshall.
630. Id
631. Id at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
632. Id
633. 440 U.S. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
634. 446 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
635. Id at 230-35 (Powell, J., dissenting).
636. Id at 230.
637. Id
638. 440 U.S. at 374.
639. Id
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tion may be constitutionally valid if a fine is imposed and at the same
time be constitutionally invalid if a prison sentence is imposed. Noth-
ing in Scott suggests that if a fine is imposed for an uncounseled con-
viction, the conviction then becomes valid for all purposes.
Moreover, the Scott Court distinguished fines from incarceration
because of the central premise of Argensinger v. Hamlin :14 that actual
imprisonment is so severe a sanction it should be imposed only if the
defendant has been afforded the assistance of appointed counsel.
641
The enhanced portion of Baldasar's sentence was imposed solely be-
cause of the first, uncounseled conviction.64z Since nothing had
changed between the first and second convictions, either to reduce the
severity of a prison term or to remedy the uncounseled nature of the
first conviction, the Argensinger-Scott rationale should apply to pro-
hibit the state from enhancing Baldasar's prison sentence from a maxi-
mum of one year to a maximum of three years."
The second objection raised' by the dissent was that the majority's
decision would create confusion and impose greater costs on local
courts. 6" Justice Powell predicted that the confusion would arise be-
cause no judge could know whether a defendant was likely to become a
repeat offender.645 Thus, judges would be forced either to appoint
counsel for all indigents charged with enhanceable offenses, resulting in
higher costs for local governments, or forego the possibility of imposing
increased prison terms for subsequent offenses.646
At least three justices disagreed with Justice Powell's assessment of
the difficulty of determining whether an indigent would become a re-
peat offender on the ground that the determination in many cases
would be a "relatively easy exercise of prosecutorial discretion."" 7 But
to a certain extent Justice Powel's predictions are probably accurate.648
640. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
641. 440 U.S. at 372-73.
642. See supra note 629.
643. For a similar approach excluding the admission of an uncounseled felony conviction
to enhance punishment for a subsequent offense, see Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115
(1967).
644. 446 U.S. at 234 (Powell, J., dissenting).
645. Id at 231.
646. Id at 235.
647. Id at 229 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring).
648. The actual financial impact of Baldasar will not be as great as Justice Powell implies.
As of 1979, an indigent defendant charged with any crime carrying a possible jail term
greater than six months (the period covered by Baldasar) already would be entitled to ap-
pointed counsel under state law in at least 31 states. 440 U.S. at 386-88 nn.18-21 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). Furthermore, as a practical matter, appointed counsel is now constitutionally
19811
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However, the constitutional right of an indigent to be imprisoned only
if he has been afforded the right to assistance of appointed counsel
should outweigh the financial burden it imposes on local
governments.649
While the result reached in Baidasar follows from Scott, it cannot
be considered as an extension of that decision. Scott applies to all mis-
demeanor convictions.650 BaIdasar is not as extensive. Justice Black-
mun's concurring opinion 65' would limit BaIdasar's application to
situations in which an uncounseled conviction carrying a potential pen-
alty of greater than six months imprisonment is used to enhance the
prison term of a subsequent conviction. The decision does not speak to
prior convictions for offenses carrying a potential jail term of less than
six months. In light of Justice Blackmun's position, it is unlikely that
BaIdasar will be extended to cover these convictions.
3. Effective assistance of counsel
The sixth amendment of the Constitution guarantees the right to
effective counsel. 652 However, an accused's right to effective counsel
arises when either his fifth or sixth amendment right to counsel has
been triggered. For example, in United States v. Zazzara,5 3 the Ninth
Circuit addressed the question of effective assistance of counsel raised
under both the fifth and sixth amendments. 54
To then succeed on an ineffective counsel claim, the Ninth Circuit
requires that an accused overcome on appeal a two-prong test set out in
required by Scott in all misdemeanor cases where the prosecution seeks a jail term. Thus,
the number of localities and cases upon which Baldasar will have an effect is limited.
649. See 446 U.S. at 229 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,
825 (1977) (rejecting argument that state need not expend funds to ensure prison inmates'
constitutional right of access to courts: "IThe cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot
justify its total denial."); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1971) (rejecting argument
that financial burden to state justified providing free trial transcripts to indigent appellants
only when appellants were subject to imprisonment). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
373 (1979) (extension of indigents' right to appointment of counsel not justified, in part,
because of substantial costs which would be imposed on states).
650. See 440 U.S. at 373-74.
651. 446 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
652. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery v. Alabama, 308
U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
653. 626 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980).
654. Id at 137. The court noted that the prerequisite to a claim of ineffective counsel is
that the defendant had a constitutional right to counsel at the time in question.
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Cooper v. Fitzharris.6" First, the defendant must at least show that his
attorney failed to provide him with reasonably competent and effective
representation.656 Under this first prong of Cooper, the Ninth Circuit
will reject a claim if it finds either that no error was committed,657 or
that the acts or omissions resulted from a reasonable trial strategy.658
United States v. Sheker65 9 is an example of the latter kind of error.
The defendant in Sheker had been convicted of impersonating an In-
ternal Revenue Service agent to obtain a "thing of value," the wherea-
bouts of a witness against him in a state criminal action.660  The
defendant alleged that his attorney had erred by stipulating that the
information which the defendant had sought was a "thing of value"
within the meaning of the statute under which the defendant was
charged.66' Rejecting this claim, the court found that the stipulation
655. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979). For the
standards followed in other circuits, see 26 A.L.R. Fed. 218, 239-57.
656. 586 F.2d at 1330.
657. See United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 138 (9th Cir. 1980) (counsel's failure to
move to suppress indictment not error where motion would have been futile because there
were no grounds to support it); United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d 221, 223 (9th Cir. 1980)
(counsel's failure to request recusance not error because motion would have been improper);
Cody v. Morris, 623 F.2d 101, 103 (9th Cir. 1980) (failure to make motion to suppress and to
call certain witnesses not error under the Cooper standard); United States v. Brackenridge,
590 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (failure to move for judgment of acquittal at end of
prosecution's case did not constitute ineffective counsel where prosecution had presented
sufficient evidence to convict defendant), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); United States v.
Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1979) (several failures by counsel not deemed constitu-
tional errors); see also United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 634 (9th Cir. 1979) (counsel's
failure to obtain certain information about codefendant not error where counsel effectively
presented an abundance of such information to the jury) (decided prior to Cooper), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980).
658. See United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 102, 106 (9th Cir. 1980) (ineffective counsel not
shown by attorney's advice to forego full trial because the decision frequently is in defend-
ant's best interest); United States v. Brackenridge, 590 F.2d 810, 811 (9th Cir.) (per curiam)
(defendant's attorney had advised defendant to testify but testimony damaged her cause;
however, counsel not ineffective because the prosecution's case against defendant was so
strong that a competent attorney "would have thought it wiser to have the jurors hear appel-
lant's version. . . than to leave them with only the prosecution's uncontradicted version"),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979).
659. 618 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
660. Id at 608.
661. Id at 610. The defendant also alleged that counsel's failure to obtain an advance
ruling on the admissibility of potential impeachment evidence, his previous impersonations
of an agent of the CIA, demonstrated that counsel was incompetent. Id He argued that this
failure prevented him from testifying in his own behalf and from directly appealing an ad-
verse ruling by the trial judge. In holding against the defendant, the court first noted that
counsel probably could not have forced the judge to make an advance ruling. Second, the
court reasoned that in light of the related state charges against the defendant for murder and
kidnapping, and the prosecution's interest in exposing the motive for the defendant's imper-
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was part of counsel's trial strategy to narrow the case to the question of
impersonation and to eliminate evidence of motive, proof of which
would have been very prejudicial to the defendant. 662 Thus, because
the stipulation was part of a reasonable trial strategy, the defendant
had not demonstrated that his counsel had been ineffective.
Moreover, to violate the constitutional standards under the first
prong of Cooper, the error must be one that a reasonably competent
attorney would not have made because the defendant "'assumes the
risk of ordinary error.' "663 The application of this rule is illustrated in
United States v. Campbell.664 In Campbell, the court found that trial
counsel erred by informing the trial judge, in the presence of the jury,
that the defendant was taking the stand against his advice.665 The at-
torney took this action in an effort to comply with section 7.7 of the
ABA Defense Function Standards that requires counsel not to aid in a
client's perjury and to indicate on the record when a client testifies
against his advice, without revealing the fact to the court.6 66 The Ninth
Circuit held that the mistake was "one which a 'reasonably competent
attorney' might make in an effort to comply with his ethical duties,1
667
and thus did not violate the constitutional standard.668
sonation of an IRS agent, it could reasonably assume that trial counsel did not seek the
advance ruling on the admissibility of the evidence because he thought it "only marginally
relevant to the [defendant's] decision whether to testify." 1d Since these other factors mili-
tated against the advisability of the defendant taking the stand, counsel's failure to obtain a
ruling was not an unconstitutional error and, at any rate, did not prejudice the defendant.
Id; see infra notes 673-74 and accompanying text.
662. 618 F.2d at 610. The court also ruled that the information sought by the defendant
was a "thing of value" within the meaning of the statute. Id at 609.
663. 586 F.2d at 1330 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 774 (1970)); see
Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606, 608 (9th Cir. 1963).
664. 616 F.2d 1151 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910 (1980).
665. Id. at 1152.
666. ABA DEFENSE FuNcTION STANDARDS § 7.7(c) provides in part:
If. . during the trial.. . the defendant insists upon testifying falsely in his own
behalf, the lawyer may not lend his aid to the perjury. Before the defendant takes
the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer should make a record of the fact that
the defendant is taking the stand against the advice of counsel in some appropriate
manner without revealing the fact to the court.
667. 616 F.2d at 1152.
668. The court also held that counsel's actions did not deny the defendant a fair trial
because it was unlikely that the jury understood the implication of counsel's statement and
thus, the jurors were not precluded from independently judging the merits of the case. Id at
1152-53. The court noted that Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978), held that
the defense counsel's actions of abruptly halting cross-examination of the defendant and
then telling the judge that he wished to withdraw from the case but could not reveal his
reason, were tantamount to informing the judge that the defendant was lying, thus denying
the defendant a fair trial. Id at 730. The Campbell court distinguished Lowery on the
ground that at defendant Campbell's trial, the jury was the trier of fact, while in Lowery that
CRIMINAL LAW SURVEY
The court's conclusion is questionable. Undoubtedly, defense
counsel made a good faith effort to comply with his ethical duties.
However, Defense Function Standard section 7.7(c) expressly warns an
attorney against revealing to the court that his client is taking the stand
against his advice.669 Yet, defense counsel in Campbell did exactly
what the standard advised against. Furthermore, counsel apparently
knew in advance that the defendant intended to testify falsely.67 ° Thus,
he had ample opportunity to make a record of the fact by less revealing
means.671 In sum, defense counsel's error does not appear to be one
that a competent attorney would have made.
If a defendant can show that his attorney's representation fell be-
low that of a reasonably competent defense counsel, the defendant
must also fulfill the second prong of Cooper and prove that his coun-
sel's acts resulted in prejudice to his defense.6 72 This application of the
harmless error rule was first enunciated by the Ninth Circuit in Cooper
v. Fitzharris73 That appeal was predicated upon trial errors,674 and
the court, in part, held that the harmless error rule applied especially in
that context because such errors appear "on the face of the trial rec-
ord." 675 The court noted that the errors in Cooper had been affirmative
omissions by the defense attorney himself.6 7 6 Consequently, the court
was able to distinguish factually Supreme Court decisions which have
indicated that the harmless error rule was not applicable to any right to
counsel violations. 77 The Cooper court stated, "In this case, appellant
position was occupied by the judge. See 616 F.2d at 1153. The court reasoned that jurors
would be less aware of an attorney's ethical duties than a judge and could have interpreted
counsel's actions as an attempt to keep the defendant off the stand so that he would not be
subject to damaging cross-examination. Id
669. ABA DEFENSE FUNCrION STANDARDS § 7.7(c); see supra note 666.
670. 616 F.2d at 1152.
671. See, e.g., 575 F.2d at 731 n.5.
672. 586 F.2d at 1331.
673. 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), ceri. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
674. The court noted that the claim was based on "specific acts and omissions of counsel
at trial." Id at 1331 (emphasis added). The specific errors listed were the failure to move to
suppress evidence, the failure to object to evidence, and the failure to stipulate to a prior
conviction to avoid damaging government proof. Id at 1332.
675. Id
676. Id
677. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487-89 (1978) (counsel forced to continue
multiple representation after objection); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976)
(defense counsel prohibited from conferring with client during overnight mid-trial recess; no
discussion of harmless error, prejudice presumed); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 864
(1975) (state statute made final summation by defense counsel discretionary); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (right to counsel fundamental); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1942) (attorney forced to represent defendants with conflicting
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does not assert that he was denied counsel at trial, or that counsel,
though present, was prevented from performing a critical function or
otherwise impeded in the advocacy of appellant's cause. ' ' 67 8 Thus, the
court attempted carefully to contrast cases in which some outside fac-
tor, such as the court6 7 9 or a statute,680 had interfered with a defend-
ant's right to effective counsel. 681 The facts and reasoning of Cooper
appear to limit the case to those errors made by counsel at trial and not
caused by some outside impediment.
Recent decisions show that the Ninth Circuit is willing to use the
harmless error rule in situations outside of Cooper's facts and reason-
ing. First, the Ninth Circuit has ignored the Cooper court's apparent
distinction between trial and non-trial errors for the purpose of the
harmless error rule, and has instead required a showing of prejudice
when non-trial errors are alleged.682 For example, in United States v.
Winston,683 the defendant appealed his conviction claiming ineffective
counsel based upon his attorney's failure to request recusance of the
trial judge, discover a codefendant's psychiatric report prior to trial,
and inform the defendant of the trial judge's participation in the code-
fendant's competency hearing. Even though the latter two alleged er-
rors had occurred before trial, and under Cooper would not have
required a showing of prejudice, the Ninth Circuit held that the de-
fendant had not been prejudiced and affirmed the conviction.684
A particularly clear example of the abandonment of the Cooper
distinction between trial and non-trial errors was presented in United
States v. Coupez.685 The defendant, who proceededpro se at trial, was
required by the appellate court to prove that she had been prejudiced
by counsel's alleged defective representation before trial. The defen-
dant charged that the trial court's restrictions on joint defense strategy
meetings, denial of continuances, and denial of the defendant's plan for
interests); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (denial of adequate opportunity to
confer with defendant or prepare for trial).
678. 586 F.2d at 1332.
679. Eg., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-89 (1978).
680. E.g., Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 865 (1975).
681. For a critical discussion of the Cooper holding, see 586 F.2d at 1334-42 (Hufstedler,
J., dissenting).
682. See United States v. Coupez, 603 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1979) (harmless error
rule applied to defendant's claim that court's orders prevented counsel from rendering effec-
tive assistance prior to trial); Ewing v. Williams, 596 F.2d 391, 395 (9th Cir. 1979) (harmless
error rule applied to errors occurring prior to trial); see also United States v. Williams, 624
F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1980) (no prejudice shown in post-trial error claim).
683. 613 F.2d 221 (9th Cir. 1980).
684. Id at 223-24.
685. 603 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1979).
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a combination of pro se and counsel representation at trial prevented
her attorney from discharging his normal functions as defense counsel
and caused him to render ineffective assistance.
The Ninth Circuit panel believed that the actions of the trial judge
were justified. The Coupez court stated that "Cooper requires that a
showing of a lack of effective representation must be coupled with a
factual showing of actual prejudice to a defendant's defense because of
such defective representation."6"6 Finding no prejudice, the court af-
firmed the conviction.68 7 Thus, the Coupez court required a showing of
prejudice even when the ineffective representation was caused by the
trial court. The court, however, has ignored the Cooper court's warn-
ing that the harmless error rule should not apply to claims that counsel
was impeded in the advocacy of an accused's cause by some outside
factor, such as the court.6 88
Post-Cooper decisions have employed indiscriminately the harm-
less error rule. Thus, a defendant must show both that his counsel ren-
dered ineffective assistance and that he was prejudiced thereby under a
harmless error standard. Even so, in light of Cuyler v. Sullivan,68 9 the
harmless error rule is inapplicable to ineffective counsel claims based
on unconstitutional multiple representations. 690 Where an actual con-
flict exists which adversely affects a counsel's representation, prejudice
need not be demonstrated in order for a defendant to obtain relief.
691
4. Conflict of interest
The sixth amendment guarantees an accused the right to the assist-
686. Id at 1350.
687. 603 F.2d at 1350-5 1. For a different approach, see United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d
432, 439 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980). In Panza, the Ninth Circuit
disposed of a similar claim, that the trial judge's actions had prevented counsel from render-
ing effective assistance, without using the Cooper standard. The court held that the trial
judge's order striking the defendant's testimony because he refused to answer questions on
cross-examination was proper and thus did not deny him effective counsel.
688. 586 F.2d at 1332; see supra notes 679-81 and accompanying text.
689. 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980) (defendant must show "conflict of interest actually affected
the adequacy of his representation.").
690. See Brown v. United States, 625 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded, 446
U.S. 962 (1980). In Brown, the Ninth Circuit had applied the Cooper standard in rejecting
an accused's claim of inadequate counsel resulting from his attorney's alleged conflict of
interest. In addition to the accused, counsel was also representing, in an administrative pro-
ceeding, a federal agent who was a witness against the accused. The Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Cuyler. 1d at 212.
691. 446 U.S. at 350; see infra notes 716-17 and accompanying text.
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ance of counsel unburdened by conflicting loyalties.692 However, there
is no per se rule against multiple representation;69 3 the sixth amend-
ment is violated only when an actual conflict of interest exists. 694
The Supreme Court in its 1978 decision of Holloway v. Arkan-
sas,6 9 5 ruled that if timely objections to joint representation are raised,
the trial court must either appoint separate counsel or investigate the
objections to "ascertain whether the risk [of conflicting interests is] too
remote to warrant separate counsel. 69 6 In Holloway, the trial judge
required a public defender to represent three defendants at the same
trial.697 The judge declined to appoint separate counsel despite the at-
torney's repeated objections that a conflict of interest existed between
the clients that would prevent him from providing effective assist-
ance.698 All three defendants were convicted. 699 Because the trial
judge failed to act on the objections, the Supreme Court reversed the
convictions.7°°
In addition, the Court refused to apply the harmless error rule to
the defendants' claim.70 Citing Glasser v. United States, °2 the Court
declared that reversal is required whenever a trial judge improperly
requires joint representation over timely objection. 70 3 As further justi-
fication, the Court noted that
a rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests
. ..prejudiced him. .. would not be susceptible of intelli-
gent, evenhanded application. . . . [Tihe evil. . . is in what
the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing,
not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotia-
tions and in the sentencing process. . . . [T]o assess the im-
pact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's opinions,
tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually
692. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 483 (1978); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 70 (1942); Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979).
693. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. at 482-83; Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d at 1202.
694. Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d at 1202; United States v. Kutas, 542 F.2d 527, 529
(9th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977).
695. 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
696. Id at 484 (footnote omitted).
697. Id at 477.
698. Id at 477-78.
699. Id at 481.
700. Id at 484.
701. Id at 488-91.
702. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) ("The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamen-
tal and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice
arising from its denial.").
703. 435 U.S. at 488.
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impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error
here would require, unlike most cases, unguided
speculation.7 °4
In the 1980 decision of Cuyler v. Sullivan, °5 the Supreme Court
again reviewed a conflict of interest claim. Defendant Sullivan, along
with two others, had been charged with two counts of first degree mur-
der. Two privately retained lawyers represented al three defendants,
who were tried at three separate trials. Sullivan, tried first, presented
no defense in the face of entirely circumstantial evidence. He was con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment. His two codefendants were
acquitted at separate trials. Neither Sullivan nor his attorneys raised
any objections to the joint representation.7 °6
After exhausting his state appeals, Sullivan sought federal habeas
corpus relief, claiming that he had been denied effective counsel by
reason of his lawyers' conflict of interest in representing three defend-
ants.707 He argued that his attorneys' decision to rest the defense was
caused by the conflict.708
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's ruling against Sulli-
van.70 9 The Third Circuit first held that the evidence established multi-
ple representation of the defendants by the two lawyers.710 In reaching
this conclusion, it noted that the lawyers had prepared the defense in
consultation with all the defendants, that both had played important
roles at all of the trials and that both had advised Sullivan with regard
to whether he should rest the defense.
711
Second, the court held that apossibility of a conflict of interest had
existed in the attorneys' joint representation of the three defendants.
712
704. Id at 490-91 (emphasis in original).
705. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
706. Id at 337-38.
707. Id at 339. Sullivan had raised this issue in his state appeal but the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that there had been no multiple representation and that resting the
defense had been a legitimate tactic. Id
708. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 162, 371 A.2d 468, 483-84 (1977).
709. United States ex rel Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated and
remanded, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
710. 593 F.2d at 518-19.
711. Id In a state court proceeding, the two attorneys, DiBona and Peruto, gave conflict-
ing versions of their respective roles in representing the defendants. DiBona said that they
had been associate counsel at each trial; Peruto stated that he assisted DiBona at Sullivan's
trial and had been chief counsel at the other defendants' trials. DiBona also claimed that he
had encouraged Sullivan to testify while Peruto said he had not wanted to present a defense
at Sullivan's trial because it would expose the defense's witnesses for the other trials. 446
U.S. at 338-39.
712. 593 F.2d at 521.
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It then granted Sullivan relief because of the possible existence of the
conflict.
On appeal, the Supreme Court accepted the Third Circuit's deter-
mination that multiple representation had existed,71 3 but vacated the
decision, holding that the mere possibility of a conflict of interest was
insufficient to invalidate a criminal conviction. 4 The Court went on
to declare that in order to show a violation of his right to effective
counsel by reason of a conflict of interest, "a defendant must establish
that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's per-
formance."7 5 However, the Court noted that once he has met this
standard, the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice in order to ob-
tain relief.716 Since both sides claimed that they should prevail under
this new standard, the Court remanded the case to resolve the issue.7 17
The Cuyler standard represents a retreat from the Court's position
in Holloway, which declared that a defendant need not show prejudice
in order to obtain relief on a conflict of interest claim. Under Cuyler,
a defendant apparently must demonstrate not only the existence of an
actual conflict, but also the adverse effect it has on his lawyer's per-
formance.7 19 Thus, the Cuyler Court in effect requires a defendant to
show that he was prejudiced by the conflict. While perhaps following
the letter of the Holloway decision, the Cuyler Court clearly evades its
spirit.
The Supreme Court in Cuyler also refused to expand the rule of
Holloway to require state trial courts to initiate an inquiry into the pro-
priety of multiple representation in all cases. 720 Holloway requires in-
713. 446 U.S. at 342. The Court also rejected the state's contention that errors of retained
counsel cannot serve as the basis for a federal writ of habeas corpus. Id at 343-44. It held
that when a state conducts a criminal trial at which the defendant is represented by inade-
quate counsel, the state participates in the denial of his right to effective counsel. Id
714. Id at 350.
715. Id The Ninth Circuit decisions are in accord with this new standard. See, e.g.,
Willis v. United States, 614 F.2d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 1979) (Ninth Circuit requires defen-
dant to show an actual conflict and some prejudice from it); United States v. Eaglin, 571
F.2d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); Lugo v. United States, 350
F.2d 858, 859 (9th Cir. 1965). But see Brown v. United States, 625 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1979)
(Ninth Circuit's case applying harmless error standard to claim of ineffective counsel result-
ing from attorney's alleged conflict of interest vacated and remanded for further considera-
tion in light of Cuyler), vacated and remanded, 446 U.S. 962 (1980).
716. 446 U.S. at 349-50.
717. Id at 350.
718. Id at 354-58 (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting); see 435 U.S. at 488-91.
719. See 446 U.S. at 348-50.
720. See id at 346-47; id at 350-54 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
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vestigation when timely objections are made.721 However, the Cuyler
Court stated that "[u]nless the trial court knows or reasonably should
know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an in-
quiry [into the joint representation]." '722 This statement suggests that
state courts have an affirmative duty to investigate in some situations,
even though no objections to the multiple representation have been
raised.723
5. Government interference with the attorney-client relationship
The Supreme Court, in Massiah v. United States, 724 held that the
sixth amendment right to counsel prohibits the government from inter-
fering with a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel once formal
proceedings have commenced.725 In Massiah, government officials
used a codefendant to elicit incriminating statements from Massiah in
the absence of counsel.726 Massiah, who had been indicted, was una-
ware that the codefendant was acting as a government agent. The elic-
ited statements were introduced at his trial, and he was convicted.727
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the sixth
amendment prohibits the use of an accused's incriminating statements
which government agents "had deliberately elicited from him after he
had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. 728
In 1980, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Massiah in United States v.
721. 435 U.S. at 484.
722. 446 U.S. at 347 (footnote omitted). The Court found that the trial judge did not
have an affirmative duty to investigate whether a conffict existed in this case. Id at 348. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that the defendants were being tried at separate
trials, that no participant in Sullivan's trial objected to the joint representation, that the
lawyers' opening argument in Sullivan's case outlined a defense compatible for all three
defendants and suggested that the defense would call witnesses who might be needed later
for the trials of the other defendants. Id at 346-48. The Cuyler Court also noted that coun-
sel's decision to rest Sullivan's defense was, on its face, reasonable in light of the weakness of
the prosecution's case. Id at 347-48.
723. Proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) provides in part:
Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged pursuant to Rule
8(b) or have been joined for trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are represented by the
same retained or assigned counsel or by retained or assigned counsel who are asso-
ciated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such
joint representation ....
18 U.S.C. App. Rule 44 (Supp. III 1979). The Ninth Circuit expressed approval of proposed
rule 44(c) in United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 964 (1980).
724. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
725. Id at 206.
726. Id at 203.
727. Id
728. Id at 206.
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Henry.729 Defendant Henry had been indicted on a bank robbery
charge and was being held in a city jail pending trial. Government
agents working on the case contacted a paid FBI informant, Nichols,
who was serving a sentence in the same jail.730 After Nichols informed
them that he was being held in the same cellblock as Henry, the agents
told him to be alert to statements made by federal prisoners, but not to
initiate any conversations with or to question Henry regarding the bank
robbery."' A few weeks after this discussion, Nichols was released
from jail. He then reported to the agents that Henry had told him
about the bank robbery. The agents paid Nichols for this
information.732
At Henry's trial, Nichols testified about what Henry had revealed
to him.2 Neither Henry nor the jury were then aware that Nichols
was a paid informant. 3 On the basis of this testimony, Henry was
convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.735
Two years after his conviction, Henry moved to vacate his sen-
tence claiming that he had just discovered that Nichols was a paid in-
formant and that Nichols intentionally had been placed in the same
cell to procure information about the robbery. He contended that the
admission of Nichols' statements had violated his sixth amendment
right to counsel under Massiah.736
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's decision 737
that had ordered Henry's sentence vacated. 73' The Court held that
Henry's statements to Nichols should not have been admitted at trial
because they were the product of governmental interference with his
right to counsel.73 9 The Court observed that the agents had "intention-
ally creat[ed] a situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating
statements without the assistance of counsel, ' 740 and that the situation
led the informant to "deliberately elicit" the statements.
741
729. 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
730. Id at 265-66. The record did not disclose whether the agents had contacted Nichols
with the intent to obtain information about Henry or the robbery. Id
731. Id
732. Id at 266.
733. Id at 267.
734. Id
735. Id
736. Id at 267-68.
737. 590 F.2d 544 (4th Cir. 1978).
738. 447 U.S. at 275.
739. Id at 274-75.
740. Id
741. See id at 270-71; id at 275-77 (Powell, J., concurring).
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In his dissent, Justice Blackmun attacked the majority's "likely to
induce" language as a radical departure from Massiah's "deliberately
elicited" test.742 Justice Blackmun argued that Massiah required inten-
tional elicitation.743 Hence, Justice Blackmun viewed the majority's
"likely to induce" standard as requiring only a "negligent triggering of
events." 7 " The dissenting opinion focused on the FBI agents' conduct
and not on the conduct of the informant.7 4 5
This view misconstrues the majority's position which focused on
the conduct of both the informant and the FBI agents. The Henry
majority ruled that the informant had deliberately elicited incriminat-
ing statements from Henry within the meaning of Massiah.746 In
reaching this conclusion, the majority noted that Nichols had not lis-
tened passively to Henry's statements to other prisoners but had en-
gaged in "'some conversations with Mr. Henry' . . .and Henry's
incriminatory statements were 'the product of this conversation.' ,7
Furthermore, the Court found that Nichols had used his position as a
fellow prisoner "sharing a common plight 748 to gain Henry's confi-
dence in order to secure incriminating statements.7 4 9
The Court also examined the conduct of the FBI agents to deter-
mine whether the informant's actions could be attributed to the govern-
ment.750 The majority concluded that even though the agents had said
that they did not intend that the informant affirmatively elicit the infor-
mation, the agents "must have known" that the situation they had cre-
ated would likely lead the informant to take affirmative steps to secure
incriminating statements from Henry. Consequently, the govern-
742. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
743. Id at 278-79.
744. Id
745. Id
746. See id at 269-74; id at 277 (Powell, J., concurring) ("I understand that the decision
today rests on a conclusion that this informant deliberately elicited incriminating informa-
tion. . .").
747. Id at 271-72.
748. Id at 273-74.
749. See id at 273-74 and 274 n.12. The Court found the fact that Henry would seek
Nichols' aid in his planned escape attempt was evidence that Nichols had taken steps to gain
Henry's trust. Id at 274 n.12.
750. Id at 270-71.
751. Id The Court's conclusion that the agents must have known that their actions
would lead Nichols to take affirmative steps to elicit the statements is supported by the facts
of the case. The agents were aware that Nichols had easy access to Henry and that he would
be able to engage him in conversation without arousing his suspicions. Id Furthermore,
they knew that Nichols had a strong financial interest in obtaining incriminating statements
from Henry because he would only be paid if he produced useful information under his
contingent fee arrangement with them. Id at 270 n.7.
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ment became responsible for the informant's actions.
Contrary to the dissent's interpretation, the Henry majority did not
abandon Massiah's "deliberately elicited" standard; rather, they found
the standard satisfied by the actions of the informant. In both cases,
the informant deliberately elicited the information from the defendant.
The "likely to induce" language in Henry was used to find a connection
between the conduct of the FBI agents and the informant. This lan-
guage was not an attempt by the majority to substitute a negligence
standard for Massiah's "deliberately elicited" test.752
The majority opinion also dealt with the Government's contention
that Brewer v. Williams753 had modified the Massiah "deliberately elic-
ited" standard to require actual interrogation. 4 Brewer involved a po-
lice officer's interrogation of an indicted defendant without the
presence of his counsel. Dicta indicated that the sixth amendment
would not have been triggered in the absence of "interrogation." 7 "
The Henry Court rejected this argument.756 Moreover, the Court ap-
peared to doubt that "interrogation" was ever a necessary prerequisite
for sixth amendment protections because the Massiah Court had not
inquired whether the informant or the defendant had initiated the dis-
cussion in that case.
757
The Court was also careful to distinguish Henry factually from a
situation where the information was gathered by an inanimate device,
as was employed in United States v. Hearst.758 The informant in Henry
752. Id at 270-7 1. While Massiah is silent on the issue of the government's responsibility
for an informant's conduct, the Henry Court could not avoid it because of the agents' claim
that they had told Nichols not to question Henry, implying that the government should not
be held responsible for Nichols' actions. See id at 271-72.
753. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
754. 447 U.S. at 271-72.
755. The Brewer Court stated that "no such sixth amendment protection would have
come into play if there had been no interrogation." 430 U.S. at 401.
756. 447 U.S. at 271. In United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1348 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978), the Ninth Circuit took the position that the Government advo-
cated in Henry, interpreting Brewer as modifying Massiah so as to require actual interroga-
tion. Id In light of Henry, the Hearst position on this issue is no longer good law, even
though the Henry Court exempted Hearst from its holding. See 447 U.S. at 271 n.9.
757. 447 U.S. at 271-72; see also Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) ("The
definitions of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term
'interrogation' is even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangea-
ble. . . ."). But see 447 U.S. at 277 (Powell, J., concurring) ("To demonstrate an infringe-
ment of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must show that the government engaged in
conduct that. . . is the functional equivalent of interrogation.") (citations omitted).
758. 563 F.2d 1331, 1347-48 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978). As part of
standard prison policy, an electronic recording device made tapes of defendant Hearst's con-
versations with visitors. Id at 1344. Portions of the taped conversations were later intro-
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was instructed to be alert to statements but not to initiate conversation
with Henry. The Court pointed out that a recording device "has no
capacity of leading the conversation into any particular replies."7 9 By
contrast, the instant informer had not been a passive listener.760
Thus, under Henry, an informant acting at government direction
may be deemed to have deliberately elicited incriminating statements
from a defendant if the informant took some affirmative actions to se-
cure the statements. However, the defendant need not show that actual
interrogation took place.
Related to Massiah-type government action are government ac-
tions which substantially interfere with the attorney-client relationship
itself. In Weatherford v. Bursey,76' an undercover agent submitted to
prosecution in order to maintain his false identity. At Bursey's request,
the agent met twice with Bursey and his attorney to prepare for the
upcoming trial. Accidentally, the agent's "cover" was revealed prior to
trial; so he testified for the Government.762 However, the agent did not
disclose any information he had received at the pretrial defense meet-
ings, either to his superiors or to the court.763 The Supreme Court held
that the agent's attendance at the meetings had not violated the sixth
amendment because no tainted evidence had been introduced at trial,
the defense's strategy had not been revealed, and the purpose of the
agent's presence at the meetings had not been to obtain evidence but to
maintain his cover.7M
In the Ninth Circuit opinion of United States v. Glover,765 a gov-
ernment agent questioned defendant Glover without the permission of
his counsel. However, the agent falsely told Glover that his attorney
had consented to the interview. Shortly after the interview had com-
menced, Glover's attorney happened to observe the conversation and
terminated the meeting. Glover later expressed the fear that his coun-
sel had "crossed" him, 7 66 and he moved to dismiss the indictment be-
cause of the government's interference with his attorney-client
duced at her trial. Id There was no evidence that the visitor, at government direction, had
attempted to engage the accused in incriminating conversation. Id at 1347.
759. 447 U.S. at 271 n.9.
760. Id at 271.
761. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
762. Id at 549.
763. Id at 555-56.
764. Id at 558.
765. 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 860 (1979).
766. Id at 859. The defendant felt "crossed" apparently because the agents' questioning
involved the location of stolen gems. Glover had previously refused to admit knowledge of
this information. Moreover, he had also repudiated his attorney's suggestion to cooperate
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relationship. The Ninth Circuit rejected this contention because the
interview had not produced any incriminating information and the
agent's purpose in conducting the meeting had been to obtain Glover's
cooperation in the prosecution of defendants other than Glover. Thus,
Glover had not been prejudiced by the divulgence of defense informa-
tion so as to establish a violation of the sixth amendment. 767 The court
stated, however, that had any incriminating evidence been obtained by
the agents, "this would [have been] a different case. 76
8
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit followed Bursey and Glover in United
States v. Irwin.769 Defendant Irwin contended on appeal that the in-
dictment should have been dismissed because the government's "gross
intrusion" into his attorney-client relationship had violated his right to
counsel. 770 After Irwin had been indicted, a federal agent contacted
him seeking his cooperation in setting up a drug arrest. The agent sug-
gested that Irwin have his attorney attempt to make a deal with the
prosecutor. During the course of their conversations, which occurred
without the consent of defense counsel, Irwin made several incriminat-
ing statements. While the district court denied the defense motion to
dismiss the indictment, the court stated that it would suppress any in-
culpatory statements that were the result of the post-indictment
conversations. 7 '
The Irwin court rejected aper se rule that mere government inter-
ference with the attorney-client relationship violates the sixth amend-
ment.772 Rather, the appellate court stated that a government intrusion
violates the right to counsel only when it substantially prejudices the
defendant.773
Applying this standard to Irwin's claims, the court found no sixth
amendment violation. First, the court noted that Irwin's incriminating
with the authorities in return for special consideration from the United States Attorney's
Office. .d
767. Id at 864.
768. Id
769. 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980).
770. Id at 1184.
771. Id
772. Id at 1186-87; see also 429 U.S. at 552; 596 F.2d at 863.
773. 612 F.2d at 1187. The court's prejudice requirement should not be mistaken for the
harmless error rule. In Glover, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's decision
in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 488-91 (1978), as holding that once a sixth amend-
ment violation is established, courts should not consider whether the error was harmless or
not. 596 F.2d at 862. However, the Glover court noted that "prejudice" could still be used to
determine whether the right to counsel was violated. Id at 862-63. Hence, the Irwin court
required a showing of prejudice to see if the right to counsel had been violated. See 612
F.2d at 1187-89.
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statements had not prejudiced him because the trial judge had said that
he would exclude them.7 This action not only prevented the intro-
duction of the evidence, it also allowed Irwin's counsel to prepare his
case uninhibited by the threat of possible introduction of the state-
ments. 775 Second, there was no evidence that the agent's conduct had
destroyed Irwin's confidence in his attorney.776 Finally, the court noted
that the agent hadonot been attempting to discover defense strategy and
that defense counsel himself had revealed his trial plans in his first con-
ference with the prosecutor.777 Consequently, the court found no
prejudice and affirmed his conviction.
Irwin represents an extension of Glover. The Glover court implied
that had incriminating information been given to the agent during the
interview, it might have ruled differently.778 In Irwin, incriminating
statements were made to the agent. However, the Irwin court held that
the district judge's exclusion order effectively prevented any prejudice
to the defendant from the statements. This ruling makes it unlikely
that a government intrusion into an attorney-client relationship will be
remedied by dismissal of the indictment, the relief sought by Irwin.
C The Sixth Amendment Right to Present a Defense
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
the criminally accused "the right. . . to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses in his favor." 779 The confrontation clause safeguards the
defendant's right to stand face-to-face with and to cross-examine wit-
nesses testifying against him. In addition, it gives the jury an opportu-
nity to judge the witness' demeanor and credibility. 780 A companion to
the right of confrontation, the compulsory process clause,7 8 ' enables the
defendant to discover and subpoena potentially exculpatory witnesses.
This clause entitles the defendant to present evidence in his favor and
to have that evidence afforded the same opportunity for belief as evi-
dence presented by the prosecution.782 Together, the confrontation
774. Id at 1187-88.
775. See id at 1188.
776. Id at 1188-89.
777. Id at 1189.
778. See 596 F.2d at 864.
779. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
780. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
781. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
782. One commentator has noted:
[The right entitles a defendant to discover the existence of potential witnesses; to
put them on the stand; to have their testimony believed; to have their testimony
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clause and the compulsory process clause constitutionalize the ac-
cused's right to present a defense.783
1. The right to confrontation
Historically, cross-examination has been considered a vital tool for
discovering the truth.784 The confrontation clause of the sixth amend-
ment requires the prosecution to produce, in person, any witness upon
whose testimony it intends to rely at trial.785 Usually, a defendant must
have an opportunity to cross-examine every witness who presents evi-
dence against him at trial. Sometimes, however, avenues other than
cross-examination may satisfy the requirements of the truth-determin-
786ing process.
a. preparing for cross-examination
Preparation for trial is a critical part of the defendant's ability to
confront the witnesses against him. Implicit in the defendant's con-
frontation right is the government's duty "to provide an indigent crimi-
nal defendant with the essential tools of trial defense. 787 In some
criminal cases, a transcript of a related prior proceeding may be essen-
tial to the presentation of an adequate defense.788 If the defendant es-
tablishes that access to a transcript of the proceeding is necessary to his
defense and makes a timely request for its production, the courts gener-
ally will comply with the request.789
In United States v. Rosales-Lopez,790 the defendant made a timely
request for a copy of an evidentiary hearing transcript. The judge, who
admitted into evidence; to compel witnesses to testify over claims of privilege; and
to enjoy an over-all fair balance of advantage with the prosecution with respect to
the presentation of witnesses.
Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71, 120-21 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Westen].
783. Westen, supra note 783, at 74.
784. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (rev. ed. 1974).
785. Simmons v. United States, 440 F.2d 890, 891 (7th Cir. 1971) (where "the opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant is essential to a defendant's right of confrontation, it must be
the government's burden to produce the declarant").
786. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (hearsay statements admissible be-
cause there was sufficient indication of reliability of the statement).
787. United States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
788. See Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Moore v. Illinois, 577 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 919 (1979).
789. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 918 (1979); United States v. Baker, 523 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Acosta, 495 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1974).
790. 617 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir. 1980).
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had held the evidentiary hearing, denied Rosales-Lopez' request be-
cause he had failed to establish any "particularized need" for the tran-
script.7 9' Although the Ninth Circuit held that the legal standard
applied by the judge was erroneous, the error was deemed harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that, overall, there was a
strong consistency between the testimony given by the witness at the
evidentiary hearing and at the trial. Thus, there was little impeach-
ment value in the transcript.
792
The government's duty to ensure that an indigent defendant has
the means with which to formulate an effective defense is also explicitly
guaranteed by 18 U.S.C. section 3006A.793 To show that a violation of
this statute has reached constitutional proportions, a defendant must
establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the violation
prejudices him.' M
In the 1980 Ninth Circuit opinion of United States v. Sims, the
trial court rejected Sims' section 3006A(e)(1) motion for the appoint-
ment of a psychologist, who would have assisted in the preparation of
the defense by rebutting the reliability of eyewitness identification.795
The appellate court affirmed for two reasons. First, relying on the Fifth
Circuit standard in United States v. Theriault,796 the court believed that
a reasonable privately retained attorney probably would not have hired
such an expert for his client.797 In this regard, the court noted that the
791. Id. at 1355.
792. The only inconsistencies alleged by defendant related to very minor descriptive
changes. For example, at trial one witness described the driver of a suspect car as wearing
"some kind of glasses," while at the hearing he described the man as wearing sunglasses. Id
at 1356 n.4; see Cadogan v. LaVallee, 428 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914
(1971).
793. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (1976) provides:
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert or
other services necessary for an adequate defense may request an ex parte applica-
tion. Upon finding after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding that the
services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the
court, or the United States magistrate if the services are required in connection
with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall authorize counsel to obtain the
services.
794. United States v. Spaulding, 588 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1971).
795. 617 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 (9th Cir. 1980).
796. 440 F.2d 713, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring) (18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A(e)(1) (1976) requires the district judge's "authorization for defense services when
the [defense] attorney makes a reasonable request in circumstances in which he would inde-
pendently engage such services if his client had the financial means to support his defenses")
(footnote omitted).
797. 617 F.2d at 1375; accord, United States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1976) (case
reversed and remanded for failure to appoint a fingerprint expert where such evidence was
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admissibility of the proposed testimony was highly disfavored by the
Ninth Circuit. A "reasonable" attorney would consider the probability
of the testimony's admissibility before engaging an expert.798 Second,
Sims failed to show that the absence of an expert's services diminished
the effectiveness of his cross-examination. Further, he made no show-
ing that an expert would have assisted his defense in any other way.
Thus, the court could not conclude that Sims' sixth amendment rights
to effectively cross-examine witnesses and to present an effective de-
fense were violated.799
Generally, in non-capital cases, the prosecution is not required to
furnish the defendant with a pretrial list of witnesses which it intends to
call at trial.8" The Ninth Circuit has said, furthermore, that a defen-
dant's sixth amendment rights are not violated when the Government
does furnish a witness list, but then calls witnesses who are not in-
cluded on the list. °10
In United States v. Sukumolachan,80 2 the defendant claimed that
the Government's omission of two names from a witness list, volunta-
rily provided to the defense, had misled the defendant in his trial prep-
aration, violating his confrontation right.80 3 One witness, however,
"provided straightforward information about where the defendant
lived," and the other witness was the informer of whose "existence and
possible testimony" the defendant "was well aware." 8" The court was
unable to find that Sukumolachan had suffered any prejudice. 805 By
pivotal); Brinkley v. United States, 498 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1974) (bank robbery conviction
remanded for failure to appoint an independent psychiatrist where it appeared that defend-
ant's counsel would have engaged such services had his client been able to pay for them).
798. 617 F.2d at 1375; see United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979) (eyewit-
ness identification would have been inadmissible, therefore, it was not necessary for the
court to authorize funds for an expert).
In Sims, however, the court specifically declined to adopt the approach in Fosher be-
cause an expert's services involved not only trial testimony but pretrial and trial assistance.
Thus, it would not be appropriate to view Sims as a decision based solely on whether an
expert's testimony in court would be admissible. 617 F.2d at 1375 n.3.
799. Id at 1375; accord, United States v. Spaulding, 588 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Hartfield, 513 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir.
1973); Christian v. United States, 398 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1968).
800. United States v. Glass, 421 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 1969); Rosenzweig v. United
States, 412 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir. 1969); accord, United States v. Chase, 372 F.2d 453, 466
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 907, 913 (1967).
801. United States v. Angelini, 607 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)).
802. 610 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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determining that the defendant had not been misled, the court disposed
of this case on the narrowest possible ground. s0 6 As a result, the court
did not reach the constitutional question of whether the defendant's
right to effective cross-examination had been violated.
In United States v. Tousant, °7 the appellant asserted that the right
to an adequate cross-examination could be satisfied only by the pretrial
disclosure of the identity of an informer. The decision whether to dis-
close the identity of an informer depends on "a balancing of the needs
of law enforcement against the [defendant's] interest in having a fair
trial."808 This decision is a matter of discietion for the court.80 9 In
]ousant, the district court found that the informer was enrolled in a
federal witness protection program and "seriously feared for his
life."8 10 Moreover, the trial record indicated that the defendant had
cross-examined the informer extensively.8 1' Consequently, the court of
appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deter-
mining that the defendant's interest in preparing his defense was out-
weighed by the government's interest in protecting the informer's
identity. Further, there was no showing by the defendant that his
cross-examination right was unduly prejudiced by withholding the in-
former's identity prior to trial.812
b. limiting cross-examination at trial
The United States Supreme Court held in Douglas v. Alabama that
"a primary interest secured by [the confrontation clause] is the right of
cross-examination."' 1 3 In Douglas, the defendant was blocked from
cross-examining his alleged accomplice because the accomplice in-
voked the right against self-incrimination. Although the prosecutor
had read the witness a confession he signed, which also damaged the
806. Id
807. 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam). The trial court denied Tousant's motion
to disclose the identity of the informer prior to trial. Id at 813.
808. United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Roviaro v.
United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-62 (1957)).
809. United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d at 1148 (citing United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d
724, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975)); cf United States v. Hoyos, 573
F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978) (discretion to grant continuance to obtain witnesses).
810. 619 F.2d at 813.
811. Id
812. Id; cf United States v. Bonilla, 615 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); see notes
679-85 supra and accompanying text. The appellant's assertion in Bonilla of prejudicial
error based upon the failure of the government to produce an informant prior to trial related
to compulsory process rights rather than confrontation rights.
813. 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965); see Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691 (1931)
("Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right.").
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defendant, the accomplice never acknowledged the statement as his
own.8 14 In light of the weight of the alleged confession, the Court held
that Douglas' inability to cross-examine the witness "plainly denied
him the right of cross-examination secured by the confrontation
clause." ' 5 The Court noted that the prejudice caused by the denial of
cross-examination did not constitute "a mere minor lapse" but, rather,
a substantial unfairness requiring reversal.
8 16
The Court implied, however, that the right of cross-examination,
although of considerable importance, is not absolute. While a defen-
dant's right to cross-examine adverse witnesses is not unrestricted,
8 17
the defendant must be afforded a level of cross-examination which sat-
isfies his confrontation right.818 Any examination beyond what is con-
stitutionally mandated is a matter within the discretion of the trial
court.8 1 9 When a trial court prohibits a defendant's cross-examination
for impeachment purposes, the test of whether the sixth amendment
has been violated is "whether the jury had sufficient information to
appraise the bias and motives of the witness. 8 20
In Chioman v. Mercer,21 the Ninth Circuit applied this test to a
trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination regarding the possible
bias of the prosecution's only eye witness who positively identifies
Chipman. Chipman was a resident of a facility for the mentally ill.
The defense sought to establish that the witness lived across the street
from the facility, that she knew Chipman lived in the facility which was
operated by Chipman's aunt, and that she had attempted to convince
city officials to close the facility because she believed the occupants
were undesirable neighbors.8 22 The defense counsel was permitted,
however, to inquire only into the witness' possible racial bias. 23
The appellate court initially noted that, although the confrontation
814. 380 U.S. at 416.
815. Id at 419.
816. Id at 420.
817. Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009
(1978).
818. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974); accord, United States v. Bass, 490
F.2d 846, 857-58 n.12 (5th Cir. 1974).
819. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931); Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d
1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009 (1978).
820. Skinner v. Cardwell, 564 F.2d 1381, 1389 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1009
(1978); accord, United States v. Kelley, 545 F.2d 619, 623 (8th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 430
U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1032 (1975); United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1267 (6th Cir. 1974).
821. 628 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1980).
822. Id at 530.
823. Id
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clause "tips the scales in favor of permitting cross-examination," it does
not require the court to allow cross-examination where the probative
value of the testimony would most likely be outweighed by an adverse
effect on the fair and efficient administration of the trial.824 The trial
court had sustained a relevancy objection, ruling that the defense had
not made a showing of "particular enmity between the witness and the
defendant." '825 However, the defendant's offer of proof set out evidence
from which the trier of fact could have found that the witness harbored
a general bias against a group of which the defendant was a member.826
Thus, cross-examination concerning this bias was necessary to expose
the possible prejudice of the witness against Chipman.827 Further, the
witness' testimony was crucial because it was the only evidence which
clearly placed Chipman at the scene of the crime. The Ninth Circuit
observed that the prosecution's other evidence was not overwhelming.
In light of all these facts, the appellate court held that the denial of an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness violated Chipman's confron-
tation right.828
The Ninth Circuit also held that the right of cross-examination
had been violated in Burr v. Sullivan.829 Citing an Oregon statute, the
Oregon state court, which had tried Burr for arson, prohibited Burr's
attorney from questioning Burr's two alleged accomplices about subse-
quent burglaries to which they had confessed in juvenile proceed-
ings. 830 During Burr's trial, the accomplices were under the continuing
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.8 3 Thus, it was arguable that the wit-
nesses testified because they hoped for leniency. The Ninth Circuit,
824. Id at 531; see FED. R. EvID. 403; CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 1966).
825. 628 F.2d at 528. The defense did not assert that the witness had hopes of receiving
better treatment from the government in exchange for her testimony, as is the most common
situation. See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Burr v. Sullivan, 618 F.2d 583 (9th
Cir. 1980).
826. 628 F.2d at 529-30.
827. Id at 532; see, e.g., United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1969) (cross-
examination concerning witness' possible bias against draft-resisters or anti-war
demonstrators).
828. 628 F.2d at 533.
829. 618 F.2d 583, 588 (9th Cir. 1980).
830. At Burr's trial, both accomplices testified on cross-examination that they had admit-
ted to the commission of over forty-five burglaries in a juvenile proceeding after the arson.
However, the trial judge struck the testimony of the first witness and forbade the defense
counsel from using the juvenile records of the second in its closing argument. The court
based its refusal on OR. REv. STAT. § 419.567(3) (1975), which states, in part: "No informa-
tion appearing in the record of the case [juvenile proceeding] ...relating to the child's
history. . . may be disclosed. . . without the consent of the [juvenile] court .... 618
F.2d at 585 n.l.
831. 618 F.2d at 586.
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relying on the factually similar Supreme Court decision of Davis v.
Alaska, 32 held that the state's interest in keeping juvenile proceedings
confidential must give way "to the defendant's right to cross-examine
the state's witnesses to show bias. '8 33 Because the accomplices were
subject to further juvenile proceedings, the Burr court found that an
even stronger showing of potential bias existed than in Davis, in which
the key witness was merely on probation.834
In addition, the Burr court noted that defense counsel's failure to
articulate the specific grounds on which he was probing the witnesses'
credibility would not foreclose raising on appeal the defendant's consti-
tutional right.835 Instead, the court held that the defense counsel's ar-
ticulation was sufficient because the witnesses' positions strongly
indicated that there was a possibility of bias.8 36 Further, the defense
attorney did indicate that he was attempting to probe the witnesses'
credibility. 837 His statement was broad enough to come within the re-
quirements of A/ford v. United States.838
In United States v. Williams,139 the Ninth Circuit held that the trial
court had not committed reversible error regarding the defendant's mo-
tion to strike the testimony of a prosecution witness who had pleaded
her fifth amendment right on cross-examination. Defense counsel had
sought to establish the witness' desire to implicate Williams in order to
protect her roommate Clark, an alleged missing accomplice, who had
participated with the witness and the defendant in -the charged bank
robbery. 40 The witness had admitted on cross-examination that she
had been convicted of the Williams robbery, via a plea bargain which
832. 415 U.S. 308 (1974). In Davis, the state had relied on the testimony of a juvenile
witness who was on probation to link the defendant to the crime. The trial court thereafter
refused to allow the defense to cross-examine the witness as to his prior juvenile adjudica-
tions and probation status. The defense sought to establish the possible bias of the witness.
The Supreme Court ruled that "[t]he state's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality
ofajuvenile offender's record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the
effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." Id at 320.
833. 618 F.2d at 586.
834. Id at 586; see supra note 833.
835. 618 F.2d at 586-87.
836. The witnesses, although accomplices of the defendant, were not being tried for the
offense. They remained under the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court after having
confessed to other offenses. Id at 586. See supra notes 831-32 and accompanying text.
837. Defense counsel stated that he was "attacking the veracity of the witness." 618 F.2d
at 586.
838. Id at 587. In Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931), the Supreme Court stated
that the cross-examiner should be given reasonable latitude in questioning witnesses in order
to ensure that he have an opportunity to test the credibility of the witnesses. Id at 692.
839. 626 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1980).
840. Id at 699-700.
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required her to testify against Williams, and had been convicted of a
burglary in a previous case.84' The witness had disclosed her relation-
ship with Clark, their drug addiction, and their commission of crimes
to support that drug habit. 42 To further demonstrate the witness' bias,
counsel asked whether she had committed burglaries and whether she
and/or Clark had stolen the car used in the Williams robbery.8 43 The
jury had also been told that Clark had furnished the stolen car.8" The
trial court sustained objections to these questions on the basis of the
witness' assertion of her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. In response to the trial court's ruling, the defendant moved to
strike the witness' entire testimony. Although the trial court twice de-
ferred the argument on this motion, defense counsel failed to pursue
the resolution of the issue.845 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit focused
on the defendant's inability to cross-examine.
8 46
On appeal, Williams argued that the trial court had erred in not
granting his motion to strike. Williams relied on Davis v. Alaska,847 in
which the court held that refusal to permit cross-examination of a wit-
ness regarding a felony conviction, for impeachment purposes, is re-
versible error without a showing of prejudice.8 48 However, the Ninth
Circuit observed that Davis required a court to protect a witness who
had properly invoked his right against self-incrimination and to protect
a witness from harassment or humiliation.849 In this regard, the court
noted that the witness had admitted two felony convictions, the Wil-
liams robbery and a burglary in another case.850 Further, the Ninth
Circuit noted that a court need not allow repetitious or cumulative
cross-examination. The court found that the cross-examination had
uncovered "considerable evidence" of the witness' bias.85 ' Conse-
quently, the court concluded that the trial court had properly restricted
cross-examination. The appellate court found that the defendant was
not prejudiced because the claim of privilege related to "collateral mat-




845. Id at 700-01. Williams' counsel made no offer of proof and made no argument in
support of his motion to strike.
846. Id at 701.
847. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
848. 626 F.2d at 703.
849. 415 U.S. at 320 (quoting Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. at 694).,
850. 626 F.2d at 702.
851. Id
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ters. 8 52 Moreover, even if the court erred in not striking the witness'
testimony, it was held harmless beyond a reasonable doubtY"
A criminal defendant's right to cross-examine the state's witnesses
was upheld in United States v. Bejar-Matrecos.54 The defendant in
Bejar-Matrecios was convicted in district court of illegal reentry into
the United States after having been previously deported.151 In order to
convict a defendant for such a violation, the previous deportation must
have been lawful." 6 The trial court, however, prohibited Bejar-Ma-
trecios from cross-examining a Government witness as to whether the
Immigration Service regulations required that an arrested alien be ad-
vised of his right to speak with the consul of the alien's country. In
pursuing this line of questioning, defense counsel was attempting to
show that this right had been violated,857 that the violation prejudiced
him, 58 and that the prior deportation was, therefore, unlawful.85 9 The
Ninth Circuit held that the lack of cross-examination had "prevented
Bejar from making an effective defense" and, consequently, Bejar's
conviction was reversed.
860
Where the identity of a criminal defendant is a significant issue,
852. See United States v. Norman, 402 F.2d 73, 77 (9th Cir. 1968) (failure to elicit further
information on cross-examination regarding witness' past misconduct did not affect substan-
tial rights of defendant); cf. United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1980) (right to
confrontation not denied where prosecution witness who was cross-examined at length in-
voked the fifth amendment only when asked about his involvement with codefendants); ac-
cord, United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1963).
853. 626 F.2d at 702; see United States v. Norman, 402 F.2d 73, 77 (9th Cir. 1968).
854. 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
855. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976).
856. See United States v. Gasca-Kraft, 522 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1975).
857. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1980).
858. See United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1979) (show-
ing violation of 8 C.F.R. § 242.2(e) (1980) without showing prejudice is insufficient to re-
verse conviction).
859. 618 F.2d at 82-83.
860. Id In light of two recent Ninth Circuit cases, United States v. Calderon-Medina,
591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir.
1979) (conviction sustained where defendant was not prejudiced by the failure of the Immi-
gration Service to advise him of his right to confer with Mexican consular officers), Bejar-
Matrecio's conviction probably will be upheld on remand unless he can make a strong show-
ing that he was prejudiced by the failure to advise him of his right to speak with the consul
of his country.
The Ninth Circuit reached a contrary result in United States v. Hemandez-Rojas, 617
F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1980), decided just five days prior to Bejar-Mairecios. Hemandez-Rojas
was convicted in district court of illegal reentry into the United States after having been
previously deported. He sought to challenge his conviction upon the same ground as was
used in Bejar-Matrecios. Both defendants claimed that their prior deportation had been
illegal because they had not been advised of their right to speak with their consul. Id at 535;
see United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979). Yet, the court in Her-
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the defendant has a right to establish that he is a victim of mistaken
identity.86 This right may require that he be allowed to challenge the
witness' identification. 62 For example, in United States v. Robinson,863
two bank tellers identified Robinson in court as one of three bank rob-
bers shown in bank surveillance photographs. Robinson sought to
challenge the identifications by offering testimony of a "disinterested
government official," that the individual in the photographs resembled
one Turner.8"4 The Second Circuit held that the trial court's exclusion
of the proffered evidence constituted reversible error because identifica-
tion of Robinson was a principle issue in the case.
865
In United States v. Brannon,8 66 defendant Cox asserted that he had
been mistaken for Garrett. Cox appealed his conviction on the ground
that the district court had erred in not admitting into evidence photo-
graphs of Garrett for the jury to compare with bank surveillance photo-
graphs introduced by the Government. 867 Although the Ninth Circuit
agreed with Cox that "[a] defendant is entitled to prove his innocence
nandez-Rojas held that the defendant's right to cross-examine the state's witnesses was not
violated. 617 F.2d at 535. This decision, however, can be reconciled with Bejar-Matrecios.
In Hernandez-Rojas, the legality of the previous deportation had been decided ad-
versely to Hernandez-Rojas at a hearing conducted by the district court prior to trial. Id
Presumably, Hernandez-Rojas was afforded an opportunity to present his defense and to
cross-examine the government witnesses at that hearing. The right of confrontation does not
explicitly require confrontation at the final "trial." See MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 255, at
616 (2d ed. 1972). Moreover, Hernandez-Rojas did not appeal the district court's pretrial
ruling. 617 F.2d at 535. It was within the discretion of the district court to prohibit cross-
examination at trial on an issue which had been previously decided following an opportu-
nity for cross-examination. Id Thus, the difference between Bejar-Matrecios and Her-
nandez-Rojas is that in Bejar-Matrecios there was no opportunity to question the legality of
the prior deportation, while in Hernandez-Rojas adequate opportunity had been provided at
a separate hearing held prior to trial.
861. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1980); accord Pettijohn v.
Hall, 599 F.2d 476, 482-83 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979); Grant v. Alldredge,
498 F.2d 376, 381-82 (2d Cir. 1974); Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163, 165-66 (5th Cir.
1965); see 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 34 (3d ed. 1940); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 413 (3d
ed. 1940).
862. See United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1976); Sf. Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (because testimony critical to defendant's defense was ex-
cluded and because defendant was prohibited from cross-examining his witness under state's
voucher rule, defendant was denied due process rights).
863. 544 F.2d 110, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1976).
864. Id The government official was not planning to testify that the individual in the
picture did not resemble Robinson, a comparison which the jury could make for itself.
Rather, he was going to testify that the person photographed resembled Turner, whose ab-
sence from the courtroom precluded the jury from making its own comparison. Id
865. Id
866. 616 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1980).
867. Id at 417.
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by showing that someone else committed the crime," 868 it also noted
that the district court had broad discretion in determining whether to
admit the photographs.869 At trial, three bank tellers identified Cox,
while only one witness, who was friendly to the defendants, testified
that the robber in the surveillance photographs "could be" Garrett.
8 70
As a result, the appellate court thought that the testimony presented
was insufficient to raise a substantial controversy to warrant overturn-
ing the trial court's decision to exclude the photographs of Garrett .'7
In Brannon, the identification of Cox as the third robber in the
bank was a crucial issue.872 This situation was very similar to that
presented in Robinson.'73 However, the different results in the two
cases may stem from the relationship between the defendant and the
witnesses. In Robinson, the witness was "disinterested"; 74 in Brannon,
the witness was "friendly" to the defense.87 5 Thus, the Brannon evi-
dence may not have been as credible as that in Robinson. However, the
right to confrontation should permit a defendant to present evidence
which tends to challenge eyewitness identifications.8 76
c. hearsay epidence
Generally, the confrontation clause ensures that the reliability of
evidence is tested by the process of cross-examination.8 77 However,
when out-of-court statements are admitted into evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted, there usually is no opportunity to cross-
examine the actual declarant. 878  Thus, possible confrontation clause
868. Id at 418 (citing United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1976); United
States v. Holt, 342 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1965)).
869. 616 F.2d at 418; see United States v. McLennan, 563 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1977)
(trial judge has broad discretion to determine relevance of evidence), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
969 (1978). A court is not required to admit relevant evidence if it feels that the evidence is
likely to confuse the issues or mislead the jury. FED. R. EvID. 403.
870. 616 F.2d at 417.
871. Id at 418.
872. Id at 417-18.
873. 544 F.2d at 112.
874. Id at 113.
875. 616 F.2d at 417.
876. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1980) (court held it was error
to exclude as irrelevant testimony that another man, fitting the description of the bank rob-
ber, had used bait money taken in the crime charged to purchase a car); Pettijohn v. Hall,
599 F.2d 476, 482-83 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 946 (1979); Holt v. United States, 342
F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir. 1965). The appellate court in Brannon even indicated that "it would
have been preferable to admit the photographs." 616 F.2d at 418.
877. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in Criminal
Prosecutions: 4 FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (1972).
878. See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 252 (2d ed. 1972).
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violations arise even though both the confrontation right and the evi-
dentiary rule of hearsay share the common goal of ensuring testimonial
reliability.
8 79
In Ohio v. Roberts,"'0 the United States Supreme Court examined
the relationship between the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule.
Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen credit
cards. At the preliminary hearing, the defense called, as its sole wit-
ness, Anita Isaacs, the daughter of the theft victims. Isaacs testified that
she had allowed Roberts to use her apartment.881 Throughout lengthy
questioning by defense counsel,88 2 Isaacs denied that she had given
Roberts checks and credit cards without informing him that she did not
have permission to use them. Following the preliminary hearing,
Isaacs left Ohio and talked by telephone with her parents only twice,
once via a social worker.8 3 However, her parents did not know how to
reach their daughter.88 4 As the trial neared, the prosecution sent five
subpoenas to her parents' residence, three of which were issued after
the state knew that Isaacs had left home. 8 ' Isaacs did not return to
Ohio for the trial and, consequently, the state was allowed to introduce
a transcript of her preliminary hearing testimony at Roberts' trial.
8 86
He was convicted. On appeal, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction after concluding that the prosecutor had not made an ade-
quate showing of a good faith effort to locate Isaacs. 87 The Ohio
Supreme Court then affirmed on other grounds.8 88 The court found
sufficient basis for concluding that due diligence would not have
brought Isaacs to trial.8" 9 The court held, however, that the transcript
was inadmissible because Isaacs had not been "cross-examined" at the
879. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (hearsay rules and confrontation
clause do not completely overlap).
880. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
881. Id at 58.
882. Id The defense attorney did not ask to have Isaacs declared a hostile witness. Nor
did he request permission to place her on cross-examination. Id However, he did employ
leading questions, which are considered the primary tool of cross-examination. 1d at 70.
883. Id at 56.
884. Id
885. Id at 79 & n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
886. Id at 60.
887. Id The appellate court concluded that Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968),
required a showing that some affirmative action had been taken to secure the presence of the
witness. 448 U.S. at 60.
888. 448 U.S. at 60.
889. Id at 61. The court distinguished Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), because in
Barber the government knew where the witness could be located, while in Roberts, Isaacs'
location was completely unknown. 448 U.S. at 60-61.
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preliminary hearing.89°
After reexamining the relationship between hearsay declarations
and the confrontation clause, the Supreme Court concluded that the
proponent had to show that the declarant was unavailable and that the
statement was reliable.89 ' First, focusing on the question of reliability,
the Court held that Isaacs' preliminary hearing testimony was reliable
because "as a matter of form," she had actually been cross-ex-
amined. 92 Defense counsel's method of questioning Isaacs had al-
lowed him to challenge her truthfulness, her perception and memory,
and her communicative abilities.8 93 Thus, even without a formal re-
quest to cross-examine Isaacs, the purpose of cross-examination was
satisfied. Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Ohio
Supreme Court. 94
Second, the Supreme Court held that Isaacs' absence had met the
unavailability standard of the Constitution. 95 The Court reaffirmed
the rule established in Barber v. Page,8 96 in which the Court stated that
"'a witness is not "unavailable" for purposes of the. . . exception to
the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have
made a goodfaith effort to obtain his presence at trial.' ",897 In Barber,
the Court did not find a good faith effort when a state had made no
effort to obtain a witness who was in federal prison in another state. 898
Roberts sheds some light on the meaning of "good faith effort." The
890. 448 U.S. at 61. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), "'goes no further than to suggest that cross-examination actually conducted
at a preliminary hearing may afford adequate confrontation for purposes of a later trial."'
448 U.S. at 61 (emphasis in original). However, the Court relied on the dissent in Green for
its holding that "the mere opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing did not
afford constitutional confrontation for purposes of trial." Id; see 399 U.S. at 195-202 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
891. 448 U.S. at 65-66. The Court noted that reliability may be inferred if the statement
falls within an established hearsay exception. Otherwise the evidence will only be admitted
if "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are shown. Id at 66.
892. Id at 70-71.
893. Id at 71.
894. Id at 77. By concluding that Isaacs actually had been cross-examined, the Court
avoided deciding whether California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), required that a witness
actually be cross-examined at the preliminary hearing before his testimony can be admitted
at trial, or whether the mere opportunity to cross-examine satisfies the confrontation clause.
See supra note 891. The Court also declined to decide whether de minimus questioning,
rather than full and formal cross-examination, is sufficient to satisfy the confrontation right.
448 U.S. at 70.
895. 448 U.S. at 77.
896. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
897. 448 U.S. at 74 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. at 724-25).
898. 390 U.S. at 723-25. But see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (witness had
established permanent residency outside the United States).
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Roberts Court stated that the prosecution did not have to make an ef-
fort to locate the witness if the witness' procurement was impossible. If
there is even a slight possibility of producing the witness at the trial,
then the effort required of the prosecution becomes a question of rea-
sonableness. 899 In either case, the burden remains with the prosecution
to establish that a "good faith effort" had been made.9 °° The Court
concluded that the prosecutor had acted reasonably and was not re-
quired to do more than he had done.901
The dissent in Roberts disagreed with this second conclusion.
902
The dissent noted that the prosecutor had made no actual effort to lo-
cate Isaacs.90 3 Moreover, the dissent concluded that subpoenaing
Isaacs and speaking with her parents were not sufficient efforts to locate
the witness. The dissenters did not think that the improbability of suc-
cess should become the rule by which a prosecutor's actions may be
excused. 904
In light of the importance of a defendant's right to confronta-
tion,90 5 the weak showing of good faith effort allowed by the majority is
a retreat from Barber.906 A cursory investigation would have been
more reasonable. 90 7 As such, Roberts illustrates that a good faith effort
is difficult to define and subject to the changing perceptions of the
Court.
In United States v. Neff, 08 the defendant asserted that an Internal
Revenue Service Certificate of Assessments and Payments constituted
inadmissible hearsay and that its admission into evidence violated the
confrontation clause. The IRS certificate stated that Neff "had filed no
proper tax returns during 1974 and 1975. " 909
The court first rejected Neff's claim that the certificate was inad-
899. 448 U.S. at 74.
900. Id at 74-75.
901. Id at 75-76.
902. Id at 79-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
903. Id at 79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The prosecutor did not investigate the few good
leads which he did have (e.g., a social worker in San Francisco who had been in contact with
Isaacs and the possibility that someone in Tucson might have been able to contact Isaacs).
Id at 81.
904. Id at 81-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
905. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965) ("essential and fundamental require-
ment" for a fair trial).
906. 390 U.S. at 72 (" 'possibility of a refusal is not the equivalent of asking and receiving
a rebuff" ") (citation omitted). But see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
907. See 448 U.S. at 80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
908. 615 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
909. Id Neff was convicted in district court of willful failure to file income tax returns.
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missible hearsay.91 ° Since the IRS certificate was admitted "to prove
the 'nonoccurrence' of Nefts . .. tax returns, was 'made and pre-
served' by the IRS, 'a public office or agency', and was 'evidence in the
form of a certification in accordance with rule 902,' "911 the court of
appeals held that the certificate was admissible under the hearsay ex-
ception of rule 803(10) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court
then was left with the issue whether the admission of the evidence vio-
lated the confrontation clause.
The Nef court applied the four-pronged test developed by the
Supreme Court in Dutton v. Evans.912 In determining whether the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence amounts to a constitutional violation, the
Supreme Court balanced (1) whether the statement asserted a past fact,
(2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the fact asserted,
(3) the possibility of faulty recollection, and (4) the possibility that the
facts asserted were misrepresented by the declarant.91 3 The Neff court
concluded that the IRS certificate was the result of "systematized data
storage and retrieval by a public agency charged with the responsibility
of maintaining accurate financial and tax information ... and in-
volved no risk of faulty human recollection and little likelihood of mis-
representation of significant data." 914  Hence, the document was
deemed reliable, satisfying the confrontation clause.
915
910. Id at 1241-42. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 27 states that "[a]n official rec-
ord or an entry therein or the lack of such a record or entry may be proved in the same
manner as in civil actions." FED. R. CRIM. PROc. 27.
911. FED. R. EVID. 803(10). See supra notes 909-11 and accompanying text.
912. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
913. 400 U.S. at 88-89 [these four factors are collectively referred to as "indicia of
reliability"].
914. 615 F.2d at 1242.
915. Id; see United States v. Lee, 589 F.2d 980, 988 (9th Cir.) ("statements made by
public officials in the discharge of their duties" are generally considered trustworthy), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 969 (1979); Warren v. United States, 447 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1971) ("a
probability of trustworthiness is found in the official's duty to maintain accurate records");
see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895) (out-of-court statements which are the
focus of the confrontation clause do not include statements made by public officials in the
discharge of their duties); accord, United States v. Mix, 446 F.2d 615, 622 (5th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Thompson, 420 F.2d 536, 545 (3d Cir. 1970). But see United States v.
Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1977) (chemical analysis report held inadmissible where
the chemist who performed the analysis was not present at trial to testify either as to proce-
dures used in identifying the substance or as to his reasons for concluding that the substance
was heroin).
Neff urged the Ninth Circuit to rely on Oates. The court, however, rejected Netrs argu-
ment that admission of the certificate was contrary to FED. R. EvID. 803(8). 615 F.2d at
1242 n.7. The document offered in Oates consisted of evaluative reports, 560 F.2d at 67
n.19, 68, 69, whereas the document offered in Neff was a national record "inherently less
[Vol. 14
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In United States v. Castllo,9 16 the district court erroneously admit-
ted hearsay testimony at trial under the co-conspirator's rule.9 17 The
statement, "We are fixing to kill a Mexican," was made by one person
to the defendants, both of whom were members of the alleged conspir-
acy.918 However, the erroneous admission of a hearsay statement may
not offend constitutional principles.9 19 The appellate court must decide
"whether the effect of that error was so prejudicial as to require
reversal."
920
The Castillo court looked to the four "indicia of reliability" set
forth in Dutton to determine whether the trial court's error amounted to
a violation of the defendant's right to confrontation. 92' The co-conspir-
ator, who allegedly made the statement, was not asserting a past fact
which might have been "clouded by a faulty recollection." Rather, the
defendant "was stating his present intention to kill a Mexican." Based
on these facts, the court of appeals concluded that the statement was
sufficiently reliable to go to the jury. Thus, the error was not a constitu-
tional violation.922
In United States v. May,9 23 the defendants asserted that the trial
court had erroneously admitted Apprehension Data Cards924 in viola-
tion of the hearsay rule.9 25 The trial court specifically stated, however,
that it was admitting the photographs on the data cards only as circum-
stantial evidence (that is, as non-hearsay) that the persons photo-
needful of probing cross-examination than are conclusions reached through scientific exami-
nation by an out-of-court analyst." 615 F.2d at 1242-43 n.7.
916. 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1980).
917. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
918. 615 F.2d at 882-83. The testimony was admitted to establish an agreement among
the members of Castillo's group. Hearsay statements are admissible under the co-conspira-
tor exception only if made "in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED. R. EvID. 810(d)(2)(E).
The court held that the statement did not further the conspiracy. See supra notes 917-18 and
accompanying text.
919. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156 (1970).
920. 615 F.2d at 883.
921. Id Since 1970, this approach has consistently been used by the Ninth Circuit. See,
e.g., United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976).
922. 615 F.2d at 883.
923. 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
924. Upon entering a naval base to protest the Trident Missile System, the demonstrators
were taken to a processing center where they were photographed and required to provide
identification information which was then recorded on an Apprehension Data Card. A sep-
arate "bar" letter ordering the addressee not to reenter the base without prior authorization
was then served on each demonstrator with the aid of the data cards. The next day a group
of demonstrators again entered the base. The defendants were among those who had re-
ceived bar letters and were subsequently charged with unlawfully reentering a naval base.
Id at 1003; see 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976).
925. 622 F.2d at 1006-07; see FED. R. EvID. 803.
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graphed were on the base on the date in question and that each was
served on that date with a letter barring him from re-entering the base
without prior authorization.926 The appellate court agreed that the
photographs were not hearsay because they were not "an assertion,
oral, written, or non verbal, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence
801(a).
' 92 7
Had the May court found that the data cards were admitted in
violation of the hearsay rule,928 the error probably would not have re-
quired reversal because the prosecution called several witnesses who
testified as to the preparation of the photographs and data cards and
the service of the bar letters.929 The court observed that the defendants
were afforded a full opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses.93°
The confrontation clause does not prohibit a witness "under oath, sub-
ject to cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the
trier of fact" from testifying as to what he has seen and heard.93' Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the defendant's confrontation rights had
not been violated.932
The delicate balance between hearsay exceptions and the confron-
tation clause is threatened when a codefendant's statement which incul-
pates the accused is admitted into evidence without an opportunity to
meaningfully cross-examine the codefendant. 933 In Bruton v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court held that where the codefend-
ant's confession, which implicated the defendant, was admitted at a joint
trial during which the codefendant did not take the stand, the defend-
ant was denied his right to confrontation.
934
In Bruton, the Supreme Court overruled the holding of Delli Paoli
v. United Sates935 because the Bruton Court found that admonitions to
the jury are "'intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a
926. 622 F.2d at 1007.
927. Id; see infra notes 929-30 and accompanying text.
928. Had the trial court admitted the evidence "to prove the truth of the matter asserted"
it would have been hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801(c).
929. 622 F.2d at 1008.
930. Id
931. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970).
932. 622 F.2d at 1008.
933. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE at 274-76 (1978).
934. 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968). Both Bruton and his codefendant, Evans, were con-
victed in district court of armed postal robbery. At their joint trial a postal inspector testified
that Evans had orally confessed to him that Evans and Bruton had committed the armed
robbery. The trial judge instructed the jury that the confession was competent evidence
against Evans, but that it constituted inadmissible hearsay which must be disregarded as to
Bruton. Id at 124-25.
935. 352 U.S. 232 (1957), overruled, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (encroachment on the right to
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nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the ju-
rors.' "936 Thus, the Court found that the admission of "powerfully in-
criminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant" in a joint trial,
without an opportunity to cross-examine, violates the defendant's con-
frontation right.93 7
In 1979, the Ninth Circuit held that the Bruton rule was not vio-
lated when a codefendant's statement, which did not "powerfully in-
criminate" the defendant, was admitted into evidence subject to the
trial court's jury instruction.938 In United States v. Buckner,9 39 the de-
fendant was convicted of various income tax violations. The trial court
admitted into evidence statements of Buckner's codefendants. The jury
was instructed that "the statement of each declarant was admitted only
as to that particular declarant and against no one else." 940 On appeal,
Buckner contended that the statements were admitted in violation of
the Bruton rule.
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed.94' The court observed that
the codefendant's statements, insofar as they related to Buckner, dealt
with matters already conceded by him.942 Furthermore, the trial court
had admitted only portions of the statements which, in its opinion, did
not transgress the Bruton rule; all other material was excised from the
statements. The Ninth Circuit concluded from these facts that the
statements of the codefendants did not tend to "powerfully incrimi-
nate" Buckner, and thus, his right to confrontation was not violated.9 4 3
Buckner is consistent with Bruton. The Bruton Court sought to
prevent juries from taking into account unchallenged and "powerfully
incriminating" hearsay statements of codefendants. 9 " Distinguishing
Bruton, the Buckner court found that the statements were not
"powerfully incriminating." Hence, the Ninth Circuit held that the ad-
monition to the jury was sufficient and effective. 945
confrontation, given circumstances of Delli Paoli, could be avoided by instructing the jury to
disregard the inadmissible hearsay evidence).
936. 391 U.S. at 129 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. at 247 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
937. 391 U.S. at 135-36.
938. United States v. Buckner, 610 F.2d 570, 574 (9th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 445 U.S.
961 (1980).
939. 610 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).




944. 391 U.S. at 135.
945. 610 F.2d at 574; see Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
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The existence of a Bruton error does not require automatic rever-
sal.946 In Harrington v. California, the Court recognized that a Bruton
error could be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" 947 if the state-
ment was merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence.
948
In United States v. Lutz, 94 9 the Ninth Circuit held that a Bruton
error did not require reversal because it was "harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt." The four codefendants appealed their convictions for
mail and wire fraud. During the course of their trial, a letter of apol-
ogy written by Lutz to a defrauded client was admitted into evidence.
The letter "indicated that Zitek had been fired because of 'promises
made in the field to clients.' "950 While conceding that admission of
this letter consituted a Bruton error as to defendant Zitek, the Govern-
ment argued that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt."95' The Ninth Circuit agreed. The court noted that five or six
witnesses, including the recipient of the letter, testified that Zitek had
made false promises. In light of this independent evidence, the court
concluded that the assertions made in the letter were cumulative and
affirmed the conviction. 952
2. The right to compulsory process
Prior to 1967, the United States Supreme Court had never based a
decision on the compulsory process clause.953 Then in 1967, the Court
in Washington v. Texas95 4 recognized that the compulsory process
clause was intended not only to enable the defendant to produce wit-
nesses but also to have them testify at trial. Washington's alleged ac-
complice in a murder, who had been tried separately and convicted,
was disqualified from testifying on Washington's behalf at his trial be-
cause of a Texas statute which rendered accomplices incompetent to
946. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); accord, Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S.
427 (1972) (Bruton error was harmless in light of overwhelming, properly admitted
evidence).
947. 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969); see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
948. 395 U.S. at 254.
949. 621 F.2d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1980).
950. Id at 947.
951. Id
952. Id This approach is consistent with other recent Ninth Circuit cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vissars, 596 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1979) (Bruton error harmless because it did
not provide the jury with any information it wouldn't otherwise have heard); United States
v. Cornejo, 598 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1979) (Bruton error harmless where three bank employees
positively identified the defendant and other evidence strongly supported his conviction).
953. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: .4 Unfed Theory of Evidencefor
Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REv. 567, 586 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Confrontation].
954. 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
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testify for one another.955 In deciding this case, Chief Justice Warren
reached beyond the "fundamental fairness" requirements of the due
process clause and relied, instead, on the specific words of the sixth
amendment. The issue was "[w]hether the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees a defendant the right. . to put his witnesses on the stand, as well
as to compel their attendance in court."956 In answering this question
affirmatively, the Supreme Court for the first time firmly established
that a defendant is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to present a
defense through witnesses.
a. Mendez-Rodriguez rule
Since 1967, the Ninth Circuit has examined the compulsory pro-
cess clause several times.957 In United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez,958
shortly after the defendant was arrested for allegedly smuggling illegal
aliens into the United States, the government deported three of the six
aliens apprehended. The government's actions placed the potential
witnesses beyond its subpoena power, thus preventing the defendant
from interviewing the aliens and ascertaining for himself which aliens
would have been valuable witnesses.959 The court of appeals con-
cluded that this interference amounted to a violation of the defendant's
right to compel favorable witnesses to testify, and, thus, required rever-
sal of his conviction.
960
Subsequent decisions have stated that under Mendez-Rodriguez a
defendant must be given "a reasonable opportunity to interview alien
witnesses and determine their possible value to the preservation of an
effective defense." 96' The Ninth Circuit's definition of what is "reason-
able" has varied considerably. For example, in the 1972 decision of
United States v. Romero, the court concluded that the defendant had
been given a reasonable opportunity to interview witnesses when the
aliens were not deported until after the defendant was indicted.962
Four years later in United States v. Lomeli-Garnica, the Ninth Circuit
upheld a conviction when the government had allowed a potential wit-
955. Id at 16-17.
956. Id at 19.
957. See, e.g., United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Lomeli-Garnica, 495 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Romero, 469 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 985 (1973); United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
958. 450 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1971).
959. Id at 4.
960. Id at 4-5.
961. United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
962. 469 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 985 (1973).
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ness to return to Mexico just twelve days after the defendant was
arrested.
963
The 1980 decision of United States v. Castillo961 provided the op-
portunity for the Ninth Circuit to clarify the definition of "reasonable."
While incarcerated in a federal correctional institution, Castillo was in-
volved in an altercation which resulted in the death of another inmate,
Flores. Following the incident, the government deported two alien in-
mates, Ramos and Gonzales, who were present at the incident.965
Before their deportation, Ramos had been available for questioning for
over one month, and Gonzales for five months. Moreover, in separate
interviews with federal agents, both aliens had denied seeing the inci-
dent. Castillo claimed that the government's deportation of Ramos
and Gonzales violated his right to compulsory process.966
The Castillo court first conceded that "the government's obligation
to retain a deportable alien who may be a material witness is not easily
defined in terms of its time element. 967 However, the court concluded
that the Mendez-Rodriguez rule had not been violated.968 In so hold-
ing, the court went beyond the issue of time. In light of the results of
their government interviews, the court agreed with the Government
that the witnesses' testimony would not have "contributed signifi-
cantly" and noted that the government's deportation of the two aliens
was done in "good faith." '9 69 However, for the third time, a panel of the
Ninth Circuit left open the exact time parameters of the government's
obligation.
In the 1980 case of United States v. Gonzales9 71 the district court
dismissed indictments against nine individuals because the Govern-
ment had failed to retain two illegal aliens, Rivera and Avila, as mate-
rial witnesses, thereby violating the defendants' rights to compulsory
963. 495 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1974). The witness in this case was not an illegal alien
and was not deported. The Court stated that further detainment of the witness would have
imposed a substantial hardship on him with only a slight possibility of benefit to the defend-
ant. In light of these facts, the government's actions apparently were neither unreasonable
nor in bad faith.
964. 615 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 1980).
965. Id at 880-81.
966. Id at 882.
967. Id
968. Id
969. Id The court stated that the compulsory process clause does not require that the
government "retain indefinitely every alien who may have some remote connection with
alleged criminal activity." Id; see United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, 608 F.2d 1314, 1318
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Lomeli-Garnica, 495 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1974).
970. 617 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (9th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 268 (1980).
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process and due process. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the
unavailability of Avila did not violate the defendant's due process
rights because it was not caused by "unilateral government action.
'971
With respect to Rivera, however, the appellate court found that the
government had allowed him to voluntarily return to Mexico rather
than being deported. This action was deemed a unilateral governmen-
tal interference with the defendants' opportunity to interview Rivera
before trial.972 Thus, the Ninth Circuit, after distinguishing its 1979
decision of United States v. Valdez,9 73 held that the district court's dis-
missal was proper as to those counts for which Rivera may have been a
material witness.974 However, the Gonzales court reached its decision
citing only the due process clause, without mentioning the compulsory
process clause, upon which the Mendez-Rodriguez rule also is based.975
b. other related cases
In United States v. Bonilla,976 the defendant claimed that the gov-
ernment's failure to produce an informant for a pretrial interview con-
stituted reversible error. The court quickly disposed of this claim with
a two-step analysis. First, the court pointed out that in Roviaro v.
United States,977 the Supreme Court firmly established that where an
informant is a material witness to a criminal transaction, or clearly
would be of help to the defendant in the preparation of his defense, the
Government need disclose only his or her identity prior to trial.971 Sec-
971. Id at 1363.
972. Id
973. 594 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1979). In Valdez, the defendants knew about the witness
before trial, the witness was available to testify at trial, and it was not clear t~hat government
action had been responsible for placing the witness beyond its subpoena power. Thus, if the
defense had been unable to interview the witness before trial, it was through no fault of the
government. In Gonzales, however, the defense was not informed that Rivera was a mate-
rial witness until after the trial began. Further, had they known, they still would not have
been able to interview Rivera as a result of the government allowing him to return volun-
tarily to Mexico in lieu of deportation. 617 F.2d at 1363.
974. 617 F.2d at 1363. The court reemphasized what the Ninth Circuit has been asserting
over the past decade-that unless a defendant could reasonably have benefited from a miss-
ing witness's testimony, there is no denial of constitutional rights. The defendant must have
been prejudiced by the witness's absence. Id (citing United States v. Sanchez-Murillo, 608
F.2d 1314, 1318 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Valdez, 594 F.2d 725, 728 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Orozco-Rico, 589 F.2d 433, 435 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920
(1979); United States v. Castellanos-Machorro, 512 F.2d 1181, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Lomeli-Garnica, 495 F.2d 313, 314 (9th Cir. 1974)).
975. 617 F.2d at 1363-64.
976. 615 F.2d 1262, 1263 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
977. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
978. 615 F.2d at 1264; see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
ond, the court emphasized that the duty to disclose the identity of an
informant does not require the Government to actually produce an in-
formant in advance of trial.9 79 The court in dicta further emphasized
that the Government is required only to exert reasonable efforts to pro-
duce an informant at trial when his "'presence has been properly re-
quested by the defendant.' "980
Bonila argued, in effect, that the constitutional right to compel
witnesses to testify in one's favor extends to pretrial access to witnesses
in order to prepare trial strategy.98' However, knowledge of the iden-
tity of an informant is the limit of the defendant's constitutional rights.
Thus, the Government is under no "general obligation to produce an
informer."982
The 1979 Ninth Circuit opinion of United States v. Panza983 also
touched on principles embodied in the compulsory process clause.
Panza took the stand during his trial for armed robbery. After offering
his version of the events, Panza then refused to answer questions posed
to him on cross-examination. As a result, the trial court ordered
Panza's testimony striken from the record because the prosecution's
questions were reasonably related to matters raised by the defendant's
testimony. Further, the testimony of three other defense witnesses was
striken because it was no longer relevant once the defendant's testi-
mony was removed from the record.984 Panza claimed that the court's
action denied him his constitutional right to testify and to present wit-
nesses on his own behalf.985
At common law, defendants did not have the right to testify on
their own behalf.986 This right was a statutory creation.987 Some
979. 615 F.2d at 1264.
980. Id (quoting United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 799 (9th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429
U.S. 1120 (1977)).
981. See United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1034 (1980); Callahan v. United States, 371 F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1967).
982. Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9, 12 (9th Cir. 1965).
983. 612 F.2d 432 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
984. Id at 440.
985. Id at 437. In Robbins v. Cardwell, 618 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit
declined to decide whether prohibiting a defense witness, or the accused himself, from testi-
fying, violates the confrontation clause or the right to present a defense implicit in the sixth
amendment. Id at 582. Without reaching the constitutional question, the court found that
"the preclusion of the witness's testimony had no effect on the course of the proceedings or
outcome of the case." Id at 583 (footnote omitted). Had the court reached the constitu-
tional question, it should have addressed the compulsory process clause, rather than the
confrontation clause, since a defendant's right to call witnesses to testify in his favor clearly
arises from the former, not the latter. See supra note 954 at 613.
986. See Sims v. Lane, 411 F.2d 661 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 943 (1969).
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courts, however, have recognized that this right overlaps with constitu-
tional interests.988 Even so, a defendant must testify "truthfully in ac-
cordance with the oath." 989 There is no right to commit perjury.990
Moreover, once a defendant chooses to testify he may not subsequently
refuse to answer questions on cross-examination which are reasonably
related to his direct testimony.991 If a defendant refuses to answer on
cross-examination, the court may, in its discretion, strike the testimony
if it feels that this sanction is the only way to accommodate the law's
interest in arriving at the truth.992 The propriety of a given sanction
will vary with the circumstances.993
In Panza, the defendant refused to answer questions on cross-ex-
amination which were "directed at the core of the defense Panza had
outlined in his direct testimony." 994 Had his refusal related to merely
collateral matters, the appellate court might have been more inclined to
find an abuse of the trial court's discretion.995 In light of the signifi-
cance of the questions which Panza refused to answer, the striking of
Panza's testimony was not inconsistent with his right to testify on his
own behalf and present his defense.
996
D. The Right to a Speedy Trial-Post-Accusatorial Delay
While the sixth amendment to the Constitution guarantees the
criminally accused the right to a speedy trial,997 this constitutional right
is not triggered until the defendant has been arrested or formally
charged with a crime. 998 A Fourth Circuit decision 999 recently read-
987. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976) provides: "In trial of all persons charged with the commis-
sion of offenses against the United States ... the person charged shall, at his own request,
be a competent witness."
988. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp.
173 (D.C.D.C. 1964), ail'd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Bentvena, 319
F.2d 916, 943 (2d Cir. 1963). ,
989. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978).
990. Id at 54.
991. See United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1000 (1978); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148, 154-56 (1958).
992. 612 F.2d at 438-39.
993. See United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 613 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822
(1963); Yates v. United States, 227 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1955).
994. 612 F.2d at 439.
995. Id; see United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 822
(1963).
996. 612 F.2d at 438-39.
997. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. .. ."
998. Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975) (per curiam); United States v.
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
dressedo °° the question of what "arrest" would be a sufficient trigger-
ing event for speedy trial purposes. In United States v. MacDonald,100 1
an army doctor was convicted of murdering his family. "2 In 1970, the
doctor first was investigated and formally charged with the murders by
the Army. Seven months later, it dismissed the charges and honorably
discharged him. During this period, the Army restricted the doctor to
his quarters and relieved him of his duties. After his discharge, the
Justice Department continued the investigation, utilizing the Army's
investigative services. In 1975, four and one-half years after the Army's
formal charge, an indictment issued from a federal grand jury. For two
years during this period, the doctor tried to speed up the government
investigation. When brought to trial, the doctor moved to have his in-
dictment dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Although the trial court
denied his motion, the Fourth Circuit reversed and ordered the indict-
ment dismissed."° 3 Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the case, deeming the interlocutory appeal inappropriate for
the speedy trial claim." 4 Consequently, the trial went forward and
ended in a conviction." ° 5 In 1980, the Fourth Circuit basically reiter-
ated its initial position and reversed the conviction with instructions to
dismiss the indictment.
The 1980 decision, like the 1976 opinion,10 6 held that the speedy
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971). In Dillingham, a clarification of Marion, the Court em-
phasized that an arrest was as significant an event as an indictment. The Court stated:
Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty,
whether he is free on bail or not,. . . [thus] actual restraints imposed by arrest and
holding to answer a criminal charge . . . engage the particular protections of the
speedy trial provisions of the sixth amendment.
423 U.S. at 65 (quoting 404 U.S. at 320-21).
999. United States v. MacDonald, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct.
3004 (1981).
1000. The Fourth Circuit first looked at this issue in 1976 when the defendant made an
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment on
speedy trial grounds. United States v. McDonald, 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1976). The court
of appeals agreed with the defendant and ordered his indictment dismissed. Id at 209.
Without reaching the merits of the case, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit
decision because the Court felt that the interlocutory appeal was improper. 435 U.S. 850
(1978). The Court held that the speedy trial claim could best be judged post-trial. Id at
858-59.
1001. 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3004 (1981).
1002. For a detailed discussion of the facts, see United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196,
200-02 (4th Cir. 1976).
1003. Id at 209.
1004. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
1005. 632 F.2d at 261.
1006. 531 F.2d at 202-05.
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trial right was triggered by the military "arrest."'" 7 According to the
Fourth Circuit, the "offending delay" ran from the military arrest until
the trial took place.100 8 Both opinions assumed that the speedy trial
clause was triggered because MacDonald's military restraint was
equivalent to a civilian arrest and MacDonald was "subjected to 'actual
restraint imposed by arrest and holding to answer in a criminal
charge.' """ Moreover, both opinions agreed that the dismissal of the
charges and the Army's honorable discharge of the defendant did not
alter the outcome.10' The Supreme Court has, once again, decided to
review the Fourth Circuit case.' 0 "1
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Henry' 10 2 briefly touched on
a situation similar to that in MacDonald. In Henry, the defendant first
had been charged by a complaint, which was eventually dismissed by
the Government, and then later the defendant was indicted by a federal
grand jury for the same crime.10 13 Unlike MacDonald, Henry involved
the same investigating and charging branch of the government. How-
ever, the Henry court, evaded the resolution of this issue by finding in-
stead that the defendant had not been prejudiced by either delay.
0 14
Prejudice to the defendant is one of four factors the Supreme
Court has noted in determining whether a defendant's sixth amend-
ment rights have been violated. 015 The other three factors are length
of the delay, reason for the delay, and the defendant's assertion of his
right. 016 While the Court in Barker v.'Wingo 017 declared that none of
these factors are necessary or sufficient and that the balancing of them
1007. The dissenting opinion in 1976 argued that MacDonald had not been arrested as
required under United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), because MacDonald was not
actually confined. 531 F.2d at 210-14 (dissenting opinion).
1008. 632 F.2d at 261.
1009. Id.; 531 F.2d at 204. But see id at 210-14 (dissenting opinion).
1010. See 632 F.2d at 261-62; 531 F.2d at 204. In the 1976 opinion, the Fourth Circuit
found that the end of the Army's investigation
did not from a practical standpoint dispel the effects of the government's initial
accusation. MacDonald, of course, realized that the favorable conclusion of the
[Army] proceedings was not the end of the government's efforts to convict him.
Prudence obliged him to retain attorneys at his own expense for his continuing
defense.
Id
1011. 101 S. Ct. 3004 (1981).
1012. 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1980).
1013. Id. at 1227.
1014. Id. at 1232-33. The circuits have variously interpreted this question. See id. at 1233
n.13.
1015. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
1016. Id
1017. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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must be performed on an ad hoc basis, 018 the outcome in two 1980
Ninth Circuit cases hinged on the presence or absence of prejudice.
In Henry, the length of the delay was more than one year, the de-
lay was negligently, rather than deliberately, caused by the Govern-
ment, and Henry had made an adequate assertion of his right. 019 The
Ninth Circuit found that these three factors were "slightly weighted" in
Henry's favor but held that he was not deprived of his right to a speedy
trial because he had not been prejudiced "in any manner."' 10
20
Henry, however, claimed a unique kind of prejudice. At the time
of his federal indictment by an Arizona federal grand jury, Henry had
been fighting extradition from Maryland to Arizona, where he had
been indicted for attempted murder. 0 2' He was then arrested by fed-
eral authorities on a warrant of removal in Maryland and released on
bond. After he appeared in Arizona for his federal arraignment, he
was arrested by Arizona authorities on the state charge. Henry con-
tended that he had been prejudiced by the federal indictment because
he was denied his right to contest the extradition proceedings. 0 22 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this claim because the federal actions did not
affect his federal trial. Thus, the court held that the issue was "perti-
nent to the state proceedings, not the federal proceedings."'0 2 3
In the second case, United States v. Tercero,124 the Ninth Circuit
also held that the defendant had not been prejudiced by the length of
delay involved. The court noted that the twenty-month period of delay
was sufficiently lengthy to favor Tercero's position, but also noted that
the Government had not made a deliberate attempt to hamper the de-
fense. In addition, the court excused Tercero's failure to assert his right
to a speedy trial. However, the court held that he had not been
prejudiced because he had not been incarcerated during the delay,
could not claim that he had suffered from anxiety or concern relating to
the delay, and had failed to show any impairment to his trial defense.
Instead, Tercero was helped by the delay because the key prosecution
witness suffered a partial memory loss. 0 25 As a result, Tercero's con-
viction was affirmed.
Both Tercero and Henry indicate the Ninth Circuit's unwillingness
1018. Id at 530.
1019. 615 F.2d at 1233-34.
1020. Id at 1234.
1021. Id at 1227.
1022. Id at 1234.
1023. Id
1024. 640 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1980).
1025. Id at 193-95.
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to find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice.
However, the 1980 Fourth Circuit decision of United States v. MacDon-
ad 10 26 appears to have adopted a more relaxed standard. The Mac-
Donald court stated that a "substantial possibility of prejudice is what
controls."' 1027 MacDonald had suffered approximately a nine-year de-
lay, although about four years of that period was attributable to a pre-
trial appeal process. 0 28  The Fourth Circuit held that the "risk to
MacDonald was simply too great [so that]. . . [t]he intervening period
of over nine years rendered it virtually impossible for MacDonald to
prove the recollections of each witness to see if they were fuller than or
different from what he had stated when his statement was taken."'
' 0 29
The Supreme Court has not spoken clearly on this standard of possible
prejudice, although past Supreme Court decisions imply that actual
prejudice must be identified. 0 30 The Court may come to grips with this
question because it has decided to review the Fourth Circuit's
decision.' 0
3 1
E. The Right to a Public Trial- Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia
1. The sixth amendment
The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that a criminal defendant has the "right. to a speedy and public
trial., ' 0 32 This right helps to insure that the criminally accused will be
"fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned."'0 3 3 The United States
Supreme Court also has held that the right to a public trial belongs to
the defendant alone. 10 34  Alternatively, in Gannett Co. v. DePas-
1026. 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3004 (1981).
1027. Id at 264.
1028. Id. at 263. See supra note 1001 and accompanying text.
1029. 632 F.2d at 263.
1030. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59 (1978) (prejudice better
gauged after trial); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,534 (1972) (prejudice minimal because no
claim that witnesses died or were otherwise unavailable; only two minor lapses of memory
on transcript); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 38 (1970) (much evidence of actual prejudice).
But see Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26 (1973) (per curiam) (pretrial motion) (prejudice
not necessary or sufficient but simply a factor); 407 U.S. at 532 ("Loss of memory, however,
is not always reflected in the record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.");
398 U.S. at 40 (Brennan, J., concurring) (actual prejudice not required by the court).
1031. 101 S. Ct. 3004 (1981).
1032. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1033. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965).
1034. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979); see Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 538-39 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 n.25 (1948).
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quale, 0 35 the Court stated that, under the sixth amendment, the public
may not demand access to a criminal trial.'
0 36
In Gannett, without objection from the prosecution, the three de-
fendants of a highly publicized trial requested that their pretrial sup-
pression hearing be closed because of potential adverse publicity. The
trial judge ruled that the press had a constitutionally protected right of
access but, after balancing this first amendment right against the de-
fendants' constitutional right to a fair trial, granted the defendants' mo-
tion for exclusion of the press.10 37 Two newspapers challenged the
judge's order.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the trial judge's order, recog-
nized an independent public interest in open criminal proceedings
0 38
but held that this interest did not amount to a constitutional right under
the sixth amendment. 0 39 Yet, because of this public interest, a defend-
ant cannot compel a closed proceeding without the consent of the
prosecutor and judge.' 04 The Court referred to the language 0 4' and
history' ° 2 of the sixth amendment in rejecting the contention that the
sixth amendment guaranteed the public a right to attend a criminal
tial. Moreover, while the Court assumed arguendo that there was his-
torical support for a "common-law right of the public to attend crimi-
nal trials,"'1 3 it found no evidence that such a right existed in the
pretrial setting.' 044
In sum, although the facts in Gannett involved a pretrial proceed-
ing, the language of the plurality opinion encompassed trials. 0 45 As a
fesult, following Gannett, the public's right under the sixth amendment
in the trial setting was still somewhat unclear. 046
The Court's most recent pronouncement in Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia1047 apparently has foreclosed argument that the public
1035. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
1036. Id at 391.
1037. Id at 376.
1038. Id at 383.
1039. Id at 391.
1040. Id at 383.
1041. Id at 379-81.
1042. Id at 385-87.
1043. Id at 387.
1044. Id at 387-91.
1045. See, e.g., id at 391.
1046. See id at 394-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (limiting Ganneu to pretrial proceedings);
see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2841, 2841 n.1 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
1047. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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has a constitutional right to attend criminal trials guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. The Richmond Newspapers decision, which arose
from a closed trial, declared that the public has a right of access to
criminal trials but based this right on the first amendment, without
mentioning the sixth. '48 Thus, in light of Gannett and Richmond News-
papers, the public cannot claim that a right to attend criminal proceed-
ings stems from the sixth amendment.1°49
2. The first amendment
The Gannett Court left unanswered whether the first amendment
guaranteed the public a right to attend criminal proceedings. The
Court observed that, even if the first amendment did guarantee a right
of access, the trial court had properly balanced the constitutional rights
of the press and public against the defendants' constitutional right to a
fair trial. 0 50
The Court affirmatively answered this question in Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia.'05' As in Gannett, the criminal defendant in
Richmond Newspapers moved that his murder trial be closed to the
public because of publicity problems. 0 52 Referring to a Virginia stat-
ute, 0 53 the trial judge, without objection from the prosecution, ex-
cluded the public and the press. °54 At a hearing following the judge's
initial ruling, 0 55 counsel for the newspaper reporters argued that the
judge had improperly ruled by not making any evidentiary findings or
1048. Id at 580. Moreover, this right was found to be implicit in the first amendment. Id
The Court indirectly removed the sixth amendment from consideration by conceding that
"neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights contains any provision which by its terms
guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials." Id at 575.
1049. Id at 603 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see id at 598 (Stewart, J., concurring). But see
id at 564 (appearing to limit Gannett to pretrial hearings); id at 584 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
1050. 443 U.S. at 391-93.
1051. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
1052. Id at 559. Defendant Stevenson's trial had been much publicized. This publicity
caused his third trial to end in mistrial; a prospective juror had read about Stevenson's two
previous trials in a newspaper and had told other prospective jurors about the case before
the retrial began. The first trial was reversed by the Virginia Supreme Court because of
improperly admitted evidence. The second trial resulted in mistrial after a juror was ex-
cused when no alternate was available. Id
1053. VA. CODE § 9.2-266 (1975) provides in part: "In the trial of all criminal cases,
whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may in its discretion, exclude
from the trial any persons whose presence would impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided
that the right of the accused to a public trial shall not be violated."
1054. 448 U.S. at 560.
1055. Reporters of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. sought a hearing on a motion to vacate the
closure order. Id
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considering any less drastic measures. 1056 The judge, accepting the de-
fendant's argument that closure was necessary, 057 ordered the trial to
continue as a closed proceeding. 05 The trial was held, and in the pub-
lished court order the defendant was declared not guilty. 10 59 Allowed
to intervene nuncpro tunc, the newspaper company petitioned the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court for writs of mandamus and prohibition and filed
an appeal from the closure order.10 60 Failing at the state court level,
the company petitioned the United States Supreme Court, 10 6' which
granted the petition.
The Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge had erred in not
setting out reasons for closure and in not considering less drastic solu-
tions.10 62 Hence, the Court held that "[a]bsent an overriding interest
articulated infindings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public."'0 63 The Court based its conclusion on implicit first amend-
ment guarantees. 0 64
The Court first observed that a presumption of openness in crimi-
nal trials has existed since the drafting of the Bill of Rights. 0 65 The
Court further noted that several benefits have resulted from this open-
ness-for example, fairness to the defendant and a perception of fair-
ness by the public.
0 66
In light of this history of open proceedings, the Court held that the
first amendment guaranteed the public a right to attend criminal tri-
als. 10 67 The Court declared that the freedoms of speech and of press,
the right to assembly, and the right to petition the government for re-
dress of grievances10 6 8 "share a common core purpose of assuring free-




1057. See supra note 1053.
1058. 448 U.S. at 561.
1059. Id at 562.
1060. Id
1061. Id at 562-63. The Court rejected a mootness argument because it deemed the action
capable of repetition. Id at 563.
1062. Id at 580-81.
1063. Id at 581 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
1064. Id at 580. No other part of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights was specifically
referred to. See Id at 573-75; see supra note 1065 and accompanying text.
1065. 448 U.S. at 564-69, 575.
1066. Id at 569-73.
1067. Id at 575-80.
1068. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
1069. 448 U.S. at 575. The Court further stated:
[p]lainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher
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In regard to the freedoms of speech and press, the Court held that
those rights would have little meaning if the right to attend trials was
not protected. The Court declared, "[flree speech carries with it some
freedom to listen."' 170 The Court held that the right to receive infor-
mation prohibited the government from "summarily closing" the court-
room doors.'
0 7 1
The Court also noted that the right of assembly guarantees a per-
son's right to "listen, observe, and learn."'1 72 The Court deemed the
right of assembly a "catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other
First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked."'
1 73
The right of assembly insures the people and their media representa-
tives a right to attend criminal trials which have been traditionally
open.
1074
Consequently, in spite of the lack of an enumerated constitutional
right, the Court held that the first amendment implicitly guaranteed the
"right to attend criminal trials."' 1 75 The Court declared the right of the
public to attend trials a fundamental right and applied this right to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 1
076
However, because the Virginia trial court had not recognized this right,
had not made any findings of fact to support closure of the trial, and
had not inquired into alternatives other than closure, 10 77 the Supreme
Court held that the trial court had erred and reversed the closure
ruling.
1078
3. Effect of Richmond Newspapers on first amendment law
Traditionally the first amendment has protected theflow of infor-
mation to the public. 10 79 Such protection has developed because first
concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are
conducted; as we have shown, recognition of this pervades the centuries-old history
of open trials and the opinions of this Court.
Id
1070. Id at 576.
1071. Id
1072. Id at 578.
1073. Id at 577.
1074. Id at 578.
1075. Id at 580.
1076. Id
1077. Id at 580-81.
1078. Id
1079. Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1308, 1314 (1978).
Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information under the First Amendment, 12 LoY.
L.A.L. REv. 357, 359 (1978) ("The Court has held in several contexts-that the right to receive
information and ideas is protected under the first amendment.") (footnote omitted). See
1981]
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amendment cases generally have involved sources willing to divulge in-
formation. 80 Until Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court had
not held that the press had a right to gather information from an
unwilling source.108 1 In Richmond Newspapers, the Court held that the
right to attend trials and disseminate information about them furthers
the workings of the goverment.10 82 Moreover, although it had indi-
cated previously that the press had no greater access to information
than the public, 0 83 the Court placed special emphasis on the impor-
tance of media attendance at trial proceedings. 0 84 Thus, while Rich-
mond Newspapers may be a "watershed case,"'' 0 85 its factual setting
may limit application.
0 86
4. Richmond Newspapers and courtroom proceedings
Although under Richmond Newspapers the press and public have a
generally Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (freedoms of speech and press
protect right to receive information); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (right to
receive information regardless of social worth protected); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965) (right to receive birth control information); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
505 (1946) (free society depends upon right to receive information).
1080. See Note, The Right to Attend CriminalHearings, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1308, 1314-15
(1978).
1081. See id at 1315-16.
1082. 448 U.S. at 575 ("public access" to trials was regarded by framers as part of the
judicial "process" itself). See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know,
1976 WASH. U.L.Q. I, 14-16.
1083. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (4-3 decision); Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974) (5-4 decision); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834
(1974) (5-4 decision); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975); Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965). See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to
Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 1; Comment, YThe Right of the Press to Gather Information under
the First Amendment, 12 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 357 (1978); Note, The Right to Attend Criminal
Hearings, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1308 (1978); Note, Right to Attend Pretrial Criminal Proce-
dures." Free Press, Public Trials, and Priorities in Curbing Pretrial Publicity, 28 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 875 (1977).
1084. 448 U.S. at 572-73. The Court stated:
[i]nstead of acquiring information about trials by firsthand observation or by word
of mouth from those who attended, people now acquire it chiefly through the print
and electronic media. In a sense, this validates the media claim of functioning as
surrogates for the public. While media representatives enjoy the same right of ac-
cess as the public, they often are provided special seating and priority of entry so
that they may report what people in attendance have seen and heard.
Id
1085. Id at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1086. The opinion of the Court emphasized the fact that trial proceedings have been open
traditionally. Id at 564-73, 575. On this ground, the opinion distinguished Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), 448
U.S. at 576 n. 11, both of which dealt with access to prisons. The Richmond Newspapers
Court stated that "[p]enaLinstitutions do not share the long tradition of openness." 448 U.S.
at 576 n. I I.
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first amendment right of access to criminal trials, the holding probably
will have little practical effect.10 87 The importance of attendance by the
public and press in the courtroom has long been recognized and pro-
tected by the Court.10 8 8 For example, in Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuartl" 9 the Court implied that even though courts must protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial, a prior restraint order limiting publica-
tion of information would not be upheld unless a heavy burden were
met.'0 90 Even under Gannett the rights of the public and press were
deemed protected because a defendant could not unilaterally close a
criminal proceeding by waiving his sixth amendment right.'09 ' In sum,
Richmond Newspapers is but a continuation of a long line of cases
which noted the importance of public attendance at criminal trials.
However, Richmond Newspapers, unlike Gannett and its predeces-
sors, affirmatively declared that the public has a constitutional right to
attend criminal trials. 0 92 Moreover, although this right is not absolute,
it can be limited only after a determination by the trial court that a
defendant's right to fair trial is jeopardized.0 93
The Court held that the following alternatives to closure must be
considered before a trial judge imposes a closure order: exclusion of
witnesses from the courtroom, sequestration of witnesses from the
courtroom, sequestration of witnesses during the trial, and sequestra-
tion of jurors.
0 94
1087. Richmond Newspapers will have little effect in California. The California courts al-
ready recognize a right of access to criminal trials by the press as members of the general
public. Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1968). The court held that
a public trial is not a private right of parties, but one involving additional interests, including
those of the public. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the requests of the accused alone
are not sufficient to justify closing the proceedings. Id at 94. Kirstowski v. Superior Ct.,
143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 750-51, 300 P.2d 163, 167 (1956).
1088. Richmond Newspapers stated three purposes served by public trials. First, a public
trial serves as a check on the judiciary. 448 U.S. at 569; see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349-50 (1966); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 268-70 (1948). Secondly, public trials increase the respect for the judi-
ciary. 448 U.S. at 570-73. Finally, public trials serve a therapeutic function in that they
provide an outlet for community hostility. Id
1089. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
1090. Id at 561.
1091. 443 U.S. at 382-83. ("In an adversary system of criminal justice, the public interest
in the administration of justice is protected by the participants in the litigation"). Id at 383.
See supra note 1049 and accompanying text.
1092. 448 U.S. at 580.
1093. Id at 580-81.
1094. Id at 581; see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-64 (1976). Shep-
pard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358-62 (1966); Comment, Fair Trial/Free Press: The Court's
Dilemma, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 125 (1977).
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Two effects Richmond Newspapers will have outside the criminal
trial context are unknown. First, whether the Richmond Newspapers
holding will apply to pretrial proceedings is unclear. The Gannett
Court never decided the question of what effect the first amendment
has in pretrial hearings. 1I9 In addition, the language and facts of Rich-
mond Newspapers are limited to the trial itself.0 96 However, the rea-
sons behind Richmond Newspapers would appear to have equal validity
in a pretrial hearing. A pretrial hearing is of equal importance, and
sometimes of greater importance, 10 97 than the trial itself.'0 98 Second,
Richmond Newspapers may be valid in civil trials also. In a footnote,
the Court indicated that it would apply the holding in civil proceedings
because civil actions also have a history of openness. 1099 Consequently,





Every defendant in a criminal prosecution has an inalienable right
1095. 443 U.S. at 392. The opinion of the Court merely assumed arguendo that the first
amendment guaranteed a right of access but it found that the trial judge had balanced prop-
erly the competing rights involved. Id at 392-93.
1096. See 448 U.S. at 564. Moreover, the opinion of the Court noted that some alterna-
tives to closure available at trial are not available at pretrial proceedings. I. at 581. How-
ever, this lack of alternatives should not preclude the Court from recognizing a first
amendment right of access in a pretrial setting. If such a right exists, however, the trial court
may have only two options after balancing the constitutional interests: to leave open or
close the pretrial hearing.
1097. For example, a pretrial suppression hearing may result in the exclusion of critical
government evidence.
1098. 443 U.S. at 436 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
If the Court found that the right of access had to be considered at pretrial proceedings
the continued effect of § 868 of the California Penal Code may be in jeopardy. Section 868
allows a defendant the absolute right to receive a closed preliminary hearing. This section
recently has been challenged in Cromer v. Superior Ct., 109 Cal. App. 3d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1980). The defendant sought a writ of mandamus to have her preliminary hearing
transcript withheld from the public until trial began, so that potential jurors could not be
prejudiced. The appellate court issued the writ. 1d at 736, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 675. But see
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 393 ("[A]ny denial of access in this case was not
absolute but only temporary. Once the danger of prejudice had dissipated, a transcript of
the suppression hearing was made available. The press and the public then had a full op-
portunity to scrutinize the suppression hearing."). The California Supreme Court has de-
cided to hear the Cromer appeal.
1099. 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
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"to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ' lo against
him. A primary function of the indictment is to fulfill this notice re-
quirement.' 10 1 In Russell v. United States,"I2 the Supreme Court for-
mulated the test by which the adequacy of an indictment is to be
measured. First, the indictment must contain the elements of the of-
fense to be charged and must sufficiently apprise the defendant of what
he must be prepared to meet at trial. 10 3 Second, the indictment must
allow the defendant to plead a bar to future prosecution for the same
offense. lO4
The Ninth Circuit strictly adheres to the Russell criteria." 0 5 Last
term, in United States v. Cecil,"l°6 the Ninth Circuit reversed defend-
ants' convictions because of the insufficiency of the indictment upon
which they were tried. The indictment charged defendants and others
with conspiring, "beginning on or before July, 1975, and continuing
thereafter until on or after October, 1975, within the District of Arizona
and elsewhere,"" 0 7 to import and distribute marijuana in violation of
federal law. It did little else." 0 8 The court observed that "Itihe indict-
ment fail[ed] to state any other facts or circumstances pertaining to the
conspiracy or any overt acts done in furtherance thereof."" 09 The
court held that because of the "glaring lack of factual particularity of
th[e] indictment,"' 0to it did not inform the defendants of the specific
offenses with which they were charged. Accordingly, it was fatally de-
1100. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1101. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763, 765 (1962).
1102. Id at 763-64.
1103. Id at 763, 765.
1104. Id at 764.
1105. The Ninth Circuit requires that each and every element of the offense charged be set
forth in an indictment. United States v. Morrison, 536 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir. 1976). Failure
to do so generally constitutes a fatal defect. United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. King, 587 F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1978).
1106. 608 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1107. Id at 1295.
1108. The court stated that "[t]he present indictment is a rather barren document." Id at
1296.
1109. Id at 1297. In a recent case, United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979), the Ninth Circuit upheld one count of a ten-count indictment,
which charged defendants with conspiracy relating to two bombing incidents at military
recruiting stations. The indictment alleged thirteen acts defendants committed in further-
ance of the conspiracy, including attending meetings, attempting to burglarize a named indi-
vidual's home to get money to purchase weapons, travelling to a specified site to test
explosives, going to the recuiting stations, and preparing a list of objectives. Id. at 1174-76,
1176 n.2.
1110. 608 F.2d at 1297. FED. R. CGlM. P. 7(c)(1) states in pertinent part: "The indictment
or information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essentialfacts
constituting the offense charged. . . ." (emphasis added).
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fective. Moreover, the court was particularly disturbed with the failure
of the indictment to place the conspiracy within a specific time
frame."" Definiteness, as to time and place of the alleged offense, is
essential in order to allow a defendant to prepare a proper defense and
to allow him to plead double jeopardy to future prosecution."
1 2
The indictment in Cecil did little more than track the language of
the statute that defendants were accused of violating, which prompted
the Ninth Circuit to emphasize that when the language of the criminal
code is used, it must be supplemented with specific facts and circum-
stances relating to the offense with which the particular defendant is
charged.'113
2. Amendment
A person's absolute fifth amendment right to a grand jury indict-
ment in any serious' 11 4 federal criminal proceedingI 5 has remained
undiminished throughout the years.' 1 16 With roots going back to pre-
Norman England, " 17 the grand jury indictment is still considered a fair
method of bringing persons accused of crimes to trial and protecting
citizens from unfounded accusations.11 To insure such protection, "a
court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not
1111. 608 F.2d at 1297.
1112. Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1927).
1113. 608 F.2d at 1297; see Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117-18 (1974); Russell
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765-66 (1962); United States v. Hess, 124 U.S. 483, 486
(1888); United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362 (1878); United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d
462, 464 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Curtis, 506 F.2d 985, 990-91 (10th Cir. 1974).
Notably, the trial judge in Cecil had recognized the insufficiency of the factual allegations of
the indictment but had ruled that the Government's "open file" discovery remedied its de-
fects. Before its ruling, the trial court initially indicated that a bill of particulars would be a
remedy. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that neither a bill of particulars nor an "open
file" discovery would cure an invalid indictment. 608 F.2d at 1296.
1114. The fifth amendment requires a grand jury indictment for "a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime." An infamous crime is one which is subject to an infamous punishment, Ex
parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885), which punishment includes imprisonment in a state
prison or penitentiary. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886).
1115. This requirement is one of the few criminal procedure rights guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights that is not incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. In Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516 (1884), the Supreme Court upheld defendant's conviction for first degree mur-
der where the charge had been made by information and not by indictment. The Court held
that due process of law, required of the states by the fourteenth amendment, did not require
indictment or presentment by the grand jury for prosecution of felonies.
1116. See, e.g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-19 (1960); Exparte Bain, 121
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1887).
1117. See Morse,A Survey of the GrandJury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 101, 102-07 (1931).
1118. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 761 (1962); Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 218 (1960); Exparte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1887).
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made in the indictment against him."1119 If any changes are to be
made to an indictment, they must be made by the grand jury. 1 20 Any
other amendment to an indictment violates a defendant's fifth amend-
ment rights.121
In two recent cases, United States v. Marolda"1 22 and United States
v. Carlson,123 the Ninth Circuit strictly applied the rule that a court
cannot by any means (bill of particulars, physical alterations or instruc-
tions to jury) alter the material or essential nature of an indictment or
broaden the offense charged. 24 In Marolda, the indictment charged
defendant with acting " 'without proper authorization and without ben-
efit to"' the union in using union funds."125 However, the trial court's
instructions to the jury allowed for conviction if the jury found that the
defendant used the union funds with the intent to defraud and without
a good faith belief that the expenditure benefited the union, even if the
expenditure was authorized or would have been authorized had the
union known of it.1126 The Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's con-
viction on the ground that this was prejudicial variance from the of-
fense charged in the indictment." 27  Under the indictment, the
Government had to show both "that the expenditures were neither
properly authorized by nor beneficial to the union."" 2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the defendant was prejudiced by the trial court's instruc-
tions because it submitted the issue of scienter to the jury but withheld
the issues of union authorization and benefit which were the crux of his
defense." 1
29
1119. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960).
1120. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962); Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S.
212, 215-16 (1960).
1121. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. at 216-17.
1122. 615 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1980).
1123. 616 F.2d 446 (9th Cir. 1980).
1124. See United States v. Dawson, 516 F.2d 796, 803-04 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
855 (1975).
1125. 615 F.2d at 868 n.2 (quoting count one of the indictment). Defendant was charged
with violation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1976) which prohibits embezzling from a labor union.
Id. at 868.
1126. 615 F.2d at 870.
Whether [defendant's] use of the credit card was properly authorized was an issue
written into the indictment and hotly contested at trial .... By the charge to the
jury, the court first dwelt upon the language in the indictment concerning authori-
zation at some length and then later treated it as surplusage, effectively telling the
jury to disregard it.
Id
1127. Id
1128. Id at 872.
1129. Id
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In Carlson, defendant was convicted on three counts of misapply-
ing bank funds in violation of federal law. 3 o Each count specifically
charged defendant, a bank president, with misapplying bank funds "by
fraudulently causing to be disbursed by the said Bank, and converting
to his personal use," monies from a specified promissory note which
purportedly represented a loan to a named person." 3' At trial, in addi-
tion to introducing evidence to prove the charge of fraud in the indict-
ment, the Government contended that one of the loans was
inadequately secured. Over defendant's objection, the trial judge in-
structed the jury that if it found that the loan was inadequately secured'
and that defendant knew as much, it could find the defendant guilty of
misapplication. Defendant appealed on the ground that the instruction
impermissibly broadened the scope of the indictment to permit convic-
tion for acts of misapplication based on an inadequately secured loan
rather than the fraud for which he was indicted by the grand jury. The
Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that the instruction constituted an imper-
missible amendment to the indictment." 32 In finding reversible error,
the Ninth Circuit noted that the Government's case of conversion was
complex, but that its case of lack of security was fairly simple. It con-
cluded that it was "not improbable that. . . where guilt was found the
jury took the easy road to a verdict."
'" 33
3. Information
The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury. . . ..."I An infamous crime is
1130. 616 F.2d at 447. Defendant was charged with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1976).
1131. Id at 447 (quoting count ten of the indictment).
1132. Id The court relied almost exclusively on Howard v. Daggett, 526 F.2d 1388 (9th
Cir. 1975) (per curiam), to support its holding. Id at 448. However, as the dissent points
out, such reliance is somewhat unjustified as the facts in Howard may be distinguished from
those in Carlson. 616 F.2d at 449 (dissenting opinion). The indictment in Howard charged
defendant with inducing two named women to engage in prostitution and with travelling
across state lines for that purpose. At trial, evidence was introduced regarding other prosti-
tutes defendant was involved with, and the trial judge's instructions to the jury permitted
conviction based upon such additional evidence. 526 F.2d at 1390. Thus, in Howard, the
trial judge's instructions to the jury impermissibly amended the indictment such that defen-
dant could be convicted for the same charge as in the indictment, but on facts other than
those alleged in the indictment. Conversely, in Carlson, the trial judge's instructions to the
jury allowed conviction for a charge not in the indictment, yet based on facts alleged in the
indictment.
1133. 616 F.2d at 447.
1134. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
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one which is subject to an infamous punishment.' 135 An infamous pun-
ishment includes imprisonment in a state prison or penitentiary,
with 1 36 or without"1 37 hard labor. It is the punishment potentially im-
posed, not the actual punishment, that determines whether a punish-
ment is infamous."' 38 In a recent case, United States v. May,"1 3 9 the
Ninth Circuit considered the effect of a pretrial court order limiting
potential punishment upon conviction. In May, defendants had been
charged, by information, with unlawfully reentering a naval installa-
tion." 40 The statutory penalty for this violation was six months in
prison. 141 However, several minor defendants were subject to punish-
ment under the Youth Corrections Act 1 42 which authorized confine-
ment for more than one year.
To insure a six month maximum penalty for these defendants, the
district court ordered, before trial, that it would not sentence any of the
defendants under the Act. The Ninth Circuit upheld the informations
with respect to the minors, holding that the trial judge's determination
that the defendants should not be sentenced under the Youth Correc-
tions Act was valid. Thus, the offense charged did not carry an infa-
mous punishment and the charge by information was proper." 1
43
In the past few years, several circuits have held that willful failure
to fie an income tax return is an offense for which the Government
may proceed by information.I" In United States v. Driscoll,"1 45 the
Ninth Circuit joined these circuits. The rationale for not requiring an
indictment for failure to file an income tax return is that the maximum
punishment for such offense is one year imprisonment,"1 46 and a sen-
tence of one year or less cannot be served in a penitentiary without the
defendant's consent.' 147
1135. Exparte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
1136. Id at 429.
1137. Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348, 352 (1886).
1138. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 307 (1900).
1139. 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
1140. Id at 1003.
1141. Id at 1002 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976)).
1142. Id at 1003 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 4216, 5010, 5017(c) (1976)).
1143. Id at 1005.
1144. United States v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915
(1980); United States v. Russell, 585 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kahl, 583
F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); United States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 842 (1975); United States v. Goldstein, 502 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1974).
1145. 612 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1980).
1146. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977).
1147. 18 U.S.C. § 4083 (1976 & Supp. 1 1977). FED. R. CRiM. P. 7(a) specifically permits
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B. Identjications
1. Photographic
The Supreme Court has declared that convictions based upon in-
court identifications following a pretrial photographic identification
will be set aside when the "photographic identification procedure [is] so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification." 114 8 The Court has also declared that
such a standard necessarily dictates that "each case must be considered
on its own facts."'"4 9 Within this broad Supreme Court standard, the
Ninth Circuit has developed its own analytical framework." 50 The
court will first look at the necessity for the photographic identification,
prosecution of such offenses by information. Circuits which have ruled on the issue of pro-
ceeding by information in cases involving failure to file in more than one year have ruled
that informations are proper in such instances even though punishment may exceed one year
if the defendant is convicted on multiple counts. United States v. Johnson, 585 F.2d 374 (8th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1978); United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351
(5th Cir. 1978). While Driscoll involved the failure to fie in only one year, it is likely that, if
and when presented with the opportunity, the Ninth Circuit will rule that informations are
proper in cases involving failure to file in multiple years.
1148. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (photographic identification held
not to violate due process where robbery took place in well-lit building, robbers wore no
masks, and each witness was shown a selection of six photos one day after the robbery). The
Simmons Court warned of the hazards of photographic identifications in the following
statement:
A witness may have obtained only a brief glimpse of a criminal, or may have seen
him under poor conditions. Even if the police subsequently follow the most correct
photographic identification procedures and show him the pictures of a number of
individuals without indicating whom they suspect, there is some danger that the
witness may make an incorrect identification. This danger will be increased if the
police display to the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally
resembles the person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons
among which the photograph of a single such individual recurs or is in some way
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is also heightened if the police indi-
cate to the witness that they have other evidence that one of the persons pictured
committed the crime. Regardless of how the initial misidentification comes about,
the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the photograph
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent
lineup or courtroom identification.
Id at 383-84 (footnotes omitted).
1149. Id at 384.
1150. The Ninth Circuit has been the leader in imposing some analytical order in the
pretrial photographic identification area. The Ninth Circuit framework originated in
United States v. Valdivia, 492 F.2d 199, 210 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974),
from a synthesis developed in Parker v. Swenson, 332 F. Supp. 1225, 1230-32 (E.D. Mo.
1971). However, another set of factors relating to pretrial identifications in general already
had been promulgated by the Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200
(1972). The divergence between the two sets of factors was recognized five years after
Valdivia by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Crawford, 576 F.2d 794, 797 n. I (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851 (1978). The court characterized the Nel factors as appropriate for
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although lack of necessity alone will not render the identification inva-
lid. 5 1 The court will then look at the likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification. This factor is appraised based upon: (1) the length of
time and the conditions under which the witness observed the perpetra-
tor during commission of the crime, (2) the similarity between the
description of the perpetrator given by the witness immediately after
the crime and the actual physical characteristics of the person subse-
quently identified, and (3) the possible prejudicial influence of one wit-
ness' opinion on the recollections of other witnesses also present at the
time of the improper identification.
In Mata v. Sumner, 2 in a habeas corpus appeal, the court ap-
plied this analysis to invalidate an identification. In Mata, a prison
knifing was observed by two witnesses. On the day of the incident, one
witness, Almengor, was shown several hundred photographs of in-
mates. He did not identify the defendant, but he did positively identify
one inmate who, as it turned out, had been outside the prison on the
day of the killing." 3 He also identified three others. The second wit-
ness, Allen, was shown no photographs on that day because he claimed
evidence of separate pretrial identifications introduced as part of the prosecutor's case, and
the Ninth Circuit's factors as applicable to later in-court identifications. Id
The set of factors promulgated in Neil, and reiterated in Manson v. Brathwaite, 432
U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977) were: (1) the opportunity to view, (2) degree of attention, (3) accuracy
of description, (4) the witness' level of certainty, and (5) the time between the crime and the
confrontation. Comparing these factors to those of the Ninth Circuit, it would appear that
the Neil list adds time between crime and confrontation, but omits police conduct focusing
attention on a particular person and the prejudicial impact of other witnesses, two items
which seem particularly appropriate for photographic sessions. Otherwise, the two sets of
factors substantially restate the same ideas.
Other circuits generally use an unadorned two-step analysis derived from Simmons: the
courts will look first at suggestiveness, then at reliability. See, e.g., United States v. Wil-
liams, 616 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (display of single photograph imper-
missibly suggestive but identification in court was nevertheless reliable under Manson
factors); United States v. Mears, 614 F.2d 1175, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1980) (photographic dis-
play improper because defendant was only person in display with two photos, but in-court
identification permitted due to "ample opportunity" to observe defendant during commis-
sion of the crime); Summitt v. Bordenkircher, 608 F.2d 247, 252 (6th Cir. 1979) (because
identification from a "multitude of police photographs" was proper, no need to consider
independent reliability of in-court identification); United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 192, 198-
99 (2d Cir.) (sharper focus and contrast in defendant's picture, a narrow strip of light not in
other photos above defendant's head, and his hair and moustache differed from others in
spread were not suggestive, thus obviating any need to consider reliability), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 872 (1977).
1151. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-14 (1977) (rejecting per se rule of exclu-
sion of unnecessarily suggestive photographic identifications in favor of totality of circum-
stances approach).
1152. 611 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
1153. Id at 756.
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he could make no identification. Eight days later, both witnesses were
shown twenty-four photographs. Neither identified the defendant and
both witnesses complained that the photographs were too old. Three
days later, both witnesses were shown fifteen photographs, three of
which were updated-those of the three inmates who were later
charged. However, photographs of the three inmates whom Almengor
previously had identified were not included. This time each witness
identified the defendant as the assailant."
54
The Ma/a court first ruled that there was no necessity to use the
photographic identification procedures because the defendant had been
isolated after the stabbing." 5 5 The dissent, however, pointed out that
the alternative, a lineup, would have been impractical, partly because
of safety risks posed by the congregation of a "substantial" group of
inmates." 1
56
The majority in Mata then found that three of the four areas of
examination bearing on the likelihood of irreparable misidentification
tainted the photographic procedures, namely, (1) conditions of observa-
tion, (2) similarity of description, and (3) police focus on a particular
individual." 57 Specifically, the violence of the knifing incident and the
threat presented by the knife were poor conditions for the witnesses to
observe the perpetrator." 58 The court also observed that the descrip-
tions of the perpetrators after the crime were "not detailed"" 59 and that
prison officials had engaged in a "systematic" plan to produce an iden-
tification of the defendant." 60 The Ma/a court found that such a sys-
tematic plan was due to the three different photographic sessions, "61 in
which the witnesses made the "correct" selection only on the third time
around, and then only after pressure had been exerted by prison au-
thorities." 62 Moreover, prior "mistaken" selections had been removed,
the number of photos had been reduced drastically, and updated
1154. Id
1155. Id at 757.
1156. Id at 760 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
1157. Id at 759.
1158. Standing alone, this factor would vitiate the observation of any witness who had
been involved in a violent incident. Id at 758.
1159. Id
1160. Id at 759.
1161. Id; see also United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17, 23 (9th Cir. 1976) (while
repeated showings were not violative of due process where witness has been consistently
definite, they did present opportunities for abuse when witness was equivocal on first selec-
tion and definite on later showing).
1162. The defendant asserted that the California Department of Corrections "reminded"
witness Allen of his upcoming parole hearing date and threatened to send him to another
state prison where his life would be in danger if he failed to cooperate. 611 F.2d at 756.
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photos of only the defendant and his codefendants had been
substituted.' 
163
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that pressure was necessary
in the volatile prison situation to protect other inmates, that the new
photograph of the defendant could be justified on the basis that his
earlier photo bore little resemblance to the way he looked at the time of
the crime and that the photographic selection "remained large."
1164
The dissent further pointed out that three state courts and one federal
court prior to the Ninth Circuit's ruling had not discerned the "system-
atic plan" which was so important to the Ninth Circuit result. 165 Be-
cause the Ninth Circuit framework is based on factors which
necessitate a case by case analysis without the benefit of mechanistic or
per se rules, the question arises as to whether the federal appellate
courts have now in Mata a potent weapon with which to strike down
any photographic identification which does not strike their fancy.
1 166
2. Accidental
In Green v. Loggins,"67 the Ninth Circuit held that an accidental
pretrial encounter between a witness and the accused may irreparably
taint a later in-court identification." 68 Whether such an encounter
does so taint an in-court identification depends upon a two-step test
1163. Id at 759.
1164. Id at 761 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
1165. Id at 760.
1166. Id at 762-63 (The opportunity to repeatedly review state court decisions turning on
the amorphous standard of "impermissible suggestiveness" "more resembles a game of
chance than it does the wise administration of criminal justice.").
1167. 614 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 1980).
1168. Id at 223. Harmless accidental encounters are found in United States v. Colclough,
549 F.2d 937, 941-42 (4th Cir. 1977) (witness inadvertently encountered black defendant in
hall outside courtroom and immediately identified defendant who was standing in a crowd
of other blacks with nothing to single him out); United States v. Massaro, 544 F.2d 547, 550
(1st Cir. 1976) (witness saw defendant in hall outside courtroom as he was being escorted by
two plain-clothed marshals, although the circumstances did not suggest defendant was in
custody), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Matlock, 491 F.2d 504, 505 (6th
Cir.) (per curiam) (witness saw defendant as defendant was led from cell to courtroom), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 864 (1974); United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 122 (5th Cir. 1973) (wit-
ness saw accused in custody outside courtroom but situation held to be different from "iden-
tification made prior to trial"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974); United States v. Hamilton,
469 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1972) (confrontation between witness and handcuffed defendant
in courtroom corridor immediately prior to trial); United States v. Conner, 462 F.2d 296, 297
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (confrontation in police station lobby where witness, as officers
brought in two men, told person at desk that one of the two men was the robber); Allen v.
Moore, 453 F.2d 970, 972-74 (Ist Cir.) (witnesses, stepping out of police car, saw defendant
walking alone on the street and saw him again after entering courthouse as he paced the
corridor), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972); United States v. Davis, 407 F.2d 846, 847 (4th
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mandated by the Supreme Court.I1 6 9 The first step is whether the en-
counter is unnecessarily and impermissibly suggestive. The second step
is whether, even given an impermissibly suggestive encounter,"1 70 the
totality of the circumstances nonetheless indicates that the in-court
identification is reliable."
7'
In Green, the witness saw a fatal restaurant shooting. Four hours
later, from a photo selection including two photos of the defendant, he
chose another man. A few days later, the witness disappeared, without
explanation, for three months. When he was eventually located, the
police scheduled a lineup to resolve questions arising from his selection
of the other man at the photo session. During the few days just before
the lineup, the witness was warned not to have any contact with the
police. But on the day before the lineup, the witness, while intoxicated,
went to a local police station where he was allowed to sleep off his
condition in a holding cell.
1 72
Coincidentally, the defendant was being held in the same cell.
However, the witness did not appear to recognize the defendant until
near the end of defendant's stay, when a booking officer asked both
men to identify themselves by name.'
1 73
The Green court found three aspects of the encounter unnecessa-
rily and impermissibly suggestive: the jail-house setting, which sug-
gested to the witness that the defendant had been accused of a
crime;" 7 4 the mention of defendant's name by the booking officer,
Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (confrontation at preliminary hearing where witness was among
spectators and later in court corridor during trial recess).
1169. The two steps are derived from language in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302
(1967) invalidating confrontations that are "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrep-
arable mistaken identification." The Ninth Circuit has characterized the two steps in differ-
ent language on occasion. See, e.g., United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1358 (9th
Cir.) ("Stovall suggests a two-part test concerning exclusion of identification testimony by
requiring that the procedure be 'unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identification . . . .'") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978);
United States v. Peele, 574 F.2d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 1978) ("What controls the case is the
likelihood of irreparable misidentification balanced against the necessity for the Govern-
ment to use the identification procedures in question.").
1170. The Green court, reviewing the proceedings at the district court level, stated that
after the district court "properly concluded" that the encounter was unnecessarily and im-
permissibly suggestive, it "was then obligated to examine the overall reliability of [witness']
subsequent identification." 614 F.2d at 224. However, if a court is "obligated" to examine
the reliability of the in-court identification even after determining that an encounter was
impermissibly suggestive, then impermissible suggestiveness as a test is rendered redundant.
1171. 614 F.2d at 223.
1172. Id at 221.
1173. Id at 221-22.
1174. Id at 223.
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which the court said identified the defendant as the state's suspect in
the murder case; 1 75 and that the encounter was the "result of the state's
negligent exercise of its control over both the witness and the
accused.""1
76
To assess the reliability of the in-court identification, the court ex-
amined the circumstances surrounding the witness' observation of the
crime. The court then analyzed these circumstances in terms of the
factors which the United States Supreme Court considered in Neil v.
Biggers. 177 The Ninth Circuit applied those factors as follows:
(1) Opportunity to view Witness had viewed defendant in the res-
taurant for not more than five minutes;
178
(2) Witness' degree of attention Witness had been merely a cas-
ual observer;
1179
(3) Accuracy of witness' prior descriion Approximately four
hours after the shooting, the witness picked the wrong man at the photo
session, even though there were two photos of the defendant in the
selection;" 80
(4) Witness' level of certainty Witness did not recognize the de-
fendant in the holding cell until after the booking officer had asked for
their names;" 8
(5) Time between crime and confrontation More than three
months had elapsed between the time of the crime and the witness'
subsequent confrontation with the defendant."
82
Thus, the court found that the factors presented uniformly under-
mined the reliability of the in-court identification. 1 83 Moreover, the
1175. Id On the other hand, one can argue that the only necessarily suggestive aspect of
the witness finding the defendant in a "holding cell" would be that the defendant, like the
witness, was also drunk. Moreover, the mention of the defendant's name by the booking
officer did not of itself connect the defendant to the crime; the Ninth Circuit presumed an
antecedent connection in the witness' mind between the defendant's name and the crime,
whereas the facts as stated by the appellate court reveal only a connection between defend-
ant'sface and the crime. Finally, to assume negligence on the state's part under these cir-
cumstances is to impose on the state a duty to monitor a witness until the time of the lineup
and to affirmatively prevent him, if necessary, from entering a police station.
1176. Id. The court did not elaborate on its "negligent exercise" language.
1177. 409 U.S. 188, 199-201 (1972) (under the totality of the circumstances, victim's identi-
fication of defendant after a showup held to be suggestive but reliable).
1178. 614 F.2d at 224.
1179. Id
1180. Id
1181. Id at 224-25.
1182. Id at 225.
1183. Id However, the witness' nonrecognition in Green of the defendant is not surpris-
ing, considering that witness was just waking up from a drunken sleep. Id at 221-22. On
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other evidence of defendant's guilt, since not relevant to the issue of the





Under 18 U.S.C. section 3146, a criminal defendant in a non-capi-
tal case may be released before trial if the judicial officer is reasonably
assured of the defendant's timely appearance at trial." l85 The most
common method of obtaining a pretrial release is via "the execution of
a bail bond with sufficient solvent securities, or the deposit of cash in
lieu thereof."" ts6 An appearance bond, another common means of ob-
taining pretrial release, is obtained by the defendant depositing cash or
other security equal to. ten percent of the amount of the bond." 187 Gen-
erally, the full amount of the bond is returned to the defendant once he
or she has complied with all the conditions of release.I" 8 However, it
is not always clear whether a defendant has met the conditions of
release.
In the 1979 case of United States v. Grattan,"ts9 defendant, Grat-
tan, was convicted in district court for wilfully failing to surrender him-
self to the United States Marshal, pursuant to a district court order,
after having been released on an appeal bond."190 Approximately five
the other hand, the witness' inability to identify the defendant a mere four hours after the
incident is a much stronger indication of witness' unreliability. Id at 221.
1184. Id at 225.
1185. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1976) provides:
(a) Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by
death, shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending
trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appear-
ance bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer deter-
mines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is
made, the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods
of release, impose. . . conditions of release which will reasonably assure the ap-
pearance of the person for trial.
1186. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(4) (1976); J. ISRAEL, Y. KAMISAR & W. LAFAVE, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 871 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as KAMISAR].
1187. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(3) (1976); KAMISAR, supra note 1187, at 871.
1188. KAMISAR, supra note 1187, at 871. In addition to the posting of bail, conditions of
release may include provisions such as reporting regularly to a designated person or not
traveling outside of a certain area. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(1), (2) (1976).
1189. 603 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1979).
1190. Id at 117. Grattan was released on bail pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a), 3148
(1976). 603 F.2d at 117. Section 3148(2) provides that a person "who has been convicted of
an offense and. . . has filed an appeal. . . shall be treated in accordance with the provi-
sions of section 3146." For the provisions of § 3146(a) see supra note 1186.
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months after being sentenced on drug charges, Grattan was released on
$50,000 bail. The bond did not restrict where Grattan could live or
travel."l9 1 Grattan subsequently traveled to Mexico and ceased contact
with his attorney and surety. Approximately six months later, Grat-
tan's convictions were affirmed and he was ordered to surrender to the
United States Marshal."192 Grattan never received a copy of the order,
however, and failed to surrender on the designated day.' 193 As a result,
he was charged with wilfull failure to surrender."
1 94
By the terms of the bond, Grattan clearly had no obligation to
appear before the court until the court of appeals decided the case. 195
Moreover, it was the court's responsibility to notify Grattan of the sur-
render order. 1196 The Ninth Circuit held that he could not be convicted
of wilfully failing to appear as required 1 7 because there was no evi-
dence that Grattan had been notified of either the surrender order or of
the disposition of his appeal.
The Grattan court relied on Graves v. United States," 98 in which
the Ninth Circuit stated that the words "knowingly" or "wilfully" re-
quire proof of culpable intent.1199 In Graves, the defendant had been
convicted of knowingly failing to report for induction into the armed
forces. The court of appeals reversed after finding that Graves was not
aware that he had been ordered to report for service.' 200 Similarly,
Grattan was unaware that he had been ordered to surrender and, thus,
could not have intentionally failed to do so. Had the terms of Grattan's
bond required that he keep in touch with the court or his attorney, then
the court could have found that he intentionally failed to comply with
1191. 603 F.2d at 117. Grattan was not required to live within the district, to notify any-
one if he changed his address or made travel plans, or to keep in touch with anyone. Id
1192. Id
1193. The order was sent by certified mail to Grattan's Ramona, California address. Be-
cause he was in Mexico at the time, the order was returned to the district court. The court
never sent a copy to Grattan's attorney or surety. Id
1194. Id at 118.
1195. United States v. Brizuela, 508 F.2d 386, 387 (9th Cir. 1974) (bond was improperly
forfeited where bond imposed no obligation on defendant to appear until appellate court
was finished with his case, and defendant became unavailable four months prior to dismissal
of his appeal).
1196. FED. R. CRIM. P. 49.
1197. 603 F.2d at 118.
1198. 252 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1958).
1199. Id at 882; see United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1943).
1200. 252 F.2d at 881. Graves was away from home, working in the fields and sleeping in
his truck, when his notice to report for service arrived. His mother had no way of contacting
him. Id at 880.
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the surrender order. 1201
2. Forfeiture
In the 1980 decision of United States v. Kodelja,120 2 the defendant
Kodeija was required to maintain daily contact with his attorney as a
condition of his release under a bond posted for him by Allied Fidelity
Corporation (Allied).120 3 When Kodel a subsequently was arrested on
a different charge, Kodelja's friend posted bail with a promissory note
secured by two quitclaim deeds. 1204 Soon after his release, Kodelja fled
and the Government successfully moved for a forfeiture of the bail
bond posted by Allied.
121
5
On appeal, Allied contended that it should not have to forfeit the
bond because Kodelja's duty to report under the bond was too vague.
Rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit stated that the clear mean-
ing of the condition on the bond was that Kodelja was to appear "once
each day, except on weekends, during working hours, when an em-
ployee, or Mr. Goodman himself was present to verify. . . [Kodelja's]
presence in Las Vegas."'' 20 6 Thus, there apparently was no question
that Kodelja knew that he was supposed to remain in Las Vegas.
Allied also asserted that it should be relieved of its obligations be-
cause its risk was enlarged when Kodelja was released on bail after
being arrested the second time.12 0 7 It has long been established that
"the mere arrest and incarceration of a person released on bail does not
exonerate the bail, if the accused subsequently is at liberty and at the
time he is required to appear on the first charge."' 1208 Thus, Allied's
1201. See United States v. Lujan, 589 F.2d 436, 438 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 919
(1979).
1202. 629 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1980).
1203. Id at 1332.
1204. Id Kodelja's friend and the friend's attorney filed affidavits as justifications pursu-
ant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(d). The court rejected, without explanation, Allied's argument
that the magistrate abused his discretion in accepting these affidavits. It also held that the
promissory note was properly accepted as "other security" pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(a)(3) (1976).
1205. Id at 1331.
1206. Id at 1332.
1207. Id at 1331.
1208. People v. Meyers, 215 Cal. 115, 118, 8 P.2d 837, 839 (1932) (emphasis in original). In
Meyers, the defendant's surety was discharged from his or her duty because the state had
released Meyers from custody and ordered her not to return to the state. The appellate court
concluded that these acts, among others, interfered significantly with the surety's ability to
perform his or her duty under the bond. In Kodelfa, the state was not in any way responsi-
ble for Kodelja's absence from Las Vegas.
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responsibility was not changed by Kodelja's second release from
custody.
Moreover, a surety has the power to arrest his or her principal
without a warrant to secure his appearance in court. 20 9 Thus, as the
appellate court noted, Allied had the option of arresting Kodelja and
surrendering him to the proper authorities had it felt that Kodelja's
second arrest and release increased its risk.
1210
3. Capital cases
Section 3148 of title 18 of the United States Code limits the right
to bail in capital cases.12 1' If the federal judicial officer believes that
the defendant in a capital case will flee or pose a danger to the public if
released, the judicial officer may detain the defendant. 212 Since 1972,
when the United States Supreme Court struck down the Georgia death
penalty statute in Furman v. Georgia, 213 there has been a continuing
controversy over the validity of statutes linked to the concept of capital
punishment. One line of cases has held that certain statutes denying
bail in capital cases were based on the "strong flight urge" reaction, a
response to the potential punishment of the death penalty 214 and,
therefore, such statutes did not survive the holding in Furman. Thus,
the decision to deny bail to such defendants was based impermissibly
upon the potential severity of the punishment.
The other line of authority expressed the viewpoint that the denial
of bail in "capitar' cases was tied to the nature of the offense allegedly
committed by the defendant and, thus, Furman did not invalidate the
denial of bail in those cases. 1215 This view was adopted by the Ninth
1209. Reese v. United States, 76 U.S. 541 (1869); Stuyvesant Ins. Co. v. United States, 410
F.2d 524 (8th Cir. 1969).
1210. 629 F.2d at 1332.
1211. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976) provides:
A person (I) who is charged with an offense punishable by death shall be treated in
accordance with the provisions of section 3146 unless the court or judge has reason
to believe that no one or more conditions of release will reasonably assure that the
person will not flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community. If such a
risk of flight or danger is believed to exist. . . the person may be ordered detained.
1212. Id
1213. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1214. Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 449 Pa. 325, 296 A.2d 829 (1972); State v. Johnson, 61
N.J. 351, 294 A.2d 245, (1972); accord, Exparte Contella, 485 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972).
1215. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 899-900 n.45, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 171-72 n.45, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 958 (1972); Dunbar v. District Court, 179 Cal.
304, 500 P.2d 358 (1972) (per curiam); State v. Flood, 263 La. 700, 269 So. 2d 212 (1972).
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Circuit in the 1980 case of United States v. Kennedy. 2 16 Kennedy was
denied bail, pursuant to section 3148, after being charged with first de-
gree murder, felony murder in the first degree, and rape. 217 The Ken-
nedy court noted that the federal statute differs from many state
statutes because it allows a federal court to deny bail if it concludes that
the defendant will pose a danger to others if released, 2 18 rather than
limiting denial of bail to cases where the court concludes that there is a
high risk that the defendant will flee.1219 In contrast, section 3146 does
not allow the court in non-capital cases to evaluate the potential for
danger which will be created by releasing the defendant. 1220 Reviewing
the two statutes, the Ninth Circuit observed that when Congress en-
acted section 3148, it must have concluded that in situations where
there is "substantial evidence that the defendant. .. [has] committed a
crime then punishable by death," the possibility that the defendant
would pose a danger to others is sufficiently high to warrant allowing
the court to weigh that risk in deciding whether to release the defen-
dant before trial.'22 Thus, different bail conditions were imposed by
Congress because the underlying offenses were different, not because
the potential penalties were different. 1222 Consequently, the court held
that section 3148 "survived Furman," and Kennedy's bail had been
properly denied.
223
D. Defendant's Right to Discovery
1. Exculpatory evidence
In Brady v. Maryland,1224 the United States Supreme Court held
that prosecutorial suppression of evidence favorable to an accused and
1216. 618 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1980).
1217. Id at 558. The district court concluded that Kennedy "was a substantial flight risk
and no condition of release would reasonably assure that the defendant would not pose a
danger to any other person." Id
1218. 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (1976).
1219. 618 F.2d at 559.
1220. 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1976).
1221. 618 F.2d at 559.
1222. Id; see United States v. Watson, 496 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir. 1973). Kennedy is not
inconsistent with United States v. Martinez, 536 F.2d 886 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
907 (1976), in which the Ninth Circuit held that the defendants did not have a right to
twenty peremptory jury challenges under FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(b). The purpose of rule 24(b)
was to assure that the jury was not biased by opinions about capital punishment. 618 F.2d at
558. Since the prosecutor had agreed not to seek the death penalty, there was no reason to
allow twenty peremptory challenges. 536 F.2d at 890. The purpose of the statute was clearly
tied to the penalty involved.
1223. 618 F.2d at 559.
1224. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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material to either guilt or punishment violates the due process clause of
the Constitution. 225 Although the prosecution has a duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence upon request by the defendant, 226 there is no
constitutional obligation to provide unlimited disclosure of its files to
the defendant. 227 Under United States v. Agurs, 228 evidence is mate-
rial if "the suppressed evidence 'creates a reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist.' 1229
Neither Brady nor Agurs established procedures which the prose-
cution must follow for disclosing evidence to the defense. However,
those decisions do say that if the prosecution has doubts about the ma-
teriality of information in its possession, it may submit the information
to the court for a determination of materiality.123' The question of who
should make the initial determination of materiality was raised in the
1980 Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Gardner.'23'
In Gardner, the defendant made a Brady request at trial for pro-
duction of evidence. After an in camera review of several documents
submitted by the Government, the court turned over a single document
to the defense. On appeal, Gardner questioned this procedure because
the documents had been prescreened and edited by the Government
prior to the review by the court. Gardner contended that this method
of production "inadequately protected his constitutional rights."'
' 232
The Ninth Circuit stated that the Government had properly sub-
mitted to the trial court only those prescreened documents that the
Government had determined were arguably subject to disclosure under
Brady andAgurs. As justification for submitting edited documents, the
1225. Id at 90-91. The Ninth Circuit has held that absent a showing that the evidence
sought was clearly favorable to the defense, a defendant is not entitled to discovery. United
States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 612 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
1226. Id. at 87; Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972).
1227. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
1228. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
1229. United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770, 774 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112).
1230. 427 U.S. at 106; Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354 (1959). In camera
inspection procedure for discovery of exculpatory evidence has been employed in other cir-
cuits. See United States v. Allen, 554 F.2d 398, 411-12 (10th Cir.) (no error in trial court's
use of in camera inspection to determine materiality of alleged exculpatory evidence), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977); United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1975) (in camera
inspection of documents approved procedure in dealing with Brady requests); Taglianetti v.
United States, 398 F.2d 558, 571-72 (Ist Cir. 1968) (in camera inspection proper where de-
fendant did not establish strong necessity for disclosure, and procedure "was especially ap-
propriate since the government ha[d] a substantial interest in preserving the secrecy of its
investigation of organized crime").
1231. 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980).
1232. Id at 774.
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Gardner court cited the government's need to withhold sensitive infor-
mation, as well as the trial court's ability to determine whether the
excised portions were necessary for a proper determination of material-
ity. 1233 The Ninth Circuit found that the procedure used by the trial
court to determine the materiality of evidence was proper absent a
''more concrete showing" of improper suppression by the
government. 1
234
While Brady requires that favorable evidence, already in exist-
ence, be turned over to the defense, the Government is not required to
create exculpatory evidence. 235 In United States v. Sukumolachan,1236
the defendant sought voiceprint analyses of recorded telephone conver-
sations to prove that a codefendant's voice was an impersonation.
There was, however, no evidence that any analyses existed. Conse-
quently, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant could not compel the
Government under Brady to make the voiceprint analyses. 237
1233. Id at 775. An additional argument for allowing the Government to prescreen and
edit documents was discussed in United States v. Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 508, 513 (N.D. I11.
1967). The Cobb court noted that the Government faces the dilemma of not knowing which
of the evidence it possesses will be presented. "[Requiring the Government to submit for in
camera examination before trial" places an intolerable burden on the court. 271 F. Supp. at
163. The court concluded, "in view of the practical difficulties, the decision as to whether
the government possesses any [exculpatory] evidence must be left to its good con-
science. . . " Id at 164.
Butsee United States v. Bryant, 448 F.2d 1182, 1184 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(court suggested that it is the defendant's right to decide for himself the usefulness of all
discoverable evidence).
1234. 611 F.2d at 775. The court cited United States v. Frazier, 394 F.2d 258 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984 (1968), in support of this proposition. In Frazier, the defendant
did not claim that the government possessed or had knowledge of exculpatory evidence or
that it suppressed any exculpatory information. Id at 262.
Gardner places the burden on the defendant to show that specific, exculpatory evidence
was improperly suppressed by the Government. The court, however, addressed only the
procedure used by the trial court in determining the materiality of the evidence. By refer-
ring to Frazier, the Gardner court seemed to suggest that an assertion of improper suppres-
sion of exculpatory evidence is necessary in order for the court to find reversible error.
1235. United States v. Goldberg, 582 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Under no circum-
stances is the Government required to volunteer to the defendant potentially exculpatory
information which it neither possesses nor of which it is aware."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 933
(1979); United States v. Walker, 559 F.2d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 1977) (no duty to "seek out"
exculpatory evidence); United States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963, 966 (5th Cir. 1975) (no affirm-
ative duty to discover information not in Government's possession), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
905 (1976); United States v. Gonzales, 466 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Brady does not
impose on the prosecutor a general duty to help the defense find witnesses who might be
favorable to the defendant.").
1236. 610 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
1237. Id at 687.
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In United States v. Bernard,2" 8 the Ninth Circuit excused deliber-
ate efforts to block discovery by not recording exculpatory evidence.
In Bernard, the defendants sought the unrecorded interview statements
of a witness. The defendants contended that the government agent
who had interviewed the witness had deliberately blocked discovery by
refusing to make notes during the interview. The agent admitted at
trial that, to avoid factual contradictions which might hamper the Gov-
ernment's success in court, he did not take notes when interviewing
potential witnesses. Only when the agent knew that the witness or de-
fendant knew "exactly what he . . . [was] saying" would the agent
make a report. 1239 The agent's acts thus deprived the defendants of
potentially favorable evidence.
Following Sukumolachan and Brady, the Ninth Circuit held that
there was no "constitutional basis for compelling the creation" of ex-
culpatory evidence. 1240 The court did not condone the agent's acts or
motivation 2 4' but, rather, held that motivation was irrelevant to the
question of production of Brady evidence. 124 2 This conclusion is con-
sistent with Brady, in which the Supreme Court held that the search for
exculpatory evidence should be made "irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution. . . . [because the underlying principle is
not] punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance
of an unfair trial to the accused."'
1 24 3
2. Inculpatory statements
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
"[u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defend-
ant to inspect and copy. . . the substance of any oral statement which
the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the
defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by
any person then known to the defendant to be a government agent."'
244
1238. 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980).
1239. Id. at 859. The government agent also had disposed of a tape he considered unintel-
ligible and photographs which had been used for identification purposes. The Ninth Circuit
deemed this action to be harmless error. Id at 860.
1240. Id. at 860. The court also relied on decisions rejecting a defendant's discovery re-
quest for transcripts of grand jury proceedings. Nothing compels the Government to make
such transcripts available and this nonfeasance does not deny the defendant the right to
discovery. See Reyes v. United States, 417 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1969); Loux v. United
States, 389 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1968).
1241. 625 F.2d at 859-60.
1242. Id at 860.
1243. 373 U.S. at 87.
1244. FED. R. C~aM. P. 16(a)(1)(A) provides that
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In United States v. Sukumolachan,1245 the Government did not dis-
close an inculpatory statement made by the defendant until the morn-
ing of the trial. Although not permitted to use the statement in its case-
in-chief, the prosecution was allowed to use it for impeachment. Con-
sequently, the defendant did not testify. On appeal, Sukumolachan
contended that his right to discovery had been violated, thus entitling
him to a new trial.'246
The Ninth Circuit held that the use of the inculpatory statement
was not prejudicial because the defendant was able to avoid impeach-
ment by not testifying. The court distinguished Sukumolachan from
situations in which inculpatory statements were not disclosed until after
the defendant had testified. 1247 In those instances, "whenever the gov-
ernment's failure to disclose such statements poses a serious detriment
to the preparation for trial and substantially determines a defendant's
defense strategy, there should be a new trial."'
' 248
The Sukumolachan court also noted that in the trial court's view
the defendant had been afforded sufficient time to prepare a rebut-
tal. 249 Because the trial court was able to correct any prejudice stem-
[ulpon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to inspect
and copy or photograph: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the
defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the gov-
ernment, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may
become known, to the attorney for the government; the substance of any oral state-
ment which the government intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the
defendant whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person
then known to the defendant to be a government agent; and recorded testimony of
the defendant before a grand jury which relates to the offense charged. Where the
defendant is a corporation, partnership, association or labor union, the court may
grant the defendant, upon its motion, discovery of relevant recorded testimony of
any witness before a grand jury who (1) was, at the time of his testimony, so situ-
ated as an officer or employee as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in
respect to conduct constituting the offense, or (2) was, at the time of the offense,
personally involved in the alleged conduct constituting the offense and so situated
as an officer or employee as to have been able legally to bind the defendant in
respect to that alleged conduct in which he was involved.
1245. 610 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
1246. Id at 687-88.
1247. The defendant in Sukumolachan relied on United States v. Lewis, 511 F.2d 798
(D.C. Cir. 1975), and United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). In
both Lewis and Padrone, the Government failed to disclose prior inculpatory statements
made by the defendants. Both circuits held that defense strategy was prejudiced because the
defendants did not know what they faced at trial. The Lewis court observed that the Gov-
ernment's use of the statements impeached the defendant's credibility and undermined a
significant element of his defense. 511 F.2d at 803. The Padrone court noted that had the
defendant known of the Government's intended use of his statement, he might not have
testified. 406 F.2d at 561. Both courts held that a new trial was the only remedy for this
violation.
1248. United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1032 (10th Cir. 1978) (McKay, J., dissenting).
1249. 610 F.2d at 688. The inculpatory statement had been disclosed the day before the
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ming from the prosecution's tardy disclosure, the court of appeals held
that the defendant was not prejudiced in his defense preparation.
3. Witness statements
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not allow disclosure
"of statements made by government witnesses or prospective govern-
ment witnesses except as provided in" the Jencks Act.125 The Jencks
Act requires the Government to produce any statement made by a
Government witness which has been adopted or approved by the wit-
ness and which relates to the witness' trial testimony.1
251
defendant would have testified. The trial court considered this sufficient time to enable the
defendant to prepare a rebuttal and to avoid impeachment. Accord, United States v. Bocki-
us, 564 F.2d 1193, 1197 (5th Cir. 1977) ("trial judge was able to counteract the use of undis-
closed evidence by giving the defense the time it requested [one-half day] to prepare its
response").
1250. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(2) provides that
[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (A), (B), and (D) of subdivision (a)(1), this rule
does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other
internal government documents made by the attorney for the government or other
government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case,
or of statements made by government witnesses or prospective government wit-
nesses except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
1251. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), provides that
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement
or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) shall be the
subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness has testified on di-
rect examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct exami-
nation, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States to
produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the possession of
the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has
testified. If the entire contents of any such statement relate to the subject matter of
the testimony of the witness, the court shall order it to be delivered directly to the
defendant for his examination and use.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be produced
under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter of the
testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to deliver such
statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such delivery the court
shall excise the portions of such statement which do not relate to the subject matter
of the testimony of the witness. With such material excised, the court shall then
direct delivery of such statement to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such
procedure, any portion of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the
defendant objects to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudication
of the guilt of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by
the United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made available
to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of the ruling
of the trial judge. Whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursuant to
this section, the court in its discretion, upon application of said defendant, may
recess proceedings in the trial for such time as it may determine to be reasonably
required for the examination of such statement by said defendant and his prepara-
tion for its use in the trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court under
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In Palermo v. United States, 25 2 the Supreme Court ruled on the
"scope and meaning of the statutory definition of 'statement' contained
in" the then-new Jencks Act. 253 The defendant in Palermo sought a
memorandum which summarized selected portions of an interview
made by a government agent. The Court found that the legislative in-
tent of the Jencks Act indicated "that only those statements which
could properly be called the witness' own words should be made avail-
able to the defense for purposes of impeachment."' 254 Thus, the Court
held that the non-verbatim, non-contemporaneous memorandum was
not discoverable under the Jencks Act.
2 55
In the 1980 Ninth Circuit decision of United States v. Bel-
tencourt,1256 the defendant contended that it was error to admit evi-
dence of his prior state arrest which had been expunged from the
record. Bettencourt asserted that the police record upon which the
Government witness relied in testifying should have been disclosed
pursuant to the Jencks Act.
257
Rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit held that the police rec-
ord was not a Jencks Act statement. Because the police record had
been prepared by an officer other than the witness, the court found it
was not a statement "made by" the witness. Therefore, the record was
not discoverable under the Act.
25 8
Certain notes made by a government agent during the course of a
subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such statement, or such
portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike from the record the
testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its discre-
tion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of this sec-
tion in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a trans-
portation thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of
such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if
any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
1252. 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
1253. Id at 351.
1254. Id at 352.
1255. The Court noted that a primary purpose of the Jencks Act was "to eliminate the
danger of distortion and misrepresentation inherent in a report which merely selects por-
tions, albeit accurately, from a lengthy oral recital." Id
1256. 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980).
1257. Id at 216. Bettencourt also contended that the witness' testimony was inadmissible
under FED. R. EvID. 403. The Ninth Circuit agreed, but found this error to be harmless. Id
at 218.
1258. Id at 216.
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criminal investigation may be discoverable as statements under the
Jencks Act. This issue was raised in United States v. Augenblick, 259
where the defendant sought notes of an interview made by a govern-
ment agent. In holding that the notes were not discoverable, the
Supreme Court expressed doubt as to whether or not such notes consti-
tuted a statement within the meaning of the Act. The Court stated that
the record did not indicate whether the notes had been made during or
after the interview. Therefore, the Court could not decide with cer-
tainty whether the Jencks Act had been violated.
2 60
In Goldberg v. United States,'26' the Court held discoverable a
prosecutor's notes of an interview with a witness who had verified the
accuracy of the notes. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated
that in order for such notes to be subject to production under the
Jencks Act, they must be a "factual narrative by the witness. . . sup-
ported by a finding of unambiguous and specific approval by the
witness." 1
262
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Johnson1263 held that notes
taken by FBI agents in interviews with prospective Government wit-
nesses or the accused are potentially discoverable materials and, thus, a
trial court has a duty to review such materials for their discoverability.
Although the Jencks Act was cited as the principle foundation for this
holding, 1264 the Ninth Circuit has noted other bases for the rule.
1265
The court of appeals went a step further than Johnson in United
States v. Harris.16 6 Criticizing the routine destruction of these rough
interview notes, the Harris court required their future preservation.
The court observed that a trial court has the duty of determining ulti-
mately what is discoverable; consequently, the court emphasized that
"the routine disposal of potentially producible materials by the FBI
amounts to a usurpation of the judicial function of determining what
evidence must be produced in a criminal case."' 1267 Hence, the court
held that such notes had to be preserved in order that the defendant's
1259. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
1260. id at 354-55.
1261. 425 U.S. 94 (1976).
1262. Id at 114-16 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1263. 521 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1975).
1264. See id at 1319-20.
1265. See United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (Rule 16 of the FED.
R. CRIM. P. and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963), provide "independent founda-
tions" requiring the preservation of evidence).
1266. 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976).
1267. Id at 1248.
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discovery rights would not be violated. 1268
Harris was concerned with preserving interview notes as state-
ments under the Jencks Act. In the 1980 decisions of United States v.
Bernard12 6 9 and United States v. Spencer, 27 ° the Ninth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of whether an agent's surveillance notes were state-
ments under the Jencks Act and, thus, subject to preservation by the
governmental agency.'27' The defendants in Bernard and Spencer
urged that the Ninth Circuit adopt a "broad prophylactic rule" requir-
ing that all law enforcement notes be preserved.
1272
The Ninth Circuit held that because surveillance notes are gener-
ally sketchy, incomplete, and made at different times, they are not
Jencks Act statements and need not be preserved under Harris. The
Bernard court observed that interview notes, unlike surveillance notes,
contain potential testimony; moreover, the circumstances of an inter-
view allow the agent to prepare complete notes. 273 Preservation of
surveillance notes would be too staggering a burden, the court held,
and, therefore, destruction of such notes would not preclude testimony
at trial.
1274
1268. Id at 1249.
1269. 623 F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1980) (revising 607 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1270. 618 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1980).
1271. In Bernard, the Government appealed the pretrial suppression of the agent's testi-
mony. Citing Harris, the district court excluded the agent's testimony because he had de-
stroyed his investigatory observation notes after incorporating them into a final report. 623
F.2d at 555-56. The Ninth Circuit held that the Jencks Act does not require the pretrial
production of a witness' statement. The Jencks Act only requires production of statements
after the witness has testified on direct examination at trial. The Ninth Circuit does not
include pretrial suppression hearings in its definition of "trial." Id at 556 (citing United
States v. Spagnuolo, 515 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Curran, 498 F.2d 30 (9th
Cir. 1974)). Therefore, the agent's testimony at the pretrial hearing did not have to be sup-
pressed even though his notes had been destroyed. 623 F.2d at 558.
In Spencer, the defendant contended that surveillance notes made during the investiga-
tion that led to his arrest, which were used to compile a final report and then routinely
destroyed, were statements under the Jencks Act. Based on this contention, the defendant
moved to strike the trial testimony of the arresting officer. The trial court denied the motion,
ruling that surveillance notes were not statements under the Jencks Act. 618 F.2d at 605-06.
1272. 618 F.2d at 606.
1273. 623 F.2d at 557-58; accord, United States v. Lane, 574 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1978).
Even when interview notes are incomplete, Harris may require preservation of the notes for
judicial determination of their discoverability. 618 F.2d at 606; Sf. United States v. Cruz,
478 F.2d 408, 413 (5th Cir. 1973) ("fact that investigator's notes contained occasional verba-
tim recitation of phrases used by the person interviewed did not make such notes Jencks Act
material").
1274. 623 F.2d at 557-58; see supra note 1271. The Spencer court believed that a judicial
invasion into law enforcement would occur if all government agents' notes had to be pre-
served. 618 F.2d at 607; accord, United States v. Lane, 574 F.2d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1978).
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Bernard and Spencer refused to extend Harris. Instead, the circuit
continues to require only that notes of a government agent which con-
tain verbatim, contemporaneous statements by the witness be preserved
for a judicial determination of their status under the Jencks Act.
While Harris forbids the destruction of interview notes, the opin-
ion does not address fully the question of what remedies the appellate
court should employ if a Harris violation occurs.12 75 Under the Jencks
Act, if the prosecution "elects" not to comply with a discovery order,
the court "shall strike from the record the testimony of the witness" and
may order a mistrial if the "interests of justice" necessitate. 12 76 Harris
was prospective in effect; 1277 investigations commenced prior to Harris
would not result in the exclusion of testimony. Thus, the admission of
such testimony would be subject to the harmless error rule. 278 Left
unanswered by Harris was the treatment to be accorded erroneously
admitted testimony which developed from post-Harris investigations
during which notes had been destroyed.
279
Recent cases in which the trial court erred by not following Harris
have not resulted in automatic reversal of a conviction. 280 Instead,
while acknowledging the Harris violation, these decisions have af-
firmed convictions using harmless error analysis.' 28 ' Similarly, in
United States v. Lutz,12 82 in which the trial court had violated Harris
1275. See 543 F.2d at 1253.
1276. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1976); see Lewis v. United States, 340 F.2d 678, 682 (8th Cir.
1965) ("Onceproducibility is established the defendant has an absolute right to the state-
ment, or, in the alternative, to have the testimony of the witness stricken if the Government
refuses to comply, and failure to so order is reversible error.") (emphasis added); cf. United
States v. Pope, 574 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1978) ("elects" in the Act indicates a conscious
choice; therefore, when a negligent violation occurs, the Act allows a judge discretion in
ordering the appropriate remedy); accord, United States v. Heath, 580 F.2d 1011, 1019 (10th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 893 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1120 (1975).
1277. 543 F.2d at 1253; see United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1976).
Harris was prospective because the "FBI should not be sanctioned for failing to follow a
rule not yet in force." 546 F.2d at 312.
1278. See United States v. Shields, 571 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Parker, 549 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977); United States v.
Woods, 550 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir. 1976).
1279. See 543 F.2d at 1253.
1280. See, e.g., United States v. Hozian, 622 F.2d 439, 441-42 (9th Cir. 1980) (error of
admission subject to harmless error); United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir.
1979). The reliance by these courts on United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1976),
is misplaced because Wood concerned a pre-Harris destruction of notes. See supra note
1277 and accompanying text.
1281. See cases cited supra note 1278.
1282. 621 F.2d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1980).
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by not turning over a federal prosecutor's interview notes, the Ninth
Circuit employed the harmless error rule.
The difference between Lutz and the cases involving a Harris vio-
lation is the availability of Jencks Act material, which the Ninth Circuit
can view in the perspective of the rest of the trial evidence. In Lutz, the
Ninth Circuit could judge if the unavailability of the Jencks Act mate-
rial was ultimately harmless because the notes had been preserved.
2 3
In the other cases, the notes had been destroyed and could not be re-
viewed by either the trial court or the appellate court. 1284 Thus, with-
out having the materials available, the Ninth Circuit appears to be
guessing as to the harmlessness of a Harris violation.128 5 Harris sought
to avoid this guessing game by requiring the preservation of such
materials so that the courts independently could arrive at the proper
determination about discovery.1
2 86
4. Identity of government witnesses
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for dis-
covery of the identity of a Government informant or witness. Although
evidence favorable to an accused must be disclosed under Brady, the
Supreme Court held in Weatherford v. Bursey1287 that the prosecution
need not reveal the identity of a witness before trial.
288
In the 1979 decision of United States v. Jones, 289 the defendant
contended that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to
discover the identity of a Government witness. In affirming the denial,
the Ninth Circuit, relying on Weatherford, held that a defendant's
1283. Id at 948.
1284. 622 F.2d at 441-42; 600 F.2d at 748. See United States v. Miranda, 526 F.2d 1319,
1329 (2d Cir. 1975) (lost tape recording did not require reversal where government had not
deliberately lost the evidence and there was not a "significant chance" in light of the whole
record that the availability of the recording "would have avoided a verdict of guilty"), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 821 (1976).
1285. Such material may show that a key witness had lied. United States v. Knowles, 594
F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1979) (conviction reversed); see Krilich v. United States, 502 F.2d 680,
686 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Where the government fails to comply with the requirements of the
Jencks Act, a conviction should be reversed unless it isperfectly, clear that the defense was
not prejudiced by the omission") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); United
States v. Pope, 574 F.2d 320, 326 (6th Cir. 1978) (harmless error rule will be invoked if the
failure to strike testimony could have adversely affected the outcome of the trial). But com-
pare United States v. Johnson, 521 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1975) ("substantial rights" of
the defendant must have been affected by the failure to make a Jencks Act statement
available).
1286. 543 F.2d at 1248.
1287. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
1288. Id at 559.
1289. 612 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980).
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rights under Brady and the Jencks Act are not violated when the Gov-
ernment refuses to divulge the identity of an informant or witness.
290
The Ninth Circuit has extended the limitation of disclosure set
forth in rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Jencks Act "to prohibit the pretrial disclosure of the identity of govern-
ment witnesses in the absence of a showing of reasonable necessity by
the defense."' 291 If the defendant can show that his discovery request
is reasonable and necessary to defense preparation, the trial court may,
in its discretion, allow disclosure. 1292 The 1980 decision of United
States v. Tousant1293 reaffirmed this position.
In Tousant, the defendant contended that the denial of his pretrial
motion to discover the identity of a Government informant was a de-
nial of his due process rights. The Ninth Circuit rejected this conten-
tion. The court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion
in denying the discovery motion since the Government's need to pro-
tect the witness outweighed the defendant's trial preparation needs.
1294
Furthermore, because the informant was subjected to extensive cross-
examination, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had not suf-
fered any prejudice.
1291
If an informant is deemed a percipient witness, the defendant is
entitled to learn his identity prior to trial. 1296 However, a defendant is
not entitled to have the informant produced prior to trial as was con-
tended in United States v. Bonilla. 297 In Bonilla, the Ninth Circuit re-
affirmed its position that the Government is obligated to use reasonable
efforts to insure the presence of an informant at trial. The Government
is not, however, "'under any general obligation to produce an in-
1290. Id at 454-55. The Ninth Circuit stated that pretrial discovery of the identity of a
Government informant or witness was not provided for in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, in the Jencks Act, or in Brady.
1291. Id; see United States v. Richter, 488 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1973).
1292. United States v. Richter, 488 F.2d at 174-75.
1293. 619 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
1294. Id at 813. The Government informant feared his life would be endangered if his
identity were revealed. In exercising its discretion, the trial court "must consider the dangers
inherent in the disclosure of the informant's identity" and weigh these dangers against "the
defendant's interest in preparing his case." Id; see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62
(1957) ("[N]o fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls
for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individ-
ual's right to prepare his defense.").
1295. 619 F.2d at 813; see Williams v. Brown, 609 F.2d 216, 220-21 (5th Cir. 1980) (where
defendant had opportunity to cross-examine an informant, even if defendant did not do so,
there is no prejudice to defendant if the identity of the informant was not revealed prior to
trial).
1296. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
1297. 615 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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former'" at trial. 298 The "reasonable efforts" standard is the generally
accepted burden that the circuits place on the Government when the
defense requests the presence of an informant at trial.
299
E. Destruction of Evidence,- United States v. Loud Hawk
300
When the Government loses or destroys criminal evidence, con-
cern arises about insuring the defendant a fair trial and maintaining
judicial integrity. Generally, courts will not reverse a conviction unless
the unavailability of evidence results in prejudice to the defendant.'
30 '
In United States v. Augenblick,13 2 the United States Supreme Court
stated that, absent the most extreme violation of due process, loss or
destruction of evidence does not amount to a constitutional issue.
130 3
As a result, the Supreme Court has not set forth guidelines to be used in
determining when destruction of evidence is prejudicial to the
defendant.
Prior to Augenblick, the Court in Killian v. United States,'3° sug-
gested that the circumstances under which evidence is lost or destroyed
are relevant to the sanctions that will be applied. 30 The Killian Court
stated that if evidence was destroyed by the Government "in good faith
and in accord with their normal practice, it would be clear that their
destruction did not constitute an impermissible destruction of evidence
nor deprive [defendant] of any right."'
130 6
Outside of the Ninth Circuit, the federal circuits have struggled
with this question and have adopted various tests to determine whether
loss or destruction of evidence necessitates exclusion of secondary evi-
dence or reversal of a conviction. 30 7 Generally, the circuits have fo-
1298. Id at 1264 (quoting Velarde-Villarreal v. United States, 354 F.2d 9, 12 (9th Cir.
1965)).
1299. See United States v. Hart, 546 F.2d 798, 802 n.8 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1120 (1977), and the cases cited therein.
1300. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
1301. See, e.g., United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979), cerf. denied,
445 U.S. 917 (1980).
1302. 393 U.S. 348 (1969) (unexplained loss of tape-recorded conversation).
1303. Id at 356. But f Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (nondisclosure of
material evidence favorable to the accused); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (same).
1304. 368 U.S. 231 (1961).
1305. Id at 242 ("Almost everything is evidence of something, but that does not mean that
nothing can ever safely be destroyed.").
1306. Id
1307. Some circuits have adopted balancing tests to determine if sanctions should be ap-
plied when evidence has been lost or destroyed. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia stated that district courts "should weigh the degree of negligence or bad faith
involved [on the government's part], the importance of the evidence lost, and the [other]
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cused on the materiality of the evidence, prejudice to the defendant and
good faith on the part of the Government.
The Ninth Circuit has consistently looked to the degree of bad
faith exhibited by the Government and the amount of prejudice suf-
fered by the defendant. The application of these factors, however, has
not always been clear." 8
In the 1979 decision of United States v. Loud Hawk, '3 9 the Ninth
Circuit established guidelines for determining whether loss or destruc-
tion of evidence requires suppression of secondary evidence or reversal
of a conviction. In Loud Hawk, the evidence was destroyed by state
police officers who had been asked to aid an FBI surveillance of fugi-
tives of the 1973 Wounded Knee occupation. Despite an explicit in-
struction not to stop the suspects' vehicles, but only to notify the FBI,
an Oregon State Trooper sighted and stopped the vehicles. The FBI
was notified subsequent to the removal of the suspects and the im-
poundment of the vehicles. Next, the state police, without any federal
assistance, obtained a state search warrant and subsequently found
evidence of guilt adduced at trial in order to come to a determination that will serve the ends
of justice." United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The First Circuit stated that
[w]hen evidence in a criminal trial is destroyed, special scrutiny must be under-
taken to ascertain whether defendant's right to due process has been prejudiced. A
three-pronged examination is in order: first, was the evidence material to the ques-
tion of uilt or the degree of punishment; second, was defendant prejudiced by its
destruction; and third, was the government acting in good faith when it destroyed
the evidence.
United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 222, 227 (1st Cir. 1978) (citing United States v. Heiden,
508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973)).
The Fifth Circuit stated that the determination of "[w]hether a defendant has been
deprived of [his] right of due process will depend upon the materiality of the evidence, the
likelihood of mistaken interpretation of it by government witnesses or the jury, and the
reasons for its nonavailability to the defense." United States v. Herndon, 536 F.2d 1027,
1029 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Seventh Circuit held that when "there [is] no hint of bad faith or deliberate sup-
pression of evidence which might reasonably have exculpatory value to [the] defendant...
[and the] [d]efendant has pointed to no concrete area of prejudice due to the disposition" of
the evidence, there is no necessity for reversal of a conviction. United States v. Shafer, 445
F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1971).
1308. See United States v. Higginbotham, 539 F.2d 17, 21 (9th Cir. 1976) (degree of negli-
gence or bad faith, importance of lost evidence, and sufficiency of other evidence are factors
to be considered); United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974) (defendant
must show "(1) bad faith or connivance on the part of the government or (2) that he was
prejudiced by the loss of the evidence"); United States v. Henry, 487 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1973)
(per curiam) ("good faith" destruction and no prejudice shown); United States v. Sewar, 468
F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972) (suppression of evidence not warranted when non-preservation was
unintentional), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
1309. 628 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980).
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various firearms and several cases of dynamite in the vehicles. Finally,
due to the lack of storage facilities, problems with the chain of custody,
and a concern for public safety, the state police destroyed the dynamite.
Although taking no active part in the state's actions, federal agents did
observe the search and subsequent destruction of the evidence.
310
A federal indictment charged the defendants with possession of a
destructive device. The district court dismissed with prejudice the dy-
namite counts on the ground of unlawful suppression of evidence be-
cause the dynamite had been destroyed. 131 1 When the Government
declined to continue with the other counts until it could appeal the dis-
missal, the district court dismissed the entire indictment with
prejudice.
3 1 2
The Government appealed both dismissals and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court. However,
upon application for en banc reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to obtain findings of fact regarding
(1) federal participation in the search and destruction of the dynamite,
and (2) prejudice suffered by the defendants as a result of the destruc-
tion of the dynamite.
1313
The district court found no federal participation in the destruction
of the dynamite, 1314 but did find prejudice to the defendants "'to the
extent that their ability to observe the destruction and to analyze sam-
ples of [the dynamite] deprived them of the opportunity to contest the
government's conclusion that the substance destroyed was indeed ex-
plosive.' ,,'31 In addition, the district court found that the destruction
of the dynamite containers was prejudicial because the defendants were
denied the chance to fingerprint the containers.
31 6
In reviewing the findings of fact, the Ninth Circuit looked to its
previous application of the principles used when evidence has been lost
or destroyed. The Loud Hawk opinion phrased them as follows:
When the government loses or destroys tangible evidence
prior to trial, a motion to suppress secondary evidence...
will be granted. . . if the defendant can show (1) bad faith or
1310. Id. at 1141-43.
1311. Id at 1143. The dismissal was ordered pursuant to rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which provides for dismissal due to unnecessary delay in bringing a
defendant to trial.
1312. 628 F.2d at 1143.
1313. Id at 1143-44.
1314. Id at 1148.




connivance on the part of the government, and (2) that he was
prejudiced by the loss or destruction of the evidence.
131 7
The opinion of the court did not thoroughly analyze or discuss the ra-
tionale behind this two part test.1 318 However, a majority 13 19 of the
Loud Hawk court joined in a concurring opinion which set forth sev-
eral factors to be considered in determining whether to exclude secon-
dary evidence due to the loss or destruction of the original evidence.
The Loud Hawk concurring opinion, written by Judge Kennedy, took
this approach because previous Ninth Circuit courts had failed to dis-
cuss the rationale behind their position.
320
First of all, the concurring judges cited the concern of the judicial
system in providing the defendant "an opportunity to produce and ex-
amine all relevant evidence, to insure a fair trial."'1321 Next, in weigh-
ing the conduct of the Government, the concurring opinion declared
that the court should determine "whether the Government acted in dis-
regard for the interests of the accused, whether it was negligent in fail-
ing to adhere to established and reasonable standards of care for police
and prosecutorial functions, and, if the acts were deliberate, whether
they were taken in good faith or with reasonable justification."'
' 322
In determining prejudice to the defendant, the court should
consider
the centrality of the evidence to the case and its importance in
establishing the elements of the crime or the motive or intent
of the defendant; the probative value and reliability of the
secondary or substitute evidence; the nature and probable
weight of factual inferences or other demonstrations and
kinds of proof allegedly lost to the accused; the probable ef-
fect on the jury from absence of evidence, including dangers
of unfounded speculation and bias that might result to the de-
fendant if adequate presentation of the case requires explana-
tion about the missing evidence.
323
1317. Id. at 1146 (emphasis added). Note that in United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898,
900 (9th Cir. 1974), the court stated the test in the disjunctive. See supra note 1329.
1318. Id
1319. Of the eleven justices sitting en banc, six subscribed to the concurring opinion which
set forth the factors to use in balancing Government participation in the loss or destruction
of evidence against prejudice to the defendant. Id at 1151 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1320. Id
1321. Id
1322. Id at 1152.
1323. Id The court analogized the approach adopted in Loud Hawk to a similar balanc-
ing approach adopted to determine whether pre-indictment delay requires dismissal of an
indictment. United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977). InMays, the court adopted
1981]
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After setting out the applicable legal principles, the opinion of the
court and the concurring opinion disagreed with the district court's
findings of prejudice to the defendants. The majority first found that
the defendants were not prejudiced by the inability to analyze the dy-
namite and to observe its destruction. The court noted that the defen-
dants' expert did not express any opinion as to whether the explosion
shown in some photographs was the result of dynamite. 1324 The con-
curring judges believed the secondary evidence of the dynamite to be
sufficiently probative and reliable.
325
Both opinions also agreed that there was no prejudice to the de-
fendants in the destruction of the boxes and plastic covering the explo-
sives, because the absence of fingerprints had little significance to prove
or disprove handling.1326 As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court rulings on the motion to suppress and on the dismissal of
the indictment.
327
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Hufstedler 328 first argued that
the appellate court, under a clearly erroneous standard, should not
have substituted its own conclusion about the alleged prejudice the de-
fendant suffered because of the district court's findings. 1329 The effect
of Loud Hawk, the dissent charged, put the entire burden of proof on
the defense because the defendants were required to show that the sub-
stance destroyed was not dynamite (although such proof had been de-
stroyed by the Government); having failed to do so, they could not
claim "prejudice" (although a prima facie case had been estab-
lished). 1330 The dissent further noted that the destruction of the finger-
print evidence also could have been relevant defense evidence.
1331
a test which balanced all the circumstances including actual prejudice to the defendant and
the Government's reason for the delay.
1324. 628 F.2d at 1145, 1149.
1325. Id at 1155 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1326. The court's opinion pointed out that the defendant's inability to fingerprint the dy-
namite containers was exculpatory since any fingerprints could only aid the prosecution. Id
at 1149. The concurring opinion concluded that the defendant's inability to fingerprint the
containers was not prejudicial since fingerprints of third parties would not be necessarily
exculpatory. Id at 1155 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1327. Id at 1151.
1328. Judge Hufstedler was joined by Judges Ely and Hug. .d at 1156.
1329. Id at 1156. Moreover, the dissent charged that the majority accepted the principles
set out in United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1974), without addressing the
fact that Heiden established a disjunctive test (either bad faith or prejudice to the defendant
could be shown). 628 F.2d at 1158. See text accompanying note 1317, supra.
1330. 628 F.2d at 1157 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1331. The dissent believed that if the cartons of dynamite had not disclosed evidence of the
defendants' fingerprints, that fact would have been helpful to the defense. Id
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Consequently, the Government actions prevented the defendants from
discovering evidence that might have been favorable to their de-
fense. 332 Finally, the dissent argued that the interests of deterring gov-
ernmental misconduct, of protecting a defendant's right to a fair trial,
and of preserving the integrity of the judicial process should not be
balanced against each other because each has independent value.
1333
In sum, the LoudfHawk test leaves a defendant with a near impos-
sible task. Besides requiring evidence of governmental bad faith, Loud
Hawk demands a showing of actual prejudice from evidence unavaila-
ble for testing because of governmental destruction. However, the bal-
ancing approach is not altogether new to the Ninth Circuit 1334 or the
other circuits. 335 Moreover, the factors set out in the concurring opin-
ion should provide a better guide than past Ninth Circuit discussions in
this area in spite of the difficulties it presents defendants. The Ninth
Circuit applied the Loud Hawk balancing test in United States v.
Tercero .1336 The defendant in Tercero sought to have his conviction
for possession of marijuana reversed because certain arrest photo-
graphs had been lost or destroyed. 1
337
The Tercero court found no bad faith on the part of the Govern-
ment because the photographs had been destroyed in the course of rou-
tine file cleaning. 338  The court also found no prejudice to the
defendant since the arrest photographs were deemed neither essential
to his defense nor useful for impeachment purposes. 1339 As a result, the
1332. The dissent pointed out that the prejudice stems from the fact that the defendants
are prevented from "finding out for themselves," id at 1158, and analogized to other Ninth
Circuit opinions voicing concern for the unfettered ability of the Government to make deci-
sions unilaterally. Id See United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971),
and United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974), which held that the Govern-
ment's routine deportation of illegal aliens who might provide exculpatory evidence was
violative of a defendant's compulsory process rights.
1333. 628 F.2d at 1158 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
1334. See cases cited supra in note 1308.
1335. See supra note 1307.
1336. 640 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1980).
1337. Id
1338. Id at 192. The court noted that the defendant conceded that there was no evidence
of bad faith and cited the Government's efforts to find the photographs.
The court did, however, repeat a warning "that the government 'ffirt[s] with the danger
of reversal any time evidence is lost or inadvertently destroyed.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898, 903 n.1 (9th Cir. 1974)). The Ninth Circuit has also stated
that "[w]hen evidence is seized, the government should take every reasonable precaution to
preserve it." United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d at 903 n.l.
1339. Id at 193. The witness who testified as to what the defendant was wearing when
arrested admitted that he had no independent recollection of this. The witness stated that
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court concluded that reversal of the conviction was unwarranted. 340
F. Abuse of Process
In United States v. Wilson,' 34' the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress statements alleg-
edly resulting from the United States Attorney's abuse of prosecutorial
discretion in serving the defendant with a grand jury subpoena.1342 In
so doing, the court applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard it
had used before in considering alleged violations of the Attorney Gen-
erals prosecutorial discretion.1
343
Agent Flett of the Drug Enforcement Agency was informed by
physician Palmer that narcotic prescriptions bearing Palmer's forged
signature had been passed at a local pharmacy and that a portion of
the doctor's prescription booklet was missing.1344 Flett relayed this in-
formation to Assistant United States Attorney Diskin.
1345
On March 1, 1979, Diskin ordered the preparation of a grand jury
subpoena for defendant Wilson, a registered nurse and an employee of
Dr. Palmer. 1346 The subpoena directed Wilson to appear before the
grand jury at 11:00 a.m. on March 13, 1979. Instead of giving the sub-
poena to the United States Marshal for routine service, Diskin gave it
to agent Flett with instructions not to make service until so directed by
Diskin. On March 12, 1979, Diskin requested Flett to deliver service to
Wilson the following morning at Dr. Palmer's office. Actual service
was not completed until 10:30 a.m. on March 13, 1979 (one-half hour
before the scheduled appearance) when Wilson arrived at work.
13 4 7
Following a conversation with her employer, Wilson asked Flett
how she could avoid an appearance before the grand jury. When Flett
replied that any decision would have to be made by the United States
Attorney in charge, Wilson requested that the agents escort her to the
courthouse. 1348 En route, Flett explained to Wilson that she was not
required to speak with the agents and that she had the right to the
his recollection was "influenced" by a review of an arrest photograph. In this situation, not
every arrest photograph could be used to impeach the witness' testimony.
1340. Id
1341. 614 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980).
1342. Id at 1228.
1343. Id
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presence of counsel except during the appearance before the grand
jury. Wilson then expressed a desire to speak with Assistant United
States Attorney Diskin. 1349 The suspect was escorted to the United
States Attorney's office, where Diskin informed her that the subpoena
did not require her presence in his office, but did require her to appear
before the grand jury. Wilson was then given the Miranda warnings,
which she waived. During the ensuing interview Wilson confessed to
the forgeries of the narcotics prescriptions.
1350
At a suppression hearing which followed Wilson's indictment, the
district court found that (1) the paramount reason for delayed service
was that the government desired to acquire additional evidence against
Wilson, and (2) the direction to appear at the United States Attorney's
office was for the purpose of allowing the witness to obtain vouchers
for witness fees, a routine accounting procedure. 135  Wilson was subse-
quently convicted of acquiring controlled substances through use of
forged order forms.
1352
In affirming Wilson's conviction, the Ninth Circuit initially ob-
served that "[s]upervisory control of grand jury procedures is narrowly
construed in the Ninth Circuit."1 353 The court noted that in view of the
constitutional independence of the grand jury it would be antithetical
for the court to exercise oversight. 354 The court stated that "[t]he legal
1349. Id
1350. Id
1351. Id These findings demonstrate that the trial court wholly accepted Diskin's testi-
mony at the suppression hearing. Id
1352. Id at 1225.
1353. Id at 1227 (citing In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Hergenroeder, 555 F.2d 686 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
1354. Id at 1227 (citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1977)). The court relied heavily on the language in Chanen, stating that
[gliven the constitutionally-based independence of each of three actors--court,
prosecutor and grand jury-we believe a court may not exercise its "supervisory
power" in a way which encroaches on theprerogatives of the other two unless there
is a clear basis in fact and law for doing so. If the district courts were not required
to meet such a standard, their "supervisory power" could readily prove subversive
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
614 F.2d at 1227 (quoting United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1313 (emphasis added)).
However, in Chanen, the remedy sought by the defendant under the court's supervisory
power was dismissal of the indictment on the ground of prosecutorial misconduct in the
presentation of evidence to the grand jury. Id at 1313. In Wilson, the defendant merely
sought to suppress the statements made as a result of an alleged abuse of process. This
action required a far less drastic and intrusive remedy under a comparatively restrained
exercise of supervisory power. The cases upon which the Chanen court relied in reaching its
decision not to dismiss the indictment involved instances in which the defendant claimed
that dismissal of the indictment was the appropriate remedy for the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1133 (2d Cir. 1972); Loraine
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basis for a court's assertion of its supervisory power 'is the need to pre-
serve the integrity of the judidial process and to avoid any fundamental
unfairness.' I'll It concluded that "'it is far from clear' that the man-
ner in which the grand jury subpoena was served 'implicates any of
those interests.' 1356 The court was unable to discern any clear basis
in law justifying the exercise of supervisory power. While recognizing
the "propriety" of the guidelines contained in the United States Attor-
ney's Manual, the court reiterated that they carried no force of law and
that it was not mandatory for the judiciary "to enforce an agency regu-
lation unless compliance with the regulation is mandated by the Con-
stitution or federal law."'1
357
Turning to the circumstances surrounding the service of the sub-
poena on Wilson, the court found that the Government was exercising
a legitimate prerogative in issuing a subpoena forthwith, because the
delay in actual service was due to the Assistant United States Attor-
ney's desire to gather additional evidence that he believed would be
forthcoming. 358  The district court's acceptance of the Government's
explanation was upheld under the "clearly erroneous" standard of
review. 1
359
Neither could the court find that the record would support a con-
clusion that the subpoena was used as a device to facilitate an office
interrogation of the defendant. 360 The court again noted that the dis-
trict court accepted the Government's explanation that grand jury wit-
nesses were routinely directed to the courthouse floor, where the
v. United States, 396 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 933 (1968); Coppedge v.
United States, 311 F.2d 128, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 946 (1963); United
States v. Wells, 163 F. 313, 314 (D. Idaho 1908); United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp.
505, 507 (C.D. Cal. 1975); United States v. Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 315 (D. Conn. 1975).
1355. United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United States
v. Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1313).
1356. Id
1357. Id (citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 749-51 (1979)).
The court professed a reluctance to interfere with the Attorney General's prosecutorial
discretion absent evidence of capriciousness or arbitrariness which rises to the level of un-
fairness. Likewise, the court claimed a lack of authority to enforce the Attorney General's
in-house rules unless their breach rose to the same level. "The per se rule urged by appellant
would be inconsistent with the narrow scope of [the court's] supervisory power over grand
jury proceedings. Whether judicial integrity will be jeopardized or fundamental fairness
threatened must be determined on a case by case basis." Id at 1227-28.
1358. Id at 1228. Diskin testified at the suppression hearing that he believed that Wilson
was likely to forge another prescription in the period between issuance and service of the
subpoena. Id at 1226.
1359. Id at 1228.
1360. The court distinguished the present factual setting in this regard from United States
v. DiGigio, 538 F.2d 972 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1976).
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United States Attorney's office was located, for purely administrative
purposes. 1361 At no point could the court discern that any pressure was
applied to Wilson in an attempt to cajole her into talking to the Gov-
ernment. In fact, the defendant had been fully informed of her rights
at all times. On these facts, the court could find no abuse of process. 1362
IV. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
A. Joinder and Severance
1. Joinder
The joinder of charges and defendants in federal criminal cases is
governed by the provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
8.1363 Rule 8 is designed to balance the need to avoid undue prejudice
to defendants that may result from joining multiple charges or defend-
ants against the need to attain judicial efficiency in the conduct of
trials. 1
364
Rule 8(a) 1365 provides for the joinder of charges in an action
against a single defendant. 1366 Under rule 8(a), two or more offenses
may be charged in the same indictment if the offenses (1) are of the
same or similar character, 1367 (2) are based on the same act or transac-
tion, 1368 or (3) are based on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan. 1
369
1361. 614 F.2d at 1228.
1362. Id
1363. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8.
1364. United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 1977); Sf. United States v.
Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) (severance should have been granted where
prejudice to defendant from joinder of charges outweighed need for judicial economy).
1365. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-
meanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act
or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or consti-
tuting parts of a common scheme or plan.
1366. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Rule 8(a) applies
only to joinder of offenses against a single defendant."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
1367. E.g., United States v. Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 1979) (conspiracy to sell
counterfeit money charge properly joined with two substantive charges arising from an in-
dependent set of events under rule 8(a) because all three were counterteiting charges and
thus similar).
1368. E.g., United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980) (joinder of two
counts of bank robbery proper where robberies occurred 30 minutes apart and thus were
part of the same transaction or series of transactions).
1369. Eg., United States v. Goldberg, 549 F.2d 1334, 1335 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(joinder of one count of theft of motion pictures with five counts of copyright infringement
proper under rule 8(a) because of likelihood that all offenses were part of a common plan).
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The Ninth Circuit has broadly construed rule 8 in favor of initial
joinder.1370 For example, in United States v. Armstrong,1371 the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the joinder of three separate bank robbery counts
against one defendant. In Armstrong, two of the robberies were com-
mitted thirty minutes apart on the same day; the other bank robbery
had occurred a month earlier. All three took place in Sacramento, Cal-
ifornia. The court found that joinder of the two robberies which oc-
curred on the same day satisfied rule 8(a) because they "were clearly
part of the same transaction or series of transactions. 1 372 As to the
earlier robbery count, the court found that it was properly joined with
the other two robberies because all three "could be considered as trans-
actions constituting part of a common scheme or plan."'
1373
In multiple defendant actions, the provisions of rule 8(b) 1374 gov-
ern both the joinder of defendants and the joinder of all charges against
the defendants. 1375 Under rule 8(b), as long as all defendants partici-
pate in an act or transaction or series of acts or transactions constituting
an offense or offenses, the defendants and offenses may be joined to-
gether. 1376 Offenses of the same or similar character that do not arise
from the same transaction or transactions may not be used to join mul-
tiple defendants, even though such joinder is proper with a single de-
fendant under rule 8(a). 1311
1370. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958
(1971).
1371. 621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1980).
1372. Id. at 954.
1373. Id.
1374. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants
may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defend-
ants need not be charged in each count.
1375. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) (joinder in indict-
ment of charges against one defendant with separate charges against a codefendant con-
trolled by rule 8(b)), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); see United States v. Friedman, 445
F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.) (joinder of substantive charges against one defendant in multiple
defendant action governed by rule 8(b)), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).
1376. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 899 (9th Cir. 1970)
(joinder against defendants of separate charges of failing to report income proper where the
offenses arose from defendants' participation in the same illegal acts), cer. denied, 401 U.S.
924 (1971).
1377. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1977) (similar modus
operandi in bank robbery offenses insufficient to justify joinder of the charges against de-
fendants), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th
Cir. 1970) ("Charges against multiple defendants may not be joined merely because they are
similar in character...."), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
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To determine whether charges joined against multiple defendants
are sufficiently related to meet the provisions of rule 8(b), the Ninth
Circuit usually requires that "substantially the same facts must be ad-
duced to prove each of the joined offenses." 137s The mere charging of a
conspiracy count linking together separate substantive charges against
various defendants ordinarily will be sufficient to satisfy the rule.
1379
However, a conspiracy charge must be brought in good faith, not for
the purpose of avoiding the requirements of rule 8(b). 13 0 The dismis-
sal of a conspiracy count serving as the link between defendants or
charges will not retroactively establish misjoinder under rule 8(b); sev-
erance subsequent to proper initial joinder is governed by rule 14, not
rule 8(b). 31 Likewise, in United States v. Jabara,1312 the Ninth Circuit
held that acquittal of the linking conspiracy charge did not alter the
initial joinder pursuant to rule 8(b).
1 38 3
In order to obtain relief on a claim of rule 8(b) misjoinder, an
appellant must prove not only that joinder was improper but also that
it was prejudicial. 3 4 The only exception to this application of the
1378. United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1977) (joinder improper
where appellant was charged in four counts of a ten count indictment and the majority of
the evidence related to the other six counts), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); see United
States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 135 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (joinder of perjury charge against
codefendant with transportation of stolen vehicle charge against codefendant and appellant
permissible where facts underlying both offenses were so intertwined that most evidence
admissible in proof of one charge was also admissible in proof of the other), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 955 (1978).
1379. United States v. Valenzuela, 596 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir.) (initial joinder of defend-
ants proper where, in addition to separate substantive charges against various defendants, all
were charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 965 (1979); United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971) (court assumed
appellant's initial joinder to eight codefendants not error where all were charged with con-
spiracy to commit bribery in one count of a ten count indictment; however, severance
granted).
1380. United States v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
1381. Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511, 515-16 (1960) (proper joinder under rule 8(b)
not vitiated by mid-trial dismissal of conspiracy count; severance subsequent to proper join-
der controlled by rule 14); Fernandez v. United States, 329 F.2d 899, 905-06 (9th Cir.) (dis-
missal on appeal of the conspiracy count which linked the defendants did not retroactively
establish misjoinder, where initial joinder proper, subsequent severance governed by rule
14), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964). I
1382. 618 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980).
1383. Id. at 1328.
1384. United States v. Martin, 567 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1977) (joinder of defendants
under rule 8(b) improper, but reversal not required because error harmless where evidence
of appellant's guilt was overwhelming); United States v. Satterfield, 548 F.2d 1341, 1346 (9th
Cir. 1977) (reversal required where defendants were misjoined and evidence introduced
against codefendant prejudiced appellant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978); United States v.
Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir. 1970) (even if joinder were improper, reversal not re-
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harmless error rule is where two or more defendants were jointly tried
on wholly unrelated charges. 1385 In this situation, prejudice is assumed
and reversal is automatic.
138 6
2. Severance
Even though joinder of claims or defendants may be proper under
rule 8, a defendant may move for severance under rule 14 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure 387 if joinder would be so prejudicial
that it would deny him or her a fair trial. 3 8  A rule 14 motion is sub-
ject to the discretion of the trial judge, unlike a rule 8 motion alleging
misjoinder which raises a non-discretionary question of law. 38 9 A trial
judge's denial of a motion to sever will be overturned on appeal only if
the appellant proves that the joint trial was so prejudicial that the trial
judge could have ruled in only one way, to order severance.
390
In assessing prejudicial effect, the Ninth Circuit has measured
whether "the jury can reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the
evidence as it relates to separate defendants [or counts] in the light of
quired because error would have been harmless), cer. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971). Some
commentators believe that the harmless error rule should not be applied to rule 8. See 8 J.
MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, 8.04.[2] (2d ed. 1965); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 144 at 328-29 (1969 and Supp. 1979).
1385. United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924
(1971);see, e.g., Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d 90, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1966) (misjoinder of
appellant and codefendant on unrelated charges of fraudulently concealing funds from same
bankruptcy trustee was prejudicial per se).
1386. See Metheany v. United States, 365 F.2d 90, 94-95 (9th Cir. 1966).
1387. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of of-
fenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a sever-
ance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a
motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the gov-
ernment to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confes-
sions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial.
1388. United States v. Escalante, 637 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980).
1389. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 958
(1971).
1390. United States v. Ragghianti, 527 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1975) (trial judge erred in
not granting motion to sever the two counts of bank robbery joined against defendant where
there was a lack of evidence linking the defendant to the first count); United States v.
Thomas, 453 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir. 1971) (no abuse of discretion in denying motion to sever
defendants charged with transporting marijuana where there was little likelihood that the
codefendant would testify in appellant's behalf at severed trial), cer. denied, 405 U.S. 1069
(1972).
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its volume and limited admissability."'1391 The court has often stated
that potential prejudice arising from joinder of defendants or counts
can be neutralized by careful jury instructions.
392
The Ninth Circuit followed these principles in 1980.1393 For ex-
ample, in United States v. Escalante,1394 the defendant claimed that he
had been prejudiced by the joint trial with his codefendants because a
codefendant's connections to organized crime and gangland murder
had been revealed to the jury. 39 5 The Ninth Circuit agreed that this
information was highly prejudicial to Escalante, but held that the
judge's instructions to the jury to disregard this information in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of the defendants were sufficient to neu-
1391. United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1128 (9th Cir.) (prejudice arising from join-
der of defendants in manslaughter prosecution was insufficient to require reversal of denial
of severance motion where no reason to believe that jury could not realistically appraise the
evidence against each defendant; the trial was relatively simple, and the judge instructed the
jury on the limited use of the evidence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1978); accord, United
States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810, 813-14, (9th Cir. 1980) (no merit to appellant's claim that
joinder of defendants in heroin prosecution caused the jury to be confused so that they
might have been unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it applied to each defendant
where the facts of the case were uncomplicated); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352,
359 (9th Cir. 1975) (prejudice from joint trial of defendants on racketeering charges insuffi-
cient to overturn denial of severance motion where factual issues were not complex and jury
was able to compartmentalize the evidence, as shown by the variation in its verdicts among
the defendants), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976).
1392. See United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir.) (court's limiting instruction
diminished possible prejudice to appellant from evidence admissible solely against code-
fendant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963 (1978); United States v. Cozzetti, 441 F.2d 344, 349 (9th
Cir. 1971) (no abuse of discretion in denial of severance motion where counsel and judge
repeatedly made jury aware of the limited admissibility of the evidence against the various
defendants); cf. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1324 (9th Cir. 1976) (appellant
could have requested judge to give a cautionary instruction to jury that would have cured
any possible prejudice from evidence admissible only in connection with one count against
him), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
1393. See, e.g., United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1980) (judge's instruc-
tions to jury to give separate consideration to each defendant were sufficient to eliminate any
prejudice to defendants from joint trial for fraud); United States v. Abraham, 617 F.2d 187,
191 n.1 (9th Cir.) (judge's denial of severance of defendants charged with same robbery not
an abuse of discretion where he instructed jury to consider the evidence against each of them
separately), cer. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980).
1394. 637 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856 (1980).
1395. The defendant also claimed prejudice from joinder because of his alleged short in-
volvement in the conspiracy (four months in a conspiracy lasting 27 months). Id. at 1200.
The Escalante court did not discuss this assertion. In United States v. Uriarte, 575 F.2d 215,
217 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 963 (1978), the Ninth Circuit affirmed that members of a
conspiracy whose involvement in it lasted for only a short period may be tried with other
members who were fully involved in the conspiracy. But cf United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d
940, 942 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (court noted without comment the trial judge's severance of two
defendants' trials because of their short involvement in the conspiracy and the relatively few
counts for which they were charged).
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tralize its prejudicial effects.1396 Since the defendant did not show any
reason why the jury would have been unable to follow these instruc-
tions, he failed to prove the "manifest prejudice" required to overturn
the denial of his severance motion.
397
A similar charge of jury confusion was asserted in United States v.
Reed1398 by a defendant who was put on trial for two bank robberies.
He contended that the similarity of the crimes could have resulted in
jury confusion about the evidence or in the jury's use of a finding of
guilt on one count to presume a finding of guilt on the other charge. 1399
Rejecting these arguments, the Ninth Circuit found that while these
risks are present to a certain degree in any case where there is joinder,
Reed was not unduly prejudiced because the presentation of evidence
as to the two counts was separate and distinct, there was no confusion
on the part of counsel or witnesses, and the court carefully instructed
the jury to consider the evidence for each count separately and gave
them separate verdict forms for each count. 1400
The Escalante and Reed decisions demonstrate that because an or-
derly and clear presentation of evidence and careful instructions by the
trial judge are sufficient to diminish the prejudice resulting from join-
der, the Ninth Circuit will not require severance. However, the actual
effectiveness of jury instructions to neutralize prejudice* arising from
joinder is debatable,' 40 ' and probably undeterminable due to the se-
crecy of jury deliberations. As a result of this secrecy, in most cases an
appellate court's determination of the effectiveness of jury instructions
is limited to whether, in light of the clarity of the instructions and the
complexity of the trial, it can reasonably assume that the jury did fol-
low them.
In 1980, the Ninth Circuit also held, in United States v. Arm-
strong, 40 2 that a defendant's claim of potential self-incrimination did
not automatically require severance. 40 3 In Armstrong, the defendant
claimed that he was prejudiced by the joinder against him of three sep-
arate bank robbery charges because he wished to testify about only two
1396. 637 F.2d at 1201-02.
1397. Id. at 1202.
1398. 620 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1980).
1399. Id. at 712. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of crimes,
wrongs, or acts "to prove-the character of a person in order to show that he acted in con-
formity therewith."
1400. Id. at 712.
1401. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135-36 (1968); Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
1402. 621 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1980).
1403. Id. at 954.
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of the counts but not about the third. The denial of severance forced
him to testify regarding all three robberies. Rejecting this argument,
the court noted the general rule that there is no need for severance on
self-incrimination grounds until the defendant shows that he has
"'both important testimony to give concerning one count and strong
need to refrain from testifying on the other.' ,,140 The defendant failed
to show that he had important testimony to give on the two counts
about which he wanted to testify." 5 As a result, he had no basis for
his claim that the joinder of charges compelled him to take the stand
(and thus incriminate himself) on the count about which he did not
care to testify. In sum, the defendant did not show any need to testify
on any of the counts, and consequently he failed to demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by joinder of the charges.
140 6
In United States v. Lutz, 140 7 one defendant argued that he was
prejudiced by the joint trial with his codefendants because one of them
attempted to shift all of the blame for the mail fraud scheme to him.
Lutz contended that severance was required because of the resulting
antagonistic defenses. The court rejected this contention simply by cit-
ing its earlier decision in United States v. Brady,1418 where the court
stated: "Conflicting and antagonistic defenses being offered at trial do
not necessarily require granting a severance, even if hostility surfaces
or defendants seek to blame one another."1 40 9 The Brady court held
1404. Id. (quoting Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970)); accord, United States v. Forrest, 623 F.2d 1107, 1115 (5th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 930 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bronco, 597 F.2d 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 1979) ("accused should show the specific testimony he
will present about one offense, and his specific reasons for not testifying about the others, to
justify severance"); United States v. Jardan, 552 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 912 (1977).
1405. Armstrong follows the rationale advanced by the District of Columbia Circuit in
Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 976-77 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 965 (1970). The Baker court declared that a defendant who wishes to testify as to some
counts and not testify as to others is prejudiced by joinder only when the advantages and
disadvantages of testifying are different for each of the joined counts. Id. Thus, the defend-
ant's freedom to determine whether to testify at his trial is infringed upon by the competing
considerations arising from each count. However, where the advantages and disadvantages
of testifying are substantially the same, the defendant's choice is not infringed; accordingly,
no prejudice follows from joinder. Id.
1406. 621 F.2d at 954.
1407. 621 F.2d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1980).
1408. 579 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979).
1409. Id. at 1128; cf. United States v. Kozloski, 453 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (no abuse of discretion in denying severance motion where defendant alleged he
would be prejudiced in joint trial by his codefendant's poor quality as a witness and because
hostility had developed between them); United States v. Meyer, 404 F.2d 254, 255 (9th Cir.
1968) (codefendant's testimony which was damaging to appellant did not immediately jus-
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that severance was not required because the defendants' attempts to
blame each other were merely cumulative of the Government's case
against each of them and because the jury could assess the relative




Although a guilty plea has been defined as a "formal admission in
court as to guilt,' 41 ' it is not entirely clear what constitutes a formal
admission or when a formal admission occurs. For example, the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Stapleton1412 rejected the argument that a
defendant's stipulation to the facts necessary to convict him constituted
a guilty plea.14 13 Nevertheless, the consequences of a guilty plea are
significant and numerous; it is a conviction of the offense charged, 414
concomitant with an admission of the material elements of the of-
fense. 14' 5 In addition, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right
against self-incrimination, his right to a jury trial, and his right of con-
frontation. 1416 The guilty plea also operates as a waiver of independent
constitutional claims arising prior to the *entry of the plea. 417
The due process clause of the Constitution mandates that the deci-
tify severance because appellant could cross-examine and rebut the codefendant's testi-
mony), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969); accord, United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 68 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 530 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971); Baker v. United States, 329 F.2d 786, 787 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 853 (1964).
1410. 579 F.2d at 1128.
1411. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 637 (5th ed. 1979).
1412. 600 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1979).
1413. Id. at 782; accord, United States v. Miller, 588 F.2d 1256, 1263 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 947 (1979). But see Cox v. Hutto, 589 F.2d 394, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) (stipulation to past convictions under habitual offender statute equivalent to guilty
plea).
1414. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
1415. Id.; accord, McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (guilty plea is "ad-
mission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge"); Larios-Mendez v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 597 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (material facts alleged in
information and complaint deemed admitted); United States v. Benson, 579 F.2d 508, 509
(9th Cir. 1978).
1416. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
1417. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Larios-Mendez v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 597 F.2d 144, 146 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (guilty plea operates as a
waiver of all constitutional claims arising prior to trial). Compare United States v. Leming,
532 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976) with Barnett v. Hopper, 548
F.2d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 1977) (guilty plea does not constitute a waiver of constitutional con-
sequences occurring subsequent to sentence).
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sion to plead guilty be made voluntarily and intelligently.'418 Accord-
ingly, the pleader must have the requisite mental capacity to enter such
a plea. 14 19 For example, in United States v. Navarro-Flores,142 0 the de-
fendant, a Spanish-speaking man, claimed that he had not intelligently
waived his rights because of the "ineffectiveness and misleading char-
acter of [his] interpreter's translation that resulted. . . in his misunder-
standing of his rights."' 42 ' The court of appeals rejected this argument,
which was made in support of the defendant's motion to withdraw his
guilty plea prior to sentencing.'422 The Ninth Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court's determination that the translation was credible. It noted
that the defendant's motion was made solely in response to his learning
about his co-defendant's imprisonment, 1423 an insufficient reason for
granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
2. Appeal of a motion to withdraw
The procedure utilized by a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty
is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d). 1424 Under
rule 32(d), a defendant may withdraw his plea prior to sentencing upon
leave of the court. During a rule 32(d) proceeding, the defendant must
present plausible, fair, and just reasons for his motion.
1425
Because an order granting a defendant's motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is considered to be interlocutory, 1426 it is generally not ap-
1418. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938) (waiver of constitutional rights must be made intelligently).
1419. See Sailer v. Gunn, 548 F.2d 271, 275 (9th Cir. 1977) ("The test [of mental capacity]
is whether the defendant had the 'ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives
presented to him.' ") (quoting Seiling v. Eyman, 478 F.2d 211, 215 (9th Cir. 1973)); cf. West-
brook v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 150 (1966) (per curiam) (competency to stand trial is not neces-
sarily competency to waive constitutional right to counsel).
1420. 628 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
1421. Id. at 1183.
1422. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d); see also infra notes 1426 & 1427 and accompanying text.
1423. 628 F.2d at 1184.
1424. FED R. CRIM. P. 32(d) provides: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is sus-
pended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment
of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea."
1425. See United States v. Navarro-Flores, 628 F.2d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 1980) (per
curiam) (standard of review on appeal from denial of motion for leave to withdraw is
whether trial court abused its discretion); United States v. Ulano, 468 F. Supp. 1054 (C.D.
Cal. 1979), afdper curiam, 614 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1980) (withdrawal denied on basis of
finding that plea bargain and rule I 1 not violated); cf United States v. King, 618 F.2d 550
(9th Cir. 1980) (denial of rule 32(d) motion proper where the only basis of defendant's mo-
tion is that the court failed to inform him of collateral consequences of guilty plea).
1426. United States v. Martin, 611 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1979).
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pealable under 18 U.S.C. section 3731.1427 Thus, in United States v.
Martin,1428 the Government could not appeal a district court's order
granting the defendant's motion to withdraw, at least until there was an
order terminating the then current proceedings against the
defendant.1429
However, in United States v. LaBinia,143 the Ninth Circuit noted
that an order granting a motion to withdraw a guilty plea and a sepa-
rate order dismissing an indictment are appealable together under sec-
tion 373 1.14 31 In LaBinia, the defendant pled guilty to an indictment
under the Hobbs Act1432 for attempted bank extortion. Subsequently,
he brought a motion under rule 32(d) to have his plea withdrawn on
the ground that attempted bank extortion was not chargeable under the
Hobbs Act. The trial court granted this interlocutory motion, and, in a
separate order, dismissed the indictment on the same grounds. The
Government appealed both orders. The court of appeals held that it
had jurisdiction over the Government's appeal under section 3731 be-
cause "'[w]here, as here, the basis of the dismissal of the indictment is
inextricably intertwined' with an appealable order 'both orders must be
reviewed together.' "1433
The court, without explaining its conclusion, relied upon the Sec-
ond Circuit holding in United States v. Tane.14 34 In Tane, the Second
Circuit exercised jurisdiction under section 3731 to hear the Govern-
ment's appeal of a district court's interlocutory order suppressing cer-
tain evidence. 1435 The evidence was the basis for an indictment, which
was dismissed subsequent to the granting of the suppression order. Ac-
cordingly, the Second Circuit referred to both the suppression and in-
dictment orders as "inextricably intertwined" and, as such, held that
1427. Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976), provides in relevant part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts ...
An appeal by the United States shall He to a court of appeals from a decision
or order of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence ....
1428. 611 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1979).
1429. Id. at 261.
1430. 614 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1980).
1431. Id. at 1208.
1432. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1976).
1433. 614 F.2d at 1208 n.2 (quoting United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 851-52 (2d Cir.
1964)).
1434. 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964); accord, United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176, 179 (7th
Cir. 1966).
1435. 329 F.2d at 851.
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they were appealable together under section 373 1.1436
LaBinia, however, is distinguishable from Tane. Unlike Tane,
where the interlocutory suppression order removed the basis for the
indictment, the grant of LaBinia's motion to withdraw his guilty plea
did not remove the basis for his indictment. Although both the motion
to withdraw his guilty plea and the dismissal of his indictment devel-
oped because LaBinia's offense was not chargeable under the Hobbs
Act, the grant of the motion was not the basis for the motion to dismiss
the indictment. Thus, the LaBinia court appears to have applied incor-
rectly the "inextricably intertwined" theory.
In addition, the LaBinia court failed to mention the Ninth Cir-
cuit's prior holding in United States v. Kanan.437 The Kanan court was
faced with facts similar to those of Tane, except that the indictment was
dismissed at the Government's insistence. The Government had
wanted to seek review of a suppression order. 1438 Because of the Gov-
ernment's actions, the Kanan court distinguished Tane 1439 and refused
to exercise jurisdiction' 440 to review the suppression order.' 44 1 Thus,
even though the indictment and suppression orders were "inextricably
intertwined," the Kanan court refused to follow Tane.1442
1436. Id. at 851-52.
1437. 341 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1965).
1438. Id. at 510-11.
1439. Id. at 513.
1440. The courts in both Tane and Kanan were concerned with § 3731 prior to its amend-
ment in 1971. Before the amendment, § 3731 provided in pertinent part:
An appeal may be taken by and on behalf of the United States from the dis-
trict courts to a court of appeals in all criminal cases, in the following instances:
From a decision or judgment setting aside, or dismissing any indictment or
information, or any count thereof except where a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States is provided by this section.
From an order, granting a motion. . . to suppress evidence,. if the United
States attorney certifies to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not
taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge
pending against the defendant.
Wright and Miller have stated that under § 3731, as amended, "[aippeals are clearly allowed
from interlocutory orders suppressing or excluding evidence." 15 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3919, at 656 (1976); see, e.g., United States v. Dono-
van, 429 U.S. 413, 421 n.8 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 514 F.2d 308, 310 (9th
Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Although § 3731 in its present form would alleviate the problem in Tane and Kanan,
the amended statute purposely included only a provision for the appeal of evidentiary inter-
locutory orders. United States v. Weller, 466 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1972) (§ 3731 demon-
strates legislative policy to provide review only in certain cases and to restrict it to those
cases).
1441. 341 F.2d at 514.
1442. Id. at 513-14.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
Moreover, the Kanan court read section 3731 narrowly, stating:
It follows from all that has been said that reading § 3731 in
the light of its legislative history, as we are required to do, the
Government may appeal thereunder from a decision or judg-
ment, 'setting aside, or dismissing' an indictment only if such
decision or judgment is based upon a defect in the indictment
or in the institution of the prosecution.
Thus, because the suppression order was neither a defect in the indict-
ment nor in the institution of the prosecution, the suppression order
was not appealable.
Following Kanan, the order in LaBinia granting the defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea would be neither a defect in the
indictment nor in the institution of the prosecution. Thus, in addition
to the lack of support provided by the Tane decision, the Kanan deci-
sion should have barred the LaBinia court's exercise of jurisdiction.
3. Rule 11
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1444 sets forth
the required manner by which federal courts are to accept guilty
1443. Id. at 511 (quoting United States v. Apex Distrib. Co., 270 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir.
1959)) (emphasis in the original).
1444. FED. R. CRIM P. I 1 states, in relevant part:
(c) Advice to Defendant. Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere, the court must address the defendant personaly in open court and inform
him of, and determine that he understands, the following:
(1) the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory
minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty
provided by law; and
(2) if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has the
right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against
him and, if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and
(3) that he has the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it
has already been made, and that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at
that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to in-
criminate himself; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will not be a further
trial of any kind, so that by pleading guilty or nolo contendere he waives the
right to a trial; and
(5) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere, the court may ask him
questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these
questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his an-
swers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement.
(d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in
open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or
threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as
to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results
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from prior discussions between the attorney for the government and the defendant
or his attorney.
(e) Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for
the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussion
with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to a lesser or related offense,
the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defend-
ant's request, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such
recommendation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of
the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by
the parties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agree-
ment in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the
plea is offered. If the agreement is of the type specified in subdivision
(e)(1)(A) or (C), the court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its
decision as to the acceptance or rejection until there has been an opportunity
to consider the presentence report. If the agreement is of the type specified in
subdivision (e)(l)(B), the court shall advise the defendant that if the court does
not accept the recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no
right to withdraw his plea.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agree-
ment, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment
and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agree-
ment, the court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the
defendant personally in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera,
that the court is not bound by the plea agreement, afford the defendant the
opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and advise the defendant that if he
persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the disposition of the case
may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good cause shown,
notification to the court of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at
the arraignment or at such other time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the
court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements.
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of a plea of guilty,
later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or
nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements
made in connection with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers,
is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who
made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection
with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo con-
tendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or
any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false
statement if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the rec-
ord, and in the presence of counsel.
(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea
of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making
such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which
the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, the record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to the
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pleas.'" 5 Under rule 11 (c), the trial judge 446 must personally question
the defendant to determine whether he or she understands the nature of
the charges,'" 7 the range of possible sentences,1448 and his or her con-
stitutional rights.'
The 1980 Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. King, 450 reaf-
firmed that court's position in Sanchez v. United States.'145  Although
the trial judge must inform the defendant of the direct consequences of
his or her plea of guilty, 145 2 under Sanchez, the defendant need not be
informed of the collateral consequences. 453 Thus, as provided in rule
11,14-4 and as mandated by King and Sanchez, the trial judge need only
defendant, the inquiry into voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement,
and the inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea.
1445. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969) (purpose of rule I I is to
insure voluntariness of plea).
1446. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c). But see Johnson v. United States, 542 F.2d 941, 942 (5th Cir.
1976) (per curiam) (sufficient that the defendant's counsel address the defendant).
1447. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(c).
1448. Id. In Lewis v. United States, 601 F.2d 1100, 1101 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), the
court held that rule I 1 requires that the defendant understand only the range of possible
sentences and penalties. Accord, United States v. Eaton, 579 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir.
1978) (a broad explanation of the range of sentences is sufficient if it includes the ultimate
sentence); Johnson v. United States, 539 F.2d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 918 (1977); cf. Hinds v. United States, 429 F.2d 1322, 1323 (9th Cir. 1970) (improper for
the court to inform the defendant of the probability of receiving one sentence or another).
1449. FED. R. CRIM. P. I I(c)(2)-(3). These provisions require that the defendant must be
informed that he has a right to an attorney, the right to plead not guilty, the right of confron-
tation, the right to cross-examination, and the right against self-incrimination.
1450. 618 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1980).
1451. 572 F.2d 210, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
1452. Before December 1, 1975, rule I 1 required that the defendant be informed of "the
consequences of the plea." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1097 (1966). That language does
not appear in the present rule. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (c). Under Sanchez v. United States, 572
F.2d at 211, a court need not attempt to explain all the consequences that may flow from
conviction or from the imposition of the sentence, so long as the court explains the direct
consequences. Thus, in Sanchez, the possibility of parole revocation was deemed collateral.
Id; see also Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1976) (the possibility of
potential deportation is collateral); Faulisi v. Daggett, 527 F.2d 305, 309 (7th Cir. 1975) (the
possibility that a federal sentence might be ruled to run consecutively to a state sentence is
collateral); Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (the likelihood of an
undesirable military discharge is functionally collateral). See generally NOTES OF THE AD-
VISORY COMM. ON 1975 AMENDMENTS OF RULES, FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, reprinted in 8 J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 111.01[4], at 11-10 (2d ed. 1977) (court must explain
consequences, not implications, of entering guilty plea); J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND
GuILTY PLEAS 148 (1975) (discussion of the classification of consequences as direct or
indirect).
1453. But cf. United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 141, 141-42 (9th Cir. 1976) (failure to advise
defendant of special parole term constitutes "manifest injustice" because the special parole
term is a direct consequence of the plea, and under FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d), warrants with-
drawal of the guilty plea).
1454. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
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inform the defendant that as a direct result of his or her guilty plea, he
or she may be subject to the range of sentences provided by law for the
offense, '4 " and that answers given under oath during the rule 11 pro-
ceeding can be used against him or her in any later prosecution for
peljury.
1456
In King, the defendant, on his plea of guilty, was convicted of
filing a criminally false and fraudulent income tax return. 45 7 On ap-
peal, the defendant contended that the district court had abused its dis-
cretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he
had not been informed of the potential effects his guilty plea might
have on subsequent civil litigation the Government might bring to re-
cover unpaid taxes. 458 In rejecting the defendant's arguments, the
court noted that, although it might be desirable to inform a defendant
that his guilty plea might estop him from denying in a subsequent civil
action the falsity of his return, 145 9 neither rule 11 nor any other authori-
ty required that this information be given to the defendant. 1460 Thus,
the King court determined that the effect a guilty plea may have on
subsequent, related civil litigation was a "collateral consequence" of
pleading guilty.
Finally, under rule 11 (f), the trial court must determine that there
is a factual basis in the record' 46' for the plea before it accepts the
plea.
462
1455. FED. R. GRIM. P. Il(c)(1). But see United States v. Ulano, 614 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th
Cir. 1980) (claim that special parole term not sufficiently explained rejected because raised
only on second appeal).
1456. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (c)(5); see NOTES OF COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No.
247, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 674, 679,
which provides in pertinent part:
The Committee recast the language of rule 1 (c), which deals with the advice
given to a defendant before the court can accept his plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere. The Committee acted in part because it believed that the warnings given
to the defendant ought to include those that Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238
(1969), said were constitutionally required. In addition, and as a result of its
change in subdivision (e)(6), the Committee thought it only fair that the defendant
be warned that his plea of guilty (later withdrawn) or nolo contendere, or his offer
of either plea, or his statements made in connection with such pleas or offers, could
later be used against him in a perjury trial if made under oath, on the record, and
in the presence of counsel.
1457. 618 F.2d at 551.
1458. Id. at 552.
1459. Id.
1460. Id.
1461. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); United States v. Del Prete,
567 F.2d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1978) (signing a written guilty plea application containing all of
the required items of disclosure inadequate because not on the record).
1462. FED. R. CRiM. P. 11(f); see, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Beltran, 607 F.2d 1223, 1225
(9th Cir.) (a personal inquiry into the underlying charges was mandated; thus, a brief recita-
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4. Plea bargaining
a. the negotiating process
Plea bargaining has been recognized as both an essential and judi-
cially necessary component of the criminal justice system. 1463 Al-
though the existence of a plea bargain is a question of fact, not until
1979 in United States v. Pantohan 1464 did the Ninth Circuit clarify what
constitutes plea bargaining. In Pantohan, the defendant appealed his
conviction alleging, inter alia, that certain self-incriminating statements
should have been suppressed because they were made during plea bar-
gain negotiations. 1465 The defendant urged that a purely subjective test
should be utilized to determine whether plea bargaining had oc-
curred. 14 6 6 Rejecting this argument, the court followed the lead of the
Fifth Circuit 467 and adopted a two-tiered test for determining whether
an admission by a criminal defendant was made in the course of a plea
bargain. 1468 The court held that a plea bargain has taken place only if
(1) the accused subjectively believed at the time of the discussion that
plea negotiations were occurring, and (2) the accused's beliefs were rea-
sonable under the circumstances. 469 The Pantohan court determined
that plea bargaining had not occurred because the defendant was not
under arrest at the time he made his self-incriminating statements, and
the government officials to whom his statements were directed had
not made any promises nor had they directed any offer to the
defendant.
1470
tion of the facts by the prosecutor was inadequate), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 931 (1980). See
generally McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (rule 1(1) requires the trial
judge to make an examination of the relationship between the law and the acts the defend-
ant admits having committed, a task designed to expose "the defendant's state of mind on
the record through personal interrogation").
Moreover, the judge may accept a guilty plea even if the accused possesses a meritori-
ous defense. United States v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310, 315 (9th Cir.) (a guilty plea accepted as
voluntarily and knowingly made is valid despite allegations of insanity at the time of the
offense), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1024 (1979); accord, Speed v. United States, 441 F.2d 1106
(5th Cir. 1971); Davis v. United States, 358 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1966).
1463. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971). See generally Langbein,
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 261, 262 (1979);
Church, In Defense of "Bargain Justice," 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 509, 511 (1979).
1464. 602 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1979).
1465. Id. at 857.
1466. Id.
1467. United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1366 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
1468. 602 F.2d at 857.
1469. Id.; see United States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 1980).
1470. 602 F.2d at 857.
[Vol. 14
1981] CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
In the 1980 decision of United States v. Castillo, 47 the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Pantohan two-tiered test in considering the scope of
rule ll(e)(6). 147 2 Rule 1l(e)(6) provides, inter alia, that statements
made in connection with plea negotiations are inadmissible against the
pleading party. Confessions, however, are not excluded by this rule.
473
In Castillo, the defendant showed a correctional counselor a typewrit-
ten list of potential charges and said he would probably "cop" to one of
the listed offenses. 1474 In rejecting the defendant's argument that the
statement was made during plea negotiations, the court held that the
defendant did not exhibit the requisite intent to negotiate as "he merely
related voluntarily his expectations on the probable outcome of plea
negotiations."' 1475 The court further stated: "[O]bjectively, even if he
had harbored a subjective intent to negotiate. . . .any expectation at
that time would have been unreasonable because the counselor was not
empowered to negotiate on behalf of the government." 476
The Ninth Circuit considered the scope of permissible conduct by
the Government during plea bargain negotiations in United States v.
Gardner.'477 The Government, seeking to strike a plea bargain with
the defendant, offered to abandon plans to seek a second indictment if
the defendant would plead guilty to one count of the original indict-
ment and cooperate in another criminal investigation. After rejecting
the offer, the defendant was convicted on both the original and the sec-
1471. 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1980).
1472. Id. at 885; FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (e)(6). Effective December 1, 1980, new rule 1 l(e)(6)
attempts to remove the ambiguities which have caused confusion about when statements
made in the course of plea bargaining are admissible. The new rule provides as follows:
(6) Inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related statements. Except as
otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of the following is not, in any civil
or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was
a participant in the plea discussions:
(A) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(B) a plea of nolo contendere;
(C) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under this rule
regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(D) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attor-
ney for the government which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result
in a plea of guilty later withdrawn. However, such a statement is admissible
(i) in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the
same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in
fairness be considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal pro-
ceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the de-
fendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel.
1473. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(e)(6).
1474. 615 F.2d at 885.
1475. Id.
1476. Id.
1477. 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980).
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ond indictment. On appeal, he claimed that the Government's threat
to obtain the second indictment created an atmosphere of vindictive-
ness. 1478 The Gardner court, relying on the Supreme Court decision of
Bordenkircher v. Hayes,14 79 held that because the defendant was free to
accept or reject the Government's offer, the Government could lawfully
present the possible prosecutorial alternatives to the defendant. Thus,
the Government could seek to induce the defendant to aid in another
criminal investigation.1
48 0
The Ninth Circuit also limited the Government's disclosure re-
quirements during plea bargain negotiations in United States v.
Krasn. '4 ' In Krasn, the defendant was indicted for various gratuities
offenses involving the meat packing industry. While he was negotiat-
ing a plea bargain, an antitrust investigation involving the same indus-
try and the defendant began. The defendant pled guilty to some of the
gratuities charges pursuant to the negotiated plea bargain and three
years later was indicted on the antitrust charges. At an evidentiary
hearing, the district court concluded that the gratuities plea bargain did
not include a promise not to institute a criminal antitrust proceeding
against the defendant. 482 The defendant sought review of the district
court's interpretation of the gratuities plea bargain and also claimed
that the Government had acted in bad faith by not informing him, at
the time he was plea bargaining to the gratuities charges, of the pen-
dency of the antitrust investigation.
4 3
1478. Id. at 773; see infra note 1479 and accompanying text.
1479. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). In Bordenkircher, the prosecutor informed the defendant that if
he did not plead guilty to the pending charges, the Government would seek another indict-
ment, under which the defendant could be sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant
declined and the Government obtained another indictment for a separate and distinct of-
fense. The defendant was convicted under the second indictment and sentenced to life im-
prisonment. On appeal, he contended that the prosecutor's actions amounted to vindictive
prosecution analogous to that in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (defendant charged
with felony for same conduct which gave rise to misdemeanor charge after defendant ap-
pealed misdemeanor conviction). The Supreme Court disagreed, stating that "[lthe course
of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case, which no more than openly presented
the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which
he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 434 U.S. at 365.
1480. 611 F.2d at 773; accord, United States v. Warren, 594 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1979)
(offer of probation in exchange for witness' testimony analogous to plea bargain); see Wat-
kins v. Solem, 571 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1978) (prosecution's threat to file habitual criminal
charges to induce guilty plea not vindictive because record in state court proceeding sup-
ported claim of voluntariness).
1481. 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1980).
1482. Id. at 1233.
1483. Id. at 1233-34.
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The court of appeals, after first affirming the district court's inter-
pretation of the gratuities plea bargain, 1484 held that the Government
was not obligated 1485 to inform the defendant of the initial phases of
the antitrust investigation during the gratuities plea bargain negotia-
tions. 1486 The court rationalized its holding on two grounds. First, the
two indictments involved independent criminal investigations, al-
though both had evolved from the same industry. 14 87  Second, and
more significant, at the time that the defendant was negotiating his gra-
tuities plea bargain, the antitrust investigation was merely in its initial
phases as "the government 'was not conducting an active, ongoing'"
investigation. ' 488 This holding appears fair in light of the court's com-
ment that had "the government had its antitrust case against Krasn
ready to submit to the grand jury during the plea negotiations on the
gratuities charges, then a different result might be required."'
1489
b. nature of the agreement
In United States v. Arnett, 1490 the Ninth Circuit firmly established
that a plea bargain is contractual in nature. 1491 The court stated that
the terms of the plea bargain should be determined under objective
standards 1492 by the district court to which the plea was submitted. 
149
1484. Id. at 1233. The Ninth Circuit's review of a district court's findings are subject to the
clearly erroneous standard. Id.; see United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430, 433 (9th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979).
1485. See generally Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (general disclosure duty
of government prosecutor).




1490. 628 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1979). InArnelt, the defendant moved to strike the Govern-
ment's responses to the court's inquiries during a FED. R. CRiM. P. 35 motion hearing on the
ground that the responses violated his plea agreement. The Government contended that the
scope of the plea agreement was not violated by its responses. Id. at 1163. The court re-
manded the case to the trial court to consider the terms of the agreement. Id. at 1166.
1491. 628 F.2d at 1164; accord, Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Crusco, 536 F.2d 21, 26 (3d Cir. 1976); see United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835,
837 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[W]here the content of a plea bargain and the authority for its offer are
at issue. . . traditional precepts of contract and agency should apply.").
1492. 628 F.2d at 1164; see United States v. Bronstein, 623 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1980)
(terms, intent and language of plea agreement self-evident); cf. United States v. Petsas, 592
F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1979) (objective determination established plea bargain for one of-
fense but did not subsume related offense), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910 (1979); Johnson v.
Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1972) (plea bargaining analogous to promissory estoppel;
must have explicit expression of terms and reliance). But see United States v. Miller, 565
F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d Cir. 1977) (language of plea agreement determined by its plain meaning,
not by objective interpretation), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 959 (1978).
1981]
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Relying on Arnett, the court in United States v. Krasn 14 94 held that ap-
pellate review of a district court's interpretation of a plea bargain is
subject to the clearly erroneous standard.
Furthermore, both parties must bargain 495 and abide1496 by the
terms of the agreement in good faith. Thus, in Krasn, the court held
that the Government did not breach its duty of good faith by withhold-
ing from the defendant information concerning the pendency of one
criminal investigation involving the defendant while the defendant was
negotiating a plea bargain to another indictment.
497
Various remedies, functionally equivalent to those in contract law,
are available when either party breaches the agreement. 498 Moreover,
once one party withdraws from the agreement, the other party is no
longer bound by it. 1499 For example, in United States v. Black,150 0 the
defendant had been indicted on two counts of mailing threatening let-
ters to a district court judge. Prior to any trial proceedings on these
charges, Black had written two other threatening letters to a different
district court judge. Following these acts, the Government struck a
plea bargain with the defendant, who agreed to plead guilty to one
count of obstruction of justice, and in return, the Government agreed
1493. 628 F.2d at 1164; see United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976)
(court approving plea bargain must determine whether the parties duly performed their mu-
tual obligations); United States v. Avery, 589 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir. 1979) (remanded to
determine implied meaning of prosecutor's promise); Jones v. Estelle, 584 F.2d 687, 689 (5th
Cir. 1978) (affirming lower court interpretation of plea bargain terms and language); United
States v. Scharf, 551 F.2d 1124, 1130 (8th Cir.) (when terms of a plea bargain are in issue on
appeal, appellate court must remand for evidentiary hearing), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824
(1977). See generally 2 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 539, at 477 (1969).
1494. 614 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra note 1482 and accompanying text.
1495. See United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir. 1980) (Government has
duty of good faith to defendant during plea bargain negotiations); United States v. Gardner,
611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980) (offering inducements to defendant during plea negotiations is
not breach of good faith and did not impinge on defendant's right to plead not guilty and
stand trial).
1496. See generally Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) ("When a plea rests
in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said
to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.").
1497. See supra notes 1483-86 and accompanying text.
1498. 628 F.2d at 1166 (if, on remand, the court finds that the Government breached the
agreement, then the defendant can rescind his guilty plea and stand trial on the original
charges); see also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-62 (1971) (the fairness of any
voluntary agreement turns upon the parties' expectations, first, that it will be honored by the
other party, and second, that redress is available when necessary). See generally Westen &
Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remediesfor Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 471
(1978).
1499. See United States v. Black, 609 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1979) (prosecution can reindict
defendant on original charges after defendant successfully has prior guilty plea vacated).
1500. 609 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1979).
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to drop the remaining charges and refrain from prosecuting Black for
the later criminal acts. While serving his sentence for his conviction on
the single count, Black filed a section 2255 motion 150' and was success-
ful in having his plea and sentence vacated. 50 2 Thereafter, the Gov-
ernment charged Black with allfour counts of writing threatening
letters, and he was convicted. On appeal, Black claimed that the sec-
ond indictment and longer sentence constituted vindictive prosecution.
Distinguishing two Supreme Court cases, 1503 the court held that the
second indictment was based on criminal acts in addition to those upon
which the original indictment was based.15 4 Moreover, the court held
that the Government was no longer bound' 50 5 by the plea bargain once
it had been vacated.150 6 Thus, because a plea bargain is contractual in
nature, 50 7 the Black court effectively condoned rescission as an appro-
priate remedy when the defendant is successful in having his plea bar-
gain vacated.
C. Jury Administration
1. The right to trial by jury
In federal court, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases is guar-
anteed by the following two provisions of the Federal Constitution: (1)
article III, section 2, clause 3, which provides that the trial of all crimes,
except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;'508 and (2) the sixth
amendment, which declares that in all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to be tried by an impartial jury drawn from
the state and district where the crime was committed. 50 9 Moreover,
the right to trial by jury is applicable to the states by virtue of the four-
1501. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1971).
1502. 609 F.2d at 1332.
1503. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (defendant should not be subjected to in-
creased charges and longer sentences for the same conduct on which he had been previously
charged and sentenced); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (same).
1504. 609 F.2d at 1333.
1505. Accord, United States v. McMann, 436 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir. 1970) (reindictment on
original charges after defendant revoked his part of plea bargain not vindictive), cerl. denied,
402 U.S. 914 (1971); see United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1306 (9th Cir. 1974) ("The
government should not be locked into its side of the bargain when the defendant succeeds in
withdrawing his."); Sf. United States v. Resnick, 483 F.2d 354, 358 (5th Cir.) (reindictment
on original charges after accused refused to plead guilty not vindictive prosecution), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973).
1506. 609 F.2d at 1333.
1507. See supra notes 1490-91 and accompanying text.
1508. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
1509. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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teenth amendment. 151 0 The right to trial by jury has been characterized
as "fundamental to the American scheme of justice,"' 51' essential
to a fair trial,' 5' 2 and necessary to prevent oppression by the
government. 1
5 13
The Constitution does not enumerate the offenses for which the
right to trial by jury is guaranteed, but refers to all criminal prosecu-
tions. 514 However, the Supreme Court has held that only defendants
charged with serious offenses are entitled to that guarantee.' 1 - Con-
versely, the Supreme Court has denied the right to defendants charged
withpetty offenses, 516 namely, those offenses carrying a maximum po-
tential penalty of six months imprisonment. 517  The Ninth Circuit,
however, generally has defined petty offenses as misdemeanors which
prescribe maximum penalties of six months imprisonment or a fine of
five hundred dollars or both.
518
In United States v. May, 1 19 the Ninth Circuit held that a pretrial
order by the trial court limiting the potential sentence to six months
confinement obviated the guarantee of a jury trial. 52 In May, the de-
fendants were charged with unlawfully reentering a naval installation,
1510. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
1511. Id.
1512. Id. at 157-58 ("[A] general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental
right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are
provided for all defendants.").
1513. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965).
1514. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1515. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-61 (1968) (implication that a person
facing apotential penalty in excess of six months imprisonment is thereby charged with a
serious offense to which the right to a jury trial attaches); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
373, 380 (1966). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (right to counsel is
triggered if actual sentence is imprisonment).
1516. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148
(1969); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937); accord, United States v.
Marthaler, 571 F.2d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Coates, 573
F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1517. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) ("no offense can be deemed 'petty' for
purposes of the right to trial by jury where imprisonment for more than six months is au-
thorized"); cf. United States v. Smyer, 596 F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1979) (no guaranteed
right to a jury trial where actual sentence for multiple offenses does not exceed six months
confinement).
1518. See United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (petty of-
fenses defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1976)). But see United States v. Sanchez-Meza, 547
F.2d 461, 464 (9th Cir. 1976) (in spite of maximum penalty of six months imprisonment,
right to jury trial applies to defendant accused of conspiracy because conspiracy was a seri-
ous offense at common law and because crime is "morally offensive and malum in se").
1519. 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
1520. Id. at 1005; accord, United States v. Marthaler, 571 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam).
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an offense carrying a maximum potential penalty of six months con-
finement." 2' Additionally, due to the defendants' minor age, they were
subject to punishment under the Youth Corrections Act, which could
have resulted in confinement in excess of one year. 522 The trial court
entered an equitable pretrial order which limited punishment to that
prescribed for unlawfully reentering the naval installation. 5 23 Con-
comitantly, the trial court denied the defendants' motion for a jury
trial. 524 After conviction, the defendants appealed, contending that
the trial court's denial of their motion for a jury trial was improper.
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and affirmed the trial court's ruling. Rely-
ing on Taylor v. Hayes1525 and United States v. Marthaler,526 the court
held that since the pretrial order limited the potential penalty to six
months confinement, the defendants were not accused of a serious of-
fense, and thus, the defendants did not have a constitutional right to a
jury trial.
5 27
The May court misapplied the holdings of Taylor and Martha/er
to the facts of May. First, May involved a statute with a specified max-
imum sentence in excess of six months. In this situation, the Supreme
Court has focused on whether thefpotential penalty authorized by the
legislature was in excess of six months confinement. 1528 The legislative
determination of maximum penalty is a significant indicator of the seri-
ousness of the crime. If found to be "serious," the charged crime trig-
gers the right to trial by jury. Hence, the actual sentence imposed by a
judge should not be determinative of the seriousness of the crime.
529
Second, Taylor and Martha/er were criminal contempt cases in which
the sentencing was within the sole discretion of the trial judge because
of the absence of legislative authorization of serious penalties for con-
1521. 18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976).
1522. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5010, 5017(c) or 4216 (1976). But cf. United States v. Doe, 627 F.2d
181, 183 (9th Cir. 1980) (a juvenile prosecuted under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,
18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-42 (1976), has "neither a constitutional right to a jury trial. . . nor a
statutory right to a jury trial"). However, if the juvenile elects to be prosecuted as an adult,
he "has a sixth amendment right to a jury trial in any case in which he is charged with an
offense punishable by more than six months imprisonment." 627 F.2d at 183.
1523. 622 F.2d at 1004.
1524. Id. at 1005.
1525. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
1526. 571 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
1527. 622 F.2d at 1005.
1528. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (one year maximum possible; therefore
no difference if labeled "felony" or "misdemeanor"); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (two years imprisonment authorized by legislature).
1529. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159-61 (1968) (sixty-day sentence not determina-
tive of right to trial by jury when potential punishment was two years).
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tempt. In those cases, the actual imprisonment imposed was the key
factor in determining whether the defendants were denied their right to
trial by jury.15 30 Because the potential penalty in May exceeded six
months imprisonment and did not arise in criminal contempt proceed-
ings, the defendants' right to trial by jury appears to have been vio-
lated; thus, the reasoning employed is erroneous.
2. Jury representation
Federal jury selection is governed by the Jury Selection and Serv-
ice Act (Act),1531 which assures that defendants are tried before impar-
tial juries. 153 2 The Act states:
It is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal
courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand
and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of
the community in the district or division wherein the court
convenes. 1
533
The Act provides various procedures for implementing this pol-
icy 5 34 along with a procedure which enables defendants to challenge
their indictments or convictions if the grand jury which indicted them,
or the petit jury which convicted them, was not selected in accordance
1530. 418 U.S. at 495-96 (sentence amended in criminal contempt case so that the defend-
ant received only six months imprisonment; thus, no right to jury trial violation); 571 F.2d at
1105 (pretrial order limiting the potential penalty to six months imprisonment and denying
jury trial upheld in criminal contempt case). The difference between criminal contempt pro-
ceedings and other criminal proceedings is that contempt proceedings intrinsically, without
regard to punishment, are not deemed "serious" enough to trigger the jury trial right.
United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). Moreover, because of the lack of legislative
promulgation of maximum penalties, defendants in criminal contempt proceedings can
show that their charged crime is serious only if the actual imprisonment imposed is more
than six months. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974); id. at 519 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part) ("in contempt cases it is the sentence actually imposed rather than the
penalty by law which is determinative"); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); see
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
1531. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1874 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Act].
1532. See H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 1792 (discussing the policy and principles underlying the Act). Several other
devices within the American criminal justice system insure jury impartiality. See Groppi v.
Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1971) (continuance and change of venue); Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 357-63 (1966) (control of publicity regarding trial); Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 532 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring and dissenting) (jury challenge
based on juror bias).
1533. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976).
1534. See id. § 1862 (prohibition against discriminatory exclusion from juror service); id.
§ 1863(a) (district court must devise and implement jury selection systems consistent with
the Act); id. § 1863(b)(2) (district court must specify source of prospective jurors).
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with the Act. 1535
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Duren v. Missouri1536 set out the
standard to be used in determining whether the "fair cross section" re-
quirement was met. The Court declared that
[i]n order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross
section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the
group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive" group in the
community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires
from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and
(3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclu-
sion of the group in the jury selection process. 1
5 37
Moreover, Duren also requires a showing that the particular distinctive
group was absent from the defendant's venire. 1538 However, even if a
defendant establishes the prima facie violation, his indictment or con-
viction still may withstand challenge if the state demonstrates that
those aspects of the jury selection process that result in the under-
representation manifestly and primarily advance a significant state
interest. 1
5 39
In United States v. Berry,1540 the Ninth Circuit applied the Duren
test in affirming the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to
dismiss his indictment. Defendant Berry was indicted by a grand jury
selected from the combined Phoenix and Prescott divisions of the Dis-
trict of Arizona. Under the jury selection system then in operation,
prospective jurors in each division who lived more than one hundred
.miles from the division courthouse could exempt themselves from jury
service. 154 1 The defendant contended that the jury service exemption
resulted in a jury pool in which Indians were underrepresented, thus
violating the fair cross section requirement of the Jury Selection and
1535. Id. § 1867. Moreover, the Act provides that "[t]he procedures prescribed by this
section shall be the exclusive means by which a person accused of a Federal crime. . . may
challenge any jury on the ground that such jury was not selected in conformity with the
provision of this title." Id. § 1867(e).
1536. 439 U.S. 357 (1979); see Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) ("We accept
the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation.").
1537. 439 U.S. at 364.
1538. The Duren Court held that the defendant must demonstrate "that the under-
representation of [the distinctive group], generally and on his venire, was due to their system-
atic exclusion in the jury-selection process." 439 U.S. at 366 (emphasis added).
1539. 439 U.S. at 368.
1540. 627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980).
1541. Id. at 195.
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Service Act. 54 2 The trial court denied his motion for dismissal of the
indictment.
On appeal, the defendant reasserted his contention that his indict-
ment was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed his
conviction and held that the defendant had failed to show a prima facie
violation of the fair cross section requirement of Duren. While Berry
might have satisfied the first three numerically listed elements of
Duren,543 he failed to satisfy the fourth element which required evi-
dence that Indians were underrepresented on his particular venire. 544
Consequently, the court held that the defendant's failure to introduce
any evidence demonstrating underrepresentation of Indians on his ve-
nire was "fatal to [his] argument."' 545 In sum, Berry distills the Duren
test into four distinct elements.
546
1542. Id. at 195-96.
1543. See supra text accompanying note 1537.
The court held that Indians were a distinctive group in the community. Id.; accord,
United States v. Brady, 579 F.2d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074
(1979); cf United States v. Foxworth, 599 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1979) (registered voters in a
given city or town not a "distinct" group); United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 905 19th Cir.
1977) (young people and less educated people are not cognizable groups); United States v.
Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1977) (young people, poorly educated people, and
unemployed people do not constitute cognizable classes); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d
564, 570-72 (1st Cir. 1970) (young adults and less educated people are cognizable groups, but
residents of particular counties not a "distinct" group).
In addition, the Berry court noted the defendant's statistical evidence but refused to rule
on it because the defendant's claim failed under the fourth element of Duren. 627 F.2d at
196. Compare United States v. Goodlow, 597 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir.) (the defendant's fail-
ure to offer evidence concerning whether the subject groups were underrepresented resulted
in the court's refusal to rule upon the distinctiveness of the groups), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
913 (1979) with United States v. Masbeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1980) (the court re-
fused to decide whether each group alleged by the defendant to be underrepresented was
"distinctive" under the Duren test, and instead based its decision on the ground that the
subject groups were not unconstitutionally disproportionate).
1544. 627 F.2d at 196. See supra note 1539 and accompanying text.
1545. Id.
1546. Id. To establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement a de-
fendant must show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community;
(2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected
is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the
community;
(3) that this general underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of this
group in the jury selection process; and
(4) that the systematic exclusion of this group from the jury selection process re-
sulted in an underrepresentation of this group on the defendant's venire.
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3. Juror bias
An impartial jury is a constitutional right guaranteed the crimi-
nally accused by the sixth amendment. 5 47 Voir dire examination of
potential jurors provides the prosecution and defense an opportunity to
select impartial jurors who will decide a case solely on the admissible
evidence presented during the trial. 548 Hence, "a court [may not] force
a party to exhaust his peremptory challenges on persons who should be
"11549excused for cause ....
In United States v. Alsup,1550 the Ninth Circuit held that it was
reversible error not to excuse for cause two jurors who were employed
by the bank, although not the particular bank branch, which the de-
fendant allegedly had robbed. At trial the defendant had been forced
to use up his peremptory challenges on such prospective jurors. 1551 The
A//sup court inferred juror bias, despite the juror's untested claim of
impartiality,1 552 from the jurors' employment and their reasonable ap-
prehension of violence from the bank robbers resulting from their
occupation.I153
The defendants in United States v. Panza,1554 citingAilsup, argued
they were prejudiced by the impanelment of two prospective jurors
who banked at a bank branch different than the one which allegedly
had been robbed by the defendants. The defendants also contended
that they had been forced impermissibly to use one of their peremptory
challenges to exclude a person who banked at the branch that had been
robbed. 
555
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed. The court reasoned that
1547. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 818 (1977).
1548. Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524,532-33 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). There
are two ways of excluding jurors. First, a juror may be challenged for cause if the juror fails
to meet statutory requirements or is prejudiced toward the defendant. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1865-1866 (1976). Second, a juror may be excluded by aperemptory challenge, a method
of excluding qualified jurors without cause. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 169-
75 (2d Cir. 1979) (Meskill, J., dissenting) (discussion of peremptory challenge); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 24(b).
1549. United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v.
Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1976)).
1550. 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977).
1551. Id. at 71, 72.
1552. See Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 638 (9th Cir. 1968) (merely ob-
taining subjective assurances of impartiality was insufficient to determine whether bias
existed).
1553. 566 F.2d at 71.
1554. 612 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
1555. Id. at 440-41.
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under Al//sup, the determinative issue was "whether the 'potential for
substantial emotional involvement, adversely affecting impartiality'
that is evident when a prospective juror works for a bank is also present
when a prospective juror does business with a bank."'' 556 The court
held "that there was insufficient potential for prejudice to require ex-
clusion of the two prospective jurors who banked with a different
branch than the one that was robbed."'1557 As to the prospective juror
who banked with the branch. that was robbed, the court thought a
closer question was presented but still refused to reverse because the
possibility of bias was not deemed substantial. 1558 The court did ob-
serve that the "better practice" would have been to excuse the juror. 1559
Thus, under Panza and .4/sup, a prospective juror who conducts
business with, or is employed by, an establishment against which the
defendant is accused of having committed a crime, should be excused
from the jury which considers the defendant's case. 1560 This rule is
similar to appellate determinations that a prospective juror must be ex-
cluded from impanelment if the juror (1) holds a position similar to the
victim of the crime,' 56' or (2) is closely associated with a victim of the
same offense.
1562
Once voir dire examinations are completed and jurors are sworn
in, it is presumed that jurors will conduct themselves in an impartial
manner. 563 However, if an incident later occurs which may tend to




1560. Cf. United States v. Clabaugh, 589 F.2d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(court affirmed trial court's approval ofjuror whofour years before had been a project archi-
tect for the corporate headquarters of the loan association robbed by the defendant).
1561. See United States v. Poole, 450 F.2d 1084, 1084-85 (3d Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(dicta) (bank teller); Sims v. United States, 405 F.2d 1381, 1384 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (dicta)
(taxicab driver).
1562. See United States v. Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam)
(new trial ordered because of discovery that juror who served in trial for conspiracy to pos-
sess heroin had two sons who were imprisoned for murder and robbery in connection with
an attempt to acquire heroin); Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 427 F.2d 532, 534 (3d Cir. 1970) (rape
victim's brother was juror on rape case); Jackson v. United States, 395 F.2d 615, 616-18
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (juror had been involved in love triangle similar to that alleged in defen-
dant's murder trial); see also United States v. Jones, 608 F.2d 1004, 1010 (4th Cir. 1979)
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting) (suggesting a per se rule of disqualification where a juror is
related to a victim of a similar crime). But see United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333,
1345-47 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (allowed a son and a father-in-law of policemen to serve as jurors
in a case arising from a policeman slaying), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
1563. Cavness v. United States, 187 F.2d 719, 723 (9th Cir.) (jurors are presumed to have
performed their official duties faithfully), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 951 (1951).
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bias the jury, the trial court should adequately investigate the incident
to determine whether it will unconstitutionally prejudice the defend-
ant. 15 6 4 If the trial judge then determines that the allegations of mis-
conduct are true and that the incident denied the defendant a fair trial,
a mistrial must be declared. 565 Generally, the Ninth Circuit has de-
ferred to lower court determinations regarding prejudice.
566
In United States v. Berry,1567 the defendant, a disbarred attorney,
was tried for offenses related to perjury and the obstruction of justice.
After the trial court had ruled evidence of the defendant's disbarment
inadmissible, the jury foreman informed the trial judge that he had
accidently read the first few lines of a newspaper article which de-
scribed the defendant as a disbarred attorney. 568  The defendant
moved for a mistrial, and the trial judge instituted an investigation of
the incident. The judge questioned the jury foreman in chambers as to
whether the foreman had continued to read the article once the defend-
ant's name was mentioned and whether the foreman had read anything
which may have influenced him. 1569 After the foreman responded neg-
atively to both inquiries, the judge questioned the other jurors in open
court regarding whether they had read the article. 570 Upon obtaining
an indication that the jury had not read the article, the judge denied the
defendant's motion.
On appeal, the defendant contended that the trial judge had failed
to investigate the incident adequately 1571 and had erred in refusing to
grant a mistrial.157  The Ninth Circuit, however, upheld the trial
judge's actions. The court initially concluded that the trial judge did
1564. The Ninth Circuit has held that the exact procedure a trial court follows is within its
discretion. United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
818 (1977). But see United States v. McKinney, 429 F.2d 1019, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1970) (full
investigation mandatory), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 922 (1971). The purpose of an adequate
investigation is two fold: (1) to determine the truthfulness of the alleged juror bias and (2) to
determine if the bias has deprived the defendant of his fifth amendment (due process) or
sixth amendment (impartial jury) guarantees. 549 F.2d at 1228-29.
1565. See United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
818 (1977); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394, 396 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835
(1974).
1566. See United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d at 1229.
1567. 627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980).
1568. Id. at 197.
1569. Id.
1570. Id.
1571. Id. The defendant argued that the trial judge should have asked the jury foreman
"precisely what he remembered from the article and should have questioned each of the
other jurors individually in chambers."
1572. Id. The defendant argued that the foreman's conduct alone justified a mistrial.
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not abuse his discretion in conducting the investigation. 5 73 In com-
mending the trial judge's actions, the court noted that the judge had
"questioned the jurors enough to satisfy himself that no significant bias
had been caused but refused to conduct such an inquisition that the
jurors might conclude that [the defendant] had been involved in other
criminal activity."' 574 Moreover, the court held that the juror's partial
reading of the article did not warrant by itself a mistrial. The court
observed that the foreman had been conscientious in voluntarily re-
vealing that he had read the article, and the court emphasized that the
only information the foreman gleaned was that the defendant was a
disbarred attorney. 1575 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that while "[t]his
information may not have impressed [the foreman] favorably . . . it
was not so prejudicial as to deny [the defendant] a fair trial.''1576 Thus,
the court's review in Berry is consistent with the Ninth Circuit position
that the trial judge is "in a better position than [the appellate court] to
determine whether what happened was prejudicial.'
1 577
4. The Allen charge





1577. United States v. Goliday, 468 F.2d 170, 172 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert denied,
410 U.S. 934 (1973); see United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d at 1229; United States v. Klee,
494 U.S. at 396 ("When a wise and experienced judge, who presided at the trial and ob-
served the jury, comes to such a conclusion, it is not for us to upset it."); V. United States v.
Noah, 475 F.2d 688, 692 (9th Cir.) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312
(1959)) (per curiam) ("The trial judge has a large discretion in ruling on the issue of
prejudice resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles concerning the trial. General-
izations beyond that statement are not profitable, because each case must turn on its special
facts."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
The result in Berry is somewhat contrary to that in Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310 (1959) (per curiam). In Marshall, jurors had read a newspaper article which revealed
the defendant's previous record and other defamatory matters. The trial court had excluded
the record from the trial. Id. at 311. The trial court accepted the jurors' assurances of their
impartiality, but the Supreme Court ordered a new trial. Id. at 312-13. However, the Court
reached this conclusion on the basis of its supervisory powers, not a constitutional right. Id.
at 313. Berry was factually different from Marshall because the juror in Berry discovered
only that he had been disbarred, not the cause of the disbarment. The information in Mar-
shall was far more damaging and extensive than that in Berry and reached several jurors,
whereas in Berry only one juror had seen the article.
1578. In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the Supreme Court approved instruc-
tions which in substance stated:
that in a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be expected; that,
although the verdict must be the verdict of each individual juror, and not a mere
acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they should examine the question
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advises deadlocked jurors to reconsider their opinions in light of each
other's arguments "with a disposition to be convinced," especially con-
sidering the majority's viewpoint. 579 Since its initial approval by the
Supreme Court in Allen v. United States,""° there has been a trend
towards abolishing or limiting its use.' 581 Courts have disfavored the
instruction because of its potential coercive effect on minority
jurors.1
582
The Ninth Circuit, however, has taken the position that jury in-
structions similar to the Allen charge are not per se invalid.15 83 The
court instead seeks to see if the instruction had a coercive effect upon
the jury. 584 The circuit has examined the coercive effect of the instruc-
tion by considering the cumulative effect of many factors, including:
(1) the instruction's content and its variance from the original Allen
instruction, 158 5 (2) whether it was given prematurely, 586 (3) the amount
submitted with candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other, that it was their duty to decide the case if they could conscientiously do
so; that they should listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other's argu-
ments; that, if much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror
should consider whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impres-
sion upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with him-
self. If, upon the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to
ask themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judg-




1581. See People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 846-47, 566 P.2d 997, 1002-03, 139 Cal. Rptr.
861, 866-67 (1977) (citing numerous state and federal court cases).
1582. United States v. Seawall, 583 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir.) (concurring opinion), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 991 (1978); see United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 416-17 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1967); see also Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung
Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 126 (1967).
1583. United States v. Guglielmini, 598 F.2d 1149, 1151-53 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Seawall, 583 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978); United States v.
Moore, 429 F.2d 1305, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1970); Dearinger v. United States, 378 F.2d 346,
347-48 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 885 (1967). But see United States v. Seawall, 550
F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1977) (second reading of Allen charge, unless requested by jury, is re-
versible error); United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177, 1186-87 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc)
(Allen charge per se invalid); United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 933-34 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1017 (1970); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407, 420 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
1584. United States v. Seawall, 583 F.2d 416, 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991
(1978); Marsh v. Cupp, 536 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 981 (1976); cf.
United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1980) (court avoided claim of coercive
Allen-type charge by holding that the jury instructions were not a modified Allen charge, but
"merely a restatement of prior [valid] instructions").
1585. Compare United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(modified Allen instruction coercive) with Dearinger v. United States, 378 F.2d 346, 347 n.2
(9th Cir. 1967) (identical instruction as used in Contreras, but not coercive).
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of deliberation after it is utilized, 5 8 7 and (4) whether the instruction
was given as part of the original jury instruction or as a supplemental
instruction.1 588 Moreover, whether the instruction was given prema-
turely depends on whether the jury was sufficiently deadlocked when
the instruction was used. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has noted
several factors: (1) the length of deliberation prior to the instructions
use, 15 8 9 (2) the complexity of the deliberated issue, 159 ° (3) whether the
jury returns to the court to receive further instructions or to rehear tes-
timony prior to its use, 159' and (4) how the court perceived that the jury
was deadlocked.
5 92
One Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Contreras,H93 sug-
gested that the factor of prematurity alone would be sufficient to re-
verse a conviction. In Contreras, a drug smuggling case, the jury had
deliberated for approximately eight hours before they returned to court
for further instruction concerning the definition of evidence and con-
1586. United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
1587. United States v. Contreras, 463 F.2d at 774 (thirty-five minutes; coercive); United
States v. Moore, 429 F.2d 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1970) (extensive deliberation and review of
testimony after receipt of instruction; not coercive); accord United States v. Robinson, 560
F.2d 507, 517-18 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (four hours; not coercive), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
905 (1978); United States v. DeStefano, 476 F.2d 324, 337 (7th Cir. 1973) (four hours; not
coercive); United States v. Pope, 415 F.2d 685, 690-91 (8th Cir. 1969) (almost four hours; not
coercive), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 950 (1970). But see United States v. Williams, 626 F.2d 697,
704 (9th Cir. 1980) (although not Allen charge problem because later instructions were
deemed restatement of valid original instruction, court also noted that "the return of a ver-
dict within one hour does not strongly indicate coercion.").
1588. See United States v. Williams, 624 F.2d 75, 77 (9th Cir. 1980) ("less likelihood of
coercion" if Allen charge given in original instructions); United States v. Guglielmini, 598
F.2d 1149, 1153 n.4 (9th Cir. 1979) (coercive effect "eliminated by giving the instruction as
part of the original instruction to the jury"); accord United States v. Wiebold, 507 F.2d 932,
934 (8th Cir. 1974) (preferable to give Allen charge as part of the original instructions prior
to deadlock). But see United States v. Seawall, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977) (second
reading of Allen charge, unless requested by the jury, is reversible error).
1589. United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (two days of delibera-
tions after three day conspiracy trial); cf. United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d
Cir.) (mistrial declared when jury appeared deadlocked) (time needed,to reach a verdict is
"best left to a trial judge"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973).
1590. United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (three day conspiracy
trial with testimony of 24 witnesses involved "unraveling of events and personalities [which]
was not an easy task for a fact finder"); see Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th
Cir. 1969) (Allen charge "should be given only when it is apparent to the district judge from
the jury's conduct . . . that it is clearly warranted.").
1591. See United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Sullivan v. United
States, 414 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1969).
1592. United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d at 659; Sullivan v. United States, 414 F.2d at 717
(court determined jury was deadlocked after jury indicated its difficulty in reaching a
verdict).
1593. 463 F.2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
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spiracy. The trial judge then asked whether the jury had reached a
verdict on any count of the indictment. The jury responded negatively,
and the judge sua sponte gave the jury a modified Allen charge.
1594
Following thirty-five minutes of further deliberations, the jury returned
a guilty verdict. On appeal, the Contreras court concluded that the
modified Allen charge was given prematurely and, consequently, re-
versed the conviction.1 595 The court noted the following: "Here, al-
though the jury had deliberated for nearly eight hours, there was no
indication that it was deadlocked. In seeking clarification of the judge's
instructions, the jury did not indicate that it was having trouble reach-
ing a unanimous verdict."'
1596
In the 1980 case, United States v. Beattie,15 97 the defendant, relying
on Contreras, argued that the Allen charge 5 98 in his trial had been
given prematurely, and thus, his conviction should be reversed. The
defendant was tried on various criminal counts related to mail fraud.
Following four days of testimony, the case went to the jury. After one
hour of deliberation, the jury recessed for the night. The following day,
deliberations continued, and the jury returned to court once to be rein-
structed regarding the elements of mail fraud and once to rehear the
testimony of a witness. The following morning, the jury again returned
1594. Id. at 774.
1595. Id.
1596. Id. (citations omitted).
1597. 613 F.2d 762 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980).
1598. The court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
Just a word or two about approaching your task.
It frequently develops that a jury may be evenly divided where half of you
think there's reasonable doubt, the other half see no reasonable doubt. I'd suggest
in a case like that, if half or almost half of you have doubts about the proof, that
those who have no doubts would wonder if they were right to be as certain as they
are when a substantial number of other jurors seem to find doubts about the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.
Conversely, it would seem to me that if only one or two had doubts, that they
should reappraise those doubts and consider the views of the fellow jurors and
decide whether those doubts are reasonable when so many of their fellow jurors
don't see them as reasonable doubt.
This is simply a method of re-examining your views about the case and it is
without any intention of the Court to suggest that anyone should give up an hon-
estly held conviction about the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. But you will
recall I did tell you that it would be desirable, from time to time, to reappraise your
views, to consider the impact on your views and the views of your fellow jurors and
to change your views from time to time if you thought it appropriate to do so.
But always remember that it is your conscientious view about the evidence
that must control and you don't give up a conscientiously held view solely for
purposes of arriving at a verdict, although, as I say, it is highly desirable that there
be a verdict on all or substantially all of the counts or at very least on some of the
counts.
Id. at 763-64; see supra note 1578 and accompanying text.
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for instructions. The trial judge then asked the jury if they were in
agreement on any count of the indictment. The jury foreman indicated
that they were not, and thereupon, the trial judge advised the jury
utilizing an Allen-type instruction. 599 Following three and one-half
hours of further deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict.
The Ninth Circuit held that the Allen charge in Beattie did not
have a coercive effect on the jurors, and it affTrmed the defendant's con-
viction. The court initially suggested that Beattie was factually similar
to Contreras and thus reversal might result. 1600 However, the court in-
terpreted Contreras differently. The court concluded that the Contreras
court must have examined factors other than prematurity in reaching
its decision that the modified Al/en charge was coercive.' 60 ' As a result,
the Beattie court did not overrule Contreras,6°2 but employed a consid-
eration of several factors with prematurity merely being one of them, in
concluding that reversal was not necessary.'
60
The court first noted that the Beattie instruction contained all of
the elements of the original Allen charge, 6°4 consistently approved of
by the Ninth Circuit. 60 5 Second, the court ruled that the three-and-
one-half hours of deliberation following the instruction did not raise a
suspicion of coercion. 60 6 Third, the court stated that the total time of
deliberation, approximately twelve hours, "was [not] so disproportion-
ate . . . as to raise an inference that the Allen charge coercively pro-
1599. 613 F.2d at 763.
1600. Id. at 764. However, a basic factual distinction is that in Contreras the jury deliber-
ated only 35 minutes after the Allen charge was given; whereas in Beattie, the jury required
three and one half hours.
1601. The Beattie court believed that the Contreras court's statement that "[w]e have a
profound feeling that [the modified Allen instruction] was coercive upon the jury," 463 F.2d
at 774, suggested that the Contreras court did examine the instruction "'in its context and
under all the circumstances."' 613 F.2d at 765. But see United States v. Guglielmini, 598
F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir.) (Contreras holding that Allen charge was improper rested on the
lack of indication of jury deadlock), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979).
1602. 613 F.2d at 764-65.
1603. Id. at 765-66; accord, United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 374, 376-77 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Martinez, 446
F.2d 118, 119-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 994 (1971).
1604. 613 F.2d at 765. Those elements approved in Allen represent: (1) a sufficient re-
minder to "each of the jurors of [his] obligation to give ultimate controlling weight to his
own conscientiously held opinion," and (2) "nothing express or implied in that instruction
which was more coercive in tendency than the [original Allen charge]." Id. (quoting Sulli-
van v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1969)). See generally supra note 1581
and accompanying text.
1605. See 613 F.2d at 764, 765 (citing numerous Ninth Circuit opinions).
1606. Id. at 765. In Contreras only 35 minutes passed between the Allen charge and the
verdict. 463 F.2d at 774.
[Vol. 14
CRIMINAL LAW SUR VEY
duced the result."' 160 7 Finally, the court concluded that other factors
utilized in previous Ninth Circuit decisions 60 8 were either absent, or if
present, not suggestive of coercion. 60 9 Accordingly, after a careful re-
view of the instruction under all the circumstances, the Beattie court
found it not coercive, 16' 0 and thus, limited to the facts, appropriate. 
6 1'
D. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Although the issue of prosecutorial misconduct has recently ab-
sorbed much of the Ninth Circuit's attention, few consistent themes
have emerged from the court's opinions.161 2 Perhaps the lack of any
common theme is due to the ad hoc nature of evidentiary decisions
made during trial.
The overriding concern in this area is the fifth amendment right of
the defendant.1613 Whenever the prosecution comments or injects its
opinions into the trial in the presence of the jury, the defendant may be
deprived of his right to a fair trial. The reason is that the prosecution,
in acting for the government, may appear more credible in the eyes of
the jury. Thus, in each case the focus of the court's attention is upon
the effect of the comment on the jury and the likelihood that the de-
fendant will be deprived of a fair trial. However, the courts must be
careful not to constrict the ability of the prosecution to respond prop-
erly to the arguments raised by the defendants at trial.
The basic rule was set forth in Berger v. United States, 614 in which
the Supreme Court stated that the prosecutor has a special obligation to
"avoid improper suggestions, insinuations, and especially assertions of
personal knowledge."' 1615  From Berger, a further rule developed,
1607. 613 F.2d at 766.
1608. See supra notes 1583-90 and accompanying text.
1609. 613 F.2d at 766.
1610. Id.
1611. Compare United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Sul-
livan v. United States, 414 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1969)) ("even in its most acceptable form,
the.Allen charge 'approaches the ultimate permissible limits' ") with United States v. Beattie,
613 F.2d at 766 (Browning, J., concurring) ("the instruction in this case approaches the lim-
its of acceptability under the law of this circuit. A barely acceptable instruction, once sanc-
tioned, tends to become the new norm. By this process an instruction of dubious merit
continues to deteriorate.").
1612. For a discussion of how each of the circuits has handled the issue of prosecutorial
misconduct, see Annot., 41 A.L.R. Fed. 10 (1979).
1613. U.S. CONsT. amend. V states in part: "No person shall. . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law...." See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 359-60 n.15 (1958).
1614. 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
1615. Id. at 88.
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which disapproved of the prosecution vouching for the credibility of a
Government witness. Vouching may occur in two ways: the prosecu-
tion may place the prestige of the government behind the witness or
may indicate that information not presented to the jury supports the
witness' testimony.
16 16
In United States v. Roberts,16 17 decided by the Ninth Circuit in
1980, the latter type of vouching was at issue. In Roberts, the prosecu-
tor noted that, because of directly conflicting testimony, either the de-
fendant or the government witness was lying. The prosecutor then
suggested that the Government witness would not be lying because he
had more to lose. He had signed a plea agreement, and a police officer
"was sitting in the courtroom to be certain that the government witness
did not lie." 618 Further, the prosecutor suggested that if the Govern-
ment witness lied the plea agreement would be called off.
16 19
In examining the prosecutor's comments to determine whether
they violated the weli-established rule against prosecutorial comments,
the court noted that "the second type of vouching involves pros-
ecutorial remarks that bolster a witness' credibility by reference to mat-
ters not in the record."' 1620 The court reasoned that the "prosecutor in
this case referred to evidence not in the record by declaring that Detec-
tive Sellers (the police officer) was monitoring Adamson's testi-
mony."'1621 The court concluded that "[i]n effect, the prosecutor was
telling the jury that another witness could have been called to support
Adamson's testimony. This was error."'
' 622
1616. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n.15 (1958).
1617. 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980).
1618. .d. at 533.
1619. Id. Defense counsel properly objected to the prosecutor's reference to evidence
outside the record.
1620. Id.
1621. Id. at 534.
1622. Id. (citing United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1978) (improper to imply
that witness not called supports the prosecution) and Reichert v. United States, 359 F.2d 278
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (improper to refer to witness' statements not in record)).
The Roberts court rejected
the prosecutor's contention that his summation responded to comments made
by defense counsel during Adamson's cross-examination and that it involved
only proper inferences from evidence of Detective Sellers' presence introduced
then. His comments were neither responsive nor appropriate. A prosecutor
may naturally feel compelled to respond to the argument that criminals re-
ceiving favors from the government in exchange for their testimony are un-
trustworthy. We suggest that he might appropriately explain to the jury the
necessity of using unsavory witnesses. United States . Armedo-Sarmiento, 545
F.2d 785, 794 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977).
618 F.2d at 534 n.l.
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The court rejected the prosecutor's contention that the comments
were harmless error.1623 Noting that the Government did not have a
strong case, and that Adamson was the Government's chief witness, the
court held the conduct impermissible.1624 Undoubtedly crucial to the
court's decision was the fact that the Government's case rested almost
entirely upon the credibility of Adamson as a witness.
1625
The only other recent case in which the Ninth Circuit has consid-
ered in relative depth a claim of prosecutorial misconduct was United
States v. Castio,626 in which the defendant was convicted of man-
slaughter for stabbing another prisoner while in federal prison. On ap-
peal, the defendant asserted that certain comments made by the
prosecution at trial were improper and prejudicial.
1627
The Ninth Circuit proceeded to examine the prosecution's com-
ments. During cross-examination of two defense witnesses, the prose-
cutor asked questions that elicited invocations of the privilege against
self-incrimination by each of the witnesses and then, in closing argu-
ment, commented on the invocations of the privilege. 62 In holding
the prosecution's comments improper, the court relied on the Supreme
Court case of Namet v. United States"629 and found that a "refusal to
answer based upon the fifth amendment is not a permissible basis for
inferring how the witness would have answered, absent the
privilege."'
1630
The Ninth Circuit, however, affirmed defendant's conviction on
the ground that the prosecution's conduct and the court's failure to in-
struct the jury on the privilege did not constitute reversible error. Be-
cause defendant's counsel had failed to request an instruction curing
the damaging effect of the prosecution's comments, the court examined
whether the trial court's failure to give such a curative instruction sua
sponte was "plain error" under rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of
1623. Id. at 534.
1624. Id. at 535.
1625. Id. The court in Roberts relied upon previous authority which declared that such
prosecutorial remarks may be fatal if "the remarks, fairly construed, were based on the
District Attorney's personal knowledge apart from the evidence in the case and that the jury
might have so understood." Id. (citing Orebo v. United States, 293 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.
1961)).
1626. 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1980).
1627. Id. at 881.
1628. Id. at 884.
1629. 373 U.S. 179 (1963).
1630. 615 F.2d at 884.
19811
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
Criminal Procedure.' 631 The court held that
[t]he failure to give a curative instruction, however, was harm-
less. The inferences sought each went to the question of pre-
meditation and conspiracy. As noted earlier, the jury failed to
accept the government's theory of premeditation when it con-
victed the defendant of manslaughter. The matters involved
in the questioning were strictly collateral to the issue of Cas-
tillo's guilt, of which there was substantial independent
evidence. 1632
In the majority of recent cases, the Ninth Circuit cursorily refused
to overturn the defendants' convictions for alleged prosecutorial mis-
conduct. In United States v. Potter,1633 defendant physician appealed
his conviction for fifty-four counts of unlawfully distributing controlled
substances, alleging error in the trial court because of alleged impropri-
eties in the Government's closing argument.
1634
Two witnesses each had testified that they had engaged in oral sex
with the defendant doctor and had received, in exchange, prescriptions
for quaaludes and other drugs. 635 In contesting the propriety of the
prosecution's comments in closing argument regarding the sexual activ-
ities, defendant asserted that "the government's closing argument,
taken as a whole, deprived him of a fair trial."' 
6 36
Again, as in Castillo, the court noted that defendant had not ob-
jected to any of the statements of which he subsequently complained
and required that defendant "demonstrate plain error as to the other
statements."'' 637 The court examined the standard by which earlier
cases in the Ninth Circuit judged alleged prosecutorial improprieties.
The court stated:
This court has held repeatedly that "improprieties in counsels'
1631. Id. The court noted that defense counsel failed to request an instruction at trial
curing the damaging effect of the prosecution's comments. Id.
1632. Id. at 884-85.
1633. 616 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980).
1634. Id. at 387.
1635. Defendant also sought, unsuccessfully, to challenge the admission of such evidence
at trial as irrelevant and prejudicial under FED. R. EVID. 403 & 404(b). 616 F.2d at 386.
1636. Id. at 391. Specifically, defendant asserted that he was deprived of a fair trial
because
the prosecutor (1) appealed to the emotions and prejudice of the jurors by empha-
sizing the evidence of sexual activities; (2) interjected his personal belief concern-
ing the issues of guilt and credibility of witnesses; (3) contained inflammatory and
improper attacks on appellant's character, and (4) improperly referred to the fail-





arguments to the jury do not require a new trial unless they
are so gross as probably to prejudice the defendant, and the
prejudice has not been neutralized by the trial judge. As we
noted in Rich, "Counsel are necessarily permitted a degree of
latitude in the presentation of their closing summations."
1638
After examining each of the alleged improprieties, 163 9 the court
concluded that these "comments of the prosecutor were [not] 'so gross
as probably to prejudice the defendant.'164o And even if the conduct
was prejudicial, the prejudice "was 'neutralized' by the court's instruc-
tions and the prosecutor's own comment [that counsel's statements are
not evidence]."''
Similarly, in United States v. Schindler,1642 the Ninth Circuit noted
that any prejudice by the prosecutor in his opening statement was
cured by the "trial court's admonition that the statements of counsel
were not evidence."'1643 In Schindler, the prosecution had described a
witness as "concerned for her life if she made records available"' 6
and later had questioned the witness as to whether she had "ever had a
conversation with [the defendant] during which the subject of contracts
to kill someone arose."'' "5 The court noted that although "evidence
that appellant had threatened to kill the witness and others was ex-
cluded, the prosecutor's question did not explicitly support that appel-
1638. Id. at 391-92 (citations omitted). The court relied upon United States v. Mikka, 586
F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921 (1979); United States v. Rich, 580
F.2d 929, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978); United States v. Parker, 549 F.2d
1217, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 971 (1977).
1639. The court observed:
It is true, as appellant argues, that there were instances where the prosecutor im-
properly interjected his own opinion and commented on factual matters not in the
record. During his argument he commented on Sheri Cosner as follows: "It is
quite apparent, I think, to everybody here that this is a girl that is not only accus-
tomed to the usage of dangerous drugs, but it appears to me, based on observation,
and it is your observation that counts, of course, that in light of her testimony that
she still uses quaaludes to this day." The prosecutor also argued that "Dawn
Campbell's problem may be. . .and I suspect they revolved. . . around the use
of drugs."
Probably the most questionable comment was the prosecutor's argument in
rebuttal that it was "not an unusual prosecution function' to promise not to prose-
cute a witness "who gives important testimony against an individual, who in the
eyes of the Government has committed far more serious crimes."
616 F.2d at 392.
1640. Id.
1641. Id.
1642. 614 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980).
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lant had threatened the witness with physical harm.""''6 Based on
these facts1647 the court held that other "evidence of appellant's guilt
independent of the prosecutor's comment. was very strong indeed.
Under these circumstances, we cannot say appellant did not receive a
fair trial."'
' 6 8
Whether the prosecutor's comments upon defendant's failure to
testify constituted reversible error was the issue decided in United
States v. Bonilla.' 9 Bonilla, convicted of distribution of cocaine in
violation of federal law, appealed, contending that the prosecutor's
comments regarding his failure to testify constituted reversible error.
The court cited the earlier case of Hayes v. United States,
650 which
held that the prosecutor's comments must be "manifestly intended" or
"of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take
. . . [them] to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify."'
' 651
The Bonilla opinion is notably devoid of any reasoning which explains
the court's conclusion that the standard in Hayes had not been met.
Thus, despite its articulation of the manifest intention standard, the
Bonilla court failed to address the level of proof necessary to decide
whether related comments will constitute reversible error.
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Mouton, 65 2 again upheld
the defendant's conviction on appeal despite the existence of
prosecutorial comments 613 at defendant's trial. Defendant asserted
1646. Id.
1647. Again the court noted the failure of the defendant to object at trial. .d.
1648. Id; see also County of Maricopa v. Mayberry, 555 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Cash, 499 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1974).
Although the court in Schindler upheld defendant's conviction it noted without any
other discussion that the prosecutor may have reached the limits of acceptable comment.
"In this case the prosecutor came uncomfortably close to providing [an] impermissible aid
[to jury]." 614 F.2d at 228.
1649. 615 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1980).
1650. 368 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1966).
1651. Id. at 816.
1652. 617 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1980).
1653. During his rebuttal final argument, the prosecutor stated:
Now Mr. Cook did make mention of the vast resources of the government or that
the FBI has this wonderful ability to do many things, and implied in that you
should require something in addition to what the law otherwise requires. That, of
course, would be in violation of your duty as jurors. You're required to apply the
facts as you find them to the law as the court gives it, and if you find the defendant
guilty, that's it. Because the government is involved in this, that doesn't mean you
have to find more evidence than you otherwise would have to.
Defendant further refers to a portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal wherein he at-
tempted to respond to defense counsel's question concerning an additional 150
checks allegedly manipulated by Levias that were not in evidence or part of the
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that the prosecutor put the Government's and his own credibility at
issue when he commented as to the veracity of certain tapes in evidence
at trial.
65 4
On appeal, the court accepted the prosecutor's contention "that
wide latitude in summation is allowed the prosecutor when the com-
ments are in response to defense counsel. The . . . remark[s] of the
prosecutor [were] allegedly made in response to . . . defense argu-
ment[s].' 655  For each of the asserted prejudicial comments 1656 the
court of appeals reviewed the record and held:
[W]e are convinced that the comments attacked by defendant
were within the scope of proper argument, in light of the fact
that defense counsel first opened the door on the contested
subjects. Even if we consider the comments as slightly im-
proper, we could not conclude that it was more probable than
not that the error materially affected the verdict, which is re-
quired for reversal under United States v. Valle- Valdez. 
657
While no recent prosecutorial misconduct case was cited for au-
thority, it is clear that the court is continuing to uphold convictions if
the prejudicial error is less than serious. 658
Finally, the prosecutorial misconduct issue arose recently in the
grand jury context in United States v. Bettencourt.1659 In sustaining de-
fendant's conviction, the court rejected defendant's claim that the pros-
ecutor utilized "perjured" testimony before the grand jury. 660 The
court found that "[n]othing in the record . . . supports an inference
that the prosecutor was aware of any inaccuracy in the testimony
indictment. A third portion of the prosecutor's rebuttal is quoted to this court to
argue that the prosecutor was himself testifying to the veracity of the tapes and




1656. See supra note 1654.
1657. 617 F.2d at 1385 (citations omitted).
1658. See United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1980) (conviction reversed be-
cause error prejudicial); see also supra notes 1618-26 and accompanying text.
1659. 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980).
1660. Id. at 215. Defendant relied upon United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.
1974). In Basurto,
this court found that a prosecutor's presentation of perjured testimony relating to a
material matter resulted in a denial of due process before a grand jury. More re-
cent decisions from this circuit have suggested that prosecutorial misconduct must
be "flagrant" to violate due process. See, e.g., United States v. Vargas-Rios, 607
F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
614 F.2d at 215-16.
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presented."' 1661 The opinion concluded that defendant was not thereby
deprived of due process.1
662
There appears to be a single thread running through the numerous
recent prosecutorial decisions in the Ninth Circuit: the court's willing-
ness to extend wide latitude to the prosecution in its argument. It is not
clear whether the prosecution's misconduct must actually be "fla-
grant" 663 or whether there are some instances in which the courts will
require something less. Roberts suggests that the Ninth Circuit is not
totally unreceptive to prosecutorial misconduct claims on appeal. But a
study of the recent cases suggests that any defendant asserting such a
claim will likely face a substantial burden on appeal to convince the
court that his conviction below ought to be overturned.
E. Continuance
Trial courts are vested with such broad discretion 1664 to grant or
deny continuances that their decisions will be reversed on appeal only
upon proof of an abuse of discretion and of actual prejudice to the
defendant.1 665 During the 1980 survey period, the Ninth Circuit acted
consistently with this policy in reviewing and upholding three continu-
ance motion denials.
In United States v. Jones,6 66 the defendant argued that denial of
his continuance motion deprived him of sufficient time to "digest" ma-
terial received under the Jencks Act 667 on the morning of his trial and
resulted in a violation of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. 1668 The
Ninth Circuit found no due process or effective assistance of counsel
violation because the government had complied with the requirements
of the Jencks Act. Moreover, the court emphasized that the trial court
1661. Id. at 216.
1662. Id.
1663. See supra note 1659.
1664. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) ("Disposition of a request for continu-
ane ... is made in the discretion of the trial judge, the exercise of which will ordinarily not
be reviewed.") (footnote omitted); Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) (continuance
is discretionary with trial judge; denial may not violate due process even if defendant conse-
quently "fails to offer evidence or is compelled to defend without counsel").
1665. United States v. Hernandez, 608 F.2d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 1979); see Baker v. United
States, 393 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir.) (no abuse of discretion in granting prosecution continu-
ance because no prejudice resulted), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968). But see United States
v. Harris, 436 F.2d 775, 776 (9th Cir. 1970) (actual prejudice requirement stated in the
alternative).
1666. 612 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980).
1667. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976).
1668. 612 F.2d at 455.
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had not abused its discretion in denying the motion. 6 69
In United States v. Sukumolachan,1670 one of the appellant's code-
fendants, Hiller, pled guilty and was scheduled for sentencing after the
appellant's trial. The appellant sought Hiller's testimony and moved
for a continuance on the ground that Hiller would not testify before he
was sentenced. The appellant supported his motion with his counsel's
affidavit stating that counsel was "'informed'" that after Hiller had
been sentenced he would be "'available and willing to testify,'" and
that counsel "'belie[ved]'" that Hiller would testify to certain facts
favorable to the appellant's defense. 67' The trial court had held that
counsel's assertions were conjectural and denied the continuance mo-
tion. 16 72 The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling and ob-
served that the defense counsel should have stated "with particularity"
the grounds for his beliefs.1673 On this basis, no abuse of discretion was
found. 674
In United States v. Sandoval- Villalvazo ,1675 the defendant's motion
for a ten-minute continuance was denied. At the first scheduled trial
date, almost two months before this motion, the defendant acquiesced
to his codefendant's continuance motion only after ascertaining that a
certain subpoenaed witness who had failed to appear would later be
available to testify.1676 An eleven-day continuance was granted. Dur-
ing this time, the appellant failed to subpoena this witness, and no sub-
poena was issued when he again failed to appear. Two days later, the
court granted the defendant a continuance of two working days to ob-
tain this witness. Again, he was not subpoenaed, and again he failed to
appear. The court then granted the appellant's request to present the
witness after the Government's rebuttal, if he had appeared by then.
After the Government stated that it had no rebuttal, the defendant
moved for a ten minute recess, which the trial court denied. 16 77 Fol-
lowing the Government's closing arguments, the witness suddenly ap-
peared, and the defense moved to reopen its case in order to call the
witness. The court denied this motion also.
1 678
1669. Id. (citing United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Hernandez-Berceda, 572 F.2d 680 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978)).
1670. 610 F.2d 685 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).




1675. 620 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1980).
1676. Id. at 747.
1677. Id. at 747-48.
1678. Id. at 748.
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The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion. It quoted United
States v. Hoyos,16 7 9 which requires proof that "'due diligence has been
used to obtain [the witness'] attendance on the day set for trial.' "1680
The Sandoval- Villalvazo court found that the defendant "was aware of
the problem of securing the attendance of this particular witness and
chose not to issue a subpoena for him."' 68' Moreover, the Ninth Cir-
cuit noted that the trial court had continued the trial for the "sole pur-
pose" of enabling the defendant to obtain the witness' appearance and,
thus, had not abused its discretion in denying either the motion for a
further, brief continuance or the motion to reopen the defense.
68 2
F Admission of Evidence
1. Character evidence-rule 404(b)
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) allows admission of evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts for purposes other than to prove the char-
acter of the defendant. 683 Evidence admissible under this rule must
meet three criteria. First, the proffered evidence must be an act sepa-
rate from the crime charged. 68 4 Second, the evidence must be relevant
to the issue for which it is proffered. 6 5 Finally, the probative value of
the proffered evidence must outweigh its prejudicial effect.1
686
a. separate act
Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence of acts separate from the
crime charged. Evidence of the same act charged is direct evidence and
not subject to the conditions of rule 404(b). In United States v. Pas-
1679. 573 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1978).
1680. 620 F.2d at 748 (quoting United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d at 1114).
1681. 620 F.2d at 748.
1682. Id. Looking at the denial of continuance, clearly no abuse of discretion was commit-
ted. However, in light of the subsequent occurrence, the appearance of the witness, the
result in Sandoval- Villalvazo appears harsh. At least the better practice for the trial court
might have been to have allowed a reopening of the defense.
1683. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of
a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
1684. United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1980).
1685. FED. R. EvID. 402 provides in relevant part: "Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."
1686. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides in relevant part: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice."
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saro 1687 the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling that evidence
of the defendant's criminal activity concerning the same conspiracy
charged in the indictment did not involve a separate criminal act, even
though the activity had occurred a few months before the period cov-
ered by the indictment. Consequently, the evidence was admissible as




To be properly admissible under rule 404(b), evidence must show
motive, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake or
accident. 68 9 EVidence relevant to show only defendant's character is
not admissible. 1690  Relevant evidence admissible under rule 404(b)
need not be excluded because the past act is not similar to the crime in
question. 1691 However, in some cases the relevancy of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is dependent on the similarlity to the offense
charged.1692 In such cases, the "greater. . .the dissimilarity of the two
offenses, the more tenuous the relevance."' 1693 For example, when a
prior criminal act is relied upon to prove intent or knowledge, similar-
ity1694 between the two events is necessary to establish the threshold of
1687. 624 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1980).
1688. Id. at 943. Defendant was indicted on charges of manufacturing and conspiring to
manufacture methamphetamine. The period covered by the indictment was approximately
October, 1977, to March, 1978. The Government presented a witness who testified that in
May, 1977, she observed the defendant pick out certain items to be purchased from a cata-
logue of laboratory glassware and that she, upon a codefendant's request, ordered the equip-
ment knowing that it was to be used in a methamphetamine laboratory. Id. at 941. The trial
court ruled that this evidence was direct evidence and, therefore, not evidence of prior crimi-
nal acts inadmissible under FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Id. at 943.
1689. FED. R. EvID. 404 (b). FED. R. EvID. 402 states: "All relevant evidence is admissi-
ble, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Con-
gress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
1690. FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
1691. United States v. Longoria, 624 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Riggins,
539 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1045 (1977).
1692. United States v. Riggins, 539 F.2d 682, 683 (9th Cir. 1976). But cf. United States v.
Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (similarity not required as long as
the evidence was relevant to show duress), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
1693. United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 1979).
1694. "Similarity" means similarity of the circumstances of the crime. Thus, in United
States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000
(1978), evidence of defendant's Los Angeles robbery was held to be dissimilar from the San
Francisco bank robbery for which she was on trial, even though the charges were similar.
Likewise, in United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1979), evi-
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relevance. 16
95
The 1980 Ninth Circuit cases are consistent with this view. In
United States v. Sinn1696 defendant was charged with possession of co-
caine. The Ninth Circuit upheld the admission of a five year-old con-
viction for possession of cocaine to prove knowledge and intent.
Likewise, in United States v. Longoria1697 the court of appeals upheld
the admission of defendant's 1977 conviction for transporting illegal
aliens in his 1980 trial for the same crime. In both Sinn and Longoria
the similarity of the acts justified their use under rule 404(b).
However, similarity is not required where evidence of other crimes
is admitted to create a complete picture of the crime. 1698 For example,
in United States v. aibson1699 the Ninth Circuit upheld the admission of
defendant's sexual assaults upon the victim during the kidnapping of
the victim and her brother in defendant's trial for kidnapping. Since
the time sequence of the kidnapping was continuous, all crimes and
acts committed in the course of the kidnapping were held admissible
under rule 404(b) to link the chain of events. 1700 The court, however,
found no substantial issue of motive and intent.
dence of a prior conviction for smuggling marijuana was not similar to and, therefore, not
relevant to prove knowledge in the current charge of possession of heroin.
1695. United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1111 (1977).
1696. 622 F.2d 415 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980).
1697. 624 F.2d 66, 69 (9th Cir. 1980).
1698. Such evidence is admitted when required to show a complete picture of a continuous
crime. For example, in United States v. Goble, 512 F.2d 458, 473-74 (6th Cir. 1975), testi-
mony that defendants were arrested while attempting to commit a burglary while using a
stolen vehicle was admissible since it blended with the prior stealing of the vehicle and the
subsequent concealment of the theft. These actions were relevant to the charge of auto theft
conspiracy. Likewise, in United States v. Miller, 508 F.2d 444, 479 (7th Cir. 1974), evidence
that police officers were disarmed by defendants and that defendant Miller then fled in a
stolen police car was admissible in Miller's trial for conspiracy to violate and two violations
of the Dyer Act. The evidence formed a necessary link in the chain of events between
defendant's first interstate transportation of a stolen automobile and the second which took
place after defendant took the police car. Also, in United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637,
641 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974), evidence of shots fired from a pistol
after kidnapping victim had escaped from his captors was an integral part of the offense of
kidnapping for which the defendants were charged and thus admissible.
United States v. Aims Back, 588 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1979), is an example of a
non-continuous crime. There, in a trial for rape, evidence of a later rape committed by the
defendant that same evening is not admissible under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) to show the
whole pattern of the evening. Rape, unlike the crime of kidnapping, is not a crime continu-
ing over a period of time. Thus, evidence of the other crimes committed the same night need
not be admitted to fill gaps in the time sequence of the commission of the crime charged.
1699. 625 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1980).
1700. Id. at 888.
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c. rule 403
Evidence otherwise admissible under rule 404(b) may still be ex-
cluded, under rule 403, if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of causing unfair prejudice.17 0 ' In making this
determination, the Ninth Circuit considers three factors: the cumula-
tiveness of the evidence, the character of the act, and whether the other
criminal act resulted in conviction.
7 0 2
The probative value of the proffered evidence is diminished if the
evidence is merely cumulative on the issue which it was admitted to
prove under federal rule 404(b). 70 3 Following this rule, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Bejar-Matrecios'7° held that evidence of the
prior act was cumulative and reversed the lower court's conviction. In
that case defendant was charged with illegal reentry into the United
States after being previously deported. The trial court admitted evi-
dence of defendant's prior conviction for misdemeanor illegal entry to
prove alienage, a material element of the crime. However, the Govern-
ment had already presented a strong case for proving alienage by intro-
ducing seven documents of defendant's earlier deportation. Because
the evidence was cumulative it had a lesser probative value. The court
concluded that this lesser probative value was substantially outweighed
by the prejudicial nature of the evidence.
170 5
In United States v. Bettencourt7 °6 the court considered what type
of acts are deemed probative for the purposes of rule 403. There, the
court stated:
"[P]rior crimes involving deliberate and carefully premedi-
tated intent-such as fraud and forgery-are far more likely
to have probative value with respect to later acts than prior
crimes involving a quickly and spontaneously formed in-
tent-such as . . assault . . . . [T]he evidence of prior
crimes involving intent of the moment are hardly ever proba-
tive of later acts involving similarly split-second intent."'
17 7
1701. See United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832
(1980).
1702. This last factor is used only when a conviction is necessary to prove the element for
which it is proffered. See infra note 1710 and accompanying text.
1703. United States v. DiZenzo, 500 F.2d 263, 265-66 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
McMahon, 592 F.2d 871, 873-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
1704. 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
1705. Id. at 84.
1706. 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980).
1707. Id. at 217 n.7 (quoting United States v. San Martin, 505 F.2d 918, 923 (5th Cir.
1974)).
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In Bettencourt, the defendant was charged with interfering with a fed-
eral officer in the performance of his official duties. Bettencourt had
tried to prevent federal agents from removing his client's car while they
were searching it. During the trial, the Government produced evidence
of the defendant's earlier state arrest for interfering with local police
during the course of another search. The state arrest had occurred
twenty-one months prior to the assault on the federal agents.'7 08 The
Ninth Circuit held that specific intent to assault or impede is not ordi-
narily transferrable to events two years apart; thus, the probative value
of the evidence in establishing Bettencourt's specific intent was
minimal.
170 9
Where the other act closely resembles the newly charged offense,
the prejudicial effect is great. 7 10 The jury is likely to make the im-
proper inference that the defendant, having once committed a crime,
has a propensity to recommit that same crime. 17 11 Thus, in United
States v. Bejar-Matrecios,1712 the Ninth Circuit held that evidence of
the defendant's prior guilty plea to the charge of misdemeanor illegal
entry, although relevant to prove alienage in the present illegal entry
charge, 17 13 had a high potential for prejudice.
The third factor considered in determining the probative value of
evidence under rule 403 is whether the proffered act resulted in convic-
tion. In Bettencourt,171 4 the prosecution sought to prove intent to inter-
fere with a federal officer by introducing evidence of a similar state
offense, for which the defendant had never been prosecuted. Since the
intent to commit the prior offense had never been proven, the Ninth
Circuit held that an inference of intent in the present prosecution could
not be drawn. For this reason, it considered the probative value of the
prior offense minimal, and decided that the evidence should have been
excluded.
In 1980 the Ninth Circuit had five separate opportunities to bal-
ance these factors. In both United States v. Sinn17 5 and United States
v. Potter,1716 the court upheld the trial court's ruling that the prejudicial
1708. 614 F.2d at 215.
1709. Id. at 217.
1710. Accord, United States v. McMahon, 592 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1979).
1711. United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980).
1712. 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
1713. Admissible evidence under FED. R. EVID. 404(b) is not limited to the purposes listed
in the rule. Thus, evidence can be admitted to prove alienage under rule 404(b). See C.
MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 190, at 448 (2d ed. 1972).
1714. 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980).
1715. 622 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1980).
1716. 616 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1980).
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effect of the evidence did not outweigh its probative value. The jury
had been instructed as to the limited purpose of the evidence. Further,
the probative value of the proffered evidence was not diminished by
any of the three limiting factors stated previously.
1 7 17
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Lutz 71 8 held that although
the potential for prejudice was increased because of the similarity of
the crimes, the limiting instruction by the judge effectively minimized
any prejudice to the defendant. 1719 Reaching a different conclusion in
United States v. Bejar-Matrecios,1720 where no limiting instruction was
given, the Ninth Circuit held that evidence of a similar crime was inad-
missible.' 72 1 In addition, the probative value was diminished because
the evidence was merely cumulative. The determinative factor in both
Lutz and Bejar-Matrecios was whether the limiting instruction was
given.
Yet, the limiting instruction was not the determinative factor in
Bettencourt.1722 There the Ninth Circuit held that evidence of a similar
prior offense, even when a limiting instruction was given by the trial
judge, was too prejudicial when weighed against its slight probative
value. The probative value was diminished because of the type of of-
fense with which the defendant was charged, and because he had not
1717. In United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980), defendant was charged with
bank robbery. Evidence that defendant did not return to a half-way house the night of the
robbery was admitted at the trial. The evidence was relevant under the identity exception to
rule 404(b). On appeal the Ninth Circuit held that the probative value of the evidence out-
weighed its prejudicial effect. The court said that the trial court's limiting instruction as to
the proper weight the jury could give the evidence, coupled with the fact that no mention
was made of defendant's prior criminal record, prevented the jury from making improper
inferences and thus the evidence was not unduly prejudicial.
Likewise, in United States v. Potter, 616 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1979), the court held that
evidence of defendant's sexual conduct with his patients, relevant to prove good faith and
motive, was admissible in his trial for unlawfully distributing controlled substances and was
not too prejudicial. Although the probative value was not diminished, the prejudicial effect
was eased by the court's limiting instruction that the evidence of the sexual activities could
only be used in determining the defendant's guilt of the crime charged.
1718. 621 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1980).
1719. In Lutz, defendants were convicted of mail and wire fraud. Evidence of defendant
White's participation in a similar fraud which was the subject of a separate indictment was
admitted to prove motive and intent at trial. The district court had cautioned the jury to
consider the evidence solely for the purpose of proving these two issues.
1720. 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
1721. In Bejar-Matrecios, defendant was charged with illegal re-entry into the United
States following deportation. Over objection, evidence of defendant's guilty plea to the
charge of misdemeanor illegal re-entry was admitted to prove alienage under rule 404(b).
The jury was never informed of the purpose for which the evidence was offered.
1722. 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980).
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been prosecuted or convicted of the rule 404(b) offense.1723 Thus, it
appears that a limiting instruction is not enough to cure the prejudicial
effect of evidence admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) if
the probative value of the proffered evidence is insignificant.
The determination of whether the probative value is outweighed
by the prejudicial effect is a matter within the trial judge's discre-
tion. 1724 If that decision is reasonable it will be reversed 1725 only upon
a showing that the trial judge abused his discretion. 1
726
Even when it is determined that the trial judge did abuse his dis-
cretion, 1727 such error may not warrant reversal. Nonconstitutional er-
rors in admitting evidence constitute reversible error "only if it is more
probable than not that the erroneous admission of the evidence materi-
ally affected the jurors' verdict."' 17 28 In evaluating this effect, the Ninth
Circuit considers whether the evidence erroneously admitted under
rule 404(b) is merely cumulative as to the issue it was admitted to
prove. 1729 If the evidence is cumulative, the court will usually hold that
the admission was harmless error.
1730
Recent Ninth Circuit cases follow this rule.1731 In the one excep-
tion, United States v. Bejar-Matrecios1732 the court found that the prej-
udicial effect of the proffered evidence outweighed its probative value.
In making that determination the court found that the evidence was
1723. In Bettencourt, defendant was charged with interfering with a federal officer in the
performance of his official duties. Evidence was presented of defendant's earlier state arrest
for the same charge. The probative value of this evidence was diminished because the crime
was of the type that involved a quickly and spontaneously formed intent. See supra note
1708 and accompanying text. Also, the probative value was diminished because defendant
was never prosecuted under the prior statute. See supra notes 1706-09 and accompanying
text. The jury was properly charged that the evidence was admitted solely to prove intent.
1724. United States v. Longoria, 624 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bosley,
615 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Bailey, 505 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1725. United States v. Bosley, 615 F.2d 1274, 1278 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. San-
grey, 586 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1978).
1726. United States v. Longoria, 624 F.2d 66, 68 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lutz, 621
F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. McMahon, 592 F.2d 871, 873 (5th Cir. 1979).
1727. A trial court can abuse its discretion by either admitting evidence inadmissible under
FED. R. EvID. 404(b), admitting irrelevant evidence, or admitting evidence which is too
prejudicial under FED. R. EVID. 403.
1728. United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214, 218 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting United
States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1979)).
1729. United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1979); ac-
cord, United States v. Williams, 596 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Bailey, 505
F.2d 417, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
1730. 505 F.2d at 420-21.
1731. See, e.g., United States v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980).
1732. 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
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only slightly probative since it was cumulative on the issue of alienage,
the issue it was admitted to prove under rule 404(b). The court then
reversed defendant's conviction without determining whether the ad-
mission was harmless error. Had this analysis been made, a different
result might have been reached.
1 733
However, when a trial court sustains an objection that evidence
already admitted in court is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 404(b), the court must cure the prejudicial effect of the evidence
by either declaring a mistrial or by reading to the jury a curative in-
struction. If the court chooses to do the latter, the instruction to disre-
gard the evidence must effectively dispel its prejudicial effect. The
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Johnson1734 determined the effect of
the curative instruction by weighing "the forcefulness of the instruction
and the conviction with which it was given against the degree of
prejudice generated by the evidence . ... In fixing the degree of
prejudice, the probative force of the inadmissible evidence must be
compared with that of the admissible evidence which supports the ver-
dict." 735 In applying this test, the Johnson court determined that al-
though the instruction was not as forceful as it could have been, the
prejudicial effect was slight. The evidence was merely cumulative and,
therefore, not very prejudicial, even though the impact of the testimony
was greater because the trial court itself elicited it.1736  Since the
prejudice was so insignificant, reversal was not warranted.
2. Use of prior conviction to impeach
Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a) allows the admission of evidence
of a witness's criminal convictions for purposes of impeachment if the
1733. When evidence is cumulative its probative value is minimal and thus there is a high
probability that it will be inadmissible. However, when evidence is cumulative there is also
a very good chance that the mistaken admission of the evidence will be harmless error.
Thus few cases where admitted evidence is cumulative will result in reversal. United States
v. Bettencourt, 614 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hernandez-Miranda, 601 F.2d
1104 (9th Cir. 1980).
However, these cases may be distinguishable from Bejar-Matrecios. In Hernandez and
Bettencourt the trial judges gave instructions to the juries about the limited purpose for
which the evidence was admitted. In Bejar-Mairecios the trial judge failed to give such an
instruction. The Ninth Circuit might have reasoned that the failure to give the limiting
instruction was reversible error in itself and thus the cumulativeness of the evidence is unim-
portant. This would explain the court's failure to go into the reversible error analysis. In
any event the court fails to make this clear.
1734. 618 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1980).
1735. Id. at 62.
1736. Id.
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prior crime was a felony or a crimenfalsi1737 Evidence admitted under
rule 609, contrary to the general rule prohibiting admission of extrinsic
evidence for purposes of impeachment, may be produced through spe-
cific instances of conduct.1
7 38
a. conviction under rule 609
Rule 609 deals solely with criminal convictions. The Ninth Circuit
has broadly interpreted the word conviction. A guilty verdict is a con-
viction under rule 609; hence, convictions pending appeal may be
used. 1739 Moreover, verdicts where judgments have not been rendered
are admissible,'74 ° even when the sentence is suspended and the con-
victing statute declared unconstitutional.'174  Recently the Ninth Cir-
cuit ruled admissible a verdict without a judgment where a motion for
judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 291742
1737. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) provides that:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evi-
dence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty
or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
1738. FED. R. EVID. 608(b). In relevant part rule 608(b) states that "[s]pecific instances of
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."
1739. FED. R. EvID. 609(e).
1740. United States v. Canaday, 466 F.2d 1191, 1192 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
White, 463 F.2d 18, 20 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972).
1741. United States v. White, 463 F.2d 18 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1024 (1972). Defendant Alexander was charged with possession of drugs without a prescrip-
tion. During his trial, he took the stand, and his three year-old prior conviction for man-
slaughter abortion was admitted to impeach him. The Ninth Circuit held that this use of the
evidence was proper even though the sentence was suspended, no judgment was imposed
and the Oregon statute under which he was convicted was later held unconstitutional. The
fact that a guilty verdict was rendered provided sufficient reason to presently impeach Alex-
ander's testimony. Id. at 20.
1742. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 provides:
(a) Motion before Submission to Jury. Motions for directed verdict are
abolished and motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. The
court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judg-
ment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or information
after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction of such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the government is not granted, the
defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right.
(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. If a motion for judgment of acquit-
tal is made at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the
motion, submit the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury
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was pending.1743 Thus, a jury verdict of guilty regardless of pending
motions or subsequent dispositions constitutes a conviction under rule
609. 1744
However, to combat possible unfairness to the defendant, evidence
of the pendency of these defense motions and subsequent dispositions
may be presented to the jury.174. This additional evidence insures that
the jury will give the evidence of conviction its appropriate weight,
thus, minimizing the prejudicial effect.
b. timing of a trial court's ruling
In the Ninth Circuit, a trial judge need not make a ruling on the
admissibility of rule 609 evidence in advance of the introduction of the
evidence at trial, 7 46 although the practice is encouraged.'747 The ad-
mission of evidence is subject to the sound discretion of the trial judge,
returns a verdict or after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without
having returned a verdict.
(c) Motion after Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or
is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal
may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such
further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is
returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of
acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It
shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has
been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury.
1743. United States v. Smith, 623 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1980).
1744. FED. R. EvID. 609(c) is the exception to this statement. Rule 609(c) provides:
Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this rule if (I) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other
equivalent procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person con-
victed, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was
punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction
has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of innocence.
1745. United States v. Smith, 623 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1980); FED. R. EvID. 609(e).
1746. United States v. Tercero, 640 F.2d 190, 196 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1084 (1981); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980); United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1977).
1747. In United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1034 (1980), the Ninth Circuit stated that motions in limine are beneficial for rea-
sons ofjudicial economy since they save jury time. Likewise, in United States v. Oakes, 565
F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1977), the court stated that when feasible a court should rule "in
advance on the admissibility of a criminal record so that [the defendant] can make an in-
formed decision whether or not to testify."
On the other hand, some judges feel that greater benefits may be gained if a trial judge
waits to rule on the admissibility of a criminal record until after the defendant has taken the
stand and finished his testimony on direct. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d at 1190
(Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting). At that point, the probative value can best be
weighed against its prejudicial effect because the trial court has the benefit of defendant's
actual testimony. Id.
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and the timing of the decision is accorded great deference by the ap-
peals court. 7 48 Although the refusal to rule in advance might cause a
dilemma for the defendant in planning his defense strategy, 1749 such a
decision is not necessarily error.1750 These rulings will not be reversed
except for a showing of abuse.
17 -1
c. preservation of the right to appeal
Under United States v. Murray, 752 a defendant had to take the
stand in order to preserve his right to appeal a rule 609 ruling. The
Ninth Circuit in 1979 overruled Murray in United States v. Cook.
753
However, under Cook a defendant must at least state on the record that
he would have testified if his prior conviction had been excluded.
754
Further, he must outline sufficiently the nature of his testimony so that
both the trial and appeals courts can perform the necessary balancing
contemplated under rule 609(a)(1). 7 5 This procedure insures that the
reviewing court has adequate evidence of the prejudice suffered by the
defendant. 1756
Two 1980 decisions were guided by Cook principles. In the first,
United States v. Hendershot, 757 the defendant did not take the stand
because of the trial court's advance ruling that his twelve year-old con-
viction for armed robbery could be used to impeach his testimony. The
Ninth Circuit held that its review had been preserved properly when
the defendant had stated on the record his intentions to take the stand
if his prior conviction was excluded. 718 In the other case, United States
v. Tercero, '1759 defendant's attorney had stated at the sidebar that even
if the court had ruled in advance and excluded the prior conviction,
Tercero would not have testified due to the existence of a potential re-
buttal witness. As a result, the Tercero court held that appellate review
1748. United States v. Tercero, 640 F.2d at 196; United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d at 1186.
1749. This may produce hardship for a defendant who does not wish to take the stand on
his own behalf for fear that evidence will be introduced to impeach his testimony which
would be inadmissible under rule 609, but which he would be unable to object to until the
evidence had already been introduced to the jury.
1750. See supra cases cited note 1748.
1751. 640 F.2d at 196.
1752. 492 F.2d 178, 197 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 942 (1974).
1753. 608 F.2d 1175, 1183-86 (9th Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
1754. Id. at 1186.
1755. Id.
1756. Id. at 1188 (Wallace, J., concurring).
1757. 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980).
1758. Id. at 651.
1759. 640 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1980).
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of the rule 609 ruling had not been preserved. Thus, both Hendershot
and Tercero are consistent applications of the Cook doctrine although
reaching different results.
In Tercero the Ninth Circuit also implicitly held that a defendant
has the right to appellate review for abuse of the trial court's refusal to
make an advance ruling even when the defendant does not take the
stand.1 760 Thus, review of the trial court's discretion in admitting evi-
dence under rule 609 or of the court's failure to rule on admissibility is
preserved if the defendant states that he will take the stand if the chal-
lenged prior conviction is excluded.
d rule 609(a)(1)
Evidence of all felony convictions occurring in the ten years prior
to trial are admissible under rule 609(a)(1) regardless of whether the
crime involves dishonesty. However, to insure that the evidence of the
prior conviction will be used by the jury solely for impeachment pur-
poses, the trial judge must find that the probative value of the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect. 761 If the judge finds otherwise, the evi-
dence is inadmissible. 1762 This determination should not be overruled
absent a showing of abuse of discretion. 763 Such an abuse may be
found if the trial court fails to apply appropriate legal principles in
balancing the probative value against the prejudicial effect.
17 6 1
The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Field, 765 considered several
factors in reviewing a trial court's admission into evidence of defen-
dant's prior conviction for receiving stolen property. First, the appel-
late court inquired into how recent the prior conviction was in relation
to the charged crime. Recent prior convictions are presumed to carry a
high degree of probity of the issue of veracity. 766 Also considered was
1760. Id. at 196. The court in fact did review this very question but held that the defend-
ant was not prejudiced by the introduction of the evidence, even if it was introduced, be-
cause he would not take the stand. Thus, there was no basis for review under Cook.
1761. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
1762. Id.
1763. United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hender-
shot, 614 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir.
1979) (en banc), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 1034 (1980).
1764. United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d 648, 653 (9th Cir. 1980) (trial court's placing
burden of showing prejudicial effect of prior conviction outweighed the probative value on
defendant was abuse of discretion).
1765. 625 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1980).
1766. Id. at 872. Rule 609(b) does not allow admission of a conviction that occurred if
more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of
the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the
later date, unless the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative
1981]
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the similarity of the two crimes. The greater the degree of similarity,
the more likely it is that the use of the prior conviction may signifi-
cantly prejudice the defendant because the jury might improperly use
the prior conviction to find that the defendant had a propensity to com-
mit the charged crime. 1767 The court finally considered whether the
prior crime suggested a lack of veracity. If it did not, evidence of the
prior crime would be irrelevant.
Affirming the trial court's determination that the conviction would
be more probative than prejudicial, the Field court held that the prior
conviction had been properly admitted. 1768 First, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the conviction for receiving stolen property had occurred
less than two years prior to defendant's trial for armed bank robbery;
thus, it was deemed highly probative. 1769 Moreover, the prejudice was
deemed slight because the prior conviction and the charged crime were
sufficiently dissimilar. 1770 Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
crime of receiving stolen goods suggested a lack of veracity.1771
Without reviewing the balancing done at the trial level, the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Hendershot1772 reversed and remanded be-
cause of its uncertainty that the trial court had used the correct legal
standards. 177  The lower court had admitted the evidence of defen-
dant's prior conviction under rule 609(a)(1) even though that convic-
tion had occurred twelve years before his present trial for armed bank
robbery. The defendant had urged that the prosecution had the burden
of persuasion of establishing that the probative value outweighed the
prejudicial effects. 17 7 4 The prosecution, however, had relied upon
Gordon v. United States1775 which placed this burden of persuasion on
the defendant. The Ninth Circuit rejected this view, 1776 and placed the
burden on the prosecution. Since the trial court gave no indication
value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially
outweighs its prejudicial effect.
This rule further requires that the proponent of evidence of a conviction beyond the ten year
limit must give notice to the adverse party so as to provide a fair opportunity to contest the
use of such evidence. FED. R. EvID. 609(b).
1767. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) attempts to avoid this risk.
1768. 625 F.2d at 872.
1769. Id.
1770. Id. The conviction for stolen property was found to be dissimilar to the charged
crime of armed bank robbery.
1771. Id.
1772. 614 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1980).
1773. Id. at 653.
1774. Id. at 652.
1775. 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
1776. 614 F.2d at 654.
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which standard it employed, the possibility that the trial court had ap-
plied an improper legal standard warranted reversal.
777
e. rule 609(a)(2)
Unlike rule 609(a)(1), rule 609(a)(2) is not limited to felonies. Any
conviction, misdemeanor or felony, which involves dishonesty or false
statement is admissible for impeachment purposes. 1778 Moreover, evi-
dence under rule 609(a)(2) is not subject to a balancing of its probity
against its prejudice1779 because crimenfalsi are deemed peculiarly pro-
bative of credibility. 780 Because rule 609(a)(2) crimes are not subject
to balancing, like those under rule 609(a)(1), convictions admissible
under rule 609(a)(2) are narrowly defined.' 781 The offense must be "in
the nature of a crimenfalsi, the commission of which involves some
element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the ac-
cused's propensity to testify truthfully."1782 Convictions of crimes such
as robbery and other crimes of violence are not considered within the
provisions of rule 609(a)(2).171 However, convictions of crimes involv-
ing the element of dishonesty or false statement are admissible under
the rule. Hence, in United States v. Brashier,1784 mail fraud was held to
be a crimen falsi since an element of that offense was the intent to
deceive or defraud.
1785
The Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Field 78 6 that forgery is
1777. Id.
1778. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
1779. United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 190 (10th Cir. 1978) (prior conviction of
burglary not automatically admissible under rule 609(a)(2)); United States v. Hayes, 553
F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.) (conviction for importation of cocaine, absent evidence of false writ-
ten or oral statements, does not necessarily involve dishonesty or false statement), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977); United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977) (petty
shoplifting not evidence of dishonesty or false statement); United States v. Brashier, 548
F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976) (conviction of conspiracy to issue unauthorized securities and mail
fraud does involve intent to deceive). The courts have refused to apply FED. R. EvID. 403 to
evidence admitted under rule 609(a)(2). Recently, in United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862
(9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit was presented with this argument but avoided the problem
because defendant had not raised this issue in his motion in imine at the trial level. Id. at
871 n.5.
1780. United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977).
1781. United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977).
1782. United States v. Brashier, 548 F.2d 1315, 1326 (9th Cir. 1976) (quoting CONFERENCE
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, re-
printedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7098, 7103).
1783. United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 190 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1977).
1784. 548 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1976).
1785. Id. at 1327.
1786. 625 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1980).
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a crimenfalsi, and thus, evidence of that crime was admissible under
rule 609(a)(2). 17 8 7 An essential element of forgery is the intent to
deceive. 78" Under Brashier, the evidence of the forgery conviction in
Field was admissible because it directly bore on the defendant's credi-
bility as a witness.
3. Hearsay
Rule 801(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at a
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted."' 1789 Hearsay evidence is not admissible in federal courts. 17 9 0
Exceptions to the hearsay rule, however, are numerous.
The Anglo-American rule against hearsay testimony developed in
response to the fact that hearsay lacked three ideal conditions for testi-
mony: oath, personal presence, and cross-examination. 1791 These con-
ditions both encourage witnesses to put forth their best efforts and
expose inaccuracies in perception, memory and narration. 792 The
presence or absence of these conditions, however, is not always an ac-
curate measure of evidentiary reliability. 1793 The Federal Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence attempted to effect a sensible accom-
modation between ideal and non-ideal testimony in the formulation of
the federal hearsay rules. 1794 Consequently, the scheme adopted was a
modified common law system of class exceptions, with the addition of
the open-ended provisions in rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5), plus the




By definition, 1796 out-of-court statements are not hearsay when of-
1787. Id. at 871.
1788. Id.
1789. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
1790. FED. R. EVID. 802.
1791. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 245, at 581 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK].
1792. Id.
1793. See id. at 582-84.
1794. FED. R. EVID., Article VIII, ADV. COMM. NOTES, 51 F.R.D. 315, 409 (1971).
1795. 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 800[02], at 800-13 (1979) [hereinafter cited as WEIN-
STEIN]. Types of prior statements excluded from the definition of hearsay are set forth in
FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
1796. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
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fered to prove some fact other than the truth of their content. 1797 Two
1980 Ninth Circuit cases illustrate this point.
In United States v. Ponticelli,1798 the defendant had been convicted
of perjury for testifying before a grand jury that he could not remember
how he came into possession of a loan shark's client list. At trial, de-
fendant Ponticelli offered the testimony of his former attorney, to
whom Ponticelli had stated, prior to his grand jury testimony, that he
could not remember where he had obtained the list. Ponticelli argued
that the former attorney's testimony was offered to indirectly show the
defendant's state of mind or bad memory, not to prove the substance of
the statement. The trial court, however, excluded the testimony as
hearsay, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed-without much discussion.
1799
This decision is proper since Ponticelli's statement to his attorney that
he could not remember was offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted-Ponticelli's lack of memory.18°°
In United States v. May,' 80' the Ninth Circuit held that the admis-
sion of a written name was not hearsay. The defendants had trespassed
on government property at a Trident missile base, where they had been
caught and photographed and identified on "Apprehension Data
Cards." 1802 Defense objected to the admission of these cards as
hearsay.
After first holding that the photographs on the cards were not
hearsay,18 0 3 the May court held that the names on the cards were not
hearsay but were circumstantial evidence that the person photographed
was actually the person named.18 14 Citing other Ninth Circuit cases in
1797. An example of a non-hearsay use of out-of-court statements is where such state-
ments are "relied on as constituting slander or deceit for which damages are sought." Mc-
CORMICK, supra note 1791, § 249, at 589; see also, e.g., United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000
(9th Cir. 1980) (photograph was non-hearsay).
1798. 622 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1980).
1799. Id. at 991. The Ninth Circuit focused on defendant's major contention that the
statement fell within the "state of mind" hearsay exception of rule 803(3). See infra notes
1824-27 and accompanying text.
1800. Statements offered to circumstantially show the declarant's state of mind are not
hearsay. However, direct statements of a declarant's state of mind are considered hearsay.
See McCORMICK, supra note 1791, § 249, at 590-91.
1801. 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980).
1802. Id. at 1002-03.
1803. Id. at 1007 ("a photograph is not an assertion, oral, written, or nonverbal, as re-
quired by FED. R. EVID. 801(a)").
1804. Id. ("We can know a person's name only by being told, either by the person or
someone else, unless, of course, we happen to have christened the person. But a name,
however learned, is not really testimonial. Rather it is a bit of circumstantial evidence.").
1981],
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which written names had been admitted as non-hearsay,80 5 the court
concluded that in May a stronger foundation existed for the admission
of the names than had existed in the previous decisions.
I80 6
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, statements of co-conspira-
tors180 7 are also not hearsay if the statements are made "during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."'' 8 08 For these statements
to be admissible there must also be sufficient independent evidence of
the conspiracy.' 809
The courts have often stated that in order to be "in furtherance" of
a conspiracy a statement "'must be an act in furtherance of the com-
mon object; mere conversation between conspirators is not that.' "1810
Hence, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Eubanks18 " that a
conspirator's statements made to a common-law wife were merely in-
formational, not attempts to draw her into the conspiracy.18 1 2 Yet,
statements made to keep co-conspirators abreast of conspirators' activi-
ties, to induce continued participation in the conspiracy, or to allay
fears about the continued operation of the conspiracy are deemed to be
"in furtherance" of the conspiracy.' 8' 3 In spite of these general princi-
ples, whether a statement was made with the purpose of furthering the
object of the conspiracy may be susceptible to various appellate court
interpretations. In the 1980 case of United States v. Castillo, 1 4 the "in
furtherance" element was deemed unfulfilled. The Ninth Circuit held
that the lower court had erred in admitting a confederate's remark to a
friend that "[w]e are fixing to kill a Mexican."'' 8 1 5 The appellate court
held that the remark was not made to further the conspiracy, but
1805. United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Campbell, 466
F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1972); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
1806. 622 F.2d at 1008.
1807. See United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940, 946 (9th Cir. 1980) (out-of-court statements
by coparticipants in a mail or wire fraud scheme are admissible according to the same rules).
1808. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). The federal rules classify statements of co-conspirators
as non-hearsay. The majority rule merely grants an exception to the hearsay rule for such
statements. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 54, at 192 (1978).
1809. United States v. Batimana, 623 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Smith,
623 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lutz, 621 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1980).
1810. United States v. Birbaum, 337 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir. 1964) (quoting United States
v. Nardone, 106 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.), re'd on other grounds, 308 U.S. 338 (1939)).
1811. 591 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1979).
1812. Id. at 520.
1813. United States v. Eaglin, 571 F.2d 1069, 1083 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Salazar, 405 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); accord, United States v. James, 510 F.2d
546, 549-50 (5th Cir. 1975) (allayed suspicions).
1814. 615 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1980).
1815. Id. at 883.
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rather, was merely a "casual admission to someone he had decided to
trust."'18 16 This conclusion accords with previous Ninth Circuit case
law.1
8 17
Ruling the other way, a divided Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Sandoval-Villalvazo,'818 affirmed the lower court's admission of a state-
ment made by one co-conspirator to another in the presence of a poten-
tial narcotics "buyer," an undercover agent from the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA). While waiting for the narcotics
seller to arrive, the conspirator had stated, "'Your Campa Rafa, he has
no compassion on those of us who are just trying to make a buck or two
.... Just because he has made his millions he doesn't worry about
us.' ,,1819 The majority of the appellate court held that the lower court
was warranted in inferring that the statement was designed to keep the
DEA "buyer" from leaving the scene, and was therefore "in further-
ance" of the conspiracy. 1820 The dissenting Ninth Circuit judge consid-
ered the statement to be merely "idle conversation between two
conspirators" that did nothing to further the conspiracy.'182  In light of
the long wait for the seller, however, the majority's conclusion appears
correct and follows other precedent.1
8 2 2
b. exceptions
i. then existing state of mind
Hearsay in the form of "[a] statement of the declarant's then ex-
isting state of mind" is admissible into evidence. 18 23 Such a statement
is deemed sufficiently trustworthy to admit into evidence because of its
contemporaneousness with the state of mind.'82 4
In United States v. Ponticelli,812 5 the Ninth Circuit considered
1816. Id.
1817. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1975) (admission of
culpability not "in furtherance" of conspiracy), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
1818. 620 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1980).
1819. Id. at 746.
1820. Id. at 747. The court noted that the undercover agent had waited about three and
one half hours before the narcotics source had shown up. During the wait, other codefend-
ants had repeatedly told the agent, acting as a buyer, that the source was being located. Id.
1821. Id. at 748 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
1822. See United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1975). In a drug sale similar to
that in Sandoval-Vilialvazo, a coconspirator had said "the contact" had been made. The
James court viewed this statement as made in furtherance of the conspiracy because it al-
layed the suspicions of the buyer. Id. at 549-50; accord, United States v. Salazar, 405 F.2d
74 (9th Cir. 1968) (per curiam).
1823. FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
1824. MCCoRMICK, supra note 1791, § 294, at 695.
1825. 622 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1980).
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whether a statement made by an arrestee to his attorney met the re-
quirements of the state of mind exception. Ponticelli was convicted of
perjury for testifying to a grand jury that he did not remember how he
came into possession of a loan shark's client list. Ponticelli offered to
have his former attorney, who had represented him in a previous crimi-
nal prosecution related to the same loan sharking activities, testify that
Ponticelli had told the attorney, prior to the grand jury proceeding, that
he could not remember how he had obtained the list. The district court
sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objection and excluded the proffered
testimony. Ponticelli's counsel argued that the testimony came within
the state of mind exception. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling, however, observing that Ponticelli had been allowed a
chance for reflection and misrepresentation before making the state-
ment. Thus, the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it found
that the statement was not sufficiently reliable to admit. This decision
comports with the rationale behind the exception.
18 26
ii. business records
Certain records are admissible hearsay if they have been produced
in the course of a "regularly conducted business activity." 8 27 The unu-
sual reliability of such records is guaranteed by the following factors:
(1) the duty of the recordkeeper accurately to record information under
penalty of embarrassment or censure, (2) the customary checking or
auditing of entries for correctness, (3) the habits of precision developed
by recordkeepers from the regularity and continuity of such records,
and (4) the reliance by businesses on such records.
828
Before business records may be admitted into evidence, however,
certain foundational requirements must be met. The records must have
1826. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) & (2), ADV. CoMM. NOTES, 51 F.R.D. 315, 423 (1971). Excep-
tion (3) is essentially a "specialized application" of exception (I), since both are present
sense impressions. Id. at 424.
1827. FED. R. EvID. 803(6), provides the following:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from informa-
tion transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activ-
ity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by
the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of infor-
mation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution,
association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not con-
ducted for profit.
1828. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1795, 803(6)[01], at 803-150; MCCORMICK, supra note 1791,
§ 306, at 720; 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1522, at 442-43 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE].
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been produced in the course of a regularly conducted business activity;
the making of such records must have been a regular practice of that
business activity; the records must have been made by, or from infor-
mation transmitted by, a person with personal knowledge of the sub-
stance of the records; the records must have been made at or near the
time of the events recorded; and a custodian of the records or other
qualified witness must testify to the foregoing facts.182 9
In United States v. Basey, 1830 defendant's college records had been
admitted into evidence to establish defendant's address. In a brief foot-
note, the Ninth Circuit determined that it was not necessary for the
custodian, who testified to the foundation requirements, personally to
have recorded the information or to know who did.'83 ' Although the
Ninth Circuit had not decided this specific question since the adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the decision is in accord with the
understanding of the Senate Judiciary Committee,8 32 decisions by
other circuits,8 33 and the opinions of several commentators.
8 34
In United States v. Sims,1 35 the Ninth Circuit considered whether
an FBI report prepared in a bank robbery investigation would be ad-
1829. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). See generally WEINSTEIN, supra note 1795, 803(6)[02]-[05].
1830. 613 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980).
1831. Id at 201-02 n.1.
1832. The Senate Committee Report to Rule 803(6) states:
It is the understanding of the committee that the use of the phrase "person
with knowledge" is not intended to imply that the party seeking to introduce the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation must be able to produce, or even
identify, the specific individual upon whose first-hand knowledge the memoran-
dum, report, record or data compilation was based. A sufficient foundation for the
introduction of such evidence will be laid if the party seeking to introduce the
evidence is able to show that it was the regular practice of the activity to base such
memorandums, reports, records, or data compilations upon a transmission from a
person with knowledge ....
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7051, 7063.
1833. United States v. Reese, 568 F.2d 1246, 1252 (6th Cir. 1977) (photocopies of newspa-
per articles to prove hospital's visiting hours were admissible; custodian need not have per-
sonal knowledge of the substance of the articles); United States v. Colyer, 571 F.2d 941, 947
(5th Cir.) (credit card purchase tickets were admissible with testimony from bank official as
to how credit card system works; custodian need not have personal knowledge of the actual
creation of the document), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978); United States v. Rose, 562 F.2d
409, 410 (7th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (booking records from prior arrest of defendant in
another state were admissible upon authentication by custodian, who had not made the
records nor been custodian at the time the records were made); United States v. Page, 544
F.2d 982, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1976) (auto lease agreement admissible; custodian need not have
personal knowledge of the document's creation).
1834. McCoRMICK, supra note 1791, § 312, at 729-30; WENSTEIN, supra note 1795,
803(6)[02], at 803-151 to 153; WIGMORE, supra note 1828, § 1530, at 451.
1835. 617 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980).
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missible as a business record. The defendant was convicted of a bank
robbery primarily on the strength of a teller's identification. The report
contained a description of the bank robber given by another eyewit-
ness, a customer. This description differed from the one given by the
teller. Because the customer had died prior to trial, the defendant
sought to introduce the FBI report under the business records excep-
tion. The trial court declined to admit the report, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, first holding that the public records exception,' 836 rule 803(8),
not the business records exception, clearly covers admissibility of re-
ports made by law enforcement officers. Moreover, the appellate court
held that, assuming arguendo that the FBI report would have been ad-
missible under the public records exception, it was not plain error to
deny admission of the report because this ground was not raised in the
lower court.
1837
The first holding accords with previous Ninth Circuit case law. 8 38
The legislative history of rule 803(8), however, does not show that Con-
gress intended it to be the exclusive exception under which public
records would be admissible.18 39 Nevertheless, the FBI report in Sims
did not meet the requirements of the business records exception.'
8 40
iii. public records
Public records and reports are excepted from the hearsay rule
under certain conditions.' 8 4 1 Public records are deemed to be inher-
ently reliable. The public records exception is justified by the high
probability that a public officer will carry out his official duty to make
accurate records and by the possibility that public inspection of such
records may reveal inaccuracies and cause them to be corrected.' 4
Furthermore, this exception is necessary to prevent the inconvenience
and waste of bringing into court public officials whose memories are
1836. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
1837. 617 F.2d at 1377-78.
1838. See United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920
(1979).
1839. WEINSTEmN, supra note 1795, 1 803(8)[01], at 803-195, and 1 803(8)[04], at 803-208 to
212.
1840. This is essentially a problem of double hearsay. McCoRMIcK, supra note 1791,
§ 310, at 725-26. "[A] business record containing an assertion by someone other than the
maker should be admitted to prove the truth of that assertion only if the assertion itself
comes within an exception to the hearsay rule." Id; see WEINSTEIN, supra note 1795, $
803(6)[04], at 803-160; FED. R. EVID. 803(6), ADV. COMM. NoTES, 51 F.R.D. 315, 427 (1971).
1841. FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
1842. MCCORMICK, supra note 1791, § 315, at 735-36.
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probably less reliable than the written records.18 43 Unlike the business
records exception, the public records exception requires no foundation
due to its unusually high level of accuracy.' 44
Rule 803(8) expressly excludes records of law enforcement officers
in criminal cases,18 45 however. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the scope
of this law enforcement records exclusion in United States v. Her-
nandez-Rojas.8 46 The defendant was convicted of illegal reentry into
the United States. To establish his prior deportation, the Government
introduced into evidence a deportation warrant which contained a
dated notation signed by a United States Immigration Officer. The no-
tation stated that the defendant had been "Deported to Mexico, Calex-
ico, California." The defendant argued that the deportation warrant
was inadmissible hearsay because it was an observation made by a law
enforcement officer in a criminal case. While noting that the law en-
forcement exception to rule 803(8) has been inflexibly applied by some
circuits, the Ninth Circuit concluded, that Congress had not intended to
exclude routine, non-adversarial records.' 47 As a result, the deporta-
tion warrant was deemed admissible. The weight of authority supports
this decision.
8 48
1843. Id at 736; Report, New Jersey Supreme Court, Committee on Evidence 189 (1963),
quoted in WEINSTEIN, supra note 1795, 803(8)[0 1], at 803-190.
1844. WEINSTEIN, supra note 1795, 803(8)[01], at 803-191.
1845. FED. R. EvD. 803(8)(B) provides a hearsay exception for "matters observed pursu-
ant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, how-
ever, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement
personnel. . . ." (emphasis added).
1846. 617 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1980). The Ninth Circuit followed the Hernandez-Rojas deci-
sion in United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980).
1847. 617 F.2d at 534-35 (citing United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977)). In
Oates, defendant was convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute. The official
report and accompanying worksheet of a United States Customs Service chemist were ad-
mitted into evidence in the trial court under the business records exception, rule 803(6). On
appeal, the Second Circuit, analyzing the admissibility of the chemist's report and worksheet
under the public records exception, found that "it was the clear intention of Congress to
make evaluative and law enforcement reports absolutely inadmissible against defendants in
criminal cases." 560 F.2d at 72 (emphasis added). Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger
have assailed this opinion as "unjustifiable and pernicious in effect." Weinstein, supra note
1795, 803(8)[04], at 803-210.
1848. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir.) (computer cards made by customs
officials, containing the license numbers of automobiles which passed through the border,
were admissible since they were not made in an adversarial situation that might cloud the
officials' perception), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 920 (1979); United States v. Union Nacional de
Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 390-91 (1st Cir. 1978) (defendant sought to exclude certified
copy of marshal's return, stating he had served injunction on defendant; court cited legisla-
tive history of rule 803(8) to decide Congress did not intend to cut back on common law rule
that sheriffs returns are admissible as "official records"); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d
598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (routine records made by Irish police of weapons' serial numbers
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iv. absence of records
The absence of a public record, or the non-occurrence of an event
which a public record normally chronicles, can be proved by evidence
that a diligent search failed to disclose the record. 1849 This exception to
the hearsay rule is an extension of the public records exception. The
absence of a record that would have been made by a public official
under a duty accurately to make such records is considered as reliably
probative of the non-occurrence of an event, just as the presence of a
record would be probative of occurrence.
1850
In United States v. Neff, an IRS "Certificate of Assessments
and Payments," stating that defendant had not paid federal income
taxes during certain years, was admitted into evidence by the trial
court. A custodian of IRS records testified that, in producing the docu-
ment, he had researched the National Computer Center where all tax
information for every individual is merged. Defendant argued that the
certificate was inadmissible hearsay because the prosecution failed to
prove that a diligent search had been made. The Ninth Circuit curtly
found that the failure to include the word "diligent" is an insufficient
were not within law enforcement records exclusion of rule 803(8)(B)); WEINSTEIN, supra
note 1795; 1 803(8)[04], at 803-208 to 213; see S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11,
reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7051, 7064 ("Ostensibly, the reason for this
exclusion [of law enforcement records] is that observations by police officers at the scene of
the crime or the apprehension of the defendant are not as reliable as observations by public
officials in other cases because of the adversarial nature of the confrontation between police
and the defendant in criminal cases." [emphasis added]); see also United States v. Stone, 604
F.2d 922, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1979) (Treasury Department official's affidavit certifying a pro-
gress sheet, to show that a check had been placed in the mail, was not admissible because it
was "litigation-oriented"; hearsay exception in rule 803(8)(A) "designed to allow admission
of official records and reports prepared by an agency or government office for purposes
independent of specific litigation"); United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966-69 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (discussing admission of police records under business records exception, the court
stated that records relating primarily to the "systematic conduct of police business" may be
admissible) (quoting United States v. Ware, 247 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 1957)); United States
v. Verlin, 466 F. Supp. 155, 159-60 (N.D. Texas 1979) (fire department's tape recording of
incoming phone call admissible as a business record; routine recordings not prepared in
anticipation of litigation are admissible).
The Ninth Circuit upheld the Hernandez-Rojas rule in United States v. Bejar-Ma-
trecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980).
1849. FED. R. EvID. 803(10) provides:
To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any
form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report,
statement, or data compilation, in any form, was regularly made and preserved by
a public office or agency, evidence in the form of a certification in accordance with
rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report,
statement, or data compilation, or entry ... [is not excluded by the hearsay rule].
1850. See WIGMORE, supra note 1828, § 1531, at 463.
1851. 615 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980).
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ground to exclude evidence of the absence of a public record. 8 52
4. Privileges
Since 1975, federal evidentiary privileges have been governed by
rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 501 provides that priv-
ileges "shall be governed by the principles of the common law as...
interpreted. . . in the light of reason and experience."' 1853 For exam-
ple, in Trammel v. United States,8 54 the United States Supreme Court
in 1980 reviewed a marital privilege 8 55 to determine if it required
amendment in light of "reason and experience."' 56 The Court held
that adverse spousal testimony could be barred only by the witness
spouse, thus preventing the accused spouse from claiming the privi-
lege. 8 57 In sum, privileges, new1858 and old, are subject to case-by-case
scrutiny. 8 .59
a. attorney-client
Like the marital privileges,18 60 the attorney-client privilege'
86'
only applies to confidential communications. 8 62 Thus, as reaffirmed in
the 1980 Ninth Circuit case of United States v. lores,8 63 either the
1852. Id at 1242.
1853. FED. R. EVID. 501. This language governs criminal matters and, generally, federal
question actions. Cf. FED. R. CRiM. P. 26. However, rule 501 requires state privilege law to
apply in "civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which state law supplies the rule of decision." FED. R. EVID. 501; see 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVI-
DENCE 1 501[02], at 501-19 (1980). For a general discussion of federal privilege law, see 10 J.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACnCE 500.03-.21 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1980-81).
1854. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
1855. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (adverse spousal testimony could
be barred by either the witness spouse or the defendant spouse).
1856. 445 U.S. at 47 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 501); see 445 U.S. at 48-53.
1857. Id at 53 ("This modification... furthers the important public interest in marital
harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs."); see United States
v. Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035 (9th Cir. 1979) (defendant could not invoke marital privilege
to bar third party witness from relating excited utterances by defendant's spouse), cert. de-
nied, 445 U.S. 966 (1980).
1858. See United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 366-68 (1980) (state legislators may not
claim a privilege which bars evidence of state legislative acts in federal criminal prosecu-
tions). See infra notes 1886-1914 and accompanying text.
1859. 2 WEINsTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 501[03], at 501-30 (1980).
1860. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 1791, §§ 66-67, at 78-86.
1861. See Matter of Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir. 1977) (elements of privilege);
United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1978) (burden of proof).
1862. Genson v. United States, 534 F.2d 719, 728 (7th Cir. 1976) (transfer of monies by
client to attorney does not represent a communication which the client could anticipate as
confidential). See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 1791, § 91, at 187.
1863. 628 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1980).
1981]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
attorney or the client may assert the privilege to bar the disclosure of
"communications obtained from [the] client during the course of the
client's search for legal advice from the [attorney] in his capacity as a
lawyer which were made in confidence by the client to the [attorney],
[if] the privilege with respect to these communications has not been
waived."'1864 Whether the attorney-client privilege exists 1865 is deter-
mined at the trial court hearing where the party invoking the privilege
must establish that the attorney was acting in the capacity of a legal
advisor.
18 66
Moreover, the attorney-client privilege does not protect communi-
cations made in the furtherance of criminal activities. 867 For example,
in United States v. Berry,1868 the Ninth Circuit stated that an attorney
cannot assert the privilege to bar testimony which would reveal that the
defendant attorney had discussed and condoned the criminally fraudu-
lent schemes of clients. 1
8 69
The identity of a client is generally not considered a confidential
communication, 1870 and thus not privileged. The Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the scope of this principle in United States v. Flores.18 7 ' In
Flores, Thorp was an attorney who, after being consulted by approxi-
1864. Id at 526.
1865. United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977) (remanded for an eviden-
tiary hearing to determine whether attorney-client privilege breached).
1866. Communications made when an attorney is acting in a capacity other than a legal
advisor do not fall within the privilege. United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.
1980) (attorney acting as business advisor); accord, United States v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 39
(9th Cir. 1978) (corporate counsel acting neither as attorney nor agent of invoking party);
United States v. Stern, 511 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (2d Cir.) (accused sought advice from attor-
ney not as a legal advisor but as a potential codefendant), cer. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975);
see United States v. Palmer, 536 F.2d 1278, 1281 (9th Cir. 1976) (attorney acted "as a trans-
fer-shipping agent dealing with material real evidence, not as a legal advisor concerning a
confidential communication.").
1867. United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977); accord,
United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1972), cer. denied, 416 U.S. 943
(1974); United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823, 827 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 909
(1971); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967); Pollock v. United
States, 202 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 993 (1953); United States v. Bob,
106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); see Clark v. United States, 289
U.S. 1, 15-16 (1933) (dicta) (party seeking to overcome a claim of attorney-client privilege by
invoking the improper purpose exception has the burden of producing prima facie evidence
to sustain a finding that the challenged communications were made in furtherance of a
crime). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2298 (rev. ed. 1961).
1868. 627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980).
1869. Id at 200.
1870. In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882, 887-89 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
See generaly MCCORMICK, supra note 1791, § 90, at 185.
1871. 628 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1980).
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mately seventy clients, including the defendant, prepared fifteen ad-
ministrative claims, alleging various civil rights violations. In one
claim, the defendant admitted he had possessed a firearm. Subse-
quently, the defendant, a convicted felon, was indicted for possession
of a firearm. 8 2 In that prosecution, the Government sought to intro-
duce the particular administrative claim which demonstrated that the
defendant had possessed a firearm. The defendant filed a motion in
limine to exclude the civil claim, arguing, inter alia, that it was hearsay.
To avoid the hearsay problem, Thorp was called to the witness stand
by the Government to establish a foundation for admission of the claim
as an authorized statement of the defendant's agent. 8 73 While on the
stand, Thorp was asked a series of questions regarding whether some of
his clients had authorized the civil claims and whether Flores was one
of those clients.1874 In response, Thorp invoked the attorney-client
privilege. The district court found Thorp in contempt, and he
appealed.
The court of appeals first held that responses to the questions in-
volving whether the civil claim was authorized by some clients were not
privileged, and, thus, Thorp could be compelled to respond by affirma-
tion or denial. 8 75 The court's holding is justified because the adminis-
trative claim, a public document, was not intended to remain
confidential. 8 76 The court also held that Thorp had to respond to the
question regarding the identity of his client. 18 77 Although the identity
of a client is generally not considered a confidential communica-
tion, 87 8 the Ninth Circuit had held in Baird v. Koerner179 that when
disclosure of the identity of a client creates a strong probability that the
client will be implicated for criminal behavior, the privilege must be
invoked to avoid disclosure of the client's identity.188 0 The F/ores court
distinguished Baird on the ground that, in Baird, the criminal charges
involved the same criminal activity for which the legal advice was
sought,'188 whereas, in Flores, the original consultation by Flores did
1872. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202 (1976).
1873. See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 1791, § 267, at 639.
1874. 628 F.2d at 524.
1875. Id at 526.
1876. Id.
1877. Id
1878. See supra note 1870 and accompanying text.
1879. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
1880. Id at 630.
1881. 628 F.2d at 526. In Baird, a client sought advice from his attorney concerning pay-
ment of back-due taxes to the IRS. The client gave the attorney the back-due amount which
the attorney anonymously sent to the IRS. Subsequently, the IRS subpoenaed the attorney
1981]
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not concern a criminal charge facing Flores.18 8 2
However, the rationale of Baird supports Thorp's position. As the
court in Baird stated:
The doctrine is based on public policy. While it is the great
purpose of law to ascertain the truth, there is the counter-
vailing necessity of insuring the right of every person to freely
and fully confer and confide in one having knowledge of the
law, and skilled in its practice, in order that the former may
have adequate advice and a proper defense. This assistance
can be made safely and readily available 9nly when the client
is free from the consequences of apprehension of disclosure
by reason of the subsequent statements of the skilled
lawyer.18
8 3
Thus, the Flores court's holding that Thorp must reveal the identity of
his client contradicts the public policy which seeks to insure free and
confidential disclosure between attorney and client. 884 The decision,
however, is supported by other authority.1185 In sum, while the Flores
holding is distinguishable from Baird and has general support, the pub-
lic policy advocated in Baird is frustrated by the conclusion in Flores.
b. other: United States v. Gillock1
8 8 6
Several privileges involving "confidential communications" are
not recognized by the Ninth Circuit under rule 501.1887 In United
States v. Webb,1888 the Ninth Circuit was asked to recognize a clergy-
man-penitent privilege. The court, avoiding the central issue,1889 held
that a prisoner's confession to a prison chaplain was not privileged be-
to reveal the name of the client, presumably in an effort to charge the client with criminal
violations of IRS laws. The attorney invoked the attorney-client privilege to bar disclosure,
and the Ninth Circuit agreed that the client's identity was privileged. 279 F.2d at 635.
1882. 628 F.2d at 526.
1883. 279 F.2d at 629-30.
1884. The court's logic is questionable. It stated: "[A]t worst, the [administrative] claim is
only circumstantial evidence that the. . . Alfredo Flores charged in [the criminal claim] is
the same Alfredo Flores named in the administrative claim." 628 F.2d at 526.
1885. See generalo , Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1047, 1058-59.
1886. 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
1887. See, e.g., United States v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (in proceeding
to enforce IRS summons, court held no federally recognized employer-stenographer privi-
lege). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2394 (rev. ed. 1961).
1888. 615 F.2d 828 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
1889. This issue was also avoided in United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 432 (9th Cir.
1973) (no showing made by the plaintiff that clergyman privilege violated). But see In re
Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (clergyman-penitent privilege acknowl-
edged in criminal matters in federal courts).
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cause the communication was given in the presence of a third party, a
security officer, thus destroying its confidentiality.18 9  The court further
stated that even if the court were to recognize the clergyman-penitent
privilege, '89 ' the defendant would have to establish that confidentiality
is not required if a prisoner takes reasonable steps to insure it.'8 92 As-
suming that the prison officials allowed such steps, the court found that
the defendant had not taken them.
893
The Supreme Court in United States v. HeIstoski894 held that the
speech or debate clause of the Constitution bars the introduction of
evidence in a federal prosecution of the legislative acts of a federal leg-
islator.8 95 In United States v. Gillock, 896 a state legislator argued that
evidence of his state legislative acts should be excluded from a federal
criminal prosecution.8 97 In Gillock, the defendant, a former Tennessee
state legislator, was indicted on seven federal charges of accepting fees
for using his office for personal gains. The Government sought to in-
troduce damaging evidence of his legislative activities. The district
court, relying on rule 501, granted the defendant's motion to sup-
press. 898 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling, al-
though excluding a few items from the suppression order since they
were deemed to be insufficiently related to the legislative process. 8 99
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed.1 9 The
Court concluded that no authority existed either in the Federal Rules
of Evidence' 90' or in the Constitution' 902 for extending thefederal priv-
ilege to state legislators. The Court initially reasoned that, although
the federal privilege rule is flexible, 9 3 neither its predecessor in the
proposed rules' 904 nor principles of federalism 90 5 compelled a state
1890. 615 F.2d at 828.
1891. The clergyman-penitent privilege has been recognized elsewhere. See Mullen v.
United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("a clergyman shall not disclose ... the
secrets of a penitent's confidential confession .. , at least absent the penitent's consent.").
1892. 615 F.2d at 828.
1893. Id
1894. 442 U.S. 477, 489 (1979) (evidence of a defendant's committee activities and his
votes and speeches on the floor of the state senate would be inadmissible).
1895. Id at 494.
1896. 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
1897. Id at 362.
1898. Id
1899. Id
1900. Id at 374.
1901. Id at 367.
1902. Id at 366.
1903. Id at 367.
1904. Id Under the Judicial Conference's proposed rules, federal courts would have been
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legislative privilege analogous to the privilege extended to federal legis-
lators. The Court was not swayed by the fact that if Tennessee had
prosecuted the defendant, most of the evidence could have been
blocked by the defendant under a state-recognized privilege.190 6 Ac-
cordingly, the Court noted that the state-recognized privilege, by itself,
did not authorize a similar federal privilege. 9 °7
Furthermore, although state legislators enjoy that privilege in
federal civil proceedings, 908 the Court stated that neither historical
antecedents nor the policy considerations which underlie the speech or
debate clause dictated that the Court recognize a comparable eviden-
tiary privilege for state legislators in federal criminal prosecutions. 90 9
The "separation of powers" rationale which is the basis of the speech or
debate clause would not warrant an extension of the federal privilege to
state legislators.1910 Moreover, although the need to insure legislative
independence is a valid policy consideration, the courts have balked at
immunizing state officials from federal civil suits.' 91'
Finally, the Court based its decision on two related rationales.
First, the Court reasoned that an evidentiary privilege for state legisla-
tors would impair the federal government's prosecution of violations of
criminal statutes.' 9' 2 Second, the Court noted that Congress had
permitted to apply only nine enumerated privileges, which did not include a state legislator's
privilege. See PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE §§ 501-513, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230-60
(1973).
1905. "IT]he claimed privilege was not... indelibly ensconced in our common law or an
imperative of federalism." 445 U.S. at 368.
1906. TENN. CONST. art. II, § 13.
1907. 445 U.S. at 368; see Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 13 (1934) (the admissibility
of evidence in criminal trials "is to be controlled by common law principles, not by local
statute").
1908. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951); see infra note 1911 and accompany-
ing text.
1909. 445 U.S. at 373.
1910. "Two interrelated rationales underlie the Speech or Debate Clause: first, the need to
avoid intrusion by the Executive or Judiciary into the affairs of a coequal branch, and sec-
ond, the desire to protect legislative independence." Id at 369.
1911. The Court distinguished Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), in the following
statement:
Although Tenney reflects this Court's sensitivity to interference with the function-
ing of state legislators, we do not read that opinion as broadly as Gillock would
have us. First, Tenney was a civil action brought by a private plaintiff to vindicate
private rights. Moreover, the cases in this Court which have recognized an immu-
nity from civil suit for state officials have presumed the existence of federal crimi-
nal liability as a restraining factor on the conduct of state officials.
445 U.S. at 372.
1912. Id at 373; see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (the executive privilege
yields to the interests of enforcing federal criminal statutes).
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neither provided nor authorized federal courts to apply a speech or de-
bate clause privilege to state legislators. 91 3 Thus, the Court reasonably
concluded that "although principles of comity command careful con-
sideration, our cases disclose that where important federal interests are






Retrial after mistrial is precluded by the double jeopardy clause in
the absence of "manifest necessity" for the mistrial. 9 15 Since this is not
a mechanical standard,191 6 appellate courts have gradually outlined on
a case by case basis when a trial court abuses its discretion by declaring
a mistrial without manifest necessity.91 7 Recently, the Ninth Circuit
1913. 445 U.S. at 374.
1914. Id at 373.
1915. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824).
1916. See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-06 (1978) (trial judge did not need to
articulate all of the factors justifying declaration of mistrial because record showed defense
counsel had aired highly improper and prejudicial information before jury).
1917. For instances where the trial court abused its discretion, see, e.g., United States v.
Join, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (plurality opinion) (trial judge declared mistrial on his own motion
after concluding, despite one witness's statements to the contrary, that the IRS had failed to
warn properly five taxpayer witnesses of their right against self-incrimination); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) (jury discharge after prosecution failed to produce key
witness); United States v. McKoy, 591 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1979) (trial judge failed to consider
adequately alternatives to mistrial); United States v. Rich, 589 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1978)
(trial court could give no reason for mistrial and none was apparent on record); Mizell v.
Attorney Gen., 586 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1978) (failure to consider alternatives to mistrial), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 967 (1979); Dunkerly v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1090 (1979); United States v. Horn, 583 F.2d 1124 (10th Cir. 1978) (jury sent note
declaring deadlock; judge gave Allen charge, allowed jurors overnight recess, and declared
mistrial next morning after a one hour deliberation); United States v. Starling, 571 F.2d 934
(5th Cir. 1978) (judge had unfounded assumptions regarding juror bias); United States ex
rel Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975) (mistrial declared after
six and one half hours of jury deliberation following a six day trial where judge received
only the foreman's opinion as to the hopelessness of the deadlock).
For instances where the trial court met the manifest necessity standard and thus prop-
erly exercised its discretion in declaring a mistrial, see, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.
497 (1978) (defense counsel's opening statement alluded to prosecutor's having hidden evi-
dence from defense at previous trial); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 (1973) (mistrial
based on indictment being insufficient to state a crime); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364
(196 1) (judge acted in sole interest of defendant in discharging jury when it appeared prose-
cution's questioning of leading witness would bring out inadmissible evidence); Wade v.
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (mistrial of court-martial because of military necessity); Lovato
v. New Mexico, 242 U.S. 199 (1916) (discharge ofjury after district attorney realized defend-
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considered this issue in two decisions.1 918 In a third decision, 1919 the
court addressed a related question, whether the double jeopardy clause
barred reprosecution after declaration of mistrial upon defendant's mo-
tion charging prosecutorial error. In Rogers v. United States,1920 the
Ninth Circuit held that the double jeopardy clause did not bar retrial
following a mistrial after a lengthy jury deadlock almost as long as the
trial itself.192 1 Defendant claimed that a lack of manifest necessity for a
declaration of mistrial after jury deadlock subjected him to double
jeopardy on the retrial. 922 The Ninth Circuit rebuffed the argument
by declaring that jury deadlock is a "classic example" of necessity for a
mistrial.192 The court refrained, however, from enunciating a per se
rule.192 4 Rather, the trial judge's determination that a particular jury
deadlock creates a necessity for a mistrial is to be given "great defer-
ence" because he is in the position to assess the relevant factors, 1925 the
ant had not entered plea after his demurrer to the indictment was overruled); Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (mistrial after revelation that one of the trial jurors had
also been on defendants' grand jury); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (news-
paper story described a letter written by defense counsel denying allegation that a juror was
acquainted with defendant); United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1978) (three
hours of jury deliberation where judge questioned each member of jury and determined it
was their belief that their differences were irreconcilable); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (twelve hours ofjury deliberation where judge questioned foreman and
jury as group with only one juror saying a verdict could be reached); United States v. See,
505 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1974) (ten hours of jury deliberation after three and a half day trial),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Brahm, 459 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.) (five hours
of deliberation after two day trial), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972); United States v. Cord-
ing, 290 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1961) (mistrial after less than four hours).
1918. United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. United States, 609
F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1979). In a related doublejeopardy context, involving the issue of retrial
after reversal for insufficient evidence, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d
889 (9th Cir. 1980), applied the established Supreme Court rule that retrial in such cases
violates the double jeopardy clause. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) ("The
Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution
another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding."
(footnote omitted)).
1919. United States v. Calderon, 618 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1980).
1920. 609 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1979).
1921. Id at 1317.
1922. Id (citing United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824) (failure of jury to agree held
not to bar retrial)).
1923. 609 F.2d at 1317.
1924. See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467 (1973) (Court has "eschewed" "rigid,
mechanical" rules in review of mistrials); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824)
("[The courts] are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject [of mistrials]; and it is impos-
sible to define all the circumstances, which would render it proper to interfere.").
1925. 609 F.2d at 1317. The Ninth Circuit considers the following factors:
(I) The jury's collective opinion that it cannot agree;
(2) The length of the trial and complexity of the issues;
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most "crucial" of which is the jury's opinion that it cannot agree. 926
In Rogers, the trial judge specifically requested that the jury deter-
mine whether they could reach a verdict or whether they were hope-
lessly deadlocked. The jury replied that it was in a "deadlock," and the
judge asked the jury foreperson for verification. Since the jury had at
that point been deliberating three and a half days, almost as long as the
trial, the judge was under no further obligation to inquire as to the
possibility of a verdict. 1927
In United States v. Smith, 1928 the Ninth Circuit held that a trial
judge's declaration of mistrial after one juror became unavailable was
an abuse of discretion because the record gave no indication that the
lower court "even considered the possibility of a continuance before
ordering a mistrial."' 19 29 In Smith, the juror was irreplaceable because
the court had neglected to select an alternate juror. The defense re-
fused to proceed with an eleven person jury. While the general rule is
that unavailability of an irreplaceable juror will meet the manifest ne-
cessity standard, 193 the Ninth Circuit held that failure to consider al-
ternatives was dispositive.
1931
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit held, however, that implied consent on
the part of the defense counsel to the trial court's abuse of discretion in
declaring a mistrial removes any double jeopardy bar to retrial.193 2
The court of appeals found such implied consent in the totality of a
series of actions taken by Smith's counsel:
(1) A request after the declaration of mistrial but before the
jury was dismissed that the court explain the mistrial to the
(3) The length of deliberation;
(4) Whether defendant makes a timely motion for a mistrial; and
(5) The effects of exhaustion or coercion on the jury.
Id (citing Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1387 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. See,
505 F.2d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975)). Arnold included one
factor omitted by Rogers, namely, any proper communications which the judge has had with
the jury.
1926. 609 F.2d at 1317.
1927. Id
1928. 621 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1980).
1929. Id at 351.
1930. Oelke v. United States, 389 F.2d 668, 671 (9th Cir. 1967) (dictum) (jeopardy did not
attach upon empaneling a jury to try four defendants where one defendant pleaded guilty,
another was granted a severance and was later tried before the originally empaneled jury,
and the remaining two were tried by a new jury), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
1931. 621 F.2d at 351 (citations omitted).
1932. Id at 351. In support of this holding, the Smith court relied on the following fed-
eral cases: United States v. Gordy, 526 F.2d 631, 635 n.1 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973); Raslich v. Ban-
nan, 273 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1959).
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jury so that they would not blame defendant because "Mr.
Smith may see these people in other trials";
(2) A request for an admonition that the jurors not discuss
the case and his lack of comment when the court replied: "It's
conceivable that some may be called back";
(3) An affirmative answer to the trial court's observation
that defense counsel's schedule would allow him to conduct a
retrial in a few weeks;
(4) Assent to the court's having voir dire and rulings on two
evidentiary matters in order to save time on retrial; and
(5) Assent to bringing the eleven person jury into the court-
room and excusing them.
Such actions, said the Ninth Circuit, indicated an affirmative under-
standing that there "could and would be a retrial."'
' 933
In United States v. Calderon, 934 the Ninth Circuit ruled that a re-
trial after a mistrial did not subject appellant to double jeopardy when
the mistrial resulted from a prosecutorial error made in good faith. In
Calderon, the defehdant successfully moved for mistrial based on the
prosecutor's error in referring to inadmissible evidence during the
opening statement. Appellant's subsequent motion to dismiss the in-
dictment was denied. 193 5 On appeal, he asserted that the prosecutor
knew or should have known of the inadmissibility of the evidence re-
ferred to and that therefore the double jeopardy clause barred
reprosecution. 1936 However, because the district court in Calderon im-
plicitly found that the prosecutor had a good faith belief that his evi-
dence was admissible under the "complex" co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule, defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment after the
mistrial was properly denied.
937
1933. 621 F.2d at 352.
1934. 618 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1980).
1935. Id at 89; see Moroyoqui v. United States, 570 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1977) ("A
motion for a mistrial by the defendant normally serves to remove any barrier to reprosecu-
tion. Such is not the case, however, when the prosecutor has through bad faith or overreach-
ing 'goaded' the defendant into requesting a mistrial.") (citing Lee v. United States, 432
U.S. 23 (1977); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400
U.S. 470, 485 (1971)); see also United States v. Sanders, 591 F.2d 1293, 1296 n.4 (9th Cir.)
("[R]eprosecution may be barred if the motion was induced by prosecutorial misconduct
'intentionally calculated to trigger the declaration of a mistrial.' ") (quoting United States v.
Nelson, 582 F.2d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 1978)), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1079 (1979).
1936. 618 F.2d at 89.
1937. Id at 90.
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2. Sentence modifications
Once a legal sentence for an offense has been imposed, the double
jeopardy clause precludes a sentence increase for, the same offense.
938
In United States v. Wickham, 119 the Ninth Circuit held that following
a probation revocation proceeding, a resentencing which modified the
initial sentence only to the extent that it eliminated a provision for pa-
role at any time was not a sentence increase and therefore did not vio-
late the double jeopardy clause. 9' Defendant had been sentenced
initially to ten years imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section
4208(a)(2), 194 ' which made him "eligible for parole 'at such time as the
board of parole. . . may determine.' ,'942 Two months later, the court
granted defendant's rule 35 motion, 1943 suspended all but six months of
his sentence, and placed him on probation for five years. The court,
either by design or oversight, omitted the (a)(2) provision from the
amended order.' 9 " Defendant later violated his probation, and the
sentencing court ordered revocation of probation and the execution of
the prior suspended sentence. Defendant contended that his sentence
had been increased, arguing that the parole commission was obligated
under 18 U.S.C. section 4208(a)(2) to give him meaningful parole con-
sideration prior to or at the completion of the first third of his sen-
tence. 945 Now he would have no such guarantee.
1938. "For of what avail is the constitutional protection against more than one trial if
there can be any number of sentences pronounced on the same verdict?. . . [If,
after judgment has been rendered on the conviction, and the sentence of that judg-
ment executed on the criminal, he can be again sentenced on that conviction to
another and different punishment, or to endure the same punishment a second
time, is the constitutional restriction of any value?"
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308 (1930) (quoting Exparle Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
163, 173 (1874)). A modern expression of the rule is found in United States v. Turner, 518
F.2d 14, 15 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The law is well settled that increasing a sentence after the
defendant has commenced to serve it is a violation of the constitutional guaranty against
double jeopardy."). In the Ninth Circuit, the rule is exemplified by United States v. Bowens,
514 F.2d 440, 441 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (resentencing defendant under a different
portion of the Federal Youth Corrictions Act so as to impose a fine violated double jeop-
ardy clause); accord, United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126, 129 (1st Cir. 1977) (formal rule
against any increase in penalty after service of probation has commenced); United States v.
Durbin, 542 F.2d 486, 489 (8th Cir. 1976) (district court extension of original, valid twelve
year sentence to fifteen years violated double jeopardy clause).
1939. 618 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1980).
1940. Id at 1313.
1941. Recodified at 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976).
1942. 618 F.2d at 1308 n.2 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1976)).
1943. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 provides for the discretionary reduction of a sentence by the
court.
1944. 618 F.2d at 1308.
1945. Id at 1311.
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The Ninth Circuit, however, declared that the sentence had not
been increased because "designation of a sentence under the (a)(2) pro-
vision" no longer has "any real effect on a prisoner's ultimate release
date."'9 46  New guidelines established by the parole commission in
1973 and the Parole Commission and Reorganization Act of 19761947
emphasize gravity of the offense rather than institutional adjust-
ment. 1948 Since the guidelines presume good institutional progress in
any case, the Ninth Circuit noted that institutional adjustment and pro-
gram progress become factors in determining the ultimate release date
only when they reflect poorly on the prisoner. 1949 Thus, a prisoner
would be considered for parole under information "little if any" differ-
ent than that considered by the sentencing judge. 950
3. Sentencing enhancement
The double jeopardy clause forbids the imposition of more than
one punishment for the same offense.' 95' A corollary provides that the
Government may not prove violations of two separate criminal statutes
with precisely the same factual showing. 9 52 This corollary, while al-
1946. Id at 1312.
1947. Both the new guidelines, codified in 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1978), and The Parole Com-
mission and Reorganization Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-233, 90 Stat. 222, which re-enacted
18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) as 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) (1976), had the effect of eliminating the
distinction between (a)(2) prisoners and others. Among other factors, the guidelines empha-
size the severity of offense, which could contribute to extending a prisoner's parole consider-
ation beyond the one-third point. See O'Brien v. Putnam, 591 F.2d 53, 56 (9th Cir. 1979)
(parole commission did not abuse its discretion in postponing hearing until one-third of
prison term was served because of severity of offense of cocaine importation). Similarly, the
recodification of 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) into 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2) altered the previous stat-
utory scheme such that (b)(2) prisoners and those with statutory minimum periods of incar-
ceration now receive the same parole consideration. Petrone v. Kaslow, 603 F.2d 779, 780
(9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184-90 (1979)
(since release date has been committed by Congress to the Parole Commission, judges have
no enforceable expectations as to a prisoner's actual release short of the statutory term).
1948. The new guidelines, which use "salient factors" relating to personal rehabilitative
potential and severity of the offense, "can be used to predict when 88 percent to 94 percent
of all prisoners will in fact be released." 618 F.2d at 1311.
1949. 618 F.2d at 1311-12 n.8 (citations omitted).
1950. Id at 1312-13.
1951. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (auto theft and joyriding were the same
offense).
1952. "Cases in which the Government is able to prove violations of two separate criminal
statutes with precisely the same factual showing. . . raise the prospect of double jeopardy
and the possible need to evaluate the statutes in light of the Blockburger test." Simpson v.
United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 (1978) (Congress did not intend a general firearm enhancement
statute to apply in a context covered by a specific firearm enhancement statute, rendering
double jeopardy argument irrelevant). The Blockburger test provides that "[w]here the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
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lowing an exception for conspiracy and the underlying substantive of-
fense, 953 nevertheless has prompted challenges to a number of firearm
enhancement statutes. Such statutes typically require an increase in a
prisoner's sentence if a firearm is used to commit certain felonies.1
954
Double jeopardy challenges to these statutes are, however, being
rejected.
For example, in May v. Sumner, 955 the appellant claimed that
since he was "first convicted of robbery with a dangerous or deadly
weapon and then received an additional sentence for using a fire-
arm,"' 19 56 he was punished twice for the same offense. The Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected the argument by simply noting that the firearm
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision
requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.
299, 304 (1931) (citation omitted). If the statutory scheme fails the Blockburger test, it runs
afoul of the double jeopardy clause by imposing, in effect, "multiple punishments for the
same offense," which is expressly forbidden in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717
(1969). But see Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); United States v.
Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1381 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that Blockburger states a rule of statu-
tory, not constitutional, construction).
1953. The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Austin, 529 F.2d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1976), dis-
cussed the "same evidence" test, noting that "[a]s the Supreme Court has held, whenever it
appears that the proof of one offense proves every essential element of another growing out
of the same act, the Fifth Amendment limits the punishment to a single act." (citing
Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 343 (1911)). In United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d
1358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971 (1977), appellants argued that the "same evidence"
test precluded consecutive sentences for conspiracy and the substantive offense. The Kear-
ney court rejected the "same evidence" test, stating that the proper test was whether the
same evidence is "required to prove" both the conspiracy and substantive counts. 560 F.2d
at 1366 (quoting United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755, 766 (D.C. Cir.) (emphasis in Boyle),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973)). Kearney relied on United States v. Ohlson, 522 F.2d
1347, 1348-50 (9th Cir. 1977), which limited the merger of conspiracy and substantive
charges to Wharton Rule situations, i.e., when the "essential participants are the only con-
spirators." 560 F.2d at 1366-67 (emphasis in original). Recently, United States v. Wylie,
625 F.2d 1371, 1381 n.14 (9th Cir. 1980), reiterated the Kearney rule. Both Wylie and Kear-
ney involved conspiracy to manufacture and distribute, and the subsequent distribution of,
illegal drugs.
1954. Eg., former CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5, which provided:
Any person who uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a
robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, murder, assault with intent to commit mur-
der, rape, burglary, or kidnapping, upon conviction of such crime, shall, in addi-
tion to the punishment prescribed for the crime of which he has been convicted, be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period of not less than five
years. Such additional period of imprisonment shall commence upon expiration or
other termination of the sentence imposed for the crime of which he is convicted
and shall not run concurrently with such sentence.
This section has been recently amended to provide for an additional two year sentence when
a person uses a firearm in the commission of a felony, "unless use of a firearm is an element
of the offense of which he was convicted." See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (Deering 1980).
1955. 622 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1980).
1956. Id at 998.
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enhancement statute in question had been interpreted by the state
supreme court as not creating a separate offense. 1957 The state legisla-
ture had established only one sentence for a given crime, albeit by
means of two statutes. 958 Accordingly, the double jeopardy clause was
not violated. The Ninth Circuit thus joined the Tenth in firmly re-
jecting double jeopardy challenges to firearm enhancement statutes. 1959
4. Appeals after acquittals
The Criminal Appeals Act allows the prosecution to appeal the
dismissal of an indictment or information unless such appeal violates
double jeopardy. 960 Acquittals, on the other hand, may not be ap-
pealed because such appeals are violative of double jeopardy. 1961
However, because a "'trial judge's characterization of his own action
cannot control the classification of the action,' ",1962 the prosecution
1957. Id at 999 (citing In re Culbreth, 17 Cal. 3d 330, 333, 551 P.2d 23, 25, 130 Cal. Rptr.
719, 721 (1976) ("[S]ection 12022.5 does not prescribe a new offense but merely additional
punishment for an offense in which a firearm is used.")). In May, appellant was appealing a
denial of his habeas corpus petition, hence his challenge was to a state statute. 622 F.2d at
998.
Statutory construction is the critical battleground in challenges to firearm enhancement
statutes. By deciding the case on legislative intent, a court can avoid passing on the double
jeopardy issue. See, e.g., Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 13 (1978) (Supreme Court
avoided a double jeopardy challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on the basis that because the
clause was not intended to apply to the statute under which defendant had been charged, the
sentencing court had no statutory authority to enhance defendant's sentence under § 924(c));
Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980) (Congress did not authorize consecutive
punishments for rape and killing in the course of rape under District of Columbia law,
hence no need to consider double jeopardy issue).
1958. 622 F.2d at 999.
1959. See Cordova v. Romero, 614 F.2d 1267, 1269 (10th Cir. 1980) (New Mexico Court of
Appeals' definitive ruling that firearm enhancement statute, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-4
(1978), "does not create a new class of crimes" but "[r]ather provides for additional conse-
quences for felonies committed by use of a firearm," precluded double jeopardy challenge).
1960. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1980) provides in part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further
prosecution.
1961. "[Ihe most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence has
been that '[a] verdict of acquittal ... could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise, without
putting [a defendant] twice in jeopardy, and thereby violating the Constitution."' United
States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (quoting United States v. Bell,
163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896)).
1962. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 96 (1978) (dismissal of one count of an indict-
ment on the basis of preindictment delay was not an "acquittal" because the dismissal did
not resolve any factual elements in offense charged) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S.
470, 478 n.7 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (plurality opinion)).
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may still have an opportunity to appeal an "acquittal" if it can demon-
strate that the trial judge erroneously entered a judgment of acquittal
which was, in substance, a dismissal.
963
In United States v. Gonzales, 96" the district court entered a judg-
ment of acquittal in a prosecution for conspiracy to transport, and for
actual transportation and harboring of, illegal aliens. 965 On the fourth
day of trial, after a jury had been empaneled, the prosecution admitted
that two potential witnesses had not been made available to the de-
fense, 966 but had been released by the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The trial was suspended. A subsequent hearing was held at
which the prosecutor produced one of the two witnesses. At the hear-
ing, the defense successfully moved to dismiss the indictment, and
upon suggestion of the trial court, moved for judgment of acquittal.
967
The judge granted the motion and denied the prosecutor's subsequent
motion to vacate.1
968
According to the Ninth Circuit, the "acquittal" was "clearly"
based on constitutional grounds arising from the unavailability of po-
tential material witnesses, and was, therefore, in substance an "order of
dismissal."'' 969 Of course, had the acquittal resulted from insufficient
evidence, appeal probably could not have been taken. 970 But, in order
to so acquit, the trial court would have needed to determine that there
was insufficient evidence for conviction "after the evidence on either
side [was] closed."' 97' Because the district court made its determina-
1963. See, e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 77-78 (1978) ("acquittal" based on
erroneous evidentiary ruling was final and unreviewable based on the double jeopardy
clause); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (per curiam) (acquittal based on
improper conduct of prosecutor and lack of credibility of government witnesses, though an
erroneous foundation, could not be reviewed without violating double jeopardy because the
trial did not terminate prior to the entry of judgment).
1964. 617 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1980).
1965. Id at 1360-61.
1966. Id at 1360; see United States v. Mendez-Rodriquez, 450 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971) (de-
portation of witnesses, who were illegal aliens, before affording defendant right to interview
and, if need be, subpoena them, violated defendant's right to compulsory process and right
to due process); United States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974) (purpose of Men-
dez-Rodriquez decision was to prevent government from being able to pick and choose
witnesses).
1967. 617 F.2d at 1360-61.
1968. Id at 1361.
1969. Id at 1362.
1970. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (acquittal based
on insufficient evidence).
1971. 617 F.2d at 1362. FED. R. CRuM. P. 29 provides in pertinent part:
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of
judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or infor-
19811
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tion mid-trial, the acquittal was not based on insufficient evidence.1972
5. Juvenile hearings
In Breed v. Jones,1973 the Supreme Court held that California's
statutory scheme 1974 providing for dispositional hearings to determine
whether a minor should be tried as a juvenile or an adult involved an
adjudication of the underlying offense. 1975 Consequently, any subse-
quent prosecution of the same offense would be barred by the double
jeopardy clause. 19 76 In Rios v. Chavez, 19 7 7 the Ninth Circuit applied
Breed retroactively.
Five years before Breed, the presiding judge of a dispositional
hearing directed that the appellant-minor in Rios be tried as an adult.
Appellant was convicted of the underlying offense and filed for habeas
corpus relief after Breed was announced. 1978 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed appellant's conviction after concluding that the Supreme Court
favors retroactive application of the law in double jeopardy
contexts. 1979
The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on Robinson v. Neil.1980 A
policy in favor of the liberal application of retroactivity in double jeop-
ardy contexts was the "clear implication" of Robinson's distinction be-
tween "procedures which assure fairness at trial and the ban on double
jeopardy which prevents a trial from occurring in the first place."1981
Moreover, since the original juvenile hearing in Rios took place after
the Supreme Court had afforded due process guarantees to juveniles in
in re Gault,1982 and after the double jeopardy clause had been made
mation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses.
1972. 617 F.2d at 1362.
1973. 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (initial dispositional hearing under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 602 (West Supp. 1980) involved adjudication of underlying offense and thus jeopardy at-
tached). The key language in § 602 refers to any person under the age of 18 who violates
any law of this state or of the United States.
1974. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 701, 702, 707 (West Supp. 1980) provide for the ad-
ministrative hearings at which it is determined whether a minor is a "person described in
Section 602." The offending hearing in Breed was held pursuant to § 701. 421 U.S. at 521.
1975. 421 U.S. at 531.
1976. Id at 532-33.
1977. 620 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1980).
1978. Id at 705.
1979. Id
1980. 409 U.S. 505 (1973).
1981. 620 F.2d at 706 (citing Robinson, 409 U.S. at 509).
1982. 387 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1967).
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applicable to the states in Benton v. Maryland,'983 the state should have
been on notice that Breed would be applied retroactively.
1984
Rios is significant because the option of not applying Breed retro-
actively was open. The Robinson "implication" for more liberality in
double jeopardy contexts was only that-an implication.19 5 The First
Circuit, for example, has refused to apply Breed retroactively.
986
The question remains after Rios whether a hearing on the amena-
bility of a minor to treatment under the juvenile justice system would
escape the Breed prohibition if considerable weight were given to the
offense charged. In all probability it would because the Rios court em-
phasized the risk of adjudication of guilt under the applicable stat-
ute. 1987 However, the Rios court also declared that "the attachment of
jeopardy under Breed must turn on its own facts,"' 1988 and relied on the
fact that the overwhelming majority of pages in the transcript of the
original hearing, 140 out of 194, dealt with evidence of the alleged of-
fense, in which the details of the crime were graphically expressed. 1989
B. Foreign Convictions
The Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences between the
United States and Mexico' 990 provides that Americans convicted of
crimes in Mexico may serve their sentences in the United States, and
vice versa. The American implementing legislation' 991 to the Treaty
1983. 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
1984. 620 F.2d at 706.
1985. Id
1986. Jackson v. Justices of the Superior Court, 549 F.2d 215 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 975 (1977). The court in Jackson distinguished Robinson by seizing on language in the
latter case which "eschewed 'an ironclad. . . classification for retroactivity analysis.'" Id
at 217 (quoting Robinson, 409 U.S. at 509). Since the Robinson court did not absolutely
mandate retroactivity, and since the "ends of public justice" would have been frustrated in
the cases before Jackson, had retroactivity been applied (i.e., petitioners would escape all
punishment), the court declined to apply Breed retroactively. 549 F.2d at 219. However,
such a result seems to run contrary to language in Breed: "For, even accepting petitioner's
premise that respondent 'never faced the risk of more than one punishment,' we have
pointed out that 'the Double Jeopardy Clause. . .is written in terms of potential or risk of
trial and conviction, not punishment."' 421 U.S. at 532 (quoting Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S.
323, 329 (1970)) (emphasis in Breed).
1987. 620 F.2d at 708 ("Section 602 clearly opened up the possibility that Rios' guilt as a
juvenile would be adjudicated at that hearing") (emphasis in original).
1988. Id
1989. Id
1990. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico,
28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718.
1991. Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-144, 91 Stat. 1212 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 955;
18 U.S.C. §§ 3244, 4100-4115) (Supp. III 1979).
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provides for a transfer hearing to be held in the transferring country.
One of the conditions of the transfer is that the offender must agree not
to assert any constitutional rights he might have regarding the foreign
conviction. 1
992
In Pfeffer v. United States,1993 appellant challenged the denial of
his petition for habeas corpus which he filed after his transfer from a
Mexican prison to one in the United States. 1994 Appellant had been
serving a twelve year sentence for a drug conviction handed down by a
Mexican court. 19 95 At a hearing in Tijuana, Mexico, appellant con-
sented to the transfer to the United States. 1996 After transfer, he filed a
petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the requirement that he forego
any challenge to the constitutionality of his foreign conviction was it-
self unconstitutional. 1997 Alternatively, he argued that he did not give
free and voluntary consent to be transferred. 1998
The Ninth Circuit rejected the first contention by holding that the
1992. Article VI of the Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, 28 U.S.T. at 7406,
provides:
The Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings,
regardless of their form, intended to challenge, modify or set aside sentences
handed down by its courts. The Receiving State shall, upon being advised by the
Transferring State of action affecting the sentence, take the appropriate action in
accordance with such advice.
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 4108 provides in part:
(a) Prior to the transfer of an offender to the United States, the fact that the of-
fender consents to such transfer and that such consent is voluntary and with full
knowledge of the consequences thereof shall be verified in the country in which the
sentence was imposed by a United States magistrate, or by a citizen ... of the
United States as defined in section 451 of title 28, United States Code .
(b) The verifying officer shall inquire of the offender whether he understands and
agrees that the transfer will be subject to the following conditions: (1) only the
country in which he was convicted and sentenced can modify or set aside the con-
viction or ... sentence, and any proceedings seeking such action may only be
brought in that country ....
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 3244 provides in part:
When a treaty is in effect between the United States and a foreign country pro-
viding for the transfer of convicted offenders-
(1) the country in which the offender was convicted shall have exclusive ju-
risdiction and competence over proceedings seeking to challenge, modify, or
set aside convictions or sentences handed down by a court of such country
1993. 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980).




1998. Id at 876. The court did not explain why, if appellant's consent to be transferred
from a Mexican to an American prison was not free and voluntary, appellant should not be
simply transferred back to Mexico.
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waiver of defendant's constitutional rights, required by the statute, met
the constitutional tests for a valid waiver. 999 The Pfeifer court arrived
at this conclusion by declaring that a waiver would be valid if it met a
specific set of requirements: (1) voluntarily and knowingly made,"'
(2) accused must have access to counsel,2°0' (3) a court must determine
the validity of the waiver,2"' 2 and (4) an affirmative showing that the
waiver was intelligent and voluntary must appear in the record. °°3
The Ninth Circuit found each of these requirements provided for in the
implementing legislation.2"
The Pfeifer court buttressed its conclusion on the constitutional
validity of the waiver requirement with a second argument. The circuit
indicated that only the relinquishment of "vested" rights as a condition
of receiving a benefit is an "unconstitutional condition. '200 5 Since
Americans held in Mexican prisons "have no right to relief from
United States courts" 2 "6 no vested rights are at stake and the waiver
requirement is constitutional."" 7
1999. Id
2000. Id (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (waiver of rights via
guilty plea: "[I]f a defendant's guilty plea is not ... voluntary and knowing, it has been
obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.") (footnote omitted)).
2001. 615 F.2d at 876 (citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-68 (1973) (when a
defendant pleads guilty he can later attack the voluntary and intelligent character of that
waiver by showing that the advice he received from counsel did not meet the standards for
competency in criminal cases)).
2002. 615 F.2d at 876 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (court must
exercise "utmost solicitude" to "make sure [defendant] has a full understanding of what the
plea connotes and of its consequence")).
2003. 615 F.2d at 876 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242) ("In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 516 ... [w]e held: Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record
must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused...
intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer [of counsel]. Anything less is not
waiver.")
2004. 615 F.2d at 876. The Court concluded that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4108 meet
the requirements for voluntariness, access to counsel, determination of validity of waiver by
a court, and a record of the proceeding. 615 F.2d at 876. The court also cited 18 U.S.C.
§ 4109 as providing for the appointment of counsel for the financially unable offender. 615
F.2d at 876.
2005. Id
2006. Id (citing Note, Constitutional Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences:
The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1500, 1524-25 (1977)).
2007. 615 F.2d at 876. The court cited three cases to imply that rights must be vested
before their waiver, in exchange for a benefit, is constitutionally protected: United States v.
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (statutory imposition of penalty for exercise of right to jury
trial); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (Saturday work as condition of unemploy-
ment benefits interfered with free exercise of religion by Seventh-Day Adventist); Smartt v.
Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967) (postponement of parole consideration for prisoners
whose petitions for habeas corpus were denied). None of these cases distinguished between
"vested" and "non-vested" rights; they simply held that the government could not condition
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The court dismissed appellant's second contention, that his con-
sent to transfer was not knowingly and intelligently given, with a sim-
ple reference to the record of the district court, which showed
otherwise.0° 8
Pfe/fer also signifies a Ninth Circuit rejection of the idea that the
joint venture doctrine is applicable to the Treaty. The joint venture
doctrine suppresses evidence obtained through the activities of foreign
officials which violate the accused's fifth amendment rights in which
United States officials substantially participated. 2009 The participation
in the criminal process implied by the Treaty, i.e., allowing a Mexican
sentence to be carried out in the United States and "encouraging" Mex-
ico to arrest American citizens who violate Mexican law, however, is
insufficient to invoke the joint venture doctrine.0 10
C. Appellate Review
1. Orders reducing sentences
The Ninth Circuit concluded in United States v. Hetrick20 11 that 28
U.S.C. section 1291, which allows the government to appeal any "final
decision" of a district court,20 12 allows appeals from sentence reduction
orders. The question of the scope of section 1291 had arisen because
18 U.S.C. section 3731 enumerates a number of specific instances al-
lowing government appeals in criminal cases, but sentence reduction
orders are not included.01 3 The Hetrick court reasoned that, since the
the receipt of benefits on the relinquishment of rights found specifically in the Constitution.
Although these cases undoubtedly involved "vested" rights, they are not direct authority for
the proposition that a right must be vested before its waiver is constitutionally protected.
The Pfefer court evidently acquired the "vested" distinction from Note, Constitutional
Problems in the Execution of Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American Prisoner
Transfer Treaty, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1500, 1525 (1977).
2008. 615 F.2d at 877.
2009. See United States v. Emery, 591 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1978) (joint venture existed
where American officials alerted Mexican police, coordinated surveillance at airport, sup-
plied pilot for plane and gave signal to arrest); Stonehill v. United States, 405 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1968) (no joint venture because raids were planned by Philippine officers beforehand
and American agents objected before raids to violation of search and seizure principles),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.) (no joint
venture because American officials did not instigate search of automobile), cer. denied, 389
U.S. 986 (1967).
2010. 615 F.2d at 877 (citations omitted).
2011. 627 F.2d 1007, 1008 (9th Cir. 1980).
2012. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ..
2013. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In a criminal case an appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals
from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or
[Vol. 14
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Supreme Court has held that the specific instances enumerated in sec-
tion 3731 do not confine the government's right of appeal in a criminal
case, section 3731 does not limit the ambit of section 1291 with regard
to sentence reduction orders. 14 In so concluding, the Hetrick court
observed that previous Ninth Circuit cases2015 had been superseded by
later Supreme Court decisions and precluded mandamus as an avenue
for review of sentence reductions.201 6 Mandamus is precluded since it
is only available where there are no other means of review.
20 17
2. Finality
Normally, a "final" decision by the district court is required before
the federal court of appeals has jurisdiction over an appeal from the
district court.20 18 However, one important exception is that pretrial or-
ders rejecting claims of double jeopardy are immediately appeala-
ble.20 19 The theory of this exception is that the very nature of a double
jeopardy claim requires access to immediate appeal, lest the exposure
to double jeopardy become a fait accompli. °2 °
In United States v. Carnes,2021 however, appellant could not come
information as to any one or more counts, except that no appeal shall lie where the
double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecu-
tion.
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision
or order of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the
return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant
has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or
information ....
2014. 627 F.2d at 1010 (quoting United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,
568 (1977) ("It suffices for present purposes that this Court . . . found that in enacting
§ 3731.. . 'Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and
to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit."' (quoting United States v. Wil-
son, 420 U.S. 332, 337 (1975))).
2015. For example, United States v. Lane, 284 F.2d 935, 937-38 (9th Cir. 1960), held that
government appeals in criminal cases were confined to the specific instances enumerated in
18 U.S.C. § 3731.
2016. 627 F.2d at 1010; see United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
2017. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 601 F.2d 379, 380 (9th Cir. 1978).
2018. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Finality is normally defined by termination of the litigation
"on the merits," leaving nothing to be done but "enforce by execution what has been deter-
mined." Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956). In criminal cases, the sentence
terminates the litigation. Id; see also DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962)
(strong policy against piecemeal appeals in criminal proceedings).
2019. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662 (1977).
2020. "Our conclusion that a defendant may seek immediate appellate review of a district
court's rejection of his double jeopardy claim is based on the special considerations permeat-
ing claims of that nature which justify a departure from the normal rule of finality." Id. at
663.
2021. 618 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1980).
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within this double jeopardy exception to the finality rule. In a prosecu-
tion for intentionally transporting illegal aliens, 20 22 appellant moved
for acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence. The motion was
denied and the jury failed to reach a verdict. The district court granted
an extension and appellant again moved for acquittal on the basis of
insufficient evidence or, alternatively, for a dismissal of the indictment.
The district court again denied appellant's motion. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit refused to consider the merits of the insufficiency argu-
ment because of the finality rule.20 23 The court reasoned that denial of
a motion for acquittal is not "final," even after a hung jury mistrial,2 24
and that denial of a motion for dismissal is not final unless made on
"colorable grounds of double jeopardy. ' 20 25 Such grounds were un-
available to appellant, even if she were to be subjected to another trial,
because a retrial after a mistrial resulting from jury deadlock does not
violate the double jeopardy clause unless the trial court abuses its dis-
cretion in declaring the mistrial,20 26 and appellant had made no conten-
tion of any such abuse.20 27
2022. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1976).
2023. 618 F.2d at 69.
2024. Id at 70.
2025. Id
2026. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824) (double jeopardy not
violated where "manifest necessity" or "ends of justice" justify discharge of jury unable to
reach verdict). The Supreme Court has expressly refused to make the standard for abuse of
discretion more precise. Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 (1973). The Ninth Circuit,
however, in Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1978), enumerated seven
factors to test for abuse of discretion in declaring a mistrial after jury deadlock: (1) timely
objection by defendant, (2) the jury's collective opinion that it cannot agree, (3) the length of
deliberation by the jury, (4) the length of the trial, (5) the complexity of issues presented to
the jury, (6) any proper communication between judge and jury, and (7) the effects of possi-
ble exhaustion and coercion of further deliberation on the verdict. Of these, the most critical
is the jury's own statement that it cannot reach a verdict. Id at 1386-87.
In actual litigation, a judge may properly declare a mistrial even though the period of
jury deliberation was quite short. See United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 299 (9th Cir.
1978) (three hours of deliberation where court questioned each member of the jury and
determined that it was their belief that their differences were irreconcilable); United States v.
Brahm, 459 F.2d 546 (3d Cir.) (five hours of deliberation), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972);
United States v. Cording, 290 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1961) (four hours of deliberation). But see
United States ex re. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975) (decla-
ration of mistrial after six and one-half hours of deliberation held abuse of discretion, where
judge interrogated and received only foreman's opinion as to the hopelessness of the dead-
lock following six day trial).
2027. 618 F.2d at 70.
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D. Sentencing
1. Judge's information in determining sentence
a. refusal to cooperate
Although the dominance of the therapeutic model of imprison-
ment has declined in recent years, sentencing philosophy in the federal
court system still retains a strong emphasis on rehabilitation.202 8 Ac-
cordingly, district courts may take into account a wide variety of infor-
mation regarding the defendant's background and character when
fixing a sentence.0 29 Cooperation with law enforcement authorities in
reporting felonies, i.e., in informing on compatriots, is a factor bearing
on a defendant's character, because such conduct has been held to be
evidence of good citizenship. 20 30 However, such informing is taboo
among criminals and prison inmates and therefore exposes the inform-
2028. "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence."
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (citing PROBATION & CRIMINAL JUSTICE
113 (S. Glueck ed. 1933) wherein four factors in imposing sentence are discussed: (1) the
protection of society against wrong-doers, (2) the punishment or discipline of the wrong-
doer, (3) the reformation and rehabilitation of the wrong-doer, and (4) the deterrence of
others from the commission of like offenses); cf. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW
§ 5 (1972) and sources cited therein (general discussion of theories of punishment).
The rehabilitative philosophy has come under severe analytical attack in recent years.
See E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL
QUESTION 184-91 (1975) [hereinafter cited as VAN DEN HAAG] (rehabilitation is based on a
"therapeutic" approach to punishment which falsely assumes that an offender is "sick";
however, as "treatment in the medical sense," incarceration is not in the "patient's interest as
he defines it"). For a more recent discussion by the Supreme Court on modem rehabilita-
tive sentencing philosophy, see United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-50 (1978) (sentenc-
ing judge may properly consider defendant's false testimony).
2029. "Highly relevant-if not essential--to [the sentencing judge's] selection of an appro-
priate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defend-
ant's life and characteristics." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) (footnote
omitted) (sentencing judge could properly take into account information not subject to de-
fendant's right of confrontation or cross-examination in determining whether defendant
would receive death penalty or life imprisonment).
The "fullest possible information" principle has been codified by Congress at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3577 (1976) which provides: "No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning
the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of
the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate
sentence." Of course, the "fullest possible information" may not include false information.
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) ("It is not the duration or severity of this
sentence that renders it constitutionally invalid; it is the careless or designed pronouncement
of sentence on a foundation so extensively and materially false. .... ").
2030. "Historically, the common law recognized a duty to raise the 'hue and cry' and re-
port felonies to the authorities." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 696 (1972) (footnote
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ant to risks of severe physical retaliation. 20 3  The issue thus raised is
whether a trial court judge should properly consider for sentencing
purposes a refusal to inform when such refusal is motivated by fears of
physical retaliation.
The Supreme Court managed to sidestep this issue in Roberts v.
United States, 2°32 because defendant did not timely raise it at trial. In
Roberts, defendant was a heroin dealer who rebuffed repeated requests
to name his suppliers. He eventually pleaded guilty to two counts of
using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of heroin.2 3 At the sen-
tencing hearing, the district court adversely considered his failure to
cooperate, sentencing him to consecutive one to four year terms on
each count plus a special three year parole term. Alternatively, the
court could have given him concurrent sentences, which, given his in-
carceration for the previous two years pending appeal, would have re-
sulted in his immediate release.20 34 The district court justified
imposition of the longer sentence on the defendant's failure to
cooperate.2 °35
The Supreme Court, however, avoided the issue of whether fear of
retaliation could negate the adverse effects of failure to inform. Be-
cause defendant did not voice his reasons for refusing to cooperate un-
til his appeal was heard, the Court held it made no difference that such
omitted) (reporter had no first amendment right to withhold information about a crime by
not responding to a grand jury subpoena and answering relevant questions).
However, Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552
(1980), issued this refutation of the proposition that being an informant is evidence of good
citizenship:
[O]ur admiration of those who inform on others has never been as unambiguous as
the majority suggests. The countervailing social values of loyalty and personal
privacy have prevented us from imposing on the citizenry at large a duty to join in
the business of crime detection. If the Court's view of social mores were accurate,
it would be hard to understand how terms such as "stool pigeon," "snitch,"
"squealer," and "tattletale" have come to be the common description of those who
engage in such behavior.
Id at 569-70 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also pointed out that the common
law duty to inform was "developed in an era in which enforcement of the criminal law was
entrusted to the general citizenry rather than to an organized police force." .d at 569 (citing
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 582-83 (2d ed. 1903)).
2031. "The prison world is unique. . . . A 'code of silence' strengthened by taboos against
'ratting' and a pervasive fear of retaliation are characteristics of the prison social order."
Mata v. Sumner, 611 F.2d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1980) (Sneed, J., dissenting), vacated on other
grounds, 101 S. Ct. 764 (1981).
2032. 445 U.S. 552 (1980).
2033. See 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
2034. Defendant had already pled guilty to one count and had been sentenced. However,
his conviction was vacated because the terms of the plea agreement were inadequately dis-
closed to the district court. 445 U.S. at 554.
2035. Id at 555-56 n.3.
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reasons "would have merited serious consideration" at the sentencing
hearing.2036 Defendant could not voice them on appeal. The Court
reasoned that since the fifth amendment must be invoked in a timely
fashion,20 37 the sentencing court was justified in considering defend-
ant's silence on the issue of his failure to cooperate as indicative of his
character. Because the Court framed the issue in terms of the infer-
ences which could be drawn from the defendant's exercise of his right
to silence,20 38 the Court was able to confine its analysis to the need to
make a timely assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.
0 39
b. prior convictions
Trial judges may consider a wide range of information in selecting
a sentence.2 040 This discretion, however, is not unlimited. Judges may
consider neither unconstitutional prior convictions, at least where such
convictions were the result of lack of effective counsel,2°41 nor false or
2036. Id at 559.
2037. "The privilege [against self-incrimination] may not be relied on and must be deemed
waived if not in some manner fairly brought to the attention of the Tribunal which must
pass on it." Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927) (alien silent
on authorship of subversive pamphlet in deportation proceeding); see Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (taxpayer had right to claim fifth amendment privilege on tax
return but waived the right by making certain disclosures); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S.
1 (1970) (corporate officers, by not asserting in their answers to government interrogatories
that there was no authorized person who could answer the interrogatories without the possi-
bility of self-incrimination, waived their fifth amendment privilege).
2038. 445 U.S. at 559.
2039. In his dissent, Justice Marshall characterized the Court's approach to waiver as
"harsh and rigid," 445 U.S. at 566, and argued that courts have a duty to inquire about that
silence before drawing a negative inference from it. Id at 567.
2040. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446 (1972) ("[A] judge may appropriately
conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he
may consider [or its source]."); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("Highly
relevant-if not essential--to . . . [the judge's] selection of an appropriate sentence is the
possession of the fullest information possible concerning defendant's life and characteris-
tics.").
A court may even consider hearsay, United States v. Wondrack, 578 F.2d 808, 809 (9th
Cir. 1978), though unwarranted weight may not be given to it. Gelfuso v. Bell, 590 F.2d 754,
756 (9th Cir. 1978); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) which provides that: "No limitation
shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a
person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."
2041. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448 (1972); cf. Portillo v. United States, 588
F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (no Tucker relief based on trial court's consideration
of conviction resulting from fourth amendment violation because sentence would have been
the same even if sentencing judge had known of prior conviction's invalidity); Farrow v.
United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (prior conviction based on sixth
amendment violation required for Tucker relief); Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d 452,
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unreliable information in the presentence report.2 42
In Brown v. United States,2 ° 3 the Ninth Circuit considered asser-
tions that because the trial judge had relied on both unconstitutional
prior state convictions and false information in fixing sentence, resen-
tencing was in order.20 " The district court had stated that it could not
categorically deny that it had considered one of the challenged convic-
tions when it sentenced defendant.2" 5 However, the district court had
declined to resentence defendant, ruling that he must first attack the
constitutionality of his conviction in the state courts.2°46 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions
that it was to reconsider the sentence as if there had been no state con-
viction.2° 7 If the sentence were to remain unchanged, then no resen-
tencing would be required.2°4 On the other hand, if the sentence
would be lighter, the lower court was directed to hear the defendant's
458 (9th Cir. 1976) (dictum) (Tucker relief not available for prior conviction based on fourth
amendment violation).
However, there is language in one pre-Tisnado Ninth Circuit opinion extending Tucker
relief to all constitutionally invalid prior convictions. Wheeler v. United States, 468 F.2d
244, 245 (9th Cir. 1972) ("[A]ny reliance upon an invalid prior conviction to enhance a
criminal sentence is constitutionally impermissible .. "); see also Wilson v. United States,
534 F.2d 130, 134 (9th Cir. 1976) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ("A Tucker violation occurs
when a defendant has sustained constitutionally invalid prior convictions, and a sentencing
judge took them into consideration in sentencing with adverse effect upon the defendant.").
2042. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (trial judge erred in passing sen-
tence in reliance on eight prior convictions without giving uncounseled defendant opportu-
nity to object that in two of the cases he had been found not guilty, and in a third the charge
had been dismissed); see also Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1359 (9th Cir. 1978)
(en banc) (sentencing judge presented with conflicting factual accounts need not accept de-
fendant's account); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626, 629-31 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentence
based on unverified, unreliable charges of serious criminal conduct vacated), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1061 (1972).
2043. 610 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1980).
2044. Appellant filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition in 1976, six years after his conviction for
interstate transportation of forged securities, alleging that the sentencing court had been
influenced by prior convictions in California, Michigan and Iowa. 610 F.2d at 674. He
contended that two of the convictions were invalid because of denial of counsel, and that the
third conviction was invalid for lack of effective counsel in that his attorney "improperly
disregarded the coercive circumstances" under which his confession was obtained. Id. Sec-
tion 2255 provides that a federal prisoner may, at any time, move the court to vacate his
sentence if it "was imposed in violation of the Constitution." 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976).
2045. 610 F.2d at 674.
2046. Id.
2047. Id.
2048. Id. "[Wlhere the judge determines . . . that a new sentence formulated without
reliance on the challenged priors would nonetheless be the same, a hearing into the validity
of the priors is. . . not required." Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339, 1353 (9th Cir.
1978) (en banc).
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claim that the conviction was unconstitutional.2" 9 The Ninth Circuit
did not address the possibilities for manipulation inherent in this pro-
cedure, specifically, that the determination of the trial judge's state of
mind at sentencing was being vested in the trial judge himself.
However, the Ninth Circuit did address the issue of the exhaustion
of state remedies. The Brown court, adhering to the established Ninth
Circuit rule, °50 provided that defendant would not be required to ex-
haust his state remedies in order to argue the constitutionality of his
state conviction. This move had the advantage of promoting judicial
economy, but the disadvantage of precluding the state's determination
of the constitutionality of its own proceeding.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected defendant's attack on the
integrity of the presentence report, applying the rule20 " that defendants
must challenge the accuracy of presentence reports when the opportu-
nity exists in open court and the report has been made available. Since
Brown and his counsel had reviewed the presentence report and had
stated that there was nothing to say in mitigation, any subsequent chal-
lenge to the accuracy of the report was thereby foreclosed.
205 2
2049. 610 F.2d at 674-75. "The [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 petitioner need be afforded an eviden-
tiary hearing into the validity of the priors only where the § 2255 judge has found that the
original sentence... would not be appropriate." Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339,
1354 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc). The procedure outlined in both Brown and Farrow
originated in the Fifth Circuit in Lipscomb v. Clark, 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
2050. A defendant attacking the constitutional validity of a prior state conviction must
have a reasonable opportunity to do so in a federal trial court. United States v. Thoresen,
428 F.2d 654, 664 (9th Cir. 1970) (challenging prior state grand larceny conviction on, inter
alia, denial of assistance of counsel). The Thoresen court derived its holding from Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), which held that a Texas prosecutor could not introduce a prior
Tennessee conviction to enhance a sentence when records of that conviction on their face
showed a denial of right to counsel. 389 U.S. at 112, 115-16. The Seventh Circuit, in United
States v. Martinez, 413 F.2d 61, 63 (7th Cir. 1969), later held that it made no difference
whether the records showed on their face some ground of presumptive invalidity. The Ninth
Circuit adopted this approach in Thoresen. 428 F.2d at 664.
The Fourth Circuit, however, has refused to let a defendant bypass the exhaustion of
state remedies. Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973). Brown gave two rea-
sons for its holding: the state should be a party to the proceeding and therefore have an
opportunity to be heard on the issue of the validity of its own convictions, and, statutorily,
28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) requires exhaustion of state remedies. Id. at 118-19. However, as the
Fifth Circuit has noted, Tucker does not mandate exhaustion in considering the validity of
prior convictions, leaving it to the circuits to decide the issue themselves. Mitchell v. United
States, 482 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1973) (a requirement of exhaustion of remedies "would
erect an insuperable barrier to effective implementation of the Tucker rule.").
2051. United States v. Leonard, 589 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1979) (no denial of due process
in imposing sentence where neither defendant nor his counsel objected to inaccuracies in
presentence report at sentencing hearing or at hearing on motion to reduce sentence).
2052. 610 F.2d at 676.
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2. Special parole terms
In Bi/ulco v. United States, °53 the Supreme Court held that the
federal prohibition against conspiracy or attempt to manufacture or
distribute certain controlled substances codified in 21 U.S.C. section
8462054 does not authorize special parole terms. The question had
arisen because the substantive prohibition against manufacture or dis-
tribution found in 21 U.S.C. section 841 does provide for such a special
parole term.20 55 Because section 846 does not provide for special pa-
role terms on its face, the federal courts have had to wrestle with the
ambiguity of whether defendants sentenced under section 846 should
have such parole terms added on to their sentences when they are sen-
tenced to imprisonment. The Fourth,2 °56 Tenth,2 °57 and Second °58
Circuits had answered in the affirmative. 20 5 9 The Third Circuit20 60 and
2053. 447 U.S. 381 (1980).
2054. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both
which may not exceed the maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission
of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy."
2055. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)-(3) (1976 & Supp. 1111979) provides for sentencing depending
on the nature of the substance sought to be manufactured or distributed, as defined in the
schedules found in 21 U.S.C. § 812. Section (b)(1)(A)'s special parole term language is as
follows:
Any sentence imposing a term of imprisonment under this paragraph shall, in the
absence of such a prior conviction, impose a special parole term of at least 3 years
in addition to such term of imprisonment and shall, if there was such a prior con-
viction, impose a special parole term of at least 6 years in addition to such term of
imprisonment.
The same language, except for variations in the length of the special parole term, is
found in § 841(b)(2). Significantly, § 841(b)(3), applicable to schedule V substances, which
have a low potential for abuse, carries no special parole term.
2056. United States v. Burman, 584 F.2d 1354, 1358 (4th Cir. 1978) ("The conspiracy stat-
ute, § 846, is punishable by a sentence which must be set by reference to the penalties of the
substantive offense statute."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1118 (1979).
2057. United States v. Jacobson, 578 F.2d 863, 868 (10th Cir.) (wording of § 841(b)-(c)
implied that "Congress viewed special parole term as being part of the term of imprisonment
to which it was appended" as does the weight of authority allowing special parole term
under § 846), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978).
2058. United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785, 794-95 (2d Cir. 1976) (sentence of
five years imprisonment with a $5000 committed fine plus three year special parole term
under § 846 was within discretion of trial judge), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977); United
States v. Wiley, 519 F.2d 1348, 1351 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (special parole term after
seven year prison term under § 846 "well within statutory limits"), cer. denied, 423 U.S.
1058 (1976).
2059. See also United States v. Rich, 518 F.2d 980, 986-87 (8th Cir. 1975) (special parole
provisions of § (b)(1)(B) not unconstitutionally vague), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 907 (1976);
United States v. Dankert, 507 F.2d 190, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (special parole
term under 21 U.S.C. § 963, a conspiracy provision, upheld because § 963 "must be consid-
ered in light" of its corresponding substantive offense statute).
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a district court in the Ninth Circuit2 °61 took the contrary position. The
Supreme Court, reviewing the language,0 62 structure,0 63 and legisla-
tive history2 064 of sections 841, 846, and related parts of the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,2065 found the
weight of authority against special parole terms under section 846.
3. Modifications
In probation revocation proceedings, 18 U.S.C. section 3653 af-
fords defendants broad protection against sentence enhancement. 66
2060. United States v. Mearns, 599 F.2d 1296, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) (parole is distinct from
imprisonment and § 846, by its "express terms," provides for only fine and imprisonment),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Jacquinto, 464 F. Supp. 728, 729 (E.D.
Penn. 1979) (parole distinct from imprisonment, House Report on § 846 indicated an intent
to fix the maximum penalty for the offense, and fact that all three penalties-fine, imprison-
ment, and special parole-are enumerated in §§ 841 and 845 but not in § 846 indicates that
§ 846 was not intended to include special parole term).
2061. Fassette v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 1245 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (conspiracy must be
distinguished from substantive offense, and § 841's use of phrase "in addition to" further
distinguishes imprisonment from special parole term).
2062. The Court noted that special parole is not authorized for all the substantive offenses
to which the conspiracy provision of § 846 applies, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(3)'s prohibition
against the manufacture or distribution of schedule V substances, and thus concluded that
the term "imprisonment" in § 846 does not necessarily include special parole. 447 U.S. at
388-89. The Court also noted the obvious distinction between imprisonment and special
parole, which is a "period of supervision served upon completion of a prison term." Id.
Furthermore, the Court found that the words "in addition to such term of imprisonment" in
the provisions for special parole in § 841 indicated that Congress wanted to distinguish be-
tween "imprisonment" and special parole for § 846 purposes. Id. at 388-90.
2063. The Court reasoned that since § 845 provides for sentences by reference to the pen-
alty provisions of other offenses and specifically enumerates imprisonment, fines, and special
parole in its sentencing scheme, Congress intentionally omitted special parole from § 846.
447 U.S. at 388-90. Section 845 provides for the doubling of§ 841's penalties when distribu-
tion is made to a person under twenty-one years of age.
2064. The Court noted that every legislative reference to the forerunners of § 846 failed to
mention special parole, even though special parole was explicitly recognized in the penalty
provisions of some substantive offenses within the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act. 447 U.S. at 398. Furthermore, the Government's argument, that Congress
must have desired special parole for the conspiracy offense because Congress' object was the
deterrence of professional criminals trafficking in drugs, was refuted by the fact that Con-
gress did not include special parole for such serious drug offenses as the conduct of a contin-
uing criminal enterprise. Id.; see 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1976). Finally, the Court noted that the
exclusion of special parole under § 846 is only logical. Section 846 punishes attempts as well
as conspiracies. Congress would logically be less stringent with an inchoate crime than with
a completed one. 447 U.S. at 398.
2065. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, tit. II, Pub. L. No.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
2066. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976) provides, in pertinent part:
As speedily as possible after arrest the probationer shall be taken before the court
for the district having jurisdiction over him. Thereupon the court may revoke the
probation and require him to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence,
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In United States v. McDonald,2 67 the Ninth Circuit invoked section
3653 to reverse an addition of a special parole term and a determina-
tion that defendant was not suitable for handling under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act. 20 68 The special parole term and non-suitability
determination had been added to the defendant's sentence after he was
resentenced upon revocation of probation.2 °69
In McDonald, the defendant received, in 1972, a seven year sen-
tence and a $7500 fine, with the proviso that if he would serve 180 days
in confinement, the "execution" of the remainder of his sentence would
be suspended and he would be on probation for five years.2 70 In addi-
tion, the court found McDonald suitable for handling under the Fed-
eral Youth Corrections Act.207' In 1976, he violated the terms of his
probation, and it was revoked. The district court then vacated the 1972
sentence, and, after finding McDonald unsuitable for handling under
the Federal Youth Corrections Act, imposed essentially the same sen-
tence, but added a mandatory special parole term.20 72 On appeal, the
defendant asserted that the second sentence was more severe than the
first, and thus constituted a violation of section 3653.2073
Since it was the execution of the 1972 sentence which had been
suspended, and not its imposition, the 1972 sentence was valid.20 74 The
and, if the imposition of the sentences was suspended, may impose any sentence
which might originally have been imposed.
2067. 611 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1980).
2068. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1976).
2069. 611 F.2d at 1293.
2070. Id. at 1292. The sentence, according to the Ninth Circuit, "appears to have been
pursuant" to 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976), which allows for probation. 611 F.2d at 1294. The
other alternatives available under § 5010 are sentencing defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General for treatment and supervision, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b), 5010(c) and sentenc-
ing him as an adult, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d). The Supreme Court, in Durst v. United States, 434
U.S. 542, 553-54 (1978), declared that a judge may select a combination of these alternatives,
thus calling into question previous Ninth Circuit authority, e.g., United States v. Marron,
564 F.2d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1977) which had held that a judge could not combine probation
and sentencing as an adult under the Youth Corrections Act.
2071. 611 F.2d at 1292. See generall, Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-
5026 (1976).
2072. 611 F.2d at 1293.
2073. Id.
2074. Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 268 (1943), clearly articulates the difference
between the suspension of the imposition and the suspension of the execution of a sentence
for probation purposes:
The difference in the alternative methods is plain. Under the first, where exe-
cution of sentence is suspended, the defendant leaves the court with knowledge
that a fixed sentence for a definitive term of imprisonment hangs over him; under
the second, he is made aware that no definite sentence has been imposed and that if
his probation is revoked the court will at that time fix the term of his
imprisonment.
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court did not refrain from sentencing during the probation period:
rather it determined the sentence, but chose not to execute it immedi-
ately. Accordingly, the 1972 sentence could not be increased.0 75
Hence the addition of the special parole term20 76 and the judgment of
non-suitability under the Federal Youth Corrections Act20 77 increased
defendant's sentence, contrary to section 3653.
Whereas McDonald represents the rule that a legally imposed sen-
tence may not be increased even though its execution was suspended,
the court in United States v. Connol4z°78 held that an illegal sentence
could be increased when the original sentence was less than the statu-
tory minimum. In Connoly, the defendant was convicted of narcotics
violations, given two consecutive five-year terms, but not given the
mandatory special parole term as required by statute.20 79 Six years
later, Connolly, who had spent the interim as a fugitive from justice,
unsuccessfully moved for correction of the sentence.2 0 80 The prosecu-
tion then successfully moved to impose the mandatory parole term
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35.2081 On appeal, the de-
320 U.S. at 268. Thus, if imposition of the sentence had been suspended, the sentencing
court could sentence anew.
2075. On the other hand, an illegally imposed sentence presents the court with the oppor-
tunity to increase the sentence upon correction, at least when the illegality lies in the fact
that the original term was less than the legal minimum. United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d
1360, 1362 (9th Cir.) (sentence increase to conform with that required by law held proper),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977).
2076. The special parole term also would have been administered under guidelines which
became more severe in the interim between 1972 and 1976. See Benites v. United States
Parole Comm'n, 595 F.2d 518, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1979) (Parole Commission and Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1976 in which severity of offense was to play dominant role in parole eligibility
could not be applied retroactively without raising ex post facto problem); De Peralta v. Gar-
rison, 575 F.2d 749, 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (Parole Commission and Reorganization Act cannot
be applied retroactively); White v. Warden, 566 F.2d 57, 62 (9th Cir. 1977) (non-retroactivity
of Parole Commission and Reorganization Act is better view).
2077. The Federal Youth Corrections Act supposedly allows greater leniency by provid-
ing, among other things, that defendant may be sentenced to "treatment and supervision"
instead of confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b)-(c) (1976). This is in accord with the purpose
of the Youth Corrections Act which, according to the House Judiciary Committee at the
time of its passage, "looks primarily to the objective idea of rehabilitation." 1950 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERV. 3985. The scheme is belied, however, in that most youths committed for
"treatment and supervision" under § 5010(b) spend their time in the same institutions and
under the same conditions as adults sentenced under more retributive sentencing schemes.
United States v. Marron, 564 F.2d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1977) (Bums, J., dissenting).
2078. 618 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1980).
2079. Id. at 554. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (1976) requires a three year special parole term
be tacked on to the sentence of first offenders when imprisonment is imposed.
2080. Id. at 555.
2081. FED. R. CriM. P. 35 provides in part: "The court may correct an illegal sentence at
any time ......
1981]
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fendant argued that the "correction" was in reality a resentencing, and
thus allocution 2°82 or a presentence report2° 83 was required under rule
32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that there was no need for allocution be-
cause a defendant's statements could not aid the court in correcting a
sentence to the statutory minimum. 20 84 There was also no need for a
presentence report because the question of how much time defendant
had left to serve had been committed to the parole commission.20 85
Connolly also argued that the correction was a resentencing after
an illegal sentence, and thus a de novo proceeding.208 6 The Ninth Cir-
cuit did not elaborate on this argument, except to flatly declare: "We
hold [that the sentence correction] was neither a resentencing proceed-
ing nor a de novo proceeding ... 2087 Instead, the court analyzed
the motion to correct the sentence and reasoned that since the motion
charged an error in law, it could be collaterally attacked only if it re-
sulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.208 8 But the motion did not
effect that result where the trial court had "no discretion" not to in-
crease the original, invalid sentence to the statutory minimum.20 8 9
While the court's exposition of the de novo proceeding argument
was at best sketchy, there is no question that the result is sound. The
Supreme Court has ruled that the correction of an invalid sentence to
the statutory minimum does not violate double jeopardy.20 90
2082. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) provides that before sentencing, the court shall address the
defendant personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to
present any information in mitigation of punishment.
2083. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1) provides that before sentencing, the probation service of
the court shall make a presentence investigation and report to the court, unless the defend-
ant waives them, or the court finds in the record sufficient information to make a meaningful
exercise of sentencing discretion and the court so explains.
2084. 618 F.2d at 556.
2085. Id. at n.l I (citing United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1969) (judi-
ciary does not possess powers of parole and post sentence supervision)).
2086. 618 F.2d at 555.
2087. Id.
2088. Id; see United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979) ("The Court has held
that an error of law does not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error
constituted 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage ofjus-
tice.' Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428").
2089. 618 F.2d at 555-56.
2090. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 (1947) (correction to include fine as well as
imprisonment). In the Ninth Circuit, the rule has been followed in United States v. Stevens,
548 F.2d 1360, 1362 (9th Cir.) (court said "two" years when all parties had agreed on a plea
bargain of "ten" years), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975 (1977); United States v. Kenyon, 519 F.2d
1229, 1231 (9th Cir.) (correction to include mandatory special parole term), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 935 (1975). But see United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir.
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4. Consecutive sentences
For purposes of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970,209 I a conspiracy2 92 to violate the Act's prohibition
against manufacture or distribution of certain controlled substances
20 93
is a separate crime from manufacture or distribution itself, and may be
punished by a separate, consecutive sentence.2 °94 Because Congress in-
tended that conspiracy and manufacture or distribution be punished
separately under the Act, one convicted of both is not subjected to
double jeopardy.2 95 Congressional intent to punish the same act as
1974) (per curiam) (oral "misspoken" sentence not correctable without double jeopardy
problem).
2091. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1976).
2092. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1976) provides that an attempt or conspiracy to violate a substan-
tive offense in subchapter I (Control and Enforcement) of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act shall be punishable by fine, imprisonment or both, but not to
exceed the punishment for the substantive offense.
2093. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976) defines the substantive offense of manufacturing or distrib-
uting certain controlled substances while 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Supp. III 1979) prescribes pen-
alties of fine, imprisonment or both, with provisos for special parole terms when
imprisonment is meted out.
2094. "In general, a court can impose separate sentences for conspiracy to commit an of-
fense and for the accomplishment of the substantive offense itself." Curtis v. United States,
546 F.2d 1188, 1190 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (sections 841(a)(1) and 846 do not merge for
sentencing purposes), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908 (1977); United States v. Bommarito, 524
F.2d 140, 144 (2d Cir. 1975) (Congress intended prosecution under § 846 and other provi-
sions separately); United States v. Valot, 481 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 1973) (legislative history of
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act led court to conclude Congress did
not intend to preclude consecutive sentences for conspiracy and substantive offenses); see
also United States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (Congress
intended to punish a conspiracy which violates both § 846 (conspiracy to manufacture or
distribute) and § 963 (conspiracy to import) twice as severely as it intended to punish a
conspiracy which violates only one of the statutes).
2095. Such congressional intent is supported by the authorities cited supra note 2094. As a
rule, after congressional intent is divined, it will control the question of whether consecutive
sentences are appropriate under a given statutory scheme. Prince v. United States, 352 U.S.
322, 324, 327 (1957) (Congress did not intend entry of a bank with intent to commit robbery
and robbery to be "two offenses consecutively punishable in a typical bank robbery situa-
tion"); see Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1958) (Congress intended to punish a
single sale of narcotics by three separate statutes for which consecutive sentences could be
imposed); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1978) (importing and
distributing under Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act were intended
by Congress to be separate and distinct criminal acts, thus allowing consecutive sentences to
be imposed). But see Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 (1942) (single agreement
to commit several unlawful acts could not be punished by multiple convictions under gen-
eral conspiracy statute).
In the Ninth Circuit, there is a "general rule of separate offenses." United States v.
Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting merger of conspiracy to import
heroin with actual importation); see United States v. Taxe, 572 F.2d 216, 217 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam) ('To allow a series of discrete violations to merge into a 'course of conduct' and be
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two or more offenses will normally preclude a double jeopardy
challenge. °96
However, when Congress intends a conspiracy charge to merge
with the substantive offense, consecutive sentences for each would vio-
late the double jeopardy clause.20 97 In United States v. Wylie, 20 98 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the contention that the use of a Pinkerton in-
struction2 99 effectively merged conspiracy and distribution charges
such that they became one offense for double jeopardy purposes. A
Pinkerton instruction allows the prosecution to achieve both conspiracy
and substantive convictions by telling the jury that if it finds the ele-
ments of the conspiracy charge, it may also convict the defendant of the
substantive charge if it finds that a coconspirator actually committed
the substantive offense.21°° In Wylie, defendant argued that since "[t]he
agreement necessary to prove the conspiracy charge was also necessary
to prove the distribution charge," the two offenses merged under the
Blockburger test,210 by which multiple provisions create separate of-
fenses when "each provision requires proof of a fact which the other
does not."
2102
The Ninth Circuit "acknowledg[ed] the logic to [defendant's] rea-
treated as a single offense would vitiate the deterrent effect of the [record piracy] statute."),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); United States v. Long, 524 F.2d 660, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1975)
(since the "unit of prosecution" prescribed by Congress was the giving of false information,
such conduct by defendant on two separate forms properly resulted in two distinct viola-
tions).
Nevertheless, because the crime of conspiracy is necessarily defined in terms of another
"substantive" crime, a sentencing tribunal must be alert to the possibility that the legislature
intended the conspiracy violation to merge with the substantive offense. Normally, this pos-
sibility is remote. "Unlike some crimes that arise in a single transaction. . . the conspiracy
to commit an offense and the subsequent commission of that crime normally do not merge
into a single punishable act." lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) (citing
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946)).
2096. "Where consecutive sentences are imposed at a single criminal trial, the role of the
constitutional guarantee [against double jeopardy] is limited to assuring that the court does
not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for the same of-
fense." Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (using
Blockburger test to conclude that joyriding and auto theft are the "same statutory offense"
for double jeopardy purposes). Id. at 166.
2097. See Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322, 327 (1957) (ascertainment of Congres-
sional intent to merge crimes will normally be dispositive on the double jeopardy issue).
2098. 625 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1980).
2099. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspirator could be properly pun-
ished for violations of substantive offense even though he was incarcerated when the sub-
stantive offense occurred).
2100. Id.
2101. 625 F.2d at 1381.
2102. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
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soning,'2 0 3 but held that the Blockburger test was irrelevant because it
was merely a way to ascertain congressional intent "to impose separate
punishment for multiple offenses" arising out of an act or transac-
tion 1°4 Since it was already clear that Congress intended that there be
punishment under two separate statutes,1 5 defendant was in jeopardy
for two offenses, not one.21° 6
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Sixth Circuit authority that if the
same evidence was used to prove each crime, defendant would be put
in double jeopardy for, in effect, one offense.2 10 7 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court, in Pinkerton, had impliedly
approved the use of consecutive sentences when Pinkerton instructions
are given. 10 8
Because the Wylie court had the benefit of past litigation on the
question of whether 18 U.S.C. sections 841 and 846 were the same of-
fense,2109 its result was reasonably predictable. Addition of the Pinker-
ton instruction did not change matters because of the known intent of
Congress on the merger of the conspiracy and distribution statutes.
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, in Whalen v. United
2103. 625 F.2d at 1381.
2104. Id. (citing Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975)).
2105. 625 F.2d at 1381-82 (citing authority found supra in note 2094).
2106. See supra note 2095 (congressional intent is dispositive on the merger issue).
2107. 625 F.2d at 1381 n.14 (citing United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1367 (9th Cir.
1977)). The Sixth Circuit authority was United States v. Austin, 529 F.2d 559, 564 (6th Cir.
1976) ("Since proof of the substantive offenses. . . also proved every essential element of
the conspiracy.. . appellant was doubly punished in violation of the Fifth Amendment.")
(citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Freeman v. United States, 146 F.2d
978 (6th Cir. 1945)). In Gavieres, the Supreme Court laid down a test for identity of offenses:
"[TIhe test of the identity of offenses [is] that the same evidence is required to sustain them."
220 U.S. at 343. The Gavieres test arguably has been superseded by the Blockburger test
enunciated some two decades later. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1931).
2108. 625 F.2d at 1382 n.15. In Pinkerton, defendant was a participant in a conspiracy, but
incarcerated at the time of the substantive offense. The Supreme Court upheld a jury in-
struction which allowed him to be convicted of both the conspiracy and the substantive
offense. See supra note 2095. For the conspiracy, defendant received two years and a $500
fine. For the substantive offense, defendant received two and one-half years, to run concur-
rently with the two year sentence, and another fine of $1000. The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that since fines are equivalent to imprisonment for double jeopardy and multiple punish-
ment purposes (citing Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977) (separate fines under
21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 848 were cumulative punishments)), Pinkerton was in effect dealing
with a consecutive sentence situation since the fines, if not the prison terms, were unambigu-
ously consecutive. Hence, by upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court was impliedly
approving "the use of consecutive punishments in those cases where the Pinkerton instruc-
tion is given." 625 F.2d at 1382 n.15.
2109. See supra note 2094.
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States,21 10 rendered a more contrived result in similar circumstances.
Defendant had been convicted under one District of Columbia statute
forbidding killing in the course of rape21 1 and another forbidding
rape.21 12 He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty years to life
for the killing and fifteen years to life for the rape.2 1 3
As in Wylie, there was negative appellate court precedent on the
question of whether the statutes were intended to merge.2114 Unlike
Wylie, the precedent was obviously nonbinding. While the Court was
less than lucid in spelling out the relationship between statutory con-
struction and the double jeopardy clause,11 the Court held that when
federal courts construe a merger question to defendant's detriment and
in so doing do not properly divine what Congress really authorized,
they violate the double jeopardy clause.2116 As such, the double jeop-
ardy clause became a means by which the Court could dispense with its
usual deference toward the District of Columbia Court of Appeals'
construction of District of Columbia law.2 117
2110. 445 U.S. 684 (1980).
2111. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2401 (1973) provides in part:
Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills another purposely...
or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any offense punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary, or without purpose so to do kills another in perpetration
or in attempting to perpetrate any . . . rape . . . is guilty of murder in the first
degree.
2112. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2801 (1973) provides in part: "Whoever has carnal
knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. . . shall be imprisoned for any term of
years or for life."
2113. 445 U.S. at 685.
2114. Whalen v. United States, 379 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1977) (statutes in question had differ-
ent roots and served different societal purposes).
2115. In this case we have concluded that the customary deference to the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals' construction of local federal legislation is inappropri-
ate with respect to the statutes involved for the reason that the petitioner's claim
under the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot be separated entirely from a resolution
of the question of statutory construction.
445 U.S. at 688. Previous to Whalen, the rule was that the Supreme Court would not over-
rule the District of Columbia Court of Appeals except in cases of egregious error. Perell v.
Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 369 (1974) (D.C. Court of Appeals' conclusion that repeal of
code section guaranteeing jury trial in actions to recover real property meant that right to
jury trial in such a case rested on constitutional grounds was not "obvious error"). The
Court, however, never really came to grips with the "but for egregious error" concept in
Pernell except to assert that the Court had article III jurisdiction over the District of Colum-
bia. 445 U.S. at 689. Perhaps the reason the Court did not tackle Pernell head on, or admit
to overruling it, was the appellate court's "defensible," indeed, "more sophisticated" analysis
of why the two statutes were separate, viz, the different common law origins of the statutes,
as well as their different social functions. Id. at 707, 713 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2116. "The Double Jeopardy Clause at the very least precludes federal courts from impos-
ing consecutive sentences unless authorized by Congress to do so." 445 U.S. at 689.
2117. See discussion of Pernellsupra note 2115.
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What Congress really authorized, however, was neither in the stat-
utes nor in their legislative history.2118 It was in another District of
Columbia statute2 ' 19 which purportedly enacted the Blockburger test as
a rule of statutory construction for the District of Columbia.21 20 Ap-
plying the test, "whether each provision requires proof of a fact which
the other does not," the Court held that the two statutes were the same
because "[a] conviction for killing in the course of a rape cannot be had
without proving all the elements of the offense of rape.
21 21
While the immediate result of Whalen was the remanding of the
case for further proceeding, i.e., vacating defendant's sentence for rape,
the long run results of Whalen may be significant. Unless Congress
makes its intent painfully clear, the literal application of the Block-
burger test, together with the Court's ruling that consecutive sentences
beyond congressional authorization offend the double jeopardy clause,
could potentially be a powerful set of instruments with which to invali-
date consecutive sentences.
5. Federalism and separation of powers
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure vests in fed-
eral judges the power to reduce federal sentences, 2122 but it does not
2118. 445 U.S. at 690.
2119. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-112 (1973) provides:
A sentence imposed on a person for conviction of an offense shall, unless the court
imposing such sentence expressly provides otherwise, run consecutively to any
other sentence imposed on such person for conviction of an offense, whether or not
the offense (1) arises out of another transaction, or (2) arises out of the same trans-
action and requires proof of a fact which the other does not.
2120. The Court stated that the "phrasing of the statute is less than felicitous," 445 U.S. at
691, perhaps thereby acknowledging that the language of the statute does not explicitly say
anything about forbidding consecutive sentences. Essentially, the Whalen majority was as-
suming that Congress knew that by explicitly permitting consecutive sentences in two speci-
fied instances, it was thereby stating a preference for non-consecutive sentences in
unspecified situations. Yet the Court's entire discussion of the legislative history of the stat-
ute, id at 692, evidences the congressional unhappiness with the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals for not allowing consecutive sentences even when the offenses were different
under Blockburger. Consequently, Congress felt the need to spell out a preference for con-
secutive sentences in different offenses as classified under Blockburger. The Court cites no
legislative history demonstrating that Congress desired concurrent sentences for situations
where the literal application of the Blockburger test would yield the same offense. Against
this vacuum the Court argued that allowing consecutive sentences even when the statutory
offenses were the same under Blockburger would allow consecutive sentences for "greater
and lesser included offenses-an extraordinary view that the Government itself disavows."
Id. at 691-92 n.6. Such an anamolous result, however, would be tempered by the sentencing
court's explicit power to provide otherwise.
2121. Id at 694 (citations omitted). The dissent argued that Blockburger is not a satisfac-
tory test for "compound and predicate" offenses. Id at 708 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2122. Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part:
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disturb the division of judicial and executive authority. In United
States v. Warren,2123 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's order
reducing two federal sentences. However, the circuit court held that
the district court exceeded its authority under rule 35 to the extent that
it ordered the transfer of the defendant from state to federal prison to
enforce a plea bargain and the crediting of the federal sentences with
time spent in state custody2 124 While free pending an appeal of a 1975
federal conviction for which he was sentenced to twelve years in prison,
the defendant in Warren pleaded guilty in 1977 to several state charges.
The state court sentenced the defendant and ordered him to state
prison. In the meantime, the federal government indicted the defend-
ant for mail fraud. After a guilty plea to one count, the district court
sentenced the defendant in 1978 to a five year prison term to run con-
currently with his 1975 federal sentence.1 25 The defendant was then
returned to the state prison by the district court.
While in state custody, the defendant filed a motion in federal
court under rule 35. He successfully argued that his state guilty pleas
were predicated upon separate agreements with local prosecutors and
the United States Attorney's office that the defendant could serve his
state sentence in federal prison.21 26 The court ordered reduction of his
1975 federal sentence from twelve to nine years. 2 7 The court further
ordered that the defendant be transferred from state to federal prison
and that his federal sentences be credited with any time spent in state
custody.
2 128
On appeal by the United States, the Ninth Circuit upheld the re-
ductions of the two federal sentences as within rule 35.2129 The Ninth
Circuit, however, reversed the order to the extent that it purported to
The court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is im-
posed, or within 120 days after receipt by the court of a mandate issued upon
affirmance of the judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within 120 days after
entry of any order or judgment of the Supreme Court denying review of, or having
the effect of upholding, a judgment of conviction. The court may also reduce a
sentence upon revocation of probation as provided by law.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
2123. 610 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1980).
2124. d at 684-85.
2125. Id at 683.
2126. Under the purported agreement, the state would recommend that the defendant
serve his state time in federal prison and the federal government would not oppose a rule 35
motion for reduction of the 1975 sentence. The defendant preferred the federal prison be-
cause of its superior medical facilities. Id at 682.
2127. Id
2128. Id
2129. Id at 685.
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transfer the defendant from state to federal prison and to credit the
federal sentence with state time.2130 The court began its analysis of the
transfer order by declaring that a sentence inconsistent with a plea bar-
gain is not "illegal" under rule 35.2 t31 It then concluded that even if
rule 35 supports an attack on a sentence as being inconsistent with a
plea bargain, it only does so with respect to federal sentences. 21 32 Thus,
rule 35 was unavailable to challenge state imprisonment on a state
charge.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the defendant's argument that re-
gardless of rule 35 the federal court's personal jurisdiction over him,
resulting from his appearance before it,21 33 was enough to legitimize
the transfer. The Ninth Circuit held that, even given the district court's
personal jurisdiction, its attempt to transfer custody violated the princi-
ples of comity and separation of powers.2134 The court reasoned that,
having first arrested the defendant, the federal authorities had priority
of jurisdiction over him. Having such priority, they also had the power
to relinquish it. The decision to relinquish it is, however, vested in the
2130. Id
2131. Id at 684. The Ninth Circuit cited two cases, Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
430 (1962), and United States v. Stevens, 548 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 975
(1977). However, the language in Hill to which the Ninth Circuit referred merely said that
the "narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction at any time of an illegal sentence, not
to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of
sentence." 368 U.S. at 430 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Hill concerned a de-
nial of allocution to the defendant as required by rule 32(a). The cite to Stevens adds even
less support to the Ninth Circuit's assertion because Stevens held that rule 35 could be used
to increase a sentence when it is imposed in an illegal manner. 548 F.2d at 1362 (judge said
"two" years when he meant, and all parties had agreed to, "ten" years).
2132. 610 F.2d at 684.
2133. In the Ninth Circuit, the rule is that a court has exclusive personal jurisdiction over
any person who appears before it regardless of how his appearance came about. See United
States v. Zammiello, 432 F.2d 72, 73 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (defendant taken from
jurisdiction of state authorities and put into federal custody); Strand v. Schmittroth, 251
F.2d 590, 600 (9th Cir.) (one sovereign yielding physical possession of defendant to another),
cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 886 (1957); Stamphill v. Johnston, 136 F.2d 291, 292 (9th Cir.) (state
authorities surrendered defendant to federal authorities even though state authorities were
entitled to keep defendant until he finished serving his sentence), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 766
(1943).
The Second Circuit, on the other hand, has recognized a more limited federal jurisdic-
tion over a person who appears pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus adtestiXcandum. See In
re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 1978) (federal district court had no right to interrupt
defendant's pre-existing state sentence for duration of contempt charge confinement because
a "loan" by a sovereign with a right of prior jurisdiction "cannot empower the courts of the
second sovereignty to tamper with the terms of the first jurisdiction's valid prior judgment of
conviction"). The Warren court showed an inclination toward the argument that the Ninth
Circuit should adopt the Liberatore approach. 610 F.2d at 684 n.8.
2134. 610 F.2d at 684.
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executive, not the judicial branch.2135 The appropriate officer desig-
nated by the Attorney General had already decided, as a matter of
comity, to return the defendant to state prison after the rule 35 hearing.
Hence, the federal court was without authority to order the transfer.
The crediting of the federal sentences with state time also con-
flicted with the separation of powers. Such an order is the "functional
equivalent" of letting a federal sentence run concurrently with a state
one.2 136 As such, it specifies where a federal prisoner will spend at least
part of his federal term. But, because it is the executive branch which
has the authority to designate the place of confinement for federal pris-
oners,2 137 a federal district court would be without jurisdiction to order
such a credit.
E. Probation
Last term, in Higdon v. United States,21 38 the Ninth Circuit found
that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an impermissible
array of probation conditions2 39 on Higdon, who had been involved in
2135. Id at 685 (citing Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922) ("[W]e have no doubt
that [authority to transfer] exists and is to be exercised with the consent of the Attorney
General. In that officer the power and discretion to practice the comity in such matters
between the Federal and state courts is vested.")); Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590, 609
(9th Cir.) (federal district court had no authority to issue writ of habeas corpus over federal
probationer charged with state crime), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 886 (1957).
2136. 610 F.2d at 685. The "crediting" problem seems ultimately semantic. While the
district court could not "credit" defendant's sentence with state time, it still could have re-
duced it under rule 35 apart from considerations of state time and accomplished the effect
precluded in Warren.
2137. Id Sections 4082(a) and (b) of Title 18, U.S.C. provide:
(a) A person convicted of an offense against the United States shall be com-
mitted, for such term of imprisonment as the court may direct, to the custody of the
Attorney General of the United States, who shall designate the place of confine-
ment where the sentence shall be served.
(b) The Attorney General may designate as a place of confinement any
available, suitable, and appropriate institution or facility, whether maintained by
the Federal Government or otherwise, and whether within or without the judicial
district in which the person was convicted, and may at any time transfer a person
from one place of confinement to another.
18 U.S.C. §§ 4082(a)-4082(b) (1976).
See United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir. 1979) ("It is the administra-
tive responsibility of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of
Prisons to compute sentences and apply credit where it is due. It is not the province of the
sentencing court.") (citations omitted).
2138. 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
2139. This author discovered only one case as extreme as Higdon. In People v. Keller, 76
Cal. App. 3d 827, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1978), defendant was convicted in municipal court of
petty theft of a 49 cent ballpoint pen. As a condition of probation, defendant waived his
fourth amendment rights for several years. The California Court of Appeal held the proba-
tion condition impermissible, stating, "[t]he probation condition here imposed, the waiver of
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a kickback scheme while serving in the United States Army.2 14 0 Hig-
don, a former Master Sergeant, was courtmartialed in 1971 for receiv-
ing kickbacks from several servicemen's clubs which he operated in
Vietnam. In 1973, he pleaded guilty to a single criminal count arising
out of his involvement in the kickback scheme. He received a five year
suspended prison sentence upon his acceptance of certain probation
conditions. The conditions included forfeiture of all his assets, includ-
ing his home, to the government and an agreement to work for charity
full-time for three years (6,200 hours) without pay.
2 141
For three years, Higdon fulfilled his probation conditions and
properly reported to his probation officer. During the fourth year,
however, the probation officer discovered that Higdon had violated
some of the conditions. Because of these violations, Higdon's proba-
tion was revoked and he was ordered to serve his full five year prison
sentence with no credit given for the four years and four months of
probation he had successfully completed.21 42
After Higdon's request for modification of the prison sentence was
denied, he collaterally attacked his sentence, asserting that the proba-
tion conditions were unlawful under the Federal Probation Act.
2 143
Therefore, Higdon concluded, his probation should not have been re-
voked for the violation of these illegal conditions.2144 The district court
denied Higdon's motion and Higdon appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit found that the trial judge had abused his discre-
a precious constitutional right resting solely upon plea to theft of a 49 cent ballpoint pen
reaches for a parallel, the use of a Mack truck to crush an gnat. In this further sense the
condition cannot be deemed reasonable." Id at 840, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
2140. The Government was purportedly defrauded of "several hundred thousand dollars"
by Higdon and his cohorts. 627 F.2d at 896.
2141. The court noted that the three year period was apparently extended by the probation
officer to allow defendant to fulfill the requirement during a four to five year period. Id at
n.5.
2142. Higdon was forced to work a second full-time job in order to support his wife and
two children. In 1976, his wife left him and "[e]ventually, the pressure of working two full-
time jobs and the travails of a deteriorating family life led to poor health and a drinking
problem." Id at 896. In his fourth year on probation, as the burden of these conditions
took their toll, Higdon fell behind on his time reports and his probation officer began check-
ing up on him. He discovered that Higdon was claiming credit for time he had not worked
and that Higdon had persuaded a state senator to write a letter for him verifying his fraudu-
lent time sheets. For these probation violations, the probation officer petitioned the judge to
revoke Higdon's probation. Id
2143. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3651-3656 (1976). Higdon also asserted that the probation conditions
violated the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Because the
court held that that the conditions violated the Federal Probation Act, it did not reach Hig-
don's constitutional claim.
2144. 627 F.2d at 897.
19811
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tion under the Federal Probation Act when he imposed forfeiture and
charitable work as conditions of Higdon's probation.2145 In reaching
this conclusion, the court was guided by the test set out in United States
v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,1 46 the circuit's leading case on the propriety of
probation conditions. In Consuelo-Gonzalez, the court held that proba-
tion conditions must be reasonably related to rehabilitation of the of-
fender, the primary purpose of probation,2 47 and to protection of the
public.
2 148
The Higdon court applied this test by using a two step analysis:
"First, we consider the purposes for which the judge imposed the con-
ditions . . second [we] determine whether the conditions are reason-
ably related to the purposes.12 149 The court did not decide whether the
sentencing judge had imposed the severe probation conditions for per-
missible purposes.21 50 Rather, it held that the conditions failed the sec-
ond portion of the test because they were not reasonably related to
either rehabilitation of the offender or protection of the public.
215 '
For probation conditions to be "reasonably related" within the
meaning of the Consuelo-Gonzalez test, they must be narrowly drawn
to achieve the permissible ends "without unnecessarily restricting the
probationer's otherwise lawful activities. 2 52 The court found that
while either of the conditions imposed upon Higdon alone may have
been within the bounds of judicial discretion,2153 taken together they
unnecessarily interfered with Higdon's legitimate activities.2 54
The Government did not dispute the impermissibility of Higdon's
probation conditions before the Ninth Circuit. Rather, it argued that
Higdon was bound by the conditions, even though some of them were
impermissible, until he sought to have them modified. The Ninth Cir-
cuit responded to this contention stating: "The government's argument
2145. Id at 896-97.
2146. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
2147. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943).
2148. 521 F.2d at 264.
2149. 627 F.2d at 897.
2150. Id at 898. The Ninth Circuit observed that the harshness of the conditions sug-
gested that they may have been imposed to punish Higdon, or to circumvent the maximum
five year sentencing limit for Higdon's crime, a limit the sentencing judge had viewed as too
lenient. Id Neither of these purposes is permissible under the Consuelo-Gonzalez test. d.
However, the court believed that it did not have to decide this issue because the probation




2153. Id at 899.
2154. Id at 899-90.
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proves too much. It is true that self-help, and particularly deceitful
self-help, is not the proper response to unreasonable probation terms.
But the reasonableness of revocation on the unusual facts of this case is
related to the reasonableness of the probation terms.21 55 The court
remanded the case to give the sentencing judge an opportunity to de-
cide whether Higdon's probation should be revoked solely on the basis
of his noncompliance with reporting requirements related to the imper-
missible conditions.2156
In United States v. Ferguson,2157 decided two months after Hig-
don, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's refusal to consider
mitigating circumstances during a probation revocation hearing was an
abuse of discretion in violation of the defendant's due process rights.
The court stated: "'[a]dmissions of probation violations, unlike guilty
pleas, do not automatically trigger sentencing.' ",2158 It further ob-
served that "[d]ue process requires that a probationer at a revocation
hearing be given the opportunity to show that mitigating circumstances
suggest the violation does not warrant revocation. 2 59
F Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus, or "Great Writ," 21 60 has been a fixture
in the Anglo-American legal system.216' The writ tests "in a court of
law the legality of restraints on a person's liberty. ' 2 162 As codified
under federal law,2 63 habeas corpus is available to a person "in cus-
tody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
2155. Id at 900.
2156. The court remanded Higdon's motion to the sentencing judge for a determination of
"(1) whether Higdon's probation should have been revoked for noncompliance with report-
ing requirements; and (2) whether if the revocation was proper his jail term should neverthe-
less be modified." d (footnotes omitted). The court suggested that, "if the judge
determines that probation should not have been revoked for mere noncompliance with re-
porting requirements, equitable considerations dictate that the remaining probation time
[eight months at the time probation was revoked] be excused because of the twenty-nine
months which Higdon has spent in jail." Id at n.18.
2157. 624 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
2158. Id at 83 (citing United States v. Diaz-Burgos, 601 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir. 1979)
(quoting United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 919
(1977))).
2159. 624 F.2d at 83.
2160. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 53, at 237 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT].
2161. Id at 236-37.
2162. R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS § 1, at 29-30 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
SOKOL].
2163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256 (1976).
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States."2164
1. Custody
Habeas corpus is available only if a petitioner is in "custody." 216
Under the traditional view, the only relief available under a habeas
corpus petition was release from custody.21 66 Thus, if the petitioner
was not in custody, the case would be moot.2167 Although the Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of available remedies in recent years,
2168
custody remains a statutory requirement.2169 Custody, however, is not
easily defined.
Custody does not require actual physical detention; rather, it in-
volves restraints on one's liberty which are not shared by the general
public.2170 Thus, "custody" has been found where a petitioner is free
on parole,2171 is challenging a sentence that would run consecutively to
a sentence presently being served,2 172 or is free on his own recognizance
2164. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1976) states the following:
The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless-
(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States or is
committed for trial before some court thereof; or
(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Con-
gress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the
United States; or
(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States; or
(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is in custody for an
act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protec-
tion, or exemption claimed under the commission, order or sanction of any
foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity and effect of which depend
upon the law of nations; or
(5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial.
2165. Id
2166. SOKOL, supra note 2162, § 6, at 65.
2167. d
2168. Id at 65-66. Available remedies include
unconditional release from custody, release from custody conditioned upon the
state's decision to retry the petitioner within a reasonable time, the vacating of a
sentence as unconstitutional even though this does not effect the petitioner's re-
lease, a transfer from one institution to another or even changing the nature of the
custody within an institution, as release from solitary confinement, or the granting
of adequate appellate review of an original conviction.
Id § 9.5, at 98-99 (footnotes omitted); see Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66 (1968) (second of
two consecutive sentences challenged); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (peti-
tioner had been unconditionally released after filing habeas corpus petition but before com-
pletion of proceedings; case not moot because there were collateral consequences to
conviction).
2169. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1976).
2170. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
2171. Id at 240-41.
2172. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 56-58 (1968).
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pending service of sentence. 173
In Rose v. Morris,2 174 the Ninth Circuit considered whether a state
detainer warrant against a federal prisoner was sufficient "custody" to
confer habeas corpus jurisdiction on the federal courts. Petitioner had
been convicted on a federal narcotics charge while on parole from two
state convictions. As a result of the federal conviction, the state court
revoked petitioner's parole. A state detainer warrant was issuedf re-
questing that the state be notified before the petitioner was released
from federal custody so that the state could retake the petitioner and
have him begin serving the balance of his state sentences. In a habeas
corpus petition, Rose challenged the probation revocation and sentenc-
ing proceeding. The district court dismissed the petition on the ground
that petitioner was not in "custody." The Ninth Circuit reversed, find-
ing that there was sufficient custody2175 under Jones v. Cunningham 2176
and Peyton v. Rowe.2 17
2. Exhaustion of state remedies
Persons in state custody are statutorily required to exhaust their
state court remedies before federal habeas corpus relief becomes avail-
able.2 178 Technically, however, this statutory requirement applies only
to persons "in custody pursuant to a judgment of a State court,"
2179
even though a conviction is not entered. 218 0 Federal courts, however,
have imposed the exhaustion requirement as a matter of comity long
before the requirement was written into statutory form.2 18 ' Thus, al-
though federal courts have jurisdiction under section 2241(c) to hear
pretrial habeas corpus petitions by persons in state custody, this juris-
diction will generally not be exercised in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances.
218 2
2173. Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 346 (1973).
2174. 619 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980).
2175. Id at 44 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit, 410 U.S. 484, 488-89 (1973); Estelle
v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 536 n.2 (1975)).
2176. 371 U.S. 236 (1963). See supra notes 2170-71 and accompanying text.
2177. 391 U.S. 54 (1968). See supra note 2172 and accompanying text.
2178. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
2179. Id
2180. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973) (by implication); Ex
parne Royall, 117 U.S. 241,251-53 (1886); Rivers v. Lucas, 477 F.2d 199, 203 (6th Cir.), rev'd
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 896 (1973).
2181. 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4262, at 613, § 4264, at 625 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER].
2182. Id; Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973) (citing Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting, with approval). See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial and the Exhaus-
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In Carden v. Montana, 183 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a habeas
corpus petition which sought dismissal of state criminal charges prior
to trial on the ground that the petitioners' right to a speedy trial had
been violated. Petitioners had unsuccessfully asserted this same claim
in the state courts in a pretrial motion, including an appeal to the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. At the district court habeas corpus hearing, the
state conceded that petitioners had exhausted state remedies prior to
trial. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held that federal court jurisdic-
tion over the habeas corpus application should not be exercised, citing
considerations of comity, and finding no special circumstances in the
case.218 4 This decision is supported by substantial authority. 185 How-
ever, jurisdiction may well have been exercised had petitioners sought
immediate trial, rather than dismissal of the charges.18 6
3. Effect of state court findings
Res judicata does not bar habeas corpus proceedings; thus, a state
court's determination of a federal claim does not preclude federal re-
examination of the claim.218 7 However, the weight that should be ac-
corded a state court's determination poses a difficult problem. Justice
Frankfurter, concurring in Brown v. Allen, t88 stated that although a
federal court may rely on a state court's determinations of historical
facts in the absence of a "vital flaw" in the state court's factfinding
process, it must independently decide questions of law and mixed ques-
tions of law and fact.2189 While shedding some light on the issue,
Brown did not give enough direction to the lower courts.
21 90
Facing this question again in Townsend v. Sain,2191 the Supreme
Court held that a federal court may "receive evidence and try the [his-
torical] facts anew" on a habeas corpus petition and must do so if the
petitioner did not receive a "full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state
tion Requirement ofFederalHabeas Corpus, 1977 DUKE L.J. 707, 707-11 [hereinafter cited as
Exhaustion Requirement].
2183. 626 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1980).
2184. Id at 83-84.
2185. Brown v. Estele, 530 F.2d 1280, 1284 (5th Cir. 1980); Dolack v. Allenbrand, 548
F.2d 891, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1977); Scranton v. New York, 532 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1976);
Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 (3d Cir. 1975); see Exhaustion Requirement, supra
note 2182, at 720-24.
2186. Exhaustion Requirement, supra note 2182, at 720-24.
2187. WRIGHT, supra note 2160, at 241.
2188. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
2189. Id at 506-08 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2190. WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 2181, § 4265, at 657.
2191. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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court. 2 192 The Court went on to identify six criteria under which a
federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing.2193 These criteria were
eventually codified in 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d), which establishes a
presumption that a state court's findings of fact after a hearing are cor-
rect unless one of the criteria is met.2194 If none of the criteria are es-
tablished, a federal court is entitled to rely on the state court findings
without an evidentiary hearing.21 95  However, the courts have been
"emphatic that the federal court may rely on the state court findings
only after making an independent review of the record of the state
2192. Id at 312.
2193. Id at 313.
2194. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976) identifies eight, rather than six criteria. It provides the
following:
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a
determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court
of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to which the applicant for the writ and
the State or an officer or agent thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding,
written opinion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed
to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or the
respondent shall admit-
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court
hearing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate
to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court
hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State
court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the
State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of
the sufficiency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is pro-
duced as provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of
such part of the record as a whole concludes that such factual determination is
not fairly supported by the record.
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court, when due
proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the existence of one or
more of the circumstances respectively set forth in paragraphs numbered (1) to (7),
inclusive, is shown by the applicant, otherwise appears, or is admitted by the re-
spondent, or unless the court concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph
numbered (8) that the record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole,
does not fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the
State court was erroneous.
2195. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 2181, § 4265, at 670.
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proceeding.
2 196
This last requirement recently caused the Ninth Circuit to vacate
and remand a district court's dismissal of a habeas corpus petition in
Rhinehart v. Gunn.2 197 While the district court appeared to rely on a
state court's determination, but did not state any findings of fact nor
include the transcript of any habeas corpus hearing in the record, the
Ninth Circuit was simply unable to conclude that the district judge had
made an "independent review of all relevant parts of the state court
record. '21 98 Following Rhinehart, the Ninth Circuit in 1980 vacated
and remanded two district court dismissals on the same grounds.
2 99
In Townsend, the Supreme Court held that "a substantial allega-
tion of newly discovered evidence" 22°° would be one criterion requiring
an evidentiary hearing. The new evidence, however, must bear upon
the constitutionality of a petitioner's custody, since evidence which re-
lated only to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for federal
habeas corpus relief.220' At an evidentiary hearing, the question arises
as to what standard to apply to determine whether the newly discov-
ered evidence warrants granting habeas corpus relief.
In Quigg v. Crst,220 2 the Ninth Circuit confronted this question.
Citing decisions from other circuits and comparing habeas corpus peti-
tions to motions for new trials, the court concluded that the proper
standard to apply is whether the newly discovered evidence "would
probably produce an acquittal. '220
3
4. Grounds for the writ
Habeas corpus is available to persons held in state custody only on
the ground that such custody is "in violation of the Constitution or laws
2196. Id at 672.
2197. 598 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
2198. Id at 558.
2199. Patterson v. Warden, 624 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (district court sum-
marily dismissed petition for habeas corpus); Cody v. Morris, 623 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1980)
(petitioner, who was transferred from federal to California custody to stand trial for murder,
claimed his murder trial took place beyond the 120 day period prescribed by Article IV,
paragraph (c), of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. (1976); district
court denied petition without hearing).
2200. 372 U.S. at 313.
2201. Id at 317.
2202. 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980).
2203. Id at 1112; see Sims v. Brewer, 439 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Iowa), aft'dper curlam, 567
F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1977); Shuler v. Wainwright, 341 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Fla. 1972), rep'don
othergrounds, 491 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Armstrong v. Collier, 536 F.2d 72 (5th
Cir. 1976); Kelly v. Ragen, 129 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1942).
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or treaties of the United States." 2 2  The Supreme Court recently con-
sidered whether the failure of retained counsel to provide adequate
representation can render a trial so fundamentally unfair as to violate
the fourteenth amendment, thereby providing the requisite grounds for
obtaining a federal writ of habeas corpus.22 °5
In Cuyler v. Sullivan,22°6 the defendant accepted representation
from the two lawyers retained by his two codefendants because he
could not afford to pay for his own. All three codefendants were tried
separately. Sullivan was the first to come to trial. After the prosecution
had presented its case, defendant's counsel decided to rest without
presenting any evidence. The defendant was convicted, and the convic-
tion was affirmed on appeal. The codefendants, however, were acquit-
ted at separate trials. During defendant's state court action for
collateral relief, one of defendant's counsel testified that he had not
wanted to put on a defense because he did not want to expose the de-
fense witnesses for the upcoming trials of the other defendants. Never-
theless, collateral relief in the state courts was denied. Further, a
federal district court denied defendant habeas corpus relief. On ap-
peal, the Third Circuit granted habeas corpus, finding that, although
multiple representation does not necessarily result in denial of effective
assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant is entitled to reversal of his
conviction whenever he makes "some showing of a possible conflict of
interest or prejudice, however remote.
220 7
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. In response to the
state's argument that the blunders of retained counsel do not involve
state action and, therefore, cannot provide the basis for habeas corpus
relief, the Court held that a state criminal trial itself is a state action
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.220 8 As such, when a
state obtains a criminal conviction in which a defendant is inade-
quately assisted in violation of his sixth amendment rights, whether by
retained or by appointed counsel, it is the state that unconstitutionally
deprives the defendant of his liberty.220 9
However, the Supreme Court went on to hold that thepossibility of
a conflict of interest of a defendant's retained counsel is not sufficient to
2204. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
2205. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
2206. Id
2207. Id at 338-40.
2208. Id at 343; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Lisenba v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (state court
responsibility to correct a wrong).
2209. 446 U.S. at 342-43.
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overturn a state's criminal conviction. Rather, to establish a violation
of the sixth amendment, "a defendant who raised no objection at trial
must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected
his lawyer's performance."22 10 Consequently, the Court remanded the
case for a determination under this latter standard.
The constitutionality of the Treaty on the Execution of Penal
Sentences between the United States and Mexico221' ("Treaty") was
considered by the Ninth Circuit in the 1980 case of Pfeifer v. United
States Bureau of Prisons.22 2 The Treaty provides that Mexicans con-
victed in the United States may elect to serve their incarcerations in
Mexico, and that Americans convicted in Mexibo may elect to serve
their incarcerations in the United States. 213 Under the terms of the
Treaty, however, the transferring state reserves "exclusive jurisdiction
over any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge,
modify or set aside sentences handed down by its courts. 221 4 In addi-
tion, the Treaty requires a prisoner's "express consent" that the transfer
be given, z 1-and allows the receiving state to verify that a prisoner's
consent is given "voluntarily and with full knowledge of the conse-
quences thereof."221 6 The legislation implementing this Treaty2 217 re-
quires verification that the prisoner understand and agree that "only
the country in which he was convicted and sentenced can modify or set
aside the conviction or sentence, and any proceedings seeking such ac-
tion may only be brought in that country.
'2218
In Pfeifer, the petitioner asserted that the Treaty and its imple-
menting legislation were unconstitutional because they deny American
prisoners transferred from Mexico the right to challenge the constitu-
tionality of their foreign convictions in United States courts. Alterna-
tively, he asserted that his consent to the transfer was not voluntarily
and knowingly given because the conditions of Mexican prisons denied
him any real choice.
The court held that "the requirement that an offender agree not to
challenge his or her conviction in a United States court is not an uncon-
2210. 1d at 350 (emphasis added).
2211. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico,
28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718 [hereinafter cited as Treaty].
2212. 615 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1980).
2213. Treaty, supra note 2211, at art. I, paras. I & 2.
2214. Id. at art. VI.
2215. Id. at art. IV, para. 2.
2216. Id. at art. V, para. 1.
2217. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3244, 4100-4115 (Supp. III 1979).
2218. 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
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stitutional condition."22 9 The court explained that as a prisoner of
Mexico, the petitioner did not have a right to relief in the United States
courts. Because he relinquished nothing by agreeing to forego judicial
review of his conviction in the United States, the consent requirement
was constitutional.2220 The court further decided that the petitioner's
consent was given voluntarily and knowingly.
2221
The Ninth Circuit also recently considered whether a violation of
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA)2222 constitutes a vi-
olation of federal law cognizable under section 2254.2223 The IADA,
enacted by Congress in 1970 and subsequently adopted by at least 46
states, "prescribes procedures by which a member State may obtain for
trial a prisoner incarcerated in another member jurisdiction and by
which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain
charges pending against him in another jurisdiction. 2224 In the 1980
case of Cody v. Morris,2 225 petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from a
California murder conviction on the ground that he was not brought to
trial within 120 days of his transfer from federal to California custody
as required by IADA.2226 Reasoning that "Congress . . . made clear
that the consequences of a failure to begin the trial within this [120 day]
period would be a dismissal of the indictment, information or com-
plaint with prejudice, ' 2227 the court found that a violation of the IADA
would be cognizable under section 2254.2228 With one exception,2229
this decision accords with decisions in several other circuits.223 °
2219. 615 F.2d at 876; accord Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1193, 1197-1200 (2d Cir.
1980) (by implication); Mitchell v. United States, 483 F. Supp. 291, 294 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
There is authority, however, for the proposition that a petitioner incarcerated under
federal authority pursuant to a foreign conviction cannot be denied all access to American
courts when he makes a persuasive showing that his conviction was obtained without any
due process. 621 F.2d at 1197-98. See also Note, Constitutional Problems in the Execution of
Foreign Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American Prisoner Transfer Treaty, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1500, 1517 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Penal Sentences]. However, such a peti-
tioner can be estopped from obtaining collateral review of the foreign conviction in Ameri-
can courts if he has validly waived that right. 621 F.2d at 1198-1200. See also Foreign Penal
Sentences, supra, at 1523-24.
2220. 615 F.2d at 876.
2221. Id at 877.
2222. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-8 (1976).
2223. Cody v. Morris, 623 F.2d 101, 102-03 (9th Cir. 1980).
2224. U.S. v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978).
2225. 623 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1980).
2226. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(c) (1976).
2227. 623 F.2d at 102.
2228. Id at 102-03.
2229. Fasano v. Hall, 615 F.2d 555, 558 (Ist Cir. 1980).
2230. Esola v. Groomes, 520 F.2d 830 (3d Cir. 1975); Young v. Mabry, 471 F. Supp. 553,
19811
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G. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Supreme Court held in Rummel v. Estelle223 1 that the eighth
amendment does not require proportionality of sentence to crime for
non-capital offenses. In Rummel, petitioner was convicted of obtaining
$120.75 by false pretenses, a felony under Texas law, 2232 and sentenced
to life imprisonment under a repeat offender statute. Petitioner had
already been twice convicted of similar minor property offenses 2233 and
the Texas repeat offender statute required a mandatory life sentence for
anyone convicted three times of a felony less than capital.
2234
Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, reasoned that any re-
quirement for proportionality under the eighth amendment should be
confined to "unique" punishments. Specifically, the Court held that
proportionality rationales found in the death penalty cases2235 were in-
applicable because of the qualitative difference between the death pen-
alty and other kinds of punishment.2 236 This did not completely settle
the proportionality issue, however, since the Court in Weems v. United
States,2237 had employed a proportionality rationale to strike down a
559-60 (E.D. Ark. 1978), a'd on other grounds, 596 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1979); Williams v.
Maryland, 445 F. Supp. 1216, 1219 (D. Md. 1978); Stroble v. Egeler, 408 F. Supp. 630, 634
(E.D. Mich. 1976), remanded on other grounds, 547 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1977); cf Beebe v.
Vaughn, 430 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Del. 1977) (transfer of custody between two states; habeas
corpus petition found to allege violation of federal law similar to other interstate compacts).
2231. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
2232. TEX. PENAL CODE arts. 1410, 1413 (Vernon 1953). These sections have been recodi-
fled at TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.02 (Vernon 1974).
2233. In 1964, petitioner was convicted of credit card fraud of $80; in 1969, he was con-
victed of passing a forged check with a face value of $28.36. Petitioner's third felony convic-
tion occurred in 1973. 445 U.S. at 265-66.
2234. In 1973, Tax. PENAL CODE art. 63 (Vernon 1925) provided: "Whoever shall have
been three times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be
imprisoned for life in the penitentiary." This statute has since been recodified at TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
2235. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (rape may not be punished
by death penalty); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion) (death penalty
not per se cruel and unusual).
2236. 445 U.S. at 272. The Rummel Court's conclusion is amply supported in the cases. In
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), Justice Brennan called the death penalty "uniquely
degrading," id. at 291 (Brennan, J., concurring), while Justice Stewart said that the sentences
at issue went "beyond, not in degree but in kind, the punishments that the state legislatures
have determined to be necessary." Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
2237. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). Other non-death penalty cases may be distinguished. In
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (punishment of drug addiction is cruel and
unusual), the Court said there are certain things which cannot be punished at all, id at 667;
hence, proportionality was not necessary to the holding. Likewise, in Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (military desertion not punishable by denationalization),
the holding did not require a proportionality analysis because of an independent rationale,
namely, the scope of the federal government's power over citizenship.
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non-capital sentence under the eighth amendment. The Rummel court
distinguished the punishment in Weems, as it had done with the death
penalty, on grounds of uniqueness.2238 It quoted at length the rather
melodramatic description of Weems' punishment for falsifying a public
record, which included, inter alia, twelve years of hard labor and life-
time surveillance.2239 Thus, by stripping away any mandate for pro-
portionality under the eighth amendment, the Rummel court was able
to uphold the application of the Texas repeat offender statute as
"purely a matter of legislative prerogative."224
Despite the elegance of its analytical framework, Rummel leaves
the eighth amendment in a state of severe philosophical tension. Pro-
portionality, as part of a moral framework, 24' is the essence of the the-
ory of retributive justice.2 42 By rejecting proportionality as an eighth
amendment principle for non-death penalty sentences, the Rummel
court acknowledged that the eighth amendment does not embody the
theory of retributive justice. However, by leaving proportionality as a
constitutional requirement in death penalty cases, 2243 the Court created
the anomaly that proportionality based retributive justice becomes a
vehicle for leniency in death penalty cases,22" whereas rehabilitation
2238. 445 U.S. at 272.
2239. Id. at 273 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910)). The Court
did not address how restrictions on the prisoner's liberty after release meaningfully differ
from probation or parole.
2240. 445 U.S. at 274 (footnote omitted).
2241. Retributive justice is sometimes called simply "retribution," and often connotes
mere revenge. Commentators have distinguished retributive justice from vengeance on
three grounds: (1) it is not arbitrary since it is administered by authority of law, rather than
personal authority, (2) it is defined by preexisting rules, and (3) it is proportioned. See VAN
DEN HAAG, supra note 2028.
2242. Justice Powell's dissenting opinion expressed the link between proportionality and
retributive justice: "Disproportionality analysis measures the relationship between the na-
ture and number of offenses committed and the severity of the punishment inflicted on the
offender. The inquiry focuses on whether a person deserves such punishment, not simply on
whether punishment would serve a utilitarian goal." 445 U.S. at 288 (Powell, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added). Much the same point was once made by C.S. Lewis in his essay, The
Humanitarian Theory of Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 302 (S. Grupp ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as Lewis]: "[Tihe concept of Desert is the only connecting link between
punishment and justice. It is only as deserved or undeserved that a sentence can be just or
unjust."
2243. See 445 U.S. at 272.
2244. Proportionality was the basis for invalidating a death penalty in Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion) (death penalty grossly disproportionate to rape).
Similarly, in striking down discretionary death penalties in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972), Justice Stewart evidenced some favor of retributive justice in his concurring opinion,
stating:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that in-
stinct in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in pro-
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or offender oriented sentencing becomes a vehicle for harshness
through repeat offender statutes. 2245  Moreover, as the dissent points
out,' ¢ the tension is exacerbated by the failure of the Court in the
death penalty opinions to confine its proportionality analysis to the
"unique" death penalty, and by the Court's reluctance in Rummel to
rule out proportionality in the extreme hypothetical case.2247
moting the stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe
that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the
punishment they "deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of-self-help,
vigilante justice, and lynch law.
Id. at 308 (Stewart, J., concurring). One may argue, of course, that Stewart couches his
argument in utilitarian terms based on social attitudes and not on what is intrinsically just.
Nevertheless, by concentrating on the offending discretionary element in sentencing, the
Furman Court evidences a pro-retributionist point of view. Justice Burger recognized this in
his dissent where he criticized Furman as threatening to turn back the progress of penal
reform toward "the blind imposition of uniform sentences for every person convicted of a
particular offense." Id. at 403 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). At the very least this result runs
contrary to the rehabilitative ideal of indeterminate sentencing.
2245. The rehabilitative philosophy stresses sentencing to suit the offender, not the offense.
See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949) ("punishment should fit the offender
and not merely the crime"). While Rummel was given a life sentence, Texas' "relatively
liberal policy of granting 'good time' credits to its prisoners" would have allowed him to
become eligible for parole in twelve years. 445 U.S. at 280. As such, Rummel represents an
extreme example of the offender-oriented sentence: after twelve years, petitioner's liberty
would depend on his "rehabilitation." Such a result puts immense power in the hands of the
parole authorities. It was on such grounds that C.S. Lewis attacked the severing of moral
Desert from sentencing: "The first result of the Humanitarian [rehabilitation and deter-
rence] theory is, therefore, to substitute for a definite sentence . . . an indefinite sentence
terminable only by the word of... experts. . . . Lewis, supra note 2242, at 304. In an
earlier passage, Lewis remarked:
It will be vain for the rest of us, speaking simply as men, to say, "but this 'punish-
ment is hideously unjust, hideously disproportionate to the criminal's deserts."
The experts with perfect logic will reply, "but nobody was talking about deserts.
No one was talking aboutpunishment in your archaic vindicative sense of the word.
Here are the statistics proving that this treatment deters. Here are the statistics
proving that this other treatment cures. What is your trouble?"
Id. at 303 (emphasis in original).
Although not explicitly mentioned, the injustice of the result in Rummel may have been
a motivating factor behind the eventual order of the district court for either Rummel's re-
lease or a new trial. The ostensible basis of the order was Rummel's lack of effective counsel
at his earlier trial on the false pretenses charge. Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793, 795
(W.D. Tex. 1980). Instead of appealing the ruling, Texas prosecutors worked out a plea
bargain whereby Rummel would admit his guilt on the false pretenses charge in exchange
for dropping charges under the habitual offender statute. Rummel would receive a seven
year sentence on the false pretenses charge, which would result in his freedom as he had
already served more than seven years. L.A. Times, Nov. 16, 1980, § 1, at 1, col. 2. Signifi-
cantly, the headline of the report reads: "'Unjust' Life Sentence Comes to a Bizarre End."
2246. "Nothing in the Coker analysis suggests that principles of disproportionality are ap-
plicable only to capital cases." 445 U.S. at 292-93 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2247. The Court severely undercut its own analytical framework--that sentence length is a
legislative prerogative-when it admitted in a footnote: "This is not to say that a propor-
tionality principle would not come into play in the extreme example mentioned by the dis-
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sent.., if a legislature made overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment."
Id. at 274 n.11.
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